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

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THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

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GERMAN CULTURE OF THE PRESENT AGE[1]

Every natural culture owes its origin to various sources. Over and above the original character and the material and intellectual wealth of a people the influence of other civilisations with which it comes into contact in course of its history is an important factor. In the present day we have moreover to reckon with the influence of technical sciences which are independent of all national characteristics and have left far behind all human achievements of the previous ages.

A German always makes a distinction between culture and civilisation. To civilisation belong all the practical and technical institutions of life which serve to make the social life comfortable and the social order beautiful. Culture, on the other hand, is to a German, above all, the affair of the psyche. Culture grows out of the psychical and characteristic qualities of a people,—civilisation is its outer garb. Still it is not always easy to draw a line of demarcation between the phenomena of inner cultural life and those of outer civilisation. The two run into each other at several points, as we shall have occasion to experience in course of the following pages.

[1] Received through the kind co-operation of Dr. Frauz. Theirfelder of Die Deutsche Akademie, Munich, Bavaria,—*Editor-in-Chief.*

Before we enter upon an exposition of the German culture of the present day, when it is particularly meant for foreign readers, it will be necessary to give at the outset a short survey of the history of German culture.

Two mighty waves of foreign influence have had far reaching effect on the German people as they were originally characterised by intellectual tendencies and material wealth. Both were originally foreign and both were revealed to the German people at the same epoch. They are the antique Graeco-Roman culture and the Christian Church. The German culture of the Middle Ages was based on these two elements. During the long centuries of the Middle Ages, Latin was the language of culture and learning everywhere in Europe and every man was subject to the authority of the Church. Germany was no exception to this rule ; but there was always an element of discontent in the heart of the Germans, and above all an ever-growing urge to vindicate the rights of the individual against the traditional authorities. Among other nations, the individual is prone to think, to judge and to behave as others do. One can say, of course not without a certain amount of exaggeration, if one knows *one* Englishman, one knows Englishmen in general ; if one knows *one* Frenchman, one knows the whole French nation. The Englishman, the Frenchman and also the American represent the English, French and the American type respectively. He is, so to say, a collective personality. But the Germans are different. Consciously or unconsciously, a German would be something unto himself. Therein lie at once his strength and also his weakness.

The true German spirit stood revealed before the world at the end of the Middle Ages when the seed of Reformation sprouted on the German soil, that is, the spirited opposition to the authority of the Church over human life as well as over science and art. These three things may be brought under the one head of human culture. In the Middle Ages, not only in Germany but also in every other part of Europe, culture was dominated by

the Church. The Church assured the people that they would have to fear no consequences in the life beyond if they followed the commandments of the Church and thus it succeeded in gaining ascendancy over the people.

The original significance of the Reformation, which took its rise from Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century, was to show that the Church and the clergy are not necessarily the infallible exponents of the Christian religion entitled to dictate the true path to the laity ; it is rather a matter of personal faith. The Reformation was therefore at the beginning a religious movement (religion being also a highly important factor in culture—having pretty often even shaped and dominated national culture), but as it placed the individual over the Church, it exercised great influence also in other regions. Its influence was most potent in the field of intellectual activities. Both the intellectual and the natural sciences were hitherto controlled by the authority of the Church. It is well known how in the Middle Ages philosophical thought was shackled by the Church, and when the natural sciences began to grow, how the first achievements in this field were condemned by it. Later on, however, a certain degree of rapproachement was achieved in this region.

What are then the decisive elements at the beginning of the modern age which compose the essence of German culture? When such a question is raised it is to be understood at once that no mechanical juxtaposition of national characteristics, not to speak of a motley of facts, would ever suffice as an answer. A nation is a living entity ; so is its national culture. One cannot even imagine that the Christian religion and the Church have now no significance for German culture or will ever cease to exercise any influence on it. We can say rather categorically that German culture has branched off towards two different poles. On one side, represented by the Church, religious views reign supreme ; on the other, the side of personality and individual freedom ; and the individual strives to chalk out his own path of culture and civilisation.

The question about the constituent elements in German culture which we have raised has been answered in the following way by one of the noblest spirits of our age,—the philosopher Ernest Troeltsch (in his last days he was a professor in the Berlin University) who died a few years ago. First of all, there is the antique faith in the dignity, beauty and harmony of the free man who depends on nobody but himself and feels himself a limb of the harmonious corpus of the universe,—the taste for beautiful form and noble proportions and the faith in the right and justification of the life of enjoyment also in man. The second element is Christianity. As against the antique view of the world, Christianity has founded its basic principles not on the experiences of the everyday life of joys and sorrows but on inner perception and therefore it stands aloof from, or is even antagonistic to the interests, passions, beauty and enjoyment of human life. The third contributing factor is constituted by the boundless imagination of the Nordic and Germanic races, their spirit of unbridled adventure and the lyrical and poetic turn of their mind, the vital force and fulness of individual life which has always characterised these races, the untamed will and the stirrings of the individual soul, the romantic love of the motherland and at the same time a longing of the soul for all that lies beyond the bounds of the mortal world.

This combination of the elements described by Troeltsch has determined the course of German culture till up to the beginning of the present age and these elements are exercising their influence even at the present day. But new forces have gradually come into play. The Middle Ages have given birth not only to the conflict between the individual and the authority of the church but also to the internecine strife among the European nations. In the Middle Ages the modern national State was quite unknown. The princes and rulers of those days carved out for themselves these states and empires without any consideration of national boundaries. Gradually however the

nations separated and every ethnic group developed the national ambition and will for political unity and independence. Already at the end of the fifteenth century Spain became a composite national State. In the seventeenth century France and England (as through the union of England and Scotland arose the kingdom of Great Britain) followed suit and Russia in the eighteenth century. Only two nations did not succeed in establishing national states—the Italians and the Germans. But still the State of Prussia occupied a large portion of Germany and it became also the natural leader of the German States. Even to this day Germany is not a homogeneous national State, for there are millions of Germans who even live on the soil which is traditionally associated with the German people, such as in Austria, in Bohemia, in the western part of Poland, in south Tyrol, etc., but still do not belong to the German Reich. In this respect the German people have not yet reached that goal which has been arrived at by the other larger or smaller nations of Europe. Yet, however, German culture has been profoundly influenced by the ideals of the modern state.

The relation between the individual and the state in modern Europe is different from that of the Middle Ages or the ancient times. The State has penetrated deeper into the life of the individual, it demands more from him and requires him to mould his life according to this demand. But there is a difference in the rôle played by the State within the sphere of German culture and that of the English, French or the Americans. The Anglo-Saxons and the Latin races are inclined to consider the state more as an institution which assures individual security and freedom for his employment, vocation and the amenities of life, interferes in his personal life as little as possible, but has naturally a claim to some kind of requital for the advantages offered by it in the shape of obedience to law and order, payment of taxes, etc. The German ideal of the state is different. According to it, it is the duty of every

individual to serve the state and even to sacrifice himself for it.

Frederick the Great, the greatest Prussian king has said, "the king is only the first servant of the state!" The Prussian kings of the previous ages have cultivated and developed to the highest degree the ideal of the state that the state is entitled to demand absolute obedience and devotion, above all from the officials, and they have also trained the people according to it. The philosopher Hegel who was appointed in the University of Berlin in the first half of the nineteenth century and possessed great influence declared the state to be the highest achievement of the human spirit. Hegel taught that it is the first duty of man to establish a perfect state and then to devote himself to its service.'

This ideal of the state gave rise to another characteristic trait in the intellectual culture of Germany, *viz.*, the habit of strict discipline in the German people. The state organised a system of strict administration, the state organised the whole system of education from the University to the primary school and the state organised also the official hierarchy and the army. The state was a mighty and successful educational machine for the whole nation. The characteristic love of order, adherence to duty, conscientiousness and punctuality of the German people were perhaps partly present already in their original natural tendencies, but the forces of opposition are also present in the German character, and it is a great achievement of the German State, above all of Prussia, that they were successfully subjected to order and discipline.

But there were also other consequences which are less happy. It is a peculiarity of Germany that society is here divided into classes and that every class considers itself in some way greater than and superior to the classes which stand lower in the order. The nearer a German is to the top of the State as a government official, military officer or politician, the more he considers himself to be exalted. In North Germany which

was dominated by Prussia for centuries this notion has gained even firmer ground than in South Germany or in the Rhineland where for a long time only small states were known and where the people were not so thoroughly trained in the ideal of the state as in Prussia. The people in these parts therefore possessed in their character a more natural, democratic trait and retain it even to this day.

The development of German culture was for a long time further influenced by another fact; in comparison with her neighbours France and England, Germany was a poor country. In the seventeenth century the Thirty Years' War devastated almost every part of Germany. The country was divided into numerous small states and was thus unable to pursue a united and profitable policy of trade and commerce. Only the English, the Dutch and the French took part in the commerce of the world and gave their stamp to the economic system of the world and amassed enormous wealth thereby. Yet the comparative poverty of the German people could not hinder them from securing the highest intellectual achievements. The year 1772 saw the result of the work of the Professor of philosophy in the University of Königsberg—Immanuel Kant: the publication of "The Critique of Pure Reason." Since the days of Plato and Aristotle no philosophical work has exercised so much influence on the western world as this. Goethe died in the year 1832—one of the greatest poets of the Occident. There is not a single cultural language on earth into which his principal works have not been translated and through which they have not worked on the mind of the educated. A period of sixty years intervenes between the appearance of "The Critique of Pure Reason" and the death of Goethe. The famous Frenchman Taine has said, there is not a single region of human intellectual activity which was not greatly enriched during this half a century directly through German science, German philosophy and German poetry.

Taine has not at all exaggerated the true state of things in these words. In those days in foreign countries Germany was

called the land of poets and thinkers. But this nation of poets and thinkers was politically weak. The German states formed a loose confederacy in which the two most powerful members Prussia and Austria always contended for supremacy. Austria however consisted not only of German provinces but contained also such other races as Slavs, Hungarians and Italians. Austrian interests therefore did not coincide with those of the German people. On the other hand, Prussia lay wholly within Germany. It was therefore only natural that Germany and Austria would come to blows for the sake of leadership. Bismarck, the Prussian statesman, brought the conflict to an end by means of "blood and steel," but if Germany was ever to be a national state, there was no other way open for it. The trouble with the Austrian Empire was that only half of it was strictly German and the other half a foreign body. The German Empire too, as founded by Bismarck, was not a German national state in the full sense of the term. It was not the "united Germany" of which the German bards had sung for half a century ; it comprised only a part of the German people. The Austrian Germans had to remain outside its boundaries, for it was not possible—nor would it have been statesmanlike—to destroy the power or separate existence and individuality of Austria for ever. But the real enemy of German unity was France, for the French people feared that a united Germany would mean the end of their supreme position in Europe to which, they have always believed, they have the first claim.

The Franco-German War of 1870 brought into existence the German Empire. This political event had a profound influence on the cultural development of Germany. Two things were hitherto wanting in the German people which have been of the highest importance for the culture of the nations of the earth from the beginning of history to the present day —national strength and national wealth. For this reason the German political horizon was always limited to the narrow

circle of the native provinces and the immediately neighbouring countries. But through political unity and this great victory over France, Germany attained a much higher position in the world than ever before. Above all, Germany rapidly developed a spirit of adventure in the field of trade, industry and commerce, and investigations and researches in science, particularly in chemistry, physics, mechanics and electricity were undertaken on a large scale with extraordinary success and fruitful results till science was utilised with unparalleled success by German enterprise and industrial activities. The material wealth of the people increased at an unheard-of pace. Germany's foreign trade was doubled with every decade. France and America were quickly left behind and Germany rapidly approached the standard of England itself in the practical field of applied science. The Germans became at last an affluent people and a prosperous nation economically, just as politically they grew into the position of a great power.

If magnificent edifices are to be raised, valuable pictures to be painted and precious and beautiful figures to be shaped out of marble and bronze—money is always needed to give stimulus to architects and artists, not only in the body politic called the state but also in principal cities and in private citizens able to serve as patrons. Great scientific laboratories and experimental stations, new universities and technical colleges—all require money. Now the outer garb of German culture too began to show signs of affluence. The cities grew rapidly and public buildings began to be constructed in large proportions, and magnificently, out of adequate materials. The German industrialists and merchants as well as the highly paid technicians and artists built beautiful houses for themselves and filled them with the works of art. The ordinary citizen would no longer be satisfied with such simple lodgings and furniture as in previous times and tried to imitate the luxury of the affluent upper classes as far as possible. Even theatres, musical halls, and pleasure resorts had a good time of it. The works of

German poets, and literary men in general passed through many editions with the diffusion of culture resulting from financial prosperity and speed of education.

In this period of wholly material prosperity, the beauty, taste and harmony of the new German life was often yet wanting at first. The picture of German culture during the first decades after the establishment of the German Empire is too flagrant with gay colours, little tempered by good taste. But already at the juncture of the nineteenth and the twentieth century clear signs of improvement were visible. The demand became louder and more insistent "back from this multicoloured flagrancy to divine simplicity," which now became the artistic creed of the new era. Yes, "back to the harmony of stuff and form and away with imitations, away with the surrogates!" If any body soberly considers the German town-halls, railway stations and private houses, the arrangement and decoration of private rooms, works of art and the products of artistic vocations, which appeared in the decade just before the World-War, in reproductions or in their original form, it will at once appear that a great advance had been made in Germany in inner culture during this period. The danger which is always associated with quickly earned riches and suddenly attained position and which threatens the inner quality of human culture, was already passing away.

It was at this critical time that the World-War broke out. It is well-known how it ended. Germany has lost her wealth, her international position as a great power; she has lost millions of men in this devastating conflagration and has been cut up into pieces by the not very honorable Peace of Versailles thrust on an unwilling, though defeated, country. And above all, an enormous weight of reparations has been imposed upon her which is quite unheard of in the history of mankind. "What has been the effect of this war on Germany and how will it affect the further development of German culture?"

If we want to answer such questions, we must first of all make it clear to us as to what are the material and intellectual

assets of Germany which have survived the carnage. There is still the voluntary submission to national discipline. There is still the aptitude for organisation. There are still the will and determination for industry and labour and conscientiousness in this labour. There are still the diligence and deftness of the German intellect and the German hands. The reconstruction of an orderly state in Germany, reorganisation of German industries, of the German merchant marine and the recapturing of Germany's share in the world trade are great achievements of modern Germany which have astounded the nations of the world. A similar achievement on the part of a conquered and plundered people was never recorded in history before. It is in reality an achievement of the German spirit, the inner forces of German character, intellect and culture. Still, this culture is now threatened by a powerful and dangerous enemy—it is so called modern *civilisation*!

Here we come back to the problem of the differenee between culture and civilisation which has been referred to at the beginning of this article. The modern age is a machine age and life is now penetrated by machines. But machine is not culture; it is at best civilisation. There is sense and will in this civilisation of machines, but it has no soul. A man may possess the highest thing that machine can procure, he may fly in the air and freely move under the surface of the ocean, he may telephone and telegraph from his office room in Cologne or Berlin, New York or Chicago, he may hear the music in reception of the Zeppelin in Los Angelos, the New Year's bells of St. Paul's in London and the opening speeches in the Australian Parliament—but for all this flaunting splendour he stands yet far from being a man of culture. He enjoys all the amenities of civilisation at the most.

A clever Chinese said twenty years ago: "When Mr. Lloyd George speaks of culture he means thereby cheap soaps and wireless telegraphy; but when I speak of culture I mean thereby my capacity of being enthusiastic over the beauty and the fine

shades of the colours of flowers in a peony garden, varying from the lightest to the deepest tones of hue." Here in a nutshell is the whole differenee between civilisation and culture in the German sense of those words, brought out by means of a single example,—in a single sentence full of significance.

The enormity of mal-treatment and exploitation which Germany has experienced and is still experiencing as the result of her defeat in the World War, has compelled the German people to set its heart at perfecting the machine, for it is now through the help of machine alone that it can live, struggle with competing nations of Europe and America, survive in such a struggle, and raise itself again. Germany is being transformed into a vast chemical, physical and electrical laboratory, into a factory equipped with enormous scientific resources, into a dock-yard or a workshop for commercial prosperity as well as propaganda—and all this only to be *able to live*, to supply nourishment to the German people, thrust back from all sides into a cramped and narrow sphere of activity, all this only to make her sell her produces and pay for the raw materials imported by her and to meet the reparations.

A pound of raw iron costs only a few pennies. But if it is transformed into steel and the steel into spiral wires for the smallest and the finest pocket-watches, then the value of the piece of iron becomes a thousand shillings. If there are enough buyers for these watch-wires and other articles which are manufactured in the same process—the process of raising the value of raw material by means of German intellect and industry—out of copper and caoutchouc, wool and cotton, wood and leather, etc., then all is well. Then the German people may get enough to eat and fulfil her obligations. Thus it is compelled by sheer necessity to devote all its intellectual capacity to these external things, and that is a real menace to German culture.

To-day there is no other country in the world which may compare with Germany as an excellent workshop for apprentices in the field of scientific, industrial and technical activity. There

is no other country to-day where the system, method and discipline for industry can be better learnt. But there is the saying that man does not live by bread alone. In the same strain we may say to-day that man cannot afford to live *on machines alone*; nay, he does not live on *civilisation* alone, he requires inner culture to make his life worth living.

Culture is an attribute of the soul. If a man or a people is unable to plunge into its own self and even for a time forget *the outer* mechanism of life in order to turn to its inner depths—to the beautiful, the exalted and the mystical, to art and poetry, the higher realm of philosophy and poesy,—then, with the progress of time it will never escape the fate which is sure to overtake it. Perhaps the will shall be still there throbbing and vital, but its soul will be dried up.

This is the danger which is threatening German culture to-day and it arises out of the fact that Germany has now been compelled to consider the machine as the only means of rescue and the ladder by means of which she can again rise to her pristine glory. This danger can only be averted if Germany can be freed from the enormous pressure of the burdens which have been imposed upon her through the injustice, violence and hypocritical moralistic exaltation of the victors. A nation is in a position to save its culture only when it is above the pressure of this type of soul-killing mechanical compulsion and brutal oppression.

DR. PAUL ROHRBACH

FEDERALISM

The next question that invites our attention is the distribution of powers which "is an essential feature of federalism." [1] In a federation, two authorities, we have seen, exist side by side. Each of these two is expected to be supreme in its own sphere. Their orbits should as far as possible, never cross. The functions which the two authorities are to discharge should therefore be rigidly divided and separated. The regions of the two should be clearly apart. It is on this account that the two governments should not be given authority over the same function. That will create an atmosphere of vague uncertainty, and introduce an element of complexity and a chance of conflict between the authorities. Hence their jurisdiction should be exclusive and not concurrent. Of course, this is an ideal arrangement which no existing federal union has been able to reach. But this is an ideal all the same which should be before the makers of all federal constitutions. Now once it is decided that the two fields of authority should be clearly separate, the question would arise as to how the line of demarcation between them is to be drawn. There cannot of course be any hard and fast rule about it. "The exact position of the line is not of the essence of federalism." [2] It may vary according to circumstances. In the United States of America, the forces of state particularism were immensely strong and powerful. The people were very tenacious as to their local patriotism. Their suspicion of a strong distant government over them was quite pronounced. Hence the powers conferred upon the central government were cribbed, cabined and confined. Only those functions were made over to the federal organ, without the jurisdiction over which no government commensurate to the exigencies of the

[1] Dicey, Law of the Constitution, p. 147.

[2] W. H. P. Clement, Law of the Canadian Constitution, p. 371.

Union could be established.[1] "The government of the states still remained the rule and that of the confederation became the exception."[2] The federal government was thus given authority only over a few well-defined and enumerated functions while the states became the legatee of the general residuary powers. The tenth amendment of the constitution clearly explains the position of the two governments. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution," says the amendment, "nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." Hence the—central government has no jurisdiction over a function which has not been expressly delegated to it by the constitution. The states on the contrary may take up any duty which has not been given to the federal government or which has not been definitely withdrawn from them. "In other words, the competence of the federal government is *positively* determined by the constitution, while that of the local government is *negatively* determined."[3] Section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution contains all the subject-matter of federal legislation. The Congress cannot take any duty which is not explicitly or implicitly mentioned in this schedule. The list embodies only some eighteen subjects with which the central legislature is concerned. Even such an important subject as criminal law, the uniformity of which, throughout the federation, seems to be essential on all grounds, is left out of it. Of course the central government to-day is not "only one department of foreign affairs," as it was characterised to be by Jefferson. Powers and functions of government have increased rapidly everywhere. And the countries with distinct laissez-faire tendencies have also been compelled to abandon their distrust of governmental agency. The government at Washington could possibly be no exception to this rule. In the course of the last half a century or more the powers of the

[1] The Federalist, No. 44.

[2] Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Tr. Henry Reeve), Vol. I, p. 120.

[3] J. W. Garner, Political Science and Government.

central government have in fact grown apace. But this development has not any way disturbed the balance between the central and the state authorities. If the federal government has grown in scope of its jurisdiction and power it has grown not to the curtailment of the authority of the states, but only by way of supplementing it.[1] Really speaking in these days of collectivism, if the powers of the federal government have increased to some extent, the powers of the states have increased no less. Again not only are the powers of the central government limited and defined, but in some cases they are not even exclusive as well. Over certain items of legislation, the states and the federal government have been given concurrent jurisdiction. Over the subjects like bankruptcy, pilot laws and harbour regulations, the two authorities alike have been invested with jurisdiction. But the states can exercise their power over such items only in the absence of federal legislation. Similarly both the states and the central legislatures are competent to determine matters relating to the election of representatives and senators. But the state legislation in this field is valid only in the absence of a federal law. If the Congress make any arrangement, the state law gives way.[2]

The problem of the division of powers between the central and the provincial governments exercised the mind of the Candian federalists as well. Both the external and the internal circumstances in Canada were of course favourable to the organisation of a far stronger and more powerful central government. By the time the publicists of this country were sitting in a conference at Quebec to form a durable union among all the North American provinces of Britain, the weaknesses of the American system had been brought out into clear relief. The American Union itself had been threatened and it had almost collapsed in the Civil War. And all this mishap, according to the Canadians, was due to the principle upon which the division of powers between the federal and the state governments had been based in the

1 Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, p. 51.

2 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, p. 316.

United States. It was simply because the residuary powers were vested in the states that they could put forward such pretensions of sovereignty. The Canadian statesmen must hence profit by the experience of their great neighbour. They any way could not take lightly the warning which the American situation was proclaiming so loudly. They must reverse the arrangement, and make the central government the legatee of general powers. Nor was this strengthening of the central government opposed to the internal circumstances of the colonies. It was a fact no doubt that a legislative union as proposed by Sir John Macdonald, the great statesman of Upper Canada, was not acceptable either to Lower Canada or to the Maritime Provinces.[1] But it was none the less a fact that once the principle of local autonomy in functions that vitally and exclusively affected the local interests was recognised, neither Lower Canada nor the Maritime provinces would oppose the concentration of the rest of the public functions in the hands of the central administration. The leaders of the Quebec Conference gauged this situation correctly. They agreed to maintain the corporate and autonomous character of the different provinces. But they proposed to delegate to them only those limited powers which were of exclusively local concern. The rest of the functions was to be vested in the federal government. This was the happy "medium" hit upon by the architects of the Canadian federation. This would conciliate the provincial pretensions and this would at the same time give the people the strength

[1] "I have again and again stated in the House that, if practicable, I thought a Legislative Union would be preferable. I have always contended that if we could agree to have one government and one parliament, legislating for the whole of these peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest system of government we could adopt. But—in the first place, it would not meet the assent of the people of Lower Canada ;—it was found that any proposition which involved the absorption of the individuality of Lower Canada—would not be received with favour by her people. We found too—there was a great disinclination on the part of the Maritime Provinces to lose their individuality as separate political orgnisation."—John A. Macdonald in the Debates in the Canadian Parliament on the Confederation.

of a legislative union. This would make the federation stable and provide against the weaknesses to which the American constitution had proved to be open. Section 91 of the British North America Act of 1867 which was based upon the Quebec Resolutions, empowers the federal government to make laws "in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces." In other words this section makes the central government the legatee of residuary rights and duties. Of course, it also enumerates a list of public functions which must be exclusively exercised by the federal government. But this enumeration of exclusive duties does not mean that this government is invested with jurisdiction over them alone. It is only "for greater certainty" that these subjects of central legislation are so clearly mentioned. Otherwise the insertion of this list of powers does not restrict and limit the generality of central authority. The next section of the Act makes the position of the federal government further simple. Section 92 enumerates a number of subjects upon which a Provincial legislature "may exclusively make laws." Beyond these clearly defined functions the provincial government has no jurisdiction over any other subject. The central government in Canada is thus a government of general powers, while the provincial governments exercise only some delegated functions.[1] Of course with this general statement everything is not said with regard to the division of functions between the two governments. Inspite of all the attempts of the framers of the

[1] No. 16 of Section 92, of course militates against any restriction of provincial jurisdiction. It gives the provincial government authority over "generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the Province. In other words the province has not only exclusive jurisdiction over the fifteen subjects mentioned in Sec. 92 but has authority over all other subjects of purely local character and concern. It is with an eye to this provision that Justice Clement emphatically declares that "it would appear to be a misnomer to say of either jurisdiction that it carries with it the residuum. There is in fact a residuary or supplementary clause in each of the two Sections 91 and 92 ;..." See the Law of the Canadian Constitution, p. 452.

constitution to draw a clear line of demarcation between the two jurisdictions, they now and again cross each other. Besides the exclusive powers specially enumerated in Section 91, the central government, we have seen, may take up any other duty, not made over to the provincial authority by the next section of the Act. But when the central government undertakes any such legislation, its authority in this field is not exclusive. Simply the fact that the central legislature may initiate a law on such a subject, cannot prohibit the provincial legislature from making a local law of similar character.[1] Again the subjects enumerated in Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act overlap and interlace in some cases. No. 14 of the subjects cited in Section 92 gives a province the exclusive authority over the administration of justice in the locality including the constitution, maintenance, and organisation of civil and criminal courts. But No. 21 of the powers enumerated in the previous section invests the central government with exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy and insolvency. This necessarily involves the organisation of an insolvency court and the administration of justice connected with insolvency on the part of the federal government. Thus the two exclusive powers to some extent overlap. In such cases of overlapping "neither legislation will be *ultra vires* if the field is clear."[2] With regard to the above subject of the administration of justice it is easy to draw a clear line of demarcation between bankruptcy and other branches of justice. Hence any measure of the central government for the organisation of a bankruptcy court is as valid as any provincial legislation for the constitution and maintenance of any other court of justice. But if the subjects of legislation cannot be so differentiated and the central and the provincial governments both make laws on the same topic, "the provincial legislation must yield to that of the Dominion Parliament."[3] Any way we find

[1] *E.g.*, temperance legislation. See A. H. Lefroy, Canada's Federal System, p. 109.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 119.
[3] *Ibid*, p. 123.

that concurrent jurisdiction could not be avoided in Canada inspite of all the attempts of the founders-statesmen. Only in two subjects, agriculture and immigration, they provided for concurrent legislation, so that both the central and the provincial governments are now competent to make laws upon them.[1] In actual practice, however, the concurrent jurisdiction of the two legislatures is not confined to these subjects of imigration and agriculture alone. The meeting-ground has extended farther and wider. Complete separation of the two fields of authority is the ideal basis of federalism indeed, but neither in the U. S. A. nor in Canada the ideal is attained. Nor is it any way a characteristic of the Australian system.

Sir Henry Parkes, who may be called the Father of the Australian Federation, was in favour of a closer union of the colonies. He preferred the Canadian system to the American model. He wanted to make the central government the repository of general powers and the states governments the legatee of delegated functions only.[2] His views, however, were overruled. The forces of state particularism were too strong for such a plan of unification being assented to. Mr. Inglis Clark, the Attorney-General for Tasmania, expressed the opinion of most of the delegates, when he observed, in the Melbourne Conference, "I regard the Dominion of Canada as an instance of amalgamation rather than of federation; and I am convinced that the different Australian Colonies do not want absolute amalgamation."[3] Accordingly it was settled that, as in the United States the residuary duties should remain vested in the government of the states and the central government should exercise only some clearly defined and enumerated functions.[4] Chapter I, Part V,

1 Sec. 95.

2 See the Parliamentary Paper C. 6025, p. 105.

3 *Ibid*, p. 60.

4 *Cf.* "The Government of the Commonwealth, as distinct from the states is one of enumerated powers,.....The federal Parliament is supreme in dealing with matters which are either expressly or by necessary implication given to it."—Sir John Quick, The Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth and the States of Australia (1919), p. 13.

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of the constitution definitely makes over thirty-nine subjects to the jurisdiction of the central government. Beyond this schedule of duties, this government cannot exercise its authority over any other subject. In order to be doubly sure of this restriction of federal power, the constitution-makers further provided in sub-section 107 of Chapter V that the states parliaments were entitled to exercise all powers and functions not definitely given to the central government nor withdrawn from the state authorities. Thus as in the United States, "the Commonwealth government is a government of limited and enumerated powers; and the parliaments of the states retain the residuary powers of government over their territory."[1] Of course though enumerated and clearly defined in character, the number of functions discharged by the central government in Australia is much greater than the number of central powers in the U. S. A. In America the government at Washington is endowed with authority by the constitution only over eighteen functions while in Australia the number reaches the figure of thirty-nine. Thus with regard to the scope of central authority and jurisdiction, we may say that the Australian Commonwealth occupies a position midway between the American federation and the Canadian Dominion. In the U. S. A., the central government is an exception and in Canada it may be said to be the rule, while in Australia it is neither the one nor the other. No doubt it must be borne in mind that "the legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament are not in general—exclusive powers."[2] Of the thirty-nine functions vested in it, twenty-three are subjects upon which both the central and the states parliaments may legislate. The [redacted] authorities have, in other words, concurrent jurisdiction [redacted]e duties of administration. This, however, does not [redacted] the supreme authority of the central government in [redacted] For in case the federal and states laws come into [redacted]e latter goes to the wall.

[redacted]

[1] Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, p. 69.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 70.

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In Switzerland, "the distribution of powers between the national and the cantonal governments is generally similar to that of the American and the Australian federations." [1] The constitution definitely points out that the cantons exercise all the rights which are not delegated to the federal government.[2] The residuary powers are thus vested in the Cantonal authorities while the central government enjoys only the enumerated powers. This authority of the federal government, though defined and circumscribed, is, however, wider in scope and jurisdiction than the central authority in America. "Legislation upon the construction and operation of railroads is in the province of the confederation."[3] With regard to the customs, the power of the Swiss central government is not limited only to the import duties. It may levy export duties as well.[4] The right of marriage is placed also under the protection of the federal authority,[5] which has power to deal with matters of commercial, civil,[6] and criminal law as well. Again it is a point of major importance that "the Swiss federation may deal legislatively with commerce as such; that is it is not confined to the regulation of inter-state commerce alone,— an illogical limitation which in the United States has led to such interminable economic and judicial controversy." [7] Thus the central government in Switzerland is not at all a weak attenuated body. Though restricted to certain definite functions, its jurisdiction is wide and its authority not quite mean. Of course all the powers vested in the central government are not exclusive in character. Some of them may be dealt with by either of the governments. In cases of such concurrent jurisdiction, the statutes of the federal legislature "prevail against those of a Canton." [8] In this respect

1 Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. I, p. 383.
2 Article 3.
3 Art. 26.
4 Art. 28.
5 Art. 54.
5 Art. 64.
7 Robert C. Brooks, Government and Politics of Switzerland,
8 Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. I, p. 384.

Swiss system is the
and Canada.

From the above exami
tion of powers between the ce
in different countries it is clear,
federation cannot be merely a depart
Jefferson wanted it to be. It must h
control over the management of this dep
sible solely on that account for the declaration an
war and the conclusion of peace. It must have also undivided
authority over the customs and tariffs. Without the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government over this vital subject, the federal union would be nothing but a misnomer and a sham. If the different territorial communities composing a federation had a common policy in all other fields of public activity and followed divergent paths only in matters of tariffs and customs, the union would still be reduced to a nullity. Nothing creates strifes and disagreements more than separate tariffs.[1] Besides it is one of the major heads of revenue of the central government. And if it is to be left to the hands of the provincial governments, the central administration will be immediately reduced to bankruptcy.

The federal legislature again must have not only exclusive jurisdiction over inter-state commerce, but it should have authority over commerce generally. In these days the distinction between local and inter-state commerce is hard to maintain. In the U.S.A., we have seen, it has given rise to some anomalies and undesirable results. The best course would be to give the central and the state governments a concurrent jurisdiction over the subject, so that the state government may legislate only in the absence of a central law. With regard to criminal law, the practices to-day differ from country to country. In Switzerland

[1] Mr. Deakin observed in the Melbourne conference, "a common tariff is the *sine qua non* of national life. There can be no true union which does not include a customs union."

...tral authority, while ...hat criminal law changes ...What is a crime in New ...ornia. What may be a capital ...venial offence punishable only ...Australia, the question as to the loca... ...as remained an open one. "There is not ...stralian constitution as there is in the ...America Act, Section 91, any express power to legislate with respect to criminal law. Yet the federal Parliament has passed laws imposing punishments and, in one case, the death penalty."[1] It is time to be definite in this respect and give up the particularism which the U.S.A. has followed at much cost, and to accept the centralisation which has given greater security of life and property in Canada and Switzerland. Criminal law should be vested in the central government.

Next we have to discuss the question of the actual relations between the two governments. In theory they are indeed expected to be completely separate and as such not interested in each other; in practice however, an intimate contact necessarily comes about between the two. Not only the two authorities meet and touch each other at various points but the provincial government is very often controlled by the central. In Australia and Switzerland, no supervision of the federal government over provincial laws is provided for in the constitution. The cantonal laws of Switzerland and the states laws of Australia do not require the assent of the central governments to be valid. In the U.S.A. also the central government has been given no authority to veto the legislative measures of the state governments. In the federal Convention of 1787, of course, there was a distinct group of influential statesmen, who advocated some such provision. A resolution was in fact moved to the effect that the national government should have veto power over all laws of the

[1] Sir John Quick, The Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth and the States of Australia, p. 92.

states legislatures which were not deemed proper and safe. The powerful support of Madison was enlisted in behalf of this resolution. He observed that without this negative upon state laws, it would be impossible to check the tide of local encroachment upon federal authority.[1] The arguments of Alexander Hamilton also were in the same direction. He rather wanted to go a step farther. In his sketch of the constitution, he provided not only for a national veto over state laws but for making this negative more stringent and efficient. He wanted the chief executive of every state to be appointed by the central government and to be endowed with the right of turning down state laws.[2] This safeguard against state encroachment upon central jurisdiction was not accepted by the convention. No such interference with state autonomy could be carried through that body. Hence, as remarked above, the state governments remained the final authority with regard to the passing of their laws. Now the Canadians in 1865 interpreted this absolute autonomy of the American states in legislation as one of the real causes of the civil war and the apparent dissolution of the federal union. If such a contingency was to be avoided at all in their country, the Canadians argued, the central government must have authority to negative provincial laws. Without this national supervision over the law-making authority of the provinces, the Canadian federation might be disrupted in the same way as the American was thought to be. Accordingly it was provided in the British North America Act of 1867 that an authentic copy of every provincial Act must be sent to the Governor-General. And if in the course of one year, the Governor-General in Council thought it right to disallow the Act, it would be annulled automatically. During the first decades of the Dominion, the central government made full and unflinching use of this veto power. It even justified the fear of Mr. Dorion who had opposed this veto power of the central government in the Canadian Parliament in 1865. He

1 Hunt and Scott, Debates in the Federal Convention, p. 75.

2 *Ibid*, p. 119.

was sure that the central government would use this power not simply on legitimate grounds but also for party purposes. He pointed out the danger that in case the central and provincial governments were of different party badges, a law passed by the local authority might be vetoed by the central government only by way of grinding a party axe.[1] This apprehension of Mr. Dorion proved, to some extent at least, true. "There were many cases of disallowance," observes Mr. Justice Riddel,[2] "where the Dominion and the provincial governments were of different politics, some which can hardly justify themselves at the bar of history." The Dominion government for some time after the federation, looked upon the provincial parliaments as no greater in status than the municipal councils.[3] The treatment meted out to them was also similar. No measure passed by the Provincial legislature was safe at the hands of the central executive. This sort of domineering attitude on the part of the central government, could not, however, continue long. And for the last few decades "the practice has been settled for the Dominion not to interfere except where the legislation is plainly *ultra vires* the Provincial Parliament." [1] But this function can be better and more efficiently discharged by the judicial courts. In fact, the courts in Canada actually act as the guardian of the constitution. And if the Provincial Parliament oversteps its boundary, the court, in a case duly brought before it, rectifies the position. The veto of the central government, limited as it is now only to the *ultra vires* cases, is superfluous. It is also quite inconsistent with the fundamental principle of federalism. Both the central and the provincial governments being the agents of the people, charged with duly differentiated duties, it is not up to the Dominion authority to interfere with local initiative. In case the provincial legislature actually does anything

[1] Kennedy, Documents of the Canadian Constitution, p. 655.

[2] The Constitution of Canada (1917), p. 98.

[3] "'A Big Country Council' was the favourite way of expressing the thought."—*Ibid*, p. 98.

indiscreet, its mentor should be the people organised in the electorates and not the federal government. The veto power of the Canadian central government over provincial legislation is an anomaly and should not be an example.

Another very insidious and dangerous form of central control over state action has been initiated and developed in the United States of America. This is the control exercised through what is known as the grant-in-aid. In Canada, the central government has to distribute a part of its income among the provinces. But this is a duty imposed upon this government by the financial system of the Dominion. No condition attaches to this contribution from the central funds. The provincial governments undertake no obligation by accepting this money.[2] In the United States, however, the subvention is based upon a different principle altogether. It is almost of the same character and involves the same conditions as the local grant-in-aid system in the United Kingdom. Up to the close of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the English local bodies were truly self-governing and autonomous. But since the year 1833, the Government at Whitehall have come out to help them with central funds. This help has of course been of incalculable material benefit to local life and conditions. It has added considerably to the activity and efficiency of the local institutions. But it has at the same time placed them under the thumb of the Whitehall agents. The central government grants the money only on its own conditions and in fulfilling these conditions the local bodies have to carry out the injunctions of the central government. Quite similar has been the state of things in the U.S.A. The residue of functions has been vested by the constitution in the states. Hence the government of the states is saddled in this country with heavy duties. Nor can these duties be discharged in a half-hearted, shilly-shally fashion. There is constant demand in

1 *Ibid*, p. 98.

2 A. B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (2nd Ed.), Vol. I.

the country for better schools, better roads, better protection. A higher standard of public service is the cry of the people. But they are not prepared to supply the sinews commensurate with this demand for greater efficiency. As a result, "the problem of getting more money without raising tax rates has become acute." [1] Now when the state legislatures were thus in a fix as to their wherewithal, the federal treasury came to their rescue. The central government offered to assist the states with financial aids, but this on its own terms. "To these terms the states have agreed and so the federal government has found in its hands a weapon with which it can establish national policies and national standards in fields of activity over which the constitution has denied it any measure of control." [2] In promoting education, in developing agriculture, in fighting filthy diseases, in opening and maintaining roads, the government of the states now draws upon central funds. But these subventions are accompanied with detailed conditions upon the fulfilment of which the continuance of the grant depends. In their eagerness for perpetuating this help, the state authorities, of course, do everything as directed by the central departments. The central government has authority over inter-state commerce. It, therefore, can and does regulate the travel of venereally affected persons across state frontiers. Over intra-state commerce, however, it has no jurisdiction and hence it cannot, of itself, control the travel of such persons within the borders of a particular state, though such regulation is indispensable. What was the central government now to do? If it asked the state governments to make such regulations, the latter might take it as an unwarranted interference in state jurisdiction. But the state governments required money from the central treasury for combating this disease. This placed all at once the trump card in the hands of the federal government which made the passing of these

[1] A. F. Macdonald, Federal Subsidies to the States (1923), p. 2.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 3.

regulations a condition of the grant. " In this manner the federal government exercises a practical control over intra-state commerce, a matter reserved to the state under the constitution." [1] In England the local bodies have to conform to the standards and regulations prescribed by Whitehall in appointing their police, public health and other officers. The grant-in-aid depends upon this conformity. Likewise, the federal government in the U.S.A. prescribes rules according to which the appointment of officers has to be made to the departments that enjoy federal subsidy. Nonconformity to such rules would amount to the discontinuance of the grant—a contingency not to be faced by the state authorities.[2] This way the central government has created an opportunity for poking its nose into spheres of action not allotted to it. In fact " the effect of this subvention system is to render less distinct the respective spheres of the federal and state governments." [3] If the principle of one who pays the piper must call for the tune is extended at the present rate, the line of demarcation between the two jurisdictions will fade away completely and the balance of power between the two governments will break down altogether.

The central government in the U.S.A. has also opportunities of interfering with state affairs in a more straightforward manner. Section 4 of Article IV of the constitution enjoins the federal government to guarantee the republican form of government to the states. It also empowers the same government to interfere in state affairs for protecting the people against domestic violence. This authority is of course limited in the fact that the central government can intervene only on an application for help from the local government. In practice, however, circumstances so turn out to be now and again, that the central

[1] *Ibid*, p. 3.

[2] In Georgia agricultural experiment station, a director was appointed who had not the necessary qualifications. The central department forthwith suspended the grant on the ground of noncompliance with law. At last the director resigned and the grant was revived.—*Ibid*, p. 23.

[3] Holcombe, State Government in the United States (1926), p. 10.

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government actually does intervene without the invitation of the state government. Troubles, though confined within the boundaries of a single state, may not be merely the concern of the government of that particular state. They may affect inter-state commerce and similar other subjects that are within the ambit of federal authority. Accordingly if the federal government comes forth to deal with these local troubles without local invitation and even in the teeth of local opposition, its action would not be illegal. During the Pullman strike in Chicago in 1894, President Cleveland looked upon the situation as sufficiently threatening inter-state commerce and immediately sent out troops to deal with it with a strong hand. Not only he did not wait for the application of help from the state government, but he actually followed his course in the face of the protest of the Governor of Illinois against his gratuitous interference.[1]

These powers of intervention at once bear witness to the fact that division of authority between the two governments in a federal union cannot be absolutely rigid and hidebound. Both of them are after all the agents of the same people. And when their interests are at stake, the line of demarcation may not be religiously observed. Nor is the rule followed in all federal unions that the laws of the two governments should be executed only by their own agents. In the U.S.A., of course, the principle is logically followed that the one government should not be dependent upon the other for the execution and administration of its policy. During the days of the Confederation, the central government had to depend solely upon the state authorities for the carrying out of its measures. And the latter governments very seldom discharged this duty faithfully. As a result the Confederation government found itself absolutely impotent and its measures were quite innocuous. When therefore the American statesmen sat together in the federal convention, they were

[1] S. E. Morison, The Oxford History of the United States, Vol. I, pp. 400-402.

bent upon rectifying this state of things. They were determined to make the central government independent of local help and co-operation as far as possible. And to-day we have two sets of independent authorities working side by side in the U.S.A. As the state laws are promulgated by the state legislature, executed by the state executive agents and interpreted by a chain of state judicial courts, so also the federal laws are made by the congress administered by the federal executive agents and interpreted by a complete line of federal courts. It is only with regard to the election of the senators and representatives to the congress, the choosing of the presidential electors and the maintenance of the militia, that the federal government is in any way dependent upon the states. " Otherwise the national government has but little to do with the states as states." [1]

In Australia also, " the commonwealth government and the states governments are in their relations independent and not hierarchical." [2] Generally the laws of the central government are not left to the state authorities for execution. They are administered by the central agents. Of course Section 5 of the Constitution Act makes it obligatory to the state governments to administer properly any central law left to them for execution. But it was discovered recently by the central government that the state authorities had on three occasions defied their constitutional obligation and failed to carry out the federal laws left to their care. Accordingly "in 1925, the federal parliament was compelled to legislate to provide for the appointment of peace officers to execute laws." [3] So far therefore, as the administration of its measures is concerned, the commonwealth government is now practically independent of the state authorities. In the judicial field, however, the two governments are not so independent of each other. As the judicial system is now organised, a close co-operation between them is essential for the proper

[1] Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, p. 319.

[2] Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[3] Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol. I, pp. 649-60.

administration of justice. The High Court of the commonwealth does not stand as the head of a chain of federal judiciary. It stands alone as a federal court. This court of course does not and cannot discharge all the federal judicial business. It is upon the state courts, invested with federal jurisdiction, that the commonwealth government is dependent for the application of its laws to the ordinary cases in the first instance. Nor is the central government alone dependent in the matter of its judicial administration. The state governments also have to depend upon the federal High Court for the hearing of many of their appeal cases. Thus in this field of the administration of justice, the principle of federalism has not been wholly worked out in Australia, a similar situation is noticeable in Canada as well. As provided for in the British North America Act, the Dominion Government has set up a central supreme Court. It is, however, only a court of appeal. Cases in the first instance are heard and dealt with in the provincial court upon which "the federation has undoubted power to confer authority in federal matters." [1] Hence both in Canada and in Australia the two governments are interdependent with regard to the discharge of their judicial duties.

NARESH CHANDRA ROY

(Concluded)

[1] *Ibid*, Vol. I, p. 545.

MODERNISM IN SPIRITUAL CULTURE.[1]

I have chosen for my paper a title of rather ambitious import. This is done with a purpose; for where the sense is lacking the only effective way to an assured hearing must be by raising high sounds. The expression 'Spiritual Culture' is in itself high-sounding enough, and when to this we add 'Modernism' the effect is simply bewildering. There are different lines of approach to the subject-matter of our enquiry, and it would be nothing short of a medley of confusion if we have to introduce them, each in detail, within the body of this paper.

To take the case of 'spiritual culture' first. There are at least three different ideas bound up with this expression. It might signify a special type of culture that has for its objective the functioning and fulfilment of the spiritual concerns of mankind as distinct from, and perhaps opposed to, that usual form of culture which is occupied with the enriching and enhancement of the temporal goods of life. Spiritual culture, in this sense, stands antagonistic to secular culture. But on this point one may raise pertinent doubts as to whether culture should have any internal division within itself. Does not all culture belong fundamentally to one and the same type? Culture as ordinarily understood has a touch of secularity and refers to that aspect of life that admits of improvement by skilled nurturing and practice. In its innermost core lies the idea of personal effort and acquisition. Spirituality, however, cannot be claimed as an outcome of personal effort. It is a divine gift that comes to man from afar, won through God's grace, as it were, and not acquired by human endeavour. In the light of this it would be wrong to characterise spiritual life as a mode of culture. The expression 'Spiritual Culture' would be then open to question, being a problem mooted for

[1] Read before the Rajshahi College Association.

discussion, not an accepted idea wherewith to start. These are the two different points of view engaging our attention, and presently they suggest a third, wherein spirituality gets incorporated in culture. To this end traditional spirituality with its other-worldly outlook is pushed aside on one side, and culture with its pre-eminently secularistic implication is made more elastic on the other, so as to harmonise with the demands of spirituality. So spiritual culture may mean a sort of hybrid combination, growing out of twofold impulses of life, *viz.*, to stand by and make the most of present-day realities of life and at the same time to seek satisfaction of the yearning for the 'invisible beyond,' not through faith which is abominable, but on the basis of positive evidence furnished by science.

So much about spiritual culture. Coming next to modernism I experience similar, if not greater, embarrassments. Modernism stands for a variety of temperaments. To some it signifies merely a negative attitude of life that, unable to reconcile itself to the doctrines of credal religions, grows indifferent to the religious call altogether. Not that these people are necessarily sunk deep in the grosser concerns of life, in satisfying the cravings of the flesh, but the influence of an exclusive training in science has made such a havoc upon the simple life of unquestioning faith that it has become impossible for this people to go through the customary forms of worship and prayer growing out of that faith. In the case of others again modernism indicates quite a positive frame of mind. It means the reawakening of a new type of religiosity in the shape of humane service and love so as to elevate and uplift mankind, even though he be a child of the dust, knowing nothing of the Heavenly Father above and beyond, nor owing any allegiance to him. Humanism is the name given to this new form of religion. To people however not accustomed to play the rôle of a philanthropist, the busy life of moving and speaking as inculcated by Humanism, modernism provides a different form of religious consolation in the self-centred life of personal

1931] ethicalism, illustrated in the scholar's devotion to truth and the artist's sentiment of beauty. But in more recent years modernism has come another phase of transformation. Even human-itarian ethicalism is found to be a poor substitute for the loss of that faith in the deity that formed the central animating principle of traditional religion. If the first onrush of scientific wave tended to undermine that faith we must call upon science to furnish new lines of scientific evidence, on the basis of which a semblance of that faith may be reconstructed. Such lines of evidence are already pouring in and the outcome has been the birth of a new science, justifying faith in the ' Beyond ' on the strength of what can be felt and perceived in the immediate present. This is the new complexion that modernism assumes. Slowly and gradually it crystallises into a definite creed to which one is found to give his assent, not in the name of scriptural authority, but in the name of well authenticated evidence of science.

There are two elements in this new creed of modernism; one centres upon the idea that our presnt-day world inspite of its apparent measurability in time and space, is not the measure of existence. Existence embraces an interminable system without the limiting conditions of fixed time and space; so that every bit of 'here' and 'now' is necessarily enveloped in, and conditioned by the limitless extent of the 'hereafter.' The second point grows out of the first and relates to the never-ending cycle of changes through which life perpetuates itself. If existence is interminable, life itself must be so. To live in one plane means but the prelude to a life in a different plane. What we call death is simply the event of transition from one plane to another. The keynote to this newly growing faith is being furnished by the modern science of spiritualism which testifies to the phenomenon of survival after death.

I have outlined above some aspects of modernism; and that is enough to show the tangle of confusion to which we must be

driven if we have to discuss them in detail. I intend to simplify the issue by regarding modern the present as the expression of certain tendencies of the age to evolve type of spiritualistic temper in consonance with the dem... of science.

The first impact of science has been decidedly in the direction of shifting the centre of man's interest from the invisible to the visible. It has broken down many of the happy dreams associated with the old orthodox religious temper. It no longer satisfies the votaries of modern science to be told that man has suddenly sprung up on the face of the globe in the image of God through his creative *fiat*. New information about nature, man, his origin and proclivities became available that dealt a death-blow to the old cosmology and anthropology based on the authority of the Scripture. With every stroke of science age-long faiths in the supernatural began to crumble away with the result that men hastened to turn away from the quest of 'the mysterious unseen' and devote themselves more and more to the affairs of the present-day existence.

So from the very beginning science has been moving in the direction of naturalism and positivism which to the people of older generations, brought up in the faith of the supernatural appeared as akin to atheism, pure and simple. Science started with matter as the only reality, and the world of events to the minutest details was thought to be dominated by the law of rigid determinism. But the hideousness of this new outlook of mechanistic fatalism was kept concealed in the new incentive to culture which the continued progress of the modern sciences afforded. Both in point of external embellishments and in the development of inward personal virtues modern science has proved to be a blessing to mankind. The output of modern science in the shape of mechanical appliances and the command over nature which with the help of steam and electricity, it gave to man have been a marvel of perfection.

They brought within the easy reach of mankind an extensive

treasure of comfort and convenience of every shade and description. People have found new ways of enjoying life, individually as well as collectively. And on the other hand, the pursuit of science has also deepened the sense of superior dignity of a life of disinterested service to truth. Let us but turn for a moment to " the magnificent edifice of the modern sciences and see how it was reared. What thousands of disinterested moral lives of men lie buried in its mere foundations, what patience and postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to the icy law of facts are wrought into its very stones and mortar." What finer examples of devotion to truth, of sacrifice and suffering could anybody cite ? And the light of knowledge lit by science has also saved man from the oppression of all manner of false hopes and superstitions to which, steeped in the darkness of ignorance, he was fastened so long. He has ceased to be a prey to baseless fears, and on the other hand he has learnt to grow sober, not given any more to indulging in an exaggerated estimate of his powers. The real man, self-reliant, vigorous and powerful, and yet sober and steady with sufficient self-restraint, has emerged on the field. In the face of all this, why should we blame science that it has created a hard and hateful world ?

All this is true; and nobody need castigate science in order thereby to strengthen the cause of traditional spirituality. The question is : Does not the scheme of a purely secularistic progress, as modern science embodies, prove to be self-destructive ? In fact, the dreariness of a purely secular life, with nothing beyond to look for, could not long be suppressed. The loss of faith in the ' above and beyond ' continued to haunt the modern scientific man and sapped at the very source the taproots of that energy wherewith he hoped to reconstruct a wholly mechanistic view of life. That for a brief span of life,—a brief span merely, no more than a tiny little speck in the boundless ages of eternity—man should engage in ceaseless toils and turmoils, dazed him evermore. Why all this craze for health and happiness, progress

and efficiency, if the values we achieve to-day are doomed to perish in oblivion to-morrow,—if that little hairless animal called man, creeping along the surface of the globe, be nothing but a short interlude in the never-ending cycle of changes of that primeval dust in its journey to dust again ? Reflections like these have already seized and possessed the minds of the 20th century man, and opened up prospects for the growth of this new order of spiritual enthusiasm typified in modernism.

The invasion of this new wave of spiritualistic fervour has already begun, and we are witnessing interesting developments of this new craze for religion leavened with science. Indeed modernism in its endeavour to entrench itself in the armour of science seems to be one of the wonders of the 20th century.

I have characterised modernism as an effort at spiritualising science. Science is primarily disposed to treat the sensuously given alone as real, but modernism seeks to impregnate it with a new cult that the non-sensuous elements extending beyond the the confines of the given are also real, and form the subject-matter of scientific enquiry. It thus helps to restore, in a way, men's belief in the 'beyond.'

The ways employed by science to preach the gospel of new transcendental immaterialism have set up a ferment. Until that subsides a bit it would be rash to pronounce an opinion. One thing will interest the reader that the very science of physics which, in the early days of its career, promulgated the cult of materialism, and turned its back upon spirituality, has been the earliest to work towards the disintegration of materialism. Both in its practical application as well as in its theoretical implication physics has been making a headway towards disavowing the reality of matter. The old views of matter as consisting of particles of hard and solid stuff, persisting in time, are no longer in favour with modern physics. The traditional conception of time as a uniform flow, homogeneous in all places has received a fatal blow, so also has the notion of space undergone a complete revolution. In place of the old notions of time and space as two

independent entities, whereon particles of matter were supposed to have been located, we have a new idea of time and space as two variables relatively determined by each other, so that without reference to time it is nonsense to speak of space, just as much as to speak of space without reference to time. To think of time as a determinant of space and of space again as a determinant of time leads to the abolition of one cosmic time and one cosmic space as two independent entities with which classical materialism was so closely bound up. The intricacies of the scientific argument on this point have been a puzzle even to professed students of science but the philosophical import may not be difficult to grasp. In a popular way we may represent the position as involving a complete revolution in our traditional conception of the structure of the world. If time should be a factor in moulding space we can no longer rest content with the assumed size and shape of the so-called atoms constituting the stuff of the world. The old solidity of atomic bodies is gone and with it also disappears any fixedness of their structure and size. This is how the materiality of the so-called material world speedily loses itself in the smoky wilderness of unsubstantial dreams. And so we must give up what Whitehead admirably calls the 'pushiness of matter.' "We naturally think of an atom," to use the words of B. Russell, "as being like a billiard ball. We should do better to think of it as like a ghost which has no pushiness and yet can make us fly."

In the practical sphere also the discoveries and inventions of physics have shown the possibility of tampering with time and space. Years ago it staggered the imagination to think of traversing the distance from one holy city to another. Already with the introduction of steam swifter motion became possible. People have begun to think less of space. What matters most is the element of time. It is noticed further that the most effective way of manipulating time is motion. For us, human beings, the stupendous distance between our earth and the stars is bewildering. But, for the rays of light our earth is as if it

were but the next-door neighbour to the stars. The speed of an aeroplane has superseded that of a steam locomotive so that we are no longer afraid of the distance between one end of the earth and the other. Even mightier changes have taken place in regard to the transmission of speech. With the coming of radio one man now can speak to millions spread over a whole country. What a marvel, people thousand miles apart can now listen to the addresses delivered by a single soul in a little corner of the globe! These are only some of the many changes that science has accomplished, and when we reflect on these the conclusion is irresistible that science no longer holds to the old doctrine of the reality of matter. At any rate it is clear that the so-called matter has ceased to be as material as it was once supposed to be. This accords with the supposition advanced by the spiritualists that matter is only an appearance of what in its inner core has no touch of materiality.

Champions of orthodox faith are too apt to make capital of the way in which science is veering round a non-materialistic standpoint. And they welcome it as a re-affirmation of the faith to which they have clung so long. But before they should proceed further in this delightful mood it is necessary that a warning be raised. There is a world of difference between the type of spiritualism embodied in modernism and that cherished by old-fashioned religious people. To the latter set religion was the only sheltering ground to provide an escape from the hard grip of a deterministic world. Faith can remove mountains. Years of sinful life can be redeemed by a single stroke of divine grace. It was a faith of this sort that made them so intensely religious. In short, spirituality was to them a sort of magic wand that could at any time unsettle the settled order of things. But the new code of spirituality to which modern modernism drifts is in no mood to concede to such a demand for the arbitrariness of the divine will. On the contrary, the very idea of miracle is tabooed. The inexorableness of the law is emphasised, although we be far removed yet to

comprehend the fulness of details as to its mode of operation. One thing is certain. The elements which help in the working out of the laws are unlike anything with which we are acquainted. They may be softer than smoke, fleeting like ghosts, and far more elusive than the thoughts of man. If modernism verges on immaterialism, it is a spirituality of this type.

The position is thrown into bolder relief if we estimate it in relation to its attitude to God. In the old scheme, God was the central pivot of spirituality. But modernism, though inclined to acknowledge the claims of spiritual reality in one form or another, finds no room for God in the traditional sense. The idea of God together with everything associated with divinity is banished from view, for science does not succeed in discovering any of these. On the contrary, it considers belief in God as devitalising. An outworn faith in God cherished merely out of fear or slothful inertia of the will has a cramping influence. For long souls have been warped and maimed by the inhibitory fear-complex and deity obsession. Our new scientific religion thus proclaims to be doing a service to humanity in freeing his soul from the fetters of God-superstition. At the same time it holds before it the promise of a new life and the hope for a 'beyond' that is sure to counteract the heedlessness of the life of mere 'getting and spending.'

In several ways modernism in spiritual culture differs from the old orthodox religious temper. Religion in the old sense was a function of the whole man prompted by love and reverence for the supreme Deity, the embodiment of all holiness and perfection. To know him, to love him, to do the will of him that sent him on earth the religious devotee dedicated himself. Out of the fulness of the heart he cried out, 'O Lord, thou hast made us for thyself, and our heart is restless till it rest in thee.' To win His heavenly grace he sacrificed every bit of earthly comfort and convenience. It is for others to enjoy the goods of life, but to the spiritual man nothing is dearer than the privilege of serving the will of his Master. He prayed

that he might have a chance of serving; he worshipped God in secret that he might nerve his whole being in hours of trials and tribulations. 'The world passeth away and the lusts thereof, but the soul inflamed with spirituality lives unaffected by the ravages of time.' This is how the old traditional deity-centric religion worked to inspire its devotees to leave aside all earthly concerns for an eternal life in heaven.

The spirit of modernism stands aloof from such enthusiasm. It no longer holds religion to be a synonym for world-renunciation, nor does anybody, under its spell, feel obliged to give up the amenities of a life of secular enjoyment to prosper in the grace of God. The modern man is pre-eminently a man of affairs. He is a lover of the world, and longs to abide here in this world in pursuit of ideals to which no limit can be set. If he speaks of spirituality and makes a religion of it, it is not with the idea of finding favour with God, to be cut adrift from all worldly occupations and transported bodily into heaven; for a zestless heavenly life, with no hopes and desires, no struggles and achievements, no promise of progress does not appeal to him. What he demands from religion is an ever-increasing assurance that every little progress that he makes to-day will, even through setbacks and oppositions, stand and make for greater progress to-morrow. His religion is to encourage him in his faith in the conservation of values, in which his love for the continuity of life takes a leading place.

Modernism is thus faced with a new problem. The desire for assurance that our life does not come to a full stop, but prolongs indefinitely through an unbroken succession of moments presses upon modern science to eke out lines of scientific evidence in support of man's survival of bodily death and we have, as a result, the science of spiritualism. Spiritualism proclaims with the definiteness of science that man need grieve no more over death. It is recorded on the observations of eminent scientists that the life of man, a complex unit of emotions and passions, tastes and desires as it is, does not close

soon as certain physiological operations of the body are set at rest. This complex framework of psychic individuality is carried beyond the point of ordinary death, and there is nothing to tell us that it ever terminates in time. On the contrary, it is quite possible so to re-arrange the situation that the disembodied individual would re-appear in our midst to enliven us with stories of his strange experiences and renew his old acquaintance.

I would not enter upon an examination of the specific nature of the evidence on which spiritualism rests its case. It is enough to show how it has affected the old notion of immortality. In classical spirituality, immortality signified a kind of divine illumination whereby the individual was elevated into a region of pure self-identical existence beyond the cycles of birth, growth, change and decay. Such divine illumination accounted for the transmutation of the whole personality of the man, so much so that from the level of an ordinary insignificant creature, clamouring for food and drink, swayed by petty hopes and desires, he rose to the dignity of 'a spectator of all time and existence.' This is the true sense of being immortal.

But modernism knows nothing of this. It holds in its place the uninspiring drama of a mere prolongation of this animal life in a brute matter-of-fact manner through an infinite order of time series with all its accessories of changing hopes and varying desires. The grief-stricken heart may be tempted to attend spiritualistic *seances* to assuage his sorrow with the evidence that the dear departed ones still continue to live, but that will never reveal to him the real excellence and beauty of the spiritual life. Our modern spiritual celebrities, equipped in scientific armour, may have elbowed out the old ministers of religion preaching the gospel of faith and prayer, but they do not seem to be alive to the spiritual needs of mankind. On the contrary, when they proclaim that we are destined by nature to carry this burdensome trail of existence through an infinite series of moments, that only takes off the dignity and

glory of human life. For it does not signify the triumph of spirit against the forces of inexorable fatality, but simply shows how spirit is overrun by blind necessity of spatio-temporal laws. That such a picture should prove consoling shows to what extent we are overtaken by the cult of materialism.

It is high time, therefore, that we should make up our mind as to the issues raised by modernism. It has two wings, each of which comes to us with a deceptive colouring, and makes us feel as if in them we have a better substitute for the traditional religion. One of these presents before us the picture of a world made up of something not like what we see as matter, but more akin to what we understand by a spirit. It is believed such a picture will persuade the soul to forego the coarse enjoyment of the immediate present, and work for the refined values of the 'hereafter.' And on the other wing is written the message of hope to mankind that he need have no fear of death. These two doctrines, it is held,—one guaranteeing the continuity of moral progress and the other continuity of life,—mark the dawn of this new religion for the enlightened. The question is: will it give satisfaction to humanity? We doubt very much. It is not enough for a man to be told that he shall survive even after death, nor will it make for the purification of his inward being if he simply learn that things are not what they seem. The noblest service that religion renders is that it helps man to realise the intrinsic worth of living a life of spotless purity. The pure in heart, it has been said, shall alone be saved; for the pure soul is ever at peace with himself. If any soul aspires to be at peace with himself, unmoved by anxieties of success and failure, life and death, let him but strive after cleansing the heart. But the heart is cleansed best when it gains in expansion. With the expansion of the heart all the filth and impurities float on the surface and the cleansing affair becomes an easy operation. It is with the expansion of self that spiritual awakening takes place. But the trouble is nobody can say definitely how to realise self-expansion.

Perhaps there is no better help to lead the soul to this goal than an immediate vision of the sublime. The sublime in nature overpowers the self with its external majesty. It makes us feel at once our littleness and insignificance. But the sublime in spirit leaves the soul with a consciousness of its vastness and immensity. Religion fastens upon God as the ideal embodiment of such a picture of the sublime. The truly religious soul in his devotional mood is privileged to come in contact with this noblest and highest form of sublimity. The frail little human frame no longer continues to be frail, but is made to participate in the life of the divine. Religion is competent to work out such a miracle, because it relies upon God. But science working with her laws of necessary connection, moves from little to little. How should it offer a substitute nobler than the sublime?

Our life, if it is to enter the joys of eternal life, must, by the strenuous endeavour of the will, keep its daily contact with the supreme sublime mind that stands above the whole family of minds. To be in touch with him is to keep untarnished the inward purity and suppleness of life. This is how the freedom of the spiritual life is won, and with freedom comes our right to inherit Life Eternal. The free soul alone can say: O Death, where is thy sting ? O Grave, where is thy victory? Let no one then be deceived with the trivialities of spiritualism. Of real life, its beauty and glory even in death it can suggest no legitimate answer. Real life is ensured against death because it can, through its self-conscious will, elevate itself into a divine plane. This is the everlasting message of religion. If modernism should grow in this temper of God-loving spirituality it will have amply done its service to humanity.

JITENDRA KUMAR CHAKRAVARTY

SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS: FIRST INTERPRETATION

II

Of his 150[1] sonnets Shakespeare wrote the first 125 to a man, the remaining 25 to a woman. Though distinctly unusual, it was not necessarily ludicrous to write a sonnet series to a man. But it was funny of Shakespeare to say precisely the same things to this man as all the other sonneteers were saying to their lady. The first 17 urge him to marry, so that when he dies his personal beauty may not be lost, but live in a son. Sidney uses this argument to a woman in his Arcadia.

> Those hours, that with gentle work did frame
> The lovely gaze where every eye doth dwell,
> Will play the tyrants to the very same
> And that unfair which fairly doth excel;
> For never-resting time leads summer on
> To hideous winter, and confounds him there;
> Sap check'd with frost, and lusty leaves quite gone,
> Beauty o'ersnow'd and bareness everywhere;
> Then, were not summer's distillation left,
> A liquid prisoner pent in walls of glass,
> Beauty's effect with beauty were bereft,
> Nor it, nor no remembrance what it was:
> But flowers distill'd, though they with winter meet,
> Leese but their show; their substance still lives sweet.

To further this argument Shakespeare delights in threatening his friend with old age, because then beauty fades; oh take a wife, he pleads, and rear a son to inherit this beauty.

[1] Really 154. I give only the rough proportions to avoid a quarrel.

Then let not winter's ragged hand deface
In thee thy summer, ere thou be distill'd:
Make sweet some vial; treasure thou some place
With beauty's treasure, ere it be self-kill'd.
That use is not forbidden usury,
Which happies those that pay the willing loan;
That's for thyself to breed another thee,
Or ten times happier, be it ten for one;
Ten times thyself were happier than thou art,
If ten of thine ten times refigur'd thee;
Then what could death do, if thou shouldst depart,
Leaving thee living in posterity?
Be not self-will'd, for thou art much too fair
To be death's conquest and make worms thine heir.[1]

Or *Is it for fear to wet a widow's eye,* or again

[2]O! that you were yourself; but, love, you are
No longer yours than you yourself here live:
Against this coming end you should prepare,
And your sweet semblance to some other give:
So should that beauty which you hold in lease
Find no determination; then you were
Yourself again, after yourself's decease,
When your sweet issue your sweet form should bear.
Who lets so fair a house fall to decay,
Which husbandry in honour might uphold
Against the stormy gusts of winter's day
And barren rage of death's eternal cold?
O! none but unthrifts. Dear my love, you know
You had a father; let your son say so.[2]

And so on he goes for 17 sonnets. The humour is not forced; a solemn reader may easily miss it, indeed many have. We are prepared to hear any amount of this sort of thing written to a woman; it was the fashionable pose. But dress a man in this fashion, make him as beautiful as a woman, let him inspire the same artificial sentiments, the same affectionate and adoring

[2] XIII

language, and we have humour—poetry with a comment of twinkling fairy laughter.

Shakespeare's man like the other poet's lady shows what Beauty is ; when other poets wrote of their beauties they but prophesied of him.

When in the chronicle of wasted time
I see descriptions of the fairest wights,
And beauty making beautiful old rime,
In praise of ladies dead and lovely knights,
Then, in the blazon of sweet beauty's best,
Of hand, of foot, of lip, of eye, of brow,
I see their antique pen would have express'd
Even such a beauty as you master now.
So all their praises are but prophecies
Of this our time, all you prefiguring ;
And for they look'd but with divining eyes,
They had not skill enough your worth to sing:
For we, which now behold these present days,
Have eyes to wonder, but lack tongues to praise.[1]

Or,

O! that record could with a backward look,
Even of five hundred courses of the sun,
Show me your image in some antique book,
Since mind at first in character was done!
That I might see what the old world could say
To this composed wonder of your frame ;
Whe'r we are mended, or whe'r better they,
Or whether revolution be the same.
O! sure I am, the wits of former days
To subjects worse have given admiring praise.[2]

The final couplet would be as sharp as Pope, if things can be sharp and not hurt. He does not forget his friend's sweet scent.

The forward violet thus did I chide:
Sweet thief, whence didst thou steal thy sweet that smells,
If not from my love's breath? The purple pride
Which on thy soft cheek for complexion dwells

[1] CIV [2] LIX

In my love's veins thou hast too grossly dy'd.
The lily I condemned for thy hand,
And buds of marjoram had stol'n thy hair;
The roses fearfully on thorns did stand,
One blushing shame, another white despair;
A third, nor red nor white, had stol'n of both,
And to his robbery had annex'd thy breath;
But, for his theft, in pride of all his growth
A vengeful canker eat him up to death.
More flowers I noted, yet I none could see
But sweet or colour it had stol'n from thee.[1]

He sometimes turns round and mocks the fashion more directly, yet still half directly for Sidney was fond of this attitude.

So is it not with me as with that Muse
Stirr'd by a painted beauty to his verse,
Who heaven itself for ornament doth use
And every fair with his fair doth rehearse,
Making a couplement of proud compare,
With sun and moon, with earth and sea's rich gems,
With April's first-born flowers, and all things rare
That heaven's air in this huge rondure hems.
O! let me, true in love, but truly write,
And then believe me, my love is as fair
As any mother's child, though not so bright
As those gold candles fix'd in heaven's air:
Let them say more that like of hear-say well;
I will not praise that purpose not to sell.[2]

Talking so much of beauty, he does not forget to write about a looking glass.

Alack! what poverty my Muse brings forth,
That having such a scope to show her pride,
The argument, all bare, is of more worth
Than when it hath my added praise beside!
O! blame me not, if I no more can write!
Look in your glass, and there appears a face
That over-goes my blunt invention quite.
Dulling my lines and doing me disgrace.

[1] XXVII [2] Cf. also XXVIII.

Were it not sinful then, striving to mend,
To mar the subject that before was well?
For to no other pass my verses tend
Than of your graces and your gifts to tell:
And more, much more, than in my verse can sit,
Your own glass shows you when you look in it.[1]

I do not mean to say that men never look in their glass except to shave, still a serious poet who introduces his hero in the Narcissus attitude does so at a risk. But Shakespeare risks all seriousness in praise of his friend. He is obsessed. Like all the other poets, he has his friend's image in his heart, but I cannot quote everything. He personifies his eyes and heart as the others do.

Mine eye and heart are at a mortal war,
How to divide the conquest of thy sight;
Mine eye my heart thy picture's sight would bar,
My heart mine eye the freedom of that right.
My heart doth plead that thou in him dost lie,—
A closet never pierc'd with crystal eyes,—
But the defendant doth that plea deny,
And says in him thy fair appearance lies.
To 'cide this title is impannelled
A quest of thoughts, all tenants to the heart;
And by their verdict is determined
The clear eye's moiety and the dear heart's part:
As thus mine eye's due is thine outward part,
And my heart's right thine inward love of heart.[2]

He does full justice to the theme of making his friend immortal.

Or I shall live your epitaph to make,
Or you survive when I in earth am rotten;
From hence your memory death cannot take,
Although in me each part will be forgotten.
Your name from hence immortal life shall have,
Though I, once gone, to all the world must die:
The earth can yield me but a common grave,
When you entombed in men's eyes shall lie.

[1] III. [2] XLVI.

Your monument shall be my gentle verse,
Which eyes not yet created shall o'er-read;
And tongues to be your being shall rehearse,
When all the breathers of this world are dead;
You still shall live,—such virtue hath my pen,—
Where breath most breathes,—even in the mouths of men.[1]

The *gaucherié* at the end was surely intentional.

Like the other poets Shakespeare goes on a journey, moping all day and thinking of his friend all night.

Weary with toil, I haste me to my bed,
The dear repose for limbs with travel tired:
But then begins a journey in my head
To work my mind, when body's work's expir'd:
For then my thoughts—from far where I abide—
Intend a zealous pilgrimage to thee,
And keep my drooping eyelids open wide,
Looking on darkness which the blind to see:
Save that my soul's imaginary sight
Presents thy shadow to my sightless view,
Which, like a jewel hung in ghastly night,
Makes black night beauteous and her old face new.
Lo! thus, by day my limbs, by night my mind,
For thee, and for myself no quiet find.[2]

Since I left you, mine eye is in my mind;
And that which governs me to go about
Doth part his function and is partly blind,
Seems seeing, but effectually is out;
For it no form delivers to the heart
Of bird, of flower, or shape, which it doth latch:
Of his quick objects hath the mind no part,
Nor his own vision holds what it doth catch;
Nor if it see the rud'st or gentlest sight,
The most sweet favour or deformed'st creature,
The mountain or the sea, the day or night,
The crow or dove, it shapes them to your feature:
Incapable of more, replete with you,
My most true mind thus maketh mine untrue.[3]

[1] LXXXI. [2] XXVII. [3] CXIII.

Or whether doth my mind being crown'd with you,
Drink up the monarch's plague, this flattery?
Or whether shall I say, mine eye saith true,
And that your love taught it this alchymy,
To make of monsters and things indigest
Such cherubins as your sweet self resemble,
Creating every bad a perfect best,
As fast as objects to his beams assemble ?[1]

or more beautiful and with less ironic comment, *From you have I been absent in the spring,*[2] and *How like a winter hath my absense been.*[3]

Shakespeare does not leave the other commonplace themes out. Praise or love from his friend compensates him for all the evils the world can do.

When in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes
I all alone beweep my outcast state,
And trouble deaf heaven with my bootless cries,
And look upon myself, and curse my fate,
Wishing me like to one more rich in hope,
Featur'd like him, like him with friends possess'd,
Desiring this man's art, and that man's scope,
With what I most enjoy contented least:
Yet in these thoughts myself almost despising,
Haply I think on thee,—and then my state,
Like to the lark at break of day arising
From sullen earth, sings hymns at heaven's gate;
For thy sweet love remember'd such wealth brings
That then I scorn to change my state with kings. [4]

When we read sonnets with this theme, we must not take it that Shakespeare's lot was really miserable. He exaggerated his lucklessness for effect. There would be no point in saying "I have only ten friends and a moderate income, but you make up for the want of more friends and money" He must, like all the poets, be the orphan of fate before the power of his friend to

[1] CXIV. [2] XCVIII. [3] XCVII. [4] X IX.

make up for the loss of life's comforts and of popular respect is worth recording.

> Your love and pity doth the impression fill
> Which vulgar scandal stamp'd upon my brow;
> For what care I who calls me well or ill,
> So you o'er-green my bad, my good allow ?
> You are my all-the-world, and I must strive
> To know my shames and praises from your tongue;
> None else to me, nor I to none alive,
> That my steel'd sense or changes right or wrong.
> In so profound abysm I throw all care
> Of other's voices, that my adder's sense
> To critic and to flatterer stopped are.
> Mark how with my neglect I do dispense:
> You are so strongly in my purpose bred,
> That all the world besides methinks are dead.[1]

He combines this with another commonplace.

> When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
> I summon up remembrance of things past,
> I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought;
> And with old woes new wail my dear times waste:
> Then can I drown an eye, unus'd to flow,
> For precious friends hid in death's dateless night,
> And weep afresh love's long since cancelled woe.
> And moan the expense of many a vanish'd sight:
> Then can I grieve at grievances foregone,
> And heavily from woe to woe tell o'er
> The sad account of fore-bemoaned moan,
> Which I new pay as if not paid before.
> But if the while I think on the, dear friend,
> All losses are restor'd and sorrows end.[2]

He exaggerates still farther in the next sonnet, where all his dead friends are mystically included in his present friend, much in the same way as all beautiful ladies become Stella in Sidney's sonnet.

[1] CXII; see also CXI.

[2] XXX.

Thy bosom is endeared with all hearts,
Which I by lacking have supposed dead;
And there reigns Love, and all Love's loving parts,
And all those friends which I thought buried.
How many a holy and obsequious tear
Hath dear religious love stol'n from mine eye,
As interest of the dead, which now appear
But things remov'd that hidden in the lie !
Thou art the grave where buried love doth live,
Hung with the trophies of my lovers gone,
Who all their parts of me to thee did give,
That due of many now is thine alone:
Their images I lov'd I view in thee,
And thou—all they—hast all the all of me.[1]

Shakespeare can write dismally too. When out of favour with his idol his sun is out.

Full many a glorious morning have I seen
Flatter the mountain-tops with sovereign eye,
Kissing with golden face the meadows green,
Gilding pale streams with heavenly alchymy;
Anon permit the basest clouds to ride
With ugly rack on his celestial face,
And from the forlorn world his visage hide,
Stealing unseen to west with this disgrace;
Even so my sun one early morn did shine,
With all-triumphant splendour on my brow;
But, out! alack! he was but one our mine,
The region cloud hath mask'd him from me now.
Yet him for this my love no whit disdaineth;
Suns of the world may stain when heaven's sun staineth.[2]

This reminds us of Drayton's 49th sonnet, with for theme

Tell me, if ever since the world began
So fair a morning had so foul a set,

or of Spenser's No. XL. He writes another sonnet on the same theme leading on to another joke, and reflecting Spenser's fortieth sonnet more particularly.

[1] XXXI. [2] XXXIII.

Why didst thou promise such a beauteous day,
And make me travel forth without my cloak,
To let base clouds o'ertake me in my way,
Hiding thy bravery in their rotten smoke ?
'Tis not enough that through the cloud thou break,
To dry the rain on my storm-beaten face,
For no man well of such a salve can speak
That heals the wound and cures not the disgrace:
Nor can thy shame give physic to my grief;
Though thou repent, yet I have still the loss:
The offender's sorrow lends but weak relief,
To him that bears the strong offence's cross.
Ah! but those tears are pearl which thy love sheds,
And they are rich and ransom all ill deeds.[1]

In the next sonnet he takes over his friend's sin:[2]

No more be grieved at that which thou hast done
Roses have thorns, and silver fountains mud;
Clouds and eclipses stain both moon and sun,
And loathsome canker lives in sweetest bud,
All men make faults, and even I in this,
Authorising thy trespass with compare,
Myself corrupting, salving thy amiss,
Excusing thy sins more than thy sins are;
For to thy sensual fault I bring in sense,—
Thy adverse party is thy advocate,—
And 'gainst myself a lawful plea commence:
Such civil war is in my love and hate,
That I an accessory needs must be
To that sweet thief which sourly robs from me.[3]

By the next sonnet he has absorbed his friend's sin so completely that his friend, now cleared, can no longer acknowledge Shakespeare laden with his base sin.

Let me confess that we two must be twain,
Although our undivided loves are one:
So shall those blots that do with me remain,
Without thy help, by me be borne alone.

[1] XXXIV. [2] *Cf.* Daniel, XXX, XXXII and XXXIII. [3] XXXV.

In our two loves there is but one respect,
Though in our lives a separable spite,
Which, though it alter not love's sole effect,
Yet doth it steal sweet hours from love's delight.
I may not evermore acknowledge thee,
Lest my bewailed guilt should do the shame,
Nor thou with public kindness honour me,
Unless thou take that honour from thy name:
But do not so; I love thee in such sort
As thou being mine, mine is thy good report.[1]

Such sonnets written to a woman do not compromise her very far since her sin is coldness and disdain. Addressed to a man, if the first ridiculousness is not caught, they make his guilt sound dastardly. Some readers miss the second stage in the joke (where Shakespeare takes over his friend's sin) and now believed Shakespeare some sort of social pariah, and when later he assumes the conventional humble unworthiness of the sonneteer, they take this solemnly as farther evidence.

Say that thou didst forsake me for some fault,
And I will comment upon that offence:
Speak of my lameness, and I straight will halt,
Against thy reasons making no defence.
Thou canst not, love, disgrace me half so ill,
To set a form upon desired change,
As I'll myself disgrace; knowing thy will,
I will acquaintance strangle, and look strange;
Be absent from thy walks; and in my tongue
Thy sweet beloved name no more shall dwell,
Lest I, too much profane, should do it wrong,
And haply of our old acquaintance tell.
For thee, against myself I'll vow debate,
For I must ne'er love him whom thou dost hate.[2]

All the sonneteers write like this, but in Shakespeare it sounds either ridiculous, or sordid. Custom has not habituated us to take trifles between man and man seriously, as it has those between man and woman.

[1] XXXVI. [2] LXXXIX.

At other times he makes the sonnet play humorous by over seriousness, pretending that an artificial sentiment is a sincere and strong emotion.

> When I have seen by Time's fell hand defac'd
> The rich-proud cost of outworn buried age;
> When sometime lofty towers I see down raz'd,
> And brass eternal slave to mortal rage;
> When I have seen the hungry ocean gain
> Advantage on the kingdom of the shore,
> And the firm soil win of the watery main,
> Increasing store with loss, and loss with store;
> When I have seen such interchange of state,
> Or state itself confounded to decay;
> Ruin hath taught me thus to ruminate
> That Time will come and take my love away.
> This thought is as a death, which cannot choose
> But weep to have that which it fears to loose.[1]

In other sonnets he plays with the idea of two being so united that they are one.

> Take all my loves, my love, yea, take them all;
> What hast thou then more than thou hadst before?
> No love, my love, that thou mayst true love call,
> All mine was thine before thou hadst this more.
> Then, if for my love thou my love receivest,
> I cannot blame thee for my love thou usest;
> But yet be blam'd, if thou thyself deceivest
> By wilful taste of what thyself refusest.
> I do forgive thy robbery, gentle thief,
> Although thou steal thee all my poverty;
> And yet, love knows it is a greater grief
> To bear love's wrong than hate's known injury.
> Lascivious grace, in whom all ill well shows,
> Kill me with spites; yet we must not be foes.[2]

I like the little snap at the end—"Kill me with spites; yet we must not be foes." He makes the efforts of the mystic

[1] LXIV. [2] XL.

union more ridiculous, by using it to excuse one of the most outrageous offences a friend could commit.

> That thou hast her, it is not all my grief,
> And yet it may be said I lov'd her dearly;
> That she hath thee, is of my wailing chief,
> A loss in love that touches me more nearly.
> Loving offenders, thus I will excuse ye:
> Thou dost love her, because thou know'st I love her;
> And for my sake even so doth she abuse me,
> Suffering my friend for my sake to approve her.
> If I loose thee, my loss is my love's gain,
> And losing her, my friend hath found that loss;
> Both find each other, and I lose both twain,
> And both for my sake lay on me this cross:
> But here's the joy; my friend and I are one;
> Sweet flattery! then she loves but me alone.[1]

Or he combines this with another conceit.

> Sin of self-love possesseth all mine eye
> And all my soul and all my every part;
> And for this sin there is no remedy,
> It is so grounded inward in my heart.
> Methinks no face so gracious is as mine,
> No shape so true, no truth of such account;
> And for myself mine own worth do define,
> As I all other in all worths surmount.
> But when my glass shows me myself indeed,
> Beated and chopp'd with tann'd antiquity,
> Mine own self-love quite contrary I read;
> Self so self-loving were iniquity.
> 'Tis thee, myself, that for myself I praise,
> Painting my age with beauty of thy days.[2]

"thee" is of course his friend, whom he cannot distinguish from himself. As all the other poets have grown wrinkled and old with love's worry, Shakespeare, not to be outdone, is "Beated and chopp'd with tann'd antiquity." Curiously enough, though this has helped to date the sonnets, so far as I know

[1] XLII. [2] LXII.

it has never been taken to prove that Shakespeare was a coachman. Just as Drayton[1] got into difficulties over his union with his love, when he played the accountant, so does Shakespeare get himself into the same hole, but more uncomfortably, for when he brings in the lady, he has three people all tangled up together by love. He says to the lady

> So, now I have confess'd that he is thine,
> And I myself am mortgag'd to thy will,
> Myself I'll forfeit, so that other mine
> Thou wilt restore, to be my comfort still:
> But thou wilt not, nor he will not be free,
> For thou art covetous and he is kind;
> He learn'd but surety-like to write for me,
> Under that bond that him as fast doth bind.
> The statute of thy beauty thou wilt take,
> Thou usurer, that putt'st forth all to use,
> And sue a friend came debtor for my sake;
> So him I lose through my unkind abuse.
> Him have I lost; thou hast both him and me:
> He pays the whole, and yet am I not free.[2]

Sometimes Shakespeare's mock submission is ironical directly. Speaking to the man he says

> Being your slave, what should I do but tend
> Upon the hours and times of your desire?
> I have no precious time at all to spend,
> Nor services to do, till you require.
> Nor there I chide the world-without-end hour
> Whilst I, my sovereign, watch the clock for you,
> Nor think the bitterness of absence sour
> When you have bid your servant once adieu;
> * * *
> So true a fool is love that in your will,
> Though you do anything, he thinks no ill.[3]
>
> That god forbid that made me first your slave,
> I should in thought control your times of pleasure,
> Or at your hand the accounts of hours to crave,
> Being your vassal, bound to stay your leisure!

[1] No. 10. [2] CXXXIV. [3] LVII.

O! let me suffer, being at your beck,
The imprison'd absence of your liberty;
And patience, tame to sufferance, bide each check,
Without accusing you of injury.

* * *

I am to wait, though waiting so be hell,
Not blame your pleasure, be it ill or well.[1]

When Shakespeare comes to sing his swan song for he also may die of love, or rather friendship—they are so much more beautiful than any one else's that we hardly think of them as skits. When he has not died of love, he is between the heats and colds of it,

So are you to my thoughts as food to life,
Or as sweet season'd showers are to the ground;
And for the peace of you I hold such strife
As 'twixt a miser and his wealth is found;
Now proud as an enjoyer, and anon
Doubting the filching age will steal his treasure;
Now counting best to be with you alone,
Then better'd that the world may see my pleasure;
Sometime, all full with feasting on your sight,
And by and by clean starved for a look;
Possessing or pursuing no delight,
Save what is had or must from you be took.
Thus do I pine and surfeit day by day,
Or gluttoning on all, or all away.[2]

Again, this short of thing would not be funny addressed to a woman, but it is not an emotion one man feels for another. I know that the Elizabethans are said to have valued friendship very greatly; who that has ever had a friend, does not? I do not think it extravagant for one man to write ardent or impassioned sonnets to another, any more than Tennyson's *In Memoriam* is extravagant, but I do say that the feelings Shakespeare expresses in the sonnets are not the feelings of friendship but of love. A healthy friendship never fears its dissolution

[1] LVIII. [2] LXXV.

as the sonnet love does, nor though unselfish, is itself abashing. The emotions of friendship are steady and give self-respect ; the joy of a friend helps rather than hinders in the of life ; its is not the sunsettling, upsetting, absorbing, distraught emotion of the sonnets. Since there is nothing physical in friendship, love, spatial separation does not rob friends of sleep in fevered nights or discolour the day with aimless fancies. Shakespeare's sonnets taken seriously are exaggerated, overbalanced, even foolish. Despite all their far-fetched affectations, the Elizabethan sonneteers had, if not sincere, at least natural emotions behind the twisted strands of their conceits. The emotions behind Shakespeare's sonnets are not natural for one man to feel towards another. To put it crudely, if Shakespeare meant those seriously, he must have had a "Grand Passion" for a man much younger than himself, in fact something less possible than that. So unnatural are his sentiments that despite his use of the masculine gender for the first 125 sonnets—and without one single exception—some of his readers, including Coleridge, declare that they are all addressed to a woman. The easier and first impression is that they are intentionally absurd ; they tickle our humour, and I see no reason why we should control that tickle. The dramatist who portrays emotion on the stage with such a sane proportion, would not suddenly lose that just balance when writing in the most conventional form he could use, unless he did it deliberately.

But there is even less doubt about Shakespeare's skit where he writes to the woman; he concentrates most of the darkness on her; the Elizabethan sonneteers almost made a dual personality of their lady, angel and devil ; Shakespeare went one better and wrote to an angel man and a devil woman. Though he does occasionally write a petulant sonnet to the man,[1] and one less

1 XCV-XCVI, *cf.* Spenser in such sonnets as XLVII, Drayton, 30, etc., and CXIX-CXX *cf.* Sidney in XCIII. V.

compromising to the woman, on the whole, he keeps to black for one and white for the other.

Two loves I have of comfort and despair,
Which like two spirits do suggest me still:
The better angel is a man right fair,
The worser spirit a woman, colour'd ill.[1]

His first sonnet to the woman refers to Sidney's audacity in writing to a black-eyed lady. Sidney excused her eyes as mourners:

When nature made her chief work, Stella's eyes,
In colour black, why wrapt she beams so bright?
Would she in beamy black like painter wise,
Frame daintiest lustre mixt of shades and light?
Or did she else that sober hue devise,
In object best, to strength and knit our sight?
Lest if no veil these brave beams did disguise,
They sun-like would more dazzle than delight.
Or would she her miraculous power show,
That whereas black seems Beauty' contrary,
She even in black doth make all Beauties flow:
But so and thus, she minding Love should be
Placed ever there, gave him this mourning weed;
To honour all their deaths, who for her bleed.[2]

Shakespeare comments:

In the old age black was not counted fair,
Or if it were, it bore not beauty's name;
But now is black beauty's successive heir,
And beauty slander'd with a bastard's shame:
For since each hand hath put on Nature's power,
Fairing the foul with Art's false borrow'd face,
Sweet beauty hath no name, no holy bower,
But is profan'd, if not lives in disgrace.
Therefore my mistress' brows are raven black,
Her eyes so suited, and they mourners seem
At such who, not born fair, no beauty lack,
Sland'ring creation with a false esteem:
Yet so they mourn, becoming of their woe,
That every tongue says beauty should look so.[3]

[1] CXLIV. [2] VII. [3] CXXVII.

We must not miss the significance of "therefore!" in the 9th line; this is Shakespeare's explanation of the darkness of his lady. In another sonnet he harps on the same theme.

Thine eyes I love, and they, as pitying me,
Knowing thy heart torments me with disdain,
Have put on black and loving mourners be,
Looking with pretty ruth upon my pain.
And truly not the morning sun of heaven
Better becomes the grey cheeks of the east,
Nor that full star that ushers in the even,
Doth half that glory to the sober west,
As those two mourning eyes become thy face:
O! let it then as well beseem thy heart
To mourn for me, since mourning doth thee grace,
And suit thy pity like in every part.
Then will I swear beauty herself is black,
And all they foul that thy complexion lack.[1]

The second sonnet to the woman is a pretty conceit, the third one against Lust.

The expense of spirit in a waste of shame
Is lust in action; and till action, lust
Is perjur'd, murderous, bloody, full of blame,
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust;
Enjoy'd no sooner but despised straight;
Past reason hunted; and no sooner had,
Past reason hated, as a swallow'd bait,
On purpose laid to make the taker mad:
Mad in pursuit, and in possession so;
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme;
A bliss in proof,—and prov'd, a very woe;
Before, a joy propos'd; behind, a dream.
All this the world well knows; yet none knows well
To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell.[2]

Although anyone who examine this closely will see that it says a number of ridiculous things, this sonnet has been taken to show that Shakespeare's moral command was weak. One

[1] CXXXII. [2] CXXIX.

might charge Sidney with a similar weakness because of his sonnet on Desire.

> Thou blind mans marke, thou fooles selfe chosen snare,
> Fond fancies scum, and dregs of scattred thought,
> Band of all evils, cradle of causelesse care,
> Thou web of will, whose end is never wrought.
> Desire, desire I have too dearely bought,
> With praise of mangled mind thy worthlesse ware,
> Too long, too long asleepe thou hast me brought,
> Who should my mind to higher things prepare.
> But yet in vaine thou madest me to vaine things aspire,
> In vaine thou kindlest all thy smokie fire.
> For vertue hath this better lesson taught,
> Within my selfe to seeke my onelie hire:
> Desiring nought but how to kill desire.[1]

This is of course in preparation for the medieval translation of his earthly love into a heavenly Love, but Sidney has debased and falsified his real feelings. Shakespeare shows the pretense by stepping behind him, and with awesome solemnity mimicing an even more exaggerated and un-Sidney-like attitude.

In the fourth sonnet he hits directly at the conventional picture of the poet's love.

> My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun;
> Coral is far more red than her lips' red;
> If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun;
> If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head.
> I have seen roses damask'd, red and white,
> But no such roses see I in her cheeks;
> And in some perfumes is there more delight
> Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks.
> I love to hear her speak, yet well I know
> That music hath a far more pleasing sound;
> I grant I never saw a goddess go,—
> My mistress, when she walks, treads on the ground;

[1] P. 322 of Cambridge edition (1922), usually No. CIX. Sir Sidney Lee quotes this sonnet as the "origin" of Shakespeare's.

And yet, by heaven, I think my love as rare
As any she belied with false compare.[1]

This is the dark lady of the sonnets, who wrecked Shakespeare's life and tortured his soul; this woman destroyed the youthful pensive poet of *Romeo and Juliet*, the gay humorist of the *Merry Wives* or *Henry IV* and turned him into the tragedian who writes from the depth of tragic passion; she is assuredly the model for Cleopatra, if not indeed for nearly every woman Shakespeare portrays. Truly a joke is a dangerous thing.

The next two sonnets return to the mourning eyes, the first trips us up unexpectedly at the end.

Thou art as tyrannous, so as thou art,
As those whose beauties proudly make them cruel;
For well thou know'st to my dear doting heart
Thou art the fairest and most precious jewel.
Yet in good faith some say that thee behold,
Thy face hath not the power to make love groan;
To say they err I dare not be so bold,
Although I swear it to myself alone.
And to be sure that is not false I swear,
A thousand groans, but thinking on thy face,
One on another's neck, do witness bear
Thy black is fairest in my judgment's place,
In nothing art thou black save in thy deeds,
And thence this slander, as I think, proceeds.[2]

But we cannot go through them all, explaining the joke. He delights chiefly to play upon his lady's ugliness the conceits the other poets use for the charm of their beauties. All the other ladies steal men's hearts, and Shakespeare uses the same theme but makes it ugly.

Thou blind fool, Love, what dost thou to mine eyes,
That they behold, and see not what they see?
They know what beauty is, see where it lies,
Yet what the best is take the worst to be.

[1] CXXX. [2] CXXXI.

If eyes, corrupt by over-partial looks,
Be anchor'd in the bay where all men ride,
Why of eyes' falsehood hast thou forged hooks,
Whereto the judgment of my heart is tied?
Why should my heart think that a several plot
Which my heart knows the wide world's common place?
Or mine eyes, seeing this, say this is not,
To put fair truth upon so foul a face?
In things right true my heart and eyes have err'd,
And to this false plague are they now transferr'd.[1]

He personifies the parts of his body but not to flatter his love.

In faith I do not love thee with mine eyes,
For they in thee a thousand errors note;
But 'tis my heart that loves what they despise,
Who, in despite of view, is pleas'd to dote.
Nor are mine ears with thy tongue's tune delighted;
Nor tender feeling, to base touches prone.
Nor taste nor smell desire to be invited
To any sensual feast with thee alone;
But my five wits nor my five senses can
Dissuade one foolish heart from serving thee,
Who leaves unswayed the likeness of a man,
Thy proud heart's slave and vassal wretch to be:
Only my plague thus far I count my gain,
That she that makes me sin awards me pain.[2]

His love makes him mad, as it did Drayton,[3] so he writes like the others.

My love is as a fever, longing still
For that which longer nurseth the disease;
Feeding on that which doth preserve the ill,
The uncertain sickly appetite to please,
My reason, the physician to my love,
Angry that his prescriptions are not kept,
Hath left me, and I desperate now approve
Desire is death, which physic did except,

[1] CXXXVII. [2] CXLI, also CXXXIX & CL. [3] 43,

Past cure I am, now Reason is past care,
And frantic mad with evermore unrest;
My thoughts and my discourse as madman's are,
At random from the truth vainly express'd;
For I have sworn the fair, and thought thee bright,
Who art as black as hell, as dark as night.[1]

In the midst of these we find this simple little plea.

Be wise as thou art cruel; do not press
My tongue-tied patience with too much disdain;
Lest sorrow lend me words, and words express
The manner of my pity-wanting pain.

* * *

For, if I should despair, I should grow mad,
And in my madness might speak ill of thee:
Now this ill-wresting world is grown so bad,
Mad slanderers by mad ears believed be.[2]

It is almost unbelievable how anyone should imagine Shakespeare wrote these sonnets to a real woman. They take their meaning as a final fling at the conventional sonnets. Nothing in any of them shows that he wrote seriously, and there is every sign he conceived them in the spirit of a "rag." We cannot very well argue about this, bringing logic to prove the humour of a joke. But I do not think we could miss the joke if we read the sonnets in their proper atmosphere, especially if we could get rid of our false reverence for Shakespeare, and the loss of our false reverence will not hurt our real reverence for him. Some of them are so humorous that even serious people have to control an inclination to smile. Mr. Massey[3] was troubled by one to the woman.

Lo, as a careful housewife runs to catch
One of her feather'd creatures broke away,
Sets down her babe, and makes all quick dispatch
In pursuit of the thing she would have stay;

[1] CXLVII. [2] CXL.

[3] *The Secret Drama of Shakespeare's Sonnets unfolded*, p. 329.

Whilst her neglected child holds her in chase,
Cries to catch her whose busy care is bent
To follow that which flies before her face,
Not prizing her poor infant's discontent:
So runn'st thou after that which flies from thee,
Whilst I thy babe chase thee afar behind;
But if thou catch thy hope, turn back to me,
And play the mother's part, kiss me, be kind;
So will I pray that thou mayst have thy *Will* [1]
If thou turn back and my loud crying still.[2]

Massey says that the idea of Shakespeare representing "himself in love with, and stark mad for, a bold bad woman—by the image of a poor little infant, a tender child, toddling after its mammy and crying out for her apron-corner to hold by, and her kiss to still its whimpering discontent...would be laughable, if not too lamentable. But Shakespeare did not write to be laughed at." Thus we put a natural interpretation of the sonnets out of court at once. Where they are so absurd that they force a smile out of us, we check ourselves—"There must be some deep meaning in this. Shakespeare did not write to be laughed at." Thereupon only the very bravest students of Shakespeare admit that they did suppress a smile.

We do feel a sort of wonder, even a mild shock, when we see a great man relaxing and playing the fool. We small people, should we win the respect due to a little more wisdom than the average, would lose our exalted reputation if we relaxed into foolishness. Common report will not have a man both wise and frivolous. We find it difficult enough to imagine how one mind can hold both the swollen emotions of *Antony and Cleopatra* and the trifling fancies of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. The sonnet parody is perhaps more whimsical than we expect from the creator of *Macbeth*, till we remember some of Shakespeare's fools. But his humour had a fanciful and delicate strand, observable even in his roaring drunkards. I

[1] Even this poem is copied from the other sonneteers. [2] CXLIII.

can easily imagine him reading his sonnets to his friends in solemn tones, watching the joke escape the heavy-minded and dawn on the more agile.

Perhaps this was an inevitable joke to the Elizabethans, their attitude to the emotions being perhaps freer from sentiment than any age till our own. Think of the difference between Thackeray's or even Wordsworth's attitude to emotion and theirs! The Elizabethans were too sincere to be sentimental. Their livest part was their brain; the renaissance had stirred their imagination, a sense of newly discovered worlds, and more worlds to be discovered, their intellect; wars kept them practical, and the late Protestant revolt helped them to a truthful outlook. We have much in common with them: science has both stimulated our imagination and intellect by the discovery of new realities, and forced on us, at first unwilling but now grateful, the attitude of truth. But the Elizabethans differed from us in not thinking so much about emotions which they felt perhaps more strongly. Like us,[1] they were robust and sincere, neither sentimentalizing nor magnifying their feelings, but not puzzled about them. Any unnatural excess or affectation was easily laughed at. We may illustrate this from the only book even attributed to Shakespeare's library—Florio's translation of Montaigne's essays. In the essay on sorrow and sadness and the effects of strong emotion, Montaigne, after telling how some have died of grief, some of joy, adds "I am little subject to these violent emotions." We can imagine a modern humorist treating the grand emotions flippantly like this. Looking at things straightforwardly without flinching or pretence, the Elizabethans could hardly be sentimental. Their only artificialities were affected ones. When they write artificially they do it on purpose; they knew they but trifled when they dressed their feeling in intellectual

[1] Meaning by "us" the average intellectual reader, for when all is said, they alone were concerned, or ever will be concerned with Shakespeare's sonnets.

or imaginative conceits. The average steady-going among them could not take their sophistications seriously, nor mistake sentiment for feeling. Nor would the Elizabethans imagine that the sonnets were the poetry of real feeling, and indeed, would probably have looked for real feeling anywhere rather than in poetry. A parody on this game of verse lovemaking would be no sacrilege in that age, though it may seem sacrilegious to us, who have learnt from Wordsworth to take poetry seriously. And more, Shakespeare was not the only poet to laugh at the fashion, though the joke may easily have begun with him. Davies wrote a series of Gullinge Sonnets in 1595.[1] I do not know the date of Gabriel Harvey's *Amorous Odious Sonnet*. And apart from these, Shakespeare would not have continually made fun of the sonnet on the stage, if his public were not ready to laugh; while even those who read the sonnets solemnly, may find him criticising the affectations of this fashion.

KATHARINE M. WILSON

[1] Sir Sidney's *Life*, Appendix IX.

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN JAINISM

By birth and education, every one of us has been placed within the sphere of power of one or another of the great human civilizations, which exercised its influence on our bodily and mental training, and on the whole development of our personality, and even impressed, on the mind of the majority, the stamp of its particular religious dogma. Strengthened by history, tradition, custom, and convention, this net-work of influences fettered the individual nearly as firmly as those bonds of kinship do, that connect him with the race of his ancestors.

Still, as those bonds of kinship do not hinder a person from attaching himself with even stronger bonds, bonds of love and friendship, bonds of fellowship and mental affinity, to other, distant persons, just so that other bondage must not keep anybody back from glancing around himself, discovering merits in heterogeneous religions, and measuring his own conceptions by the noblest of theirs.

But then: how to judge of the merit of a religion, how to know what is great and noble in it? Is not one single religion, isolated from its sister-religions, like the isolated petal of a flower, the isolated note of a melody? Is it not, in its one-sidedness, comparable to the opinion of a single one of that group of blind men, who, standing before an elephant for the first time in their lives, tried to define its nature: the first, who happened to touch its forehead, declared the elephant to be a big pebble; the second from the touch of one of its tusks, defined it as a pointed weapon, the third, after touching the trunk, said the elephant was a leather bag; the fourth caught hold of one of the ears, and defined the whole animal as a flapping fan; the fifth, after passing his hand over its back, declared it to be a mountain, the sixth, who had touched one of the legs, said the elephant was a pillar; and the seventh described it as a piece of rope, because

he had just caught hold of the tail. Each of them grasped only part of the nature of the actual thing. And just so, each of the various religions on earth appears to make us see a different aspect of Truth Divine. How then are we entitled to speak of merit in one or another of them ?

As a matter of fact, the individual, whenever acting, endeavours to act so as to establish, or to maintain, an optimum of physical well-being, in response to its innate egotistic instincts. In this activity, it feels itself often and again checked by another kind of inner voices, which (no matter whether they be called conscience, or categorical imperative, or social instincts, or whatever else) regularly warn it, whenever egotism tempts it to transgress one or another of the universal commandments of ethics, and to endanger, thereby, directly or indirectly, the well-being of the social body to which it belongs. Life seems to be nothing but an attempt of the individual to keep itself balancing, as it were, on the delicate line of demarcation between the postulates of egotism and those of ethics, avoiding to hurt its own interests on one, and those of society on the other side. This state of equilibrium is experienced, by the refined mind, as the optimum of inner happiness attainable under the given circumstances. It is that bliss, that "peace of God," which religion promises to its followers.

For religion has always considered to be its task to indicate that line of demarcation winding along between those two postulates. Every religion has approached this task with boldness and determination, and in its own peculiar way, following its own particular character and tradition. If a religion has succeeded in fulfilling its task well, its doctrines must guarantee a state of perfect and permanent harmony between the well-being of the individual and that of society, under whatever conditions imaginable. It is obvious that reversely, the degree and constancy of perfection characterizing the harmony of the above two factors must allow us to judge of the merit of the religion by which it is being vouched for.

Measured by this standard, there can be no question as to the high value of Jainism, that time-honoured religion, which goes back to the teachings of Vardhamana Mahavira, the great contemporary and countryman of Gautama Buddha, and to his predecessors, for its teachings seem to guarantee indeed "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" not only of men, but of living beings, under all circumstances imaginable. This is why I make bold to draw the attention of the reader on this extraordinarily fascinating and important subject to-day.

According to Jainism, everything that lives, has got a *soul*, or, to speak in the beautiful concise language of the Scriptures, *is* a soul. And all the souls are fellow-creatures: the god-like recluse in his purity and unshakable peace, the active man of the world with his never-resting ambitions, the innocent infant and the criminal, the lion and the nightingale, the cobra and the dragon-fly, the green leaf and the rose flower, the tiniest particle of water and the smallest of the corpuscles that compose the shining crystal, each of those myriads of beings that form the wings of the breeze, and of those that waver in the scarlet glow of fire: all are fellow-creatures, all are brothers. For all have got bodies, all have got senses, all have got instincts, all take food and digest it, all multiply, all are born and die, all are capable of suffering and enjoying, and all bear the germs of perfection within themselves. That means, all are able to develop, during the long chain of their respective existences subsequent to one another, their innate dispositions of perception, knowledge, activity, and joy, to a degree of highest perfection. And all find themselves placed in the middle of the struggle against "*Karma*."

"*Karma*" designates that substance which we incessantly assimilate by our bodily and mental activity, and which remains latent in the depths of our personality, until it "ripens" at the critical moment, destining the whole complex of our personality, as far as it is foreign to "soul," and shaping our whole fate. We bind Karma by walking and speaking, by eating and

breathing, by loving and hating, by helping and harming. And a different activity produces a different kind of Karma, which may ripen either immediately, or after some time, or even in one or another of our subsequent existences.

यादृशं क्रियते कर्म तादृशं भुज्यते फलम् ।
यादृशमुप्यते बीजं तादृशं प्राप्यते फलम् ॥

"To the actions we do, corresponds the result we have to incur, as the fruit corresponds to the seed that has been sown."

By acting in such a way as to do harm to others, we produce a Karma which will make us suffer to the adequate extent, and by acting so as to benefit others, we store up an adequate amount of latent happiness. There are moreover actions which destine our bodily constitution, our surroundings, and the length of our life, and there are actions which destine the limit within which we are allowed to perceive and to know, to enjoy and to be successful.

Thus, to bind good Karma by good deeds, means to secure the basis of a happy lot; to bind bad Karma by evil deeds, means to sow the seeds of future sorrow; and to stop the bondage of Karma completely, leads, if coupled with the consumption of all the remaining latent Karmas, to an elimination of everything that is non-soul in our personality. It means self-realization; it means that final state in which the soul, free from all encumbrance, is soul and soul alone: soul in the fullest possession of perception, knowledge, strength, and joy. This is the state called Moksha, *i.e.*, "Freedom," the "Salvation" of Jainism.

The acknowledgement of the Law of Karma as the commonest of all natural laws (the law of conservation of forces, as it were, in its application to the psychical sphere) culminates in the glorification of the *Principle of Ahimsa*, *i.e.*, Non-injury, in Jainism. For, according to the Law of Karma, a living being that causes a fellow-creature, even the lowest developed

one, to suffer, be it in order to further its own advantage, or for any other reason, cannot do so without harming its own soul, *i.e.*, without tumbling down a greater or smaller distance from the height of inner development it has reached, and without experiencing, earlier or later, as a mechanical consequence, a disturbance of its own harmonious equilibrium. What means suffering to one, can never be a source of real joy to another, and wherever it appears to be so, it is because our means of perception hinder us from being aware of the slow, but sure effectiveness of this Law of "Eternal Justice." This explains why the word "अहिंसा परमो धर्मः" *i.e.*, "Non-injury is the highest of all religious principles," acts such an important part in the daily life of the religiously inspired Jaina, whose sensible heart, a psychical galvanometer, as it were, warns him of every disturbance of well-being in the community of fellow-creatures around him, and spontaneously causes him to insert the resistance of self-control in the circuit of his own activity, or to restrain that of others in its proper course.

Strictly speaking, of all the religions that acknowledge the law of Karma in one shape or another, *i.e.*, practically of all the Indo-Aryan religions, it is Jainism with its all-comprising doctrine of soul, where the principle of Ahimsa has got the highest theoretical as well as practical importance, and where its place is substantiated more logically than anywhere else. Moreover, Jainism (unlike various other religious systems) does not believe the soul to be completely helpless in its dependence on Karma, *i.e.*, to be hopelessly condemned to act and react, like an automaton, upon the consequences of its former deeds, and to be therefore, beyond all responsibility for its moral attitude and actions. But Jainism clearly states that the individual is gifted with a certain amount of freedom of will: a fact which has, up till now, hardly been emphasized to the due extent, by Western writers on Jainism. And still, this tenet forms one of the most important and most complicate chapters of the doctrine of Karma, as expounded exhaustively in the

Jaina Scriptures. They state, it is true, that the soul is indeed constantly under the control of Karma, that its body and its sufferings and joys are indeed shaped by Karma, and that even those passions that shake it, and all the fatal instincts that arise in it, are predestined by Karma: but, on the other hand, they most emphatically declare that the soul is endowed with the power of breaking, by its free resolution and activity, the most obnoxious of the fetters of this very Karma, of destroying its own evil dispositions, and of suffocating the flames of all the various kinds of passion, before they can overpower it. That means nothing else but that the first and essential step towards religious activity, is a pronounced act of free volition, and that the soul is indeed, to a considerable extent, the lord of its own fate.

Thus, Jainism does not torpify its followers by the terrors of Karma, nor does it make them languish in unhealthy, effeminate fatalism, as many people think all oriental religions do: but on the contrary, it trains the individual to become a true hero on the battle-field of self-conquest.

For it does presuppose a great deal of heroism on the part of the hearer, to make him fully realize the cruel irony of this play of life, *viz.*, how they all strive after happiness by all means of physical and mental activity, from eating, drinking, sleeping, dressing, up to sport and play, traffic and trade, art and science, how they strive after happiness at any cost, even at the cost of the well-being of others, to reach, alas, just the contrary, *viz.*, the binding of undesirable Karma, and therewith latent sorrow and suffering! To make him realize all this, and to make him know that he cannot even quietly sit and breathe without killing and harming life round about, killing and harming brother-souls, and adding thereby to the stock of his own misfortunes! To make him aware of it, and still encourage him to take up the desperate struggle against this world of dark nights within and about him!

How can he take up this desperate struggle?

"कहं चरे कहं चिट्ठे कहमासे कहं सए।
कहं भुंजंतो भासंतो पावं कम्मं न बंधइ॥

"How to walk, how to stand, how to sit, how to lie down, how to eat, and how to speak, without binding undesirable Karma?"

The Dasavaikalika Sutra (IV. 7 f.), after giving a detailed description of the harm people do to other creatures merely by carelessness, puts these questions, and immediately lets the answer follow:

"जयं चरे जयं चिट्ठे जयमासे जयं सए।
जयं भुंजंतो भासंतो पावं कम्मं न बंधइ॥"

"By walking with care, standing with care, sitting with care, lying down with care, eating with care, and speaking with care the binding of undesirable Karma can be avoided."

The Acaranga Sutra discusses the subject in full breadth, and the Sutrakritanga Sutra, which goes more into the depth of the abstruse problem, goes so far as to state (II. 4) that the soul is binding bad Karma at any time whatsoever, even if it does not directly do evil actions, *i.e.*, even in sleep or in a state of unconsciousness. For as a man who has made up his mind to kill a certain person at the first best opportunity, goes about with his murderous intention day and night, and as his subconscious mind is constantly filled with those hostile sentiments towards that person, just so the individual is constantly filled with hostile sentiments towards the whole of creation, as long as he is inwardly prepared to satisfy, as soon as they will arouse him, his physical instincts, at the cost of the well-being of any other creature.

There is, according to the Sutras, only one way by which the individual can save himself from binding bad Karma, and that is the "*Pratyakhyana*," *i.e.*, the solemn vow of restriction concerning harmful acting. For it is not enough

not to do evil deeds, after all, but one must avoid them with full intention and deliberation. Thus, one can, *e.g.*, vow not to eat meat in order to give an assurance of safety, "Abhaya-dana," the noblest of all gifts, to a large group of animals; one can vow to avoid eating at night in order to put another kind of limit to one's actions connected with indirect harm for others; one can vow not to wear silk or fur, or leather foot-wear, for the benefit of the animals producing it; one can vow not to break flowers ; or not to kill any animal whatsoever, down to worms and insects; one can vow not to waste any articles of daily use, such as water, fire, food, clothes, beyond one's actual requirements; one can vow not to encourage the captivating and training of wild animals for the sake of sport or amusement, by avoiding to visit shows, etc., referring thereto; and one can vow to avoid thousands of similar actions connected with direct or indirect injury to other creatures. There are various kinds of Pratyakhyanas, from Pratyakhyanas of single actions of the above character, up to the stereotyped group of the five all-comprising Pratyakhyanas, called the Panca-Mahavrata or Five Great Vows, *viz.*, the Pratyakhyana of all physical injury whatsoever, that of all verbal injury, that of appropriating things arbitrarily, that of sexual intercourse and everything connected therewith, and that of keeping property or belongings of any kind. These five vows are taken by every Jain monk at the time of his initiation in a form of absolute strictness. They comprise not only the doing of those objectionable actions, but also the causing of their being done and the approval one might give to their being done, by thought, word, and action. The five Great Vows guarantee indeed the optimum of faultlessness attainable in this world. And this optimum is only attainable by persons of the highest qualities, who do not care to keep up any attachment whatsoever. Thus, a genuine Jaina Muni, even one of the twentieth century, will never use any vehicle, nor shoes, nor keep money, nor touch a woman, nor kindle or sit before

a fire, nor use unboiled water, nor take any food containing a trace of life, nor such food as has been prepared expressly for him, nor touch a green plant, for fear lest its delicate body might suffer from his bodily warmth, nor keep any property except his begging-bowls, his stick, and the scanty clothes that cover his body. And even these few things cannot well be called "property" in the sense of the Scriptures, because in their case, the characteristic which distinguishes property, *viz.*, the attachment of the owner, is wanting. And there are even a group of Jaina monks who renounce these few utensils too, walking about unclad, and using their hands as their eating vessels. But there are only a few of them, in the whole of India: the "Digambara" or sky-clad monks, whereas the other branch, the "Svetambara" or white-clad monks, come to several hundreds.

The standard of the usual Pratyakhyanas for lay men consists in the group of fixed Pratyakhyanas called the Twelve Laymen Vows, which can be taken in various shades of strictness and in optional number. Though standing below the standard of the ascetical vows, still they represent a high form of ethical conduct.

Not only the Jaina monks, but also the laymen are very particular about taking and keeping, besides those groups of fundamental "Vows," which are being taken only once in the whole life, and for life-time, a number of other, detatched Pratyakhyanas of the above described character for an optional period. For the Pratyakhyana is the very key to "Moksha": constant binding alone can lead to final "Liberty." Thus, there is practically no Jaina who will eat meat or fish or fowl, or even eggs, and there is no Jaina who will intentionally and without purpose kill or trouble a harmless living creature, be it even a fly. Most Jainas even avoid potatoes, onions, garlic, and other vegetables believed to be endowed with a higher vitality, as well as eating at night, and most Jainas take, for certain days, the vow of abstention from green vegetables, or from

travelling and moving out, or the vow of chastity and vows of innumerable other things.

The theoretical and practical valuation of the different kinds and shades of Pratyakhyanas depends not only on their duration, or on the quantity of the objects concerned, but first of all on their transcendental quality. For though all the souls, *i.e.*, all the living creatures, are equal in their original disposition, still they are observed to be in various phases of development towards perfection, in various stages of self-realization. According to the principle of economy, the higher developed ones are higher valued than the lower developed ones. Therefore the Karma bound by harming a higher developed being is thought to be of graver consequences than that bound by injuring a lower creature. Thus, plucking a handful of vegetables is by far less harmful than killing a cow, killing a menacing tiger less harmful than the murder of a peaceful antelope, or punishing a dangerous criminal of less consequences than an offence done to a saintly monk. This valuation, by-the-by, seems to have a counterpart in those less refined, universally adopted conceptions, which, with all expressions of disgust, condemn cannibalism, but do not object to the slaughtering of animals for culinary and other purposes, or which strictly forbid the bloodshed of a human being, but allow the murdering of the murderer, or that of the assailing or otherwise menacing enemy, all of which persons have ethics against them.

Thus much may be said concerning the Pratyakhyana of "Himsa," *i.e.*, Injury, that precaution against the binding of new latent suffering by deliberate abstention from actions connected with harm for others.

It has its counterpart in the attempts of securing new latent happiness, by furthering the well-being of others. Though there is no hope of gaining genuine, *i.e.*, completely pure and unhampered happiness as long as any particles of Karma of either kind mar the soul, still a certain amount of

good Karma is a necessary condition in order to secure that bodily and mental constitution from the basis of which the struggle against the obnoxious Karma particles can be successfully taken up. Good Karma is believed to be secured by charity, hospitality, and selfless service. And here too, a gradation of objects can be observed. It is, of course, meritorious to practise charity wherever our heart is moved to compassion. It is meritorious to build Pinjrapoles for the relief of poor, sick animals; it is meritorious to provide the poor hungry with bread, people suffering from cold with clothes, and homeless ones with a roof over their heads; still nothing can come up to the service done to a poor pious brother in Mahavira. The more he comes up to the ideal laid down in the Scriptures, the higher is considered to be the merit of serving him. This explains the remarkable zeal with which one can see Sravakas (laymen) hasten to feast a brother Jaina, especially on the day when the latter breaks a fast of long duration; and it accounts for the readiness with which a Jaina community or Jaina institution hastens to receive and to give facilities even to a foreign scholar who happens to be a student of Jainism, and whose learned activity in connection with Jainism is considered to be an undoubted religious merit. And it explains, last but not least, the unspeakable pleasure and devotion with which a Jaina family sees approaching towards their door the saintly monk or nun, who will enter with the greeting of " Dharmalabha " or a similar formula, and will allow the lord or lady of the house to put a small quantity of eatables into their bowl, provided that this action includes no direct or indirect injury to anybody, and that everything is in strictest accordance with the rules of monastic conduct and decency.

Now I have been asked several times whether it is true that the Jainas as alleged carry the virtue of charity so far as to cause, now and then, some poor wretch, whom they pay off, to yield his body as a pasture-ground for lice and fleas and other amiable creatures, and let them have their fill. According to my

firm conviction, this horrible allegation must be a bold invention. And if it is perhaps, against all probability, true that some ill-informed fanatic did such a thing, then he would have acted in straight opposition to the tenets of Jainism: for to make a being so highly developed as a human soul suffer in such a degrading way, in the name of all religions, would clearly fall under the heading of "Himsa" of worst and meanest injury, and would, besides, mean a downright insult to Religion in general.

Resuming, one can say that the social conduct prescribed by Jainism is characterized by the four attitudes "*Maitri*," "*Pramoda*," "*Karunya*," and "*Madhyasthya*," which have been grouped together in the following stanzas:

मा कार्षीत् कोऽपि पापानि मा च भूत् कोऽपि दुःखितः।
मुच्यतां जगदप्येषा मतिर्मैत्री निगद्यते॥
अपास्ताशेषदोषाणां वस्तुतत्त्वावलोकिनाम्।
गुणेषु पक्षपातो यः स प्रमोदः प्रकीर्त्तितः॥
दीनेष्वार्त्तेषु भीतेषु याचमानेषु जीवितम्।
प्रतीकारपरा बुद्धिः कारुण्यमभिधीयते॥
क्रूरकर्मसु निःशङ्कं देवतागुरुनिन्दिषु।
आत्मशंसिषु योऽपेक्षा तन्माध्यस्थ्यमुदीरितम्॥

"By *Maitri*, *i.e.*, amity, is meant that mentality which makes one wish that no creature should commit evil actions, that no creature should be suffering, and that the whole universe may find Salvation."

"*Pramoda*, *i.e.*, joy, designates the fullest appreciation of, and admiration for, the virtues of those who have shaken off all sin, and who can see through the essence of all things."

"*Karunya*, *i.e.*, compassion, is that trend of mind which makes one wish to help all creatures in need, all that are afflicted, and all that ask for their lives."

"*Madhyasthya*, *i.e.*, impartiality, is that indifference, or rather leniency one should always bear towards those who commit cruel actions, those who openly blaspheme the Divine,

or the spiritual teacher, and those who are filled with arrogance."

It is clear that all such principles, put in action, guarantee such an amount of happiness and peace within the whole brotherhood of living creatures, such a paradise-like state of general bliss, that one should wish them to be universally adopted and followed, to the benefit of all that lives.

On the other hand, it is true, they presuppose what appears to be a kind of sacrifice on behalf of the individual.

This apparent sacrifice at the cost of which that state of general well-being is being brought about, consists in a certain amount of personal happiness, or of expedients of the latter, which the individual has evidently to renounce, in the case of even the most insignificant of the Pratyakhyanas, and in every one of its positive altruistic efforts.

It is clear that the equilibrium of personal and general well-being would indeed remain incomplete, and Jainism could not be said to have fulfilled its noble task in the ideal way claimed before, if the individual would feel the apparent sacrifice to be an infringement on its happiness. In reality, however, both the sides are in perfect equilibrium : for there are deliberations which not only reconcile the individual with that so-called "sacrifice," but make it realize that it is, on the contrary, being benefited by it, and that this benefit by far outweighs the apparent disadvantage.

First of all, the motivation of the very "sacrifice" is, as we saw, an egotistic one : for if the individual submits to those restrictions, it does so in order to avoid the binding of unfavourable Karma, and therewith the storing up of latent suffering, and if it recurs to those actions of positive altruism, it does so in order to bind favourable Karma, and to secure latent happiness.

And both kinds of actions, those of negative as well as those of positive altruism, it does with the assistance of certain of its own natural dispositions, which form part of its "conscience." I mean those emotions of sympathy and compassion, which make us place ourselves in the situation of a suffering creature and suffer, as it were, with it, especially

when we have reason to feel ourselves responsible for its sufferings: as in the case of a night-flutterer rushing into the light we allowed to burn unscreened, in our carelessness, or in the case of a bird which was starved in its cage through our forgetfulness, or in the case of a helpless deer which we killed with our own hand, in a fit of huntsman's zeal, and the sight of whose mutilated body makes us, after all, sick and miserable. It is that universal postulate, which Hemachandra, the great Acharya and teacher of King Kumarapal of Gujarat, has expressed in that often quoted stanza (Yogasastra II, 20):

आत्मवत्सर्वभूतेषु सुखदुःखे प्रियाप्रिये ।
चिन्तयन्नात्मनोऽनिष्टां हिंसामन्यस्य नाचरेत् ॥

"In happiness and suffering, in joy and grief, we should regard all creatures as we regard our own self, and should therefore refrain from inflicting upon others such injury as would appear undesirable to us if inflicted upon ourselves."

Akin to dispositions of this kind is a certain sense of chivalrousness, a certain generosity, which overcomes us whenever we see a small innocent creature being at our mercy, provided our mind is calm enough to visualize its utter helplessness: that feeling which unfailingly overcomes even the case-hardened hunter on the occasion of battue-shooting, and which makes him, perhaps for an instant only, regret to have joined such an ungentlemanlike sport as this wholesale slaughter of helpless creatures surely is.

Another feeling of this kind is a certain instinct of economy, which, with sensible persons, proves a powerful pleader in favour of Ahimsa: I mean that spontaneous conviction that it is not right to kill, or to cause to be killed, such a high organized creature as a pigeon or a deer or a cow in order to flatter one's gluttonous appetites, when a dish of well-dressed vegetables would have served the same purpose just as well, if not better.

The appeasement of all these, and others of our social instincts, by avoiding the harming of, and trying to benefit, fellow creatures, is, after all, in itself a valuable personal gain.

In addition to avoiding bad and securing good Karma, and to appeasing its innate social instincts, the individual gains, by its non-egotistic attitude, a third advantage, which is perhaps the most valuable of all: it consists in the lasting and genuine bliss, that only renunciation can give.

For what is the good of trying to gratify all one's wishes, all one's passions, all one's ambitions? Is the advantage gained thereby, indeed worth so much hankering, so much worrying, and so much harm brought about? No, says the sage.

The happiness we crave for is transient like a dream, like a cloud, like beauty. It leaves the bitterness of its absence behind, as soon as it is passed, and it leaves behind, like a dose of opium, the ardent craving for more and more. It is just so as the Uttaradhyayana Sutra states (IX, 48):

सुवन्नरूप्पस्स उ पव्वया भवे सिया हु केलाससमा असंखया।
नरस्स लुद्धस्स न तेहिं किंचि इच्छा हु आगाससमा अणंतिया॥

"Let there be mountains of gold and silver, let them be as high as the Kailasa, and let there be innumerable ones of them: still to man in his greediness all this will mean nothing. For desire is boundless like space."

So what is the good of a drop of nectar, when you are thirsty for a cup-ful? The cup-ful being denied to you, why bother about the drop? Shake off that foolish wish and forget it.

And further, if gained, the happiness you crave for means possession—possession of land or fortune, houses or fields, beauty or skill, friends or family, honour or reputation. And possession involves the sorrow of its maintenance. You have incessantly to take care of your land and of your

fortune, you have to recur to lots of contrivances if you want to preserve your beauty or to retain your skill, you have to bring sacrifice over sacrifice for your friends and your family, you tremble for their lives when sickness shakes them, and suffer agonies when fate separates you from them, and the concern about his position and reputation, etc., has even proved able to urge a person to suicide and other desperate steps. In short, to speak in the words of Bhartrihari, the great Sanskrit epigrammatic writer :

सर्वं वस्तु भयान्वितं क्षितितले वैराग्यमेवाभयम् ॥

"Everything on earth is unstable. The only stable thing is Vairagya (*i.e.* world-weariness)."

What is the good of a happiness including so much agony? What is the good of this feasting with the Damocles-sword of sorrow threatening above your head? Would it not be much better to give up all this possession guaranteeing such a doubtful happiness? To give it up, as those saints of old did, of whom the Uttaradhyayana Sutra (IX. 15 f.) says as follows :

चत्तपुत्तकलत्तस्स निव्वावारस्स भिक्खुणो ।
पियं न विज्जई किंचि अप्पियं पि न विज्जइ ॥
बहुं खु मुणिणो भद्दमणगारस्स भिक्खुणो ।
संव्वतो विप्पमुक्कस्स एगंतमणुपस्सओ ॥

"To the begging monk, who has given up family life and all secular activity, nothing appears desirable and nothing undesirable."

"Great indeed is the bliss of the monk, the homeless beggar, who is free from all attachment, and who is aware of his solitude (which includes the metaphysical solitude of the soul)."

And then, say the wise, whether you hanker for its gain, or trouble for its preservation : all this happiness you are so particular about, means slavery in the last end. The anxiety you

feel about it, fills your mind, and mars your thinking from morn till night, so that, in your continuous worrying about your business, your position, your hobbies, your friends, your pleasures, and your wife and children, you do not find so much time as to ask yourself why you are doing all that, why you live, what you live for, and where you are steering to. You think that you do not care to ponder over it. But in reality, you are not free to do so, because you are the slave of your attachment to that empty, transient bit of happiness, which is, in reality, no happiness at all. Would it not be much better for you to be unconnected with all this, to be your own master, to be, like the Rishis and Munis of old, who, in their solitary meditations, unhampered by secular considerations, without comfort and property, without wife and children, without ambition and position, were in reality, the lords of the world ?

अर्थानामर्जने दुःखमर्जितानां च रक्षणे ।
आये दुःखं व्यये दुःखं धिग् द्रव्यं दुःखवर्द्धनम् ॥
अपायबहुलं पापं ये परित्यज्य संश्रिताः ।
तपोवनं महासत्त्वास्ते धन्यास्ते तपस्विनः ॥

"The acquisition of property, and if acquired, its preservation, both are connected with trouble. There is trouble in earning, and trouble in spending. Therefore, cursed be property, the increaser of unhappiness."

"Blessed are those ascetics, great souls are those ascetics, who have given up sin, the producer of so much suffering, and who have found a place of refuge in the grove of a hermitage."

It is not without reason that people in India have been giving to such "great souls" titles like "Svami," "Maharaj" and others, which in olden times, were applicable only to the truly renouncing ascetics, who were living examples of the fact that renunciation means power, and who indeed experienced that royal happiness of asceticitm, where there is

न च राजभयं न च चोरभयम्
इहलोकसुखं परलोकहितम् ॥

नरदेवनतं वरकीर्तिकरम्
श्रमणत्वमिदं रमणीयतरम् ॥

"No fear of the king, no fear of robbers, happiness in this, and bliss in the next world, reverence shown by men and gods, and the acquisition of true fame: delightful is this ascetical life."

Or, in other words

न चेन्द्रस्य सुखं किंचिन्न सुखं चक्रवर्तिनः ।
सुखमस्ति विरक्तस्य मुनेरेकान्तजोविनः ॥

"Nothing is the happiness of the king of the gods, nothing the happiness of the emperor of the world, compared to the happiness of the world-weary monk in his solitude."

All such considerations lead to the second great postulate of Jainism: *Sanyama* or *Renunciation, i.e.*, continuous self-control practised by giving up one's regards for physical happiness.

According to the Jaina conceptions, the individual is free to embrace whatever degree of renunciation it deems appropriate to its personal convictions and abilities. Just as Non-injury, Sanyama too can be resorted to by various kinds of Pratyakhyanas. And, Non-injury itself being not practicable without Sanyama, and Sanyama, on the other hand, needs resulting in Non-injury, the Pratyakhyanas concerning the former practically fall together with those concerning the latter great principle. Thus the climax of the Pratyakhyanas concerning Non-injury, *viz.*, the five great vows of monks, non-harming, non-lying, non-stealing, sexual renunciation, and non-property, forms, at the same time, also the climax of the Pratyakhyanas concerning Sanyama. The object is all the same, it is only the stand-point that has changed. For to the duty of omitting objectionable actions as far as they are fit to harm others, is being added the further obligation of omitting them also as far as they are fit to disturb one's own equilibrium and calmness of mind, and to detract one from that religious

activity so essential for one's real welfare. Thus the principles of Sanyama especially stands in the foreground in such particulars as the absolute prohibition of heavy food, of aphrodisiacs, excessive sleep, sexual activity, intoxicating substances, etc., for monks, and in the obligation of laymen to give up some of these things partially and some totally. The explicit command of the Scriptures never to give way to any of the four fundamental passions, *viz.*, anger, pride, deceit, and covetousness, which last includes all kinds of attachment to lifeless as well as living things, and many other regulations, fall likewise under this heading, notwithstanding their being rooted in Ahimsa after all.

Another important expedient of securing one's personal metaphysical advantage in fullest accordance with the laws of ethics, is very closely akin to, and based on, renunciation: I mean *Tapa, i.e., austerity,* or self-imposed suffering, undertaken for religious reasons. The purpose which the Jaina has in view when practising austerities, can be understood from the idea that all suffering means a consumption of bad Karma, and the voluntary undergoing of certain hardships has the further advantage of giving, at the same time, valuable assistance in the realisation of the two great principles Ahimsa and Sanyama. Thus:—

सउणी जइ पंसुगुंडिया विहुणिय धंसयइ सियं रयं।
एवं दविओवहाणवं कम्मं खवइ तवस्सी माहणे॥

Dasavaikalika Sutra.

"As a bird, covered with dust, gets rid of the latter, by shaking itself, just so the monk, who practises austerities, consumes and shakes off his Karma."

To get rid of Karma is, as we saw before, the first step to self-realization, and therewith to the last transcendental bliss. This is the reason why austerity plays such an important part in the life of the Jaina, the monk as well as the layman. Accord-

ing to the Jaina Scriptures, there are various ways of practising austerities, all of which are likewise solemnly started with the respective Pratyakhyanas, after accurately fixing their duration and other items. With particular reference to *Tapa*, there are Pratyakhyanas by which the quality, quantity, and time of one's meals are reduced, from the simple giving up of special kinds of food, of eating at night, etc., and from partial fasts, and fasts of a whole day or several days, up to fasts of more than a month's duration. There are further Pratyakhyanas by which one binds oneself to practise certain ascetical postures, to meditate for a fixed time, to devote a certain time to the regular study of the Sacred and other religious Scriptures, or to the service of co-religionists, etc. Several forms of austerity are at the same time recommended as strengthening and hardening one's bodily and mental powers, and as excellent furtherers of intellectual activity, as, *e.g.*, the Ambil Fast, a kind of bread-and-water diet which excludes all milk, fat, sugar, spices, etc., for a fixed time, and also certain Asanas, or ascetic postures, indeed prove to be. Of quite a different character is the austerity called Sallekhana, or Samlekhana, by which the individual solemnly resigns all food for the rest of his life, under formalities dealt with in the Avasyaka Sutra, the whole last chapter of which is devoted exclusively to the subject "Pratyakhyana." This form of austerity is indeed being recurred to by very religious people at the time when they positively feel death approaching, and every hope of living on has vanished.

Thus it is true that Jainism allows, under certain circumstances, the vow of starvation. But it would be wrong to infer therefrom that its ideal is the extinguishment of personal activity at all. Just the contrary is true. Jainism promulgates self-realization as the aim of individual life: a self-realization which, at the same time, forms the basis of the well-being of all that lives. The achievement of this self-realization presupposes, on the part of the individual, the highest exertion of all bodily and mental powers, constant wakefulness, and an iron will,

which precisely obeys the behests of intellect, bravely resisting all kinds of internal and external temptations. More practically speaking, it presupposes a reasonable kind of self-preservation in the narrowest limits possible. There is a parable, according to which six hungry travellers came to a mango-tree, and consulted as to how best to obtain its fruit. The first suggested to uproot the whole tree, as the promptest expedient, the second said that it would just do to cut the crown, the third wanted to cut some taller, the fourth some smaller branches, the fifth suggested that they should merely pluck as many fruits as they required, and the last said that the ripe fruit that the wind had blown down into the grass, would be amply sufficient to appease their hunger. The six men symbolize, in the above succession, the six Lesya or "colours" of souls, representing types of increasing purity. It is quite characteristic of the spirit of Jainism that the representative of the white colour, or of the type of highest purity, advises to eat the fruit fallen into the grass, but not, as absolute and one-sided negation of life would suggest, to sit down in fullest renunciation, and to die of hunger.

The postulate of Self-preservation within the reasonable limits of ethical decency is clearly and directly pronounced in the Jaina Scriptures, which recommend it, in critical cases, even at the cost of renunciation or Sanyama (Oghaniryukti, Stanzas, 47-48):

सव्वत्थ संजमं संजमाओ अप्पाणमेव रक्खिज्जा ।
मुच्चइ अइवायाओ पुणो विसोही न याऽविरई ॥
संजमहेउं देहो धारिज्जइ सो कओ ओ तदभावे ।
संजमफाइनिमित्तं देहपरिपालना इट्ठा ॥

"Before all, one should guard the rules of renunciation, but even at the cost of renunciation, one should guard one's self. For one can get rid again of the sin of transgression, if one atones for it afterwards (by austerities), and it is, as a

matter of fact, not a case of Avirati (*i.e.*, the state of not being under any Pratyakyana whatsoever, or the state of religious licentiousness)."

"The body is the instrument of renunciation. How could a man perform renunciation without it? Therefore, it is desirable to preserve the body for the sake of making one's Sanyama increase."

Thus, even the rules laid down for monks—for these two stanzas refer to monastic conduct—stand under the immediate influence of this principle. The monk, it is true, is supposed to fast and to renounce, to observe absolute chastity, to meditate, and to suffer all kinds of inconveniences and hardships, but he has, on the other hand, to follow special prescriptions as to how to accept, within narrow limits, pure food and other requisites offered, how to walk and how to sleep, how to sit and how to speak, how to serve fellow-ascetics, and how to receive their service, how to preach and how to dispute, how to work and how to move in the world as it is, with its saints and its criminals, its laymen and laywomen, its Hindus and Bauddhas, its scholars and peasants, and its kings and beggars.

In short, he is taught how to regulate his whole bodily and mental activity in order to be in constant and undisturbed harmony with all that lives around him, under all conditions given. He is shown the way how to secure the optimum of his own personal happiness in such a manner as to contribute even thereby to the welfare of the world; or how to help making the world more perfect by his own perfection.

Thus, the very secret of Jainism is contained in the three important words "*Ahimsa*," or Non-injury, "*Sanyama*" or Renunciation, and "*Tapa*," or Austerity; words which the famous first stanza of the Dasavaikalika Sutra so beautifully groups together as the essence of Dharma, *i.e.*, Religion:

धम्मो मंगलमुक्किट्ठमहिंसा संजमो तवो।
देवाऽवि तं नमंसंति जस्स धम्मे सया मणो॥

"Religion is the highest of all blessings: it comprises Ahimsa, Sanyama, and Tapa. Even the gods bow down to him whose mind is always centred in Religion."

Then the Sutra continues with the following classical verses, which are, like the above one, amongst the words to be daily recited by monks:

जहा दुम्मस्स पुप्फेसु भमरो आवियइ रसं।
ण य पुप्फं किलामेइ सो अ पीणेइ अप्पयं॥
एमेए समणा मुत्ता जे लोए संति साहुणो।
विहंगमा व पुप्फेसु दाणभत्तेसणारया॥
वयं च वित्तिं लब्भामो न य कोइ उवहम्मइ।
अहागडेसु रीयंते पुप्फेसु भमरा जहा॥
महुगारसमा बुद्धा जे भवंति अणिस्सिया।
नाणापिंडरया दंता तेण वुच्चंति साहुणो॥

"As the bee drinks honey from the blossoms of a tree and gets sated, without causing pain to the blossom, just so are those monks, who gave up all attachment and who are truly 'good ones' (original: 'Sadhu,' *i.e.*, also 'monks') in the world. As the bees with the blossoms, they are gratified with begging their alms,"

"Their device is 'Let us find something to live on, without any creature being harmed.' This is why they go in quest of what they find ready, as the bee does on the blossoms."

"Wise are those who act like the bees, and who are free from all bonds of dependence. Pleased they are with any food they obtain, and ever self-controlled. This is why they are called 'Sadhus' (*i.e.*, 'the good ones' and 'monks')."

The ideal of what human life can be like, and ought to be like, in the light of all these conceptions, is illustrated by the figure of the Jina, or Arhat, the supposed initiator of a new period of reawakening Jainism after a period of decay. Many such Arhats are related to have appeared on earth, many are said to be living even now in distant regions, and many to be expected in future too. The Jina or Arhat is man at the

summit of perfection, man at the threshold of *Moksha*, ready to enter Siddhasila, the place of eternal bliss, from where there is no return into this world of imperfection.

His Karmas, with the exception of some neutral ones, are fallen off from him, and the innate qualities of his soul are expanded in fullest beauty and majesty. He is omniscient, all-perceiving, filled with infinite joy and infinite strength. He is free from all passion and attachment, free from desire—for desire is nothing but an expression of imperfection, and yet he is man, and has to keep his human body as long as the neutral rest of his Karmas force him to keep it. He is man and, as one part of the Jaina tradition, that of the Svetambar branch, so beautifully suggests, has to satisfy the requirements of his human body: to beg his food, to eat and to sleep, within the limits prescribed for a monk, since the rest of his Karmas require him to do so. And the rest of his Karmas also require him to live exclusively to the benefit of the world, *i.e.*, of those souls that are still in the bonds of dangerous Karmas. For as long as he lives in his human shape, he goes about showing to the whole of creation the right path, by preaching and teaching, and by the example of his own model life. And it is obvious that the activity and life of the perfect one does indeed turn out to be a blessing, for he cannot but attract crowds of followers and imitators.

This is what the Jaina worships as his highest religious ideal, his "god," if one chooses to say so. He adorns his statue with pearls and diamonds, with roses and jasmine and costly champak flowers, he fans it, as one does a great king, with white chowries, he burns sweet frankincense before it, and builds beautiful temples over it, beautiful and costly as fairy palaces, and he takes it round the city in gorgeous processions, on golden cars, followed by crowds of singing women in gay-coloured, gold-glittering *sarees*: still he knows that his god dwells high beyond all this, and that all this *bhakti*, or pious service is nothing but an expression of his own admiration for

his chosen ideal, and a kind of expedient to bring it closer before his eyes and the eyes of the world, both of whom are pretty well in need of it.

Jinahood shares the quality of all ideals, to be, in spite of —or perhaps just on account of—its undiminished and undiminishable attractiveness, high above the bodily and mental standards of its admirers and imitators. And even Jaina-monkhood, its reflection on the rough mirror of actual life, is high above the standard of average man, and will always remain restricted—owing to the diversity of human dispositions—to a few privileged individuals, wanderers, as it were, on the heights of humanity. The institution of monkhood and all the other institutions of Jainism presupposing the world as it really is and humanity as it really is, the Scriptures do not account for the question as to what would become of the Universe if all people would turn monks, and it remains undecided whether that venerable Muni was right, who replied to the idle questioner that in such a case the good Karmas of mankind would cause wish-trees to grow, and streams of Amrita to flow, and gods to descend from their celestial abodes and serve them.

But even if it is not possible for everybody perfectly to come up to that ideal, still, merely acknowledging it to be an ideal, and trying to cultivate as many of its virtues as one's constitution allows, even thus much is considered to be a step towards advancement.

This is what I think to be the secret of Jainism, and what is, at the same time, a mental attitude without which a real advancement of human culture is not possible. We are living in a generation which encourages, by all means imaginable, a boundless egotism on one side, and on the other, an unrestrained violence offered to living creatures, in the shape of slaughter and war and misery: and then we think that our egotism can be satiated by regardlessness towards others, and that the violence we suffer, can be abolished by

our doing violence to others. Has there ever been a greater and more fearful mistake ? Why not acknowledge now that we are wrong, and that the way we have taken must lead to a hopeless degeneration ? Why not comprehend at last that egotism cannot succeed unless it dissolves in altruism, and that a reasonable altruism must needs lead to perfect individual bliss ? This clear and simple axiom is the basis of that time-honoured doctrine, which forms the legacy of the last Arhat, and which, even if taken as a symbol, represents such a noble image of eternal truth.

Having been asked so often as to what I think to be the innermost secret of Jainism, and what its merit as a practical religion, I have tried to give a short answer to-day, which the educated reader might be able and willing to follow. At first sight, it might appear to be a one-sided answer, because it is based on the one problem of the mutual relations of individual and society : still, this problem is one of vital importance, and it is, as I said before, the only touch-stone by which the value of a religion can be objectively ascertained.

I think there can be no doubt that Jainism stands the test.

CHARLOTTE KRAUSE

HENRIK IBSEN

The poignant termination of "*A Doll's House*" was so out-of-the-way judged by the then prevailing notions of the dramatic critics that some theatre-managers sought to improve upon it by the simple expedient of expurgating the last scene *in toto*, the very scene that makes the play the enthralling and edifying masterpiece it has been universally acknowledged to be. The arch mandarins of dramatic criticism made out that "*A Doll's House*" was based on a false conception of conjugal relations. They argued that Nora ought not to have left her husband in such a precipitous manner: she ought to have clung to him through thick and thin. There wasn't the least necessity for it; it would have been far better for everyone concerned had she never left Helmer: so on and so forth they raised parrotting cry. Henrik Ibsen wathed it all with grim sobriety: perhaps it has precisely the sort of criticism he had expected, indeed had ardently wished for. For now he could give his critics the crushing reply their philistinism so richly deserved. Ibsen knew that society should be shaken to its foundations as in an earthquake ere the pure gold of molten lava could come forth to purge the world of its false and detestable ideals. He must exasperate them if he would have his brethren think. And in such a mood did Henrik Ibsen sit to write his next play—'*Ghosts.*' Slowly he worked at it and it was at last published in 1881. Intellectually it is a sequel to '*A Doll's House*' :it is reply to, condemnation of and a powerfully sinister warning roundly aimed at, that snug entity we are all of us agreed in calling 'society.' Never before or since have the theatres of the world put on boards such a poignant and tragic study of marriage and its attendant horrors, once it is deviated from its natural course by too much insistence on the cramping restrictions of futile ideals. There is nothing either obscene or ugly about it: what elements of

repellent nature one finds there are but the concoctions of ordinary human processes, derived by logic and a grip of the realities of science. And yet it was the one play of Ibsen's to earn for its immortal author an immense vocabulary of abuse. Not its least interesting pages are those where Bernard Shaw in his "Quintessence of Ibsenism" quotes passages from the late Mr. William Archer's article entitled 'Ghosts and Gibberings': at any rate they give the lay reader a pointed indication of the extent to which conservatism and prejudice could lead critics not strong enough on their moorings, To quote but a few of the lavishly bequeathed expressions. 'Ghosts' was called 'abominable,' 'disgusting,' 'loathsome,' 'fetid,' 'scandalous,' 'blasphemous,' 'abhorrent,' 'wicked,' alas, there really is no end to the catalogue. And why indeed was '*Ghosts*' deemed so deserving of all that besmirching? The answer is to be gleaned partly from the challenging nature of the theme itself and partly from the unintrospective congestion of the average critic's faculties. The conventional critic could understand a Greek tragedy: Aristotle has told them how to. He could find a shadow of poetic justice, as he calls it, in the most painfully vibrant of Shakespearean tragedies: the doctrine of 'tragic obsession' or of 'unconscious flaw' and all that sort of diplomatic phraseology smoothes the way for the critic and he is not only satisfied by the performance but he actually asserts from housetops that it has purged him of unworthy emotions and made the world a worthier place to live in. But not thus is Ibsen's '*Ghosts*' fashioned. In the tragic horror that it smites you with, it is no whit inferior to '*Œdipus Tyrannus*' or '*King Lear*': perhaps the horror is more intrinsically horrible and deadly in the tragic denouement of Ibsen's play than in either of the other two. But the difference is what matters: it is the manner in which the *cause* leading to the tragic consummation is worked out or explained away that a fundamental divergence between the elder tragedians and Ibsen is discernible. '*Ghosts*' deals with the crash neither of the hero swayed by 'Two Ideals' nor of the hero

who acts criminally with conscious intent nor of those others who fall down the precipice of ambition, arrogance or lust. Ibsen's hero—one could call Oswald so only in a technical sense—is simply and plainly the victim of heredity: his tragedy is in effect a sort of ironical illustration of the 'divine' principle of dispensation: in other words, Ibsen's play is a scientific and pungent commentary on the Biblical saying: "The sins of the fathers shall be visited upon the children."

But then what is the kernel of this "putrid, morbid, unhealthy, unwholesome and disgusting story?" Helene is another Nora, but a Nora successfully projected on and fixed to the Kalighat of wifely devotion, even when the object of all her devotion is no worthier than a filthy beast. Mrs. Alving finds life with her husband intolerable and takes refuge in the house of Parson Manders, the idol of her ardent love. Unluckily he is an idealist by vocation and in practice: he persuades her that willy-nilly she must return home and desert her husband never. What the critics vociferated against in '*A Doll's House*' is here made good: Mrs. Alving pulls herself together with a supreme determination and dedicates her energies to the sole task of setting her husband's house in order. With a resignation born of an unflinching endurance she winks at his unnamable debaucheries. A son is born to her. But the only thing the father does is to make him smoke when scarce seven years old and then to give vent to a boisterous horse-laugh. Mrs. Alving is seriously afraid that Oswald would imbibe the qualities of his father if she did not separate them at once and as long as her husband lives. Accordingly he is sent abroad and educated by expert tutors. The Alving properties are entirely managed by the wife herself and her unexceptionable business capacity stands her in good stead. At last she detects to her irrepressible rage a liaison between her husband and her own attendant. After the first ebullition has calmed down, she takes all necessary precautious to screen the scandal. The woman is sent away but her husband's daughter by that woman is taken in the Alving household. Certainly

Regina has as much right to the protection of the Alving House as Oswald. And then the husband dies by sheer exhaustion of his strength. Now a new avenue of duty is opened up to Mrs. Alving. Is it not a wife's duty to honour her husbands' memory? Should not her whole life be ruled by the single purpose of making other folks too do likewise? Is she not in duty bound to make assurance doubly sure in the matter of Oswald's unswerving recognition of the high nobility of his father? Lastly, ought she not to erect an enduring monument for the departed soul to place Alving's memory on a permanent basis so that with the passage of time its distilled essence may not be diminished by one tiny jot of efficacy? Mr. Manders has no two opinions to offer on these points. "Proceed with the Orphanage, Mrs, Alving: that will be the fittest monument for your unfortunate husband," says the parson in effect. As for Oswald he has been nourishing all these years only the rosiest picture of his father. So consistently calculating has been the stream of lying letters from mother to son. However Oswald has some difficulty in reconciling this picture of his father with that other which was painted in lurid and disgusting colours by an eminent physician who had the impudence to tell him that he had inherited a grossly perverted disease from his father. Now at last he returns to the Alving house to witness the dedication ceremony of the Alving Orphanage. Mrs. Alving is visibly moved and hopes that the inauguration of the golden era of her life will very soon be an accomplished fact. But it is just now that disappointments fall upon her head with lightning rapidity and logical succession. Oswald is sick at heart: a sardonic smile curls over his boyish lips: on seeing the well-developed Regina his carnal appetites are aroused and he tries to kiss her and ravish her: Regina shrieks, "Oswald! Are you mad? Let me go!" Mr. Manders and Mrs. Alving are in the adjoining room. The sensible woman understands how matters are going: as in a flash this brings back to her memory the other occasion when

she had similarly been shocked by her husband's outrage on Regina's mother. She finds nothing surprising in this: with an overmastering wriggling of her soul she says in a dull and hoarse tone: "Ghosts. The couple in the conservatory—over again." And then she decides half subconsciously that Oswald shall marry Regina, half sister though she undoubtedly is, if that should be necessary to ensure the happiness of the thrice-beloved boy. Already she is willing to sacrifice some of those fond ideals she had till then passionately hugged close to her heart. But now her boy's happiness is more to her than the staggering array of a whole contingent of ideals. Parson Manders however is not of the same opinion. He warns her as fearfully as he could: "Do not spurn ideals, Mrs. Alving—they have a way of avenging themselves cruelly." Cruelly indeed come the chain of disasters: the new Orphanage is burnt down, uninsured as it is. She knows it is a judgment on the House of Sins and dismisses the matter with scarce an audible groan. And then opens Act III. It is throughout unrelieved by a solitary comic gesture. The tragic key is high-pitched and level to the very end. Like three ghosts Regina, Mrs. Alving and Oswald talk of arrangements for the future. Mrs. Alving acquaints the young pair of the truth about their parentage: Regina infers also that Oswald is not the muscular person, in the full vigour of health, she had taken him for. Life in this house of ghosts has no attractions for her. Moreover she has the rebel blood of her father in her veins: a life of sensuality beckons her from afar and, another victim of heredity, she abruptly leaves the Alving house, very probably to be soon enrolled as one of the Devil's choicest disciples. Her parting words are significant: "I really cannot stay here in the country and wear myself out looking after invalids.....If Oswald takes after his father, it is just as likely I take after my mother." There are now the two ghosts left in the dimly lighted hall: the early hours of the morning are imperceptibly brushing past this impossible pair of ghosts. Oswald clearly sees that he

can tarry no longer. He must take his mother into confidence, well as he knows how it would pain her. "Let us have a little chat, mother," he says, solemnly sitting down on the couch. The situation is ominous and beyond the ken of human comprehension. Slowly, with measured emphasis, the words emanate from the half-parted lips of Oswald: Mrs. Alving pricks her ears; they are faint in intensity, stabbing in intent. He tells her that it is no ordinary disease he is ailing from: no, it is a hereditary curse connected with the head; it is the imminent possibility of "a softening of the brain;" it is in other words a condition of abject helplessness which may overtake him at any moment and prolong till the last moments of life; it is the immediacy of a life-long mental paralysis. The unhappy mother cannot swallow this: she shrieks, she screams, she springs up to her feet in consternation. But Oswald has not come to the end of his recital: he goes on with the same studied though intensely painful emphasis: "Yes, it is so indescribably horrible, you know. If only it had been an ordinary mortal disease—I am not so much afraid of dying..... But this is so appallingly horrible. To become like a helpless child again—to have to be fed,.....Oh, it's unspeakable!" Now that she knows all, would she be willing to give him a 'helping hand' if the calamity should soon overtake him? He shows her a box he always keeps about himself, (in his inner breast-pocket that is,) and asks her if she would not be truly motherly to him and give him a potion of morphia powder or say a few pills from the box so that Oswald may not live that second childishness and ghostly snivelling existence even for one unnecessary hour? Regina, so splendidly and so radiantly light-hearted, would have given him with a thousand thanks this last helping hand. Would his beloved mother refuse that great solace to a tortured mind which a mere step-sister would have been only too glad to grant? On the answer to this question depends his peace of mind. She screams loudly. "I" she exclaims in horror. "Who has a better right than you?"

he answers. "I! Your mother!" she blurts out. "Just for that reason," Oswald says curtly. "I, who gave you your life!" Mrs. Alving explains. "I never asked you for life. And what kind of a life was it that you gave me? I don't want it! You shall take it back!" She thinks after this that he is insane even then. She runs to fetch a doctor. Oswald sees through her mind and with a quick movement locks up the door from within. "Have you a mother's heart,—" he vociferates, still following her: "and can bear to see me suffering this unspeakable terror?" Mrs. Alving is vanquished. She would give him the potion, "if it should become necessary." And meanwhile they are to "live together as long as they can." She watches her son reclining in his arm-chair. There is a ghastly silence save for the words of the mother and these sound as hoary voices from the tomb. Little by little the rays of the morning dawn upon the world: she puts out the table lamp: "It is sunrise. The glaciers and peaks in the distance are seen bathed in the bright morning light." Suddenly Oswald says: "Mother, give me the sun." The knell is struck at last. Living death is written on the countenance of the chubby boy. The doctor had only spoken the truth. Mr. Manders too had spoken only the grim truth. She passes her trembling hands into Oswald's pockets and grasps the instrument of his liberation. No, she cannot, she will not poison her own son. No, No, No—Yes,—No, No. She is a regular ghost now. And Oswald mechanically murmurs in sepulchral gloom: "The sun, the sun." The reader flings away the book in unmanageable turmoil of his elementary emotions.

There is no such denouement in all literature. It is so unutterably tragic that it may well be pronounced to be the most tragic piece ever written. Nor is the tragedy of the play confined to the unbearably intermixt pain and pathos of mother and son: If that were all, one might dismiss the play with a casual shudder and shrug of one's shoulders. No alas, there is something else The crucial tragedy in '*Ghosts*" while it interpenetrates and

envelops in a thick veil of impenetrable horror the two chief characters, transcends this limitation and surveys humanity itself with an ironic and sinister glance. The untameable and invincible monster 'Heredity' with his unescapable implications and perverse potentialities to cause and sustain human misery on a vast scale, gapes ravenously at toiling humanity: and the latter has perforce to swallow the unsavoury and killing truth that here is a reality that is a curse, a curse over which no force here or there has any controlling authority: its everlasting sway over us is also our everlasting misery. Ibsen's play, so much discussed and so much applauded, is the first work in world literature to have understood and gauged the enormous resources of this monster. This is high achievement enough.

The infamy and ridicule that were showered by unbalanced critics on this play have been already alluded to. It was therefore no wonder that Henrik Ibsen wanted to tell the rabble a bit of his own mind about their attitude. Also, the imperious gravity of '*Ghosts*' made it inevitable that he should attempt something in a somewhat lighter vein. The result was 'An *Enemy of the People*," published one year after the appearance of "*Ghosts*." This is the last of the four plays in which Ibsen went beyond the functions of the dramatist pure and simple and wielded the sword of the iconoclast preaching with pointed force the importance of the individual in his relation to society. In the later plays he is more concerned with the workings of the individual soul in its relations to one or two others and not to the whole of society. The later productions are theses on special items of the evolution of the individual. But the four that were published between 1877 and 1882 have more universal a significance and each is a sermon, artistic in cast and dramatic in medium, on four fundamental concepts. Truth and freedom are the Pillars of Society, this in the first play: a woman must develop her own individual personality even in her husband's home, this in '*A Doll's House*': the sins of the fathers are visited upon us children, the more is the pity (or horror ?) on both

sides, this in '*Ghosts*'—these are the social-didactic pills tha Ibsen wished to wash down our throat even as we gasped awe struck at his denouements. In '*An Enemy of the People*' the idea that is typified in the character of Dr. Stockmann, is the paradoxical affirmation that 'The strongest man is he who stands most alone.' Ibsen spurned ideals in whatever garb they masqueraded themselves: he had ever a demoniacal energy to tear these mockeries with vengeful violence. To him 'duty,' 'piety,' 'truth' (of a sort) and 'society' were not alone in the category of ideals: he scented and exposed their mischievous presence even in such apparently well-meaning abstractions as 'Democracy,' 'the infallibility of the Majority,' 'the Press' and such others. '*An Enemy of the People*' is in effect a counterblast to the vain pretensions of 'Democracy,' the so-called 'Liberal Majority' and the modern Press.

The facts of the story are quite simple. The municipality and certain other vested interests in a coast town in Norway are much worried about the success of the Municipal Baths. The Medical Officer of the Baths, on the other hand, who happens also to be the brother of the Mayor, has come to the conclusion that water in the Baths is much contaminated by sewage water and that consequently what the Baths offer to invalid visitors is not health in any form or quality but only poison. He has carefully carried out his researches and has no doubts about the validity of his conclusion. What he recommends the Mayor to do is to suspend opening the Baths for a year or two and in the meanwhile to lay out specially constructed pipes. But the Mayor looks literally blue and so also all those who have interests at stake in the Baths concern. But the indomitable idealist would not be silenced. Reposing faith in the promises of a time-serving journalist and the too-cautious Chairman of the Householders Association, Dr. Stockmann proposes to tell the whole world about the actual rotten condition of the Municipal Baths. Within a few hours after giving their promises the journalist as well as the Chairman of the Householders

Association join the camp of the Mayor. The press would not print his report: the newspapers would have nothing whatsoever to do with the mad opinions and the madder enterprises of Dr. Stockmann: and license to hold a public meeting is denied him. Enraged beyond control, stirred to the lowest depths by indignation and spurred on by an uncontrollable and terrific energy to declare himself at any cost, he decides to address a meeting in the private enclosure of one Captain Horster. His wife, daughter and two sons keep him company. In the meeting by general consent of the audience a Chairman is elected who takes from the beginning an antagonistic attitude towards the opinions of Dr. Stockmann. The Mayor also addresses the meeting and appeals to those assembled not to be easily carried away by ill-timed rumours and false allegations. Then Dr. Stockmann rises to address the 'people.' He takes off the mask of hyprocrisy inherent in every man and reveals to them one after another the various truths he has discovered during the past few hours. First: "all the sources of our *moral* life are poisoned and the whole fabric of our civic community is founded on the pestiferous soil of falsehood." There are outbursts and exclamations and interruptions. He speaks louder and denounces more squarely. Then falls from him the second bean: "The most dangerous enemy of truth and freedom amongst us is.....the damned compact Liberal Majority." By this time he is frantic, almost demented: then comes the third and final bean: "The Majority has *never* the right on its side.....At present the stupid people are in an absolutely overwhelming majority all the world over. (How reminiscent is this of Carlyle's famous dictum: 'The majority of mankind are fools'!) The minority is always in the right. He has said sufficiently irritating wisdom to infuriate the common people: they forthwith declare by an all but unanimous vote that Dr. Stockmann is "An Enemy of the People." The uproar is chaotic: the mob wishes to stone Dr. Stockmann and his family. They actually pelt his house with stones that would not even

harm a rabbit. The school authority send him word that he should withdraw his children immediately from school. His daughter, a school mistress, is asked to quit. The proprietor of the house serves him with a notice to vacate it immediately. This is what the Mayor tritely terms 'mutability' of public opinion. Dr. Stockmann however has no more illusions about himself or about the world. The loyal Captain places his house at the complete disposal of this martyr to truth. And Dr. Stockmann, beaming with undeniable joy, and gathering the small coterie of his family and friends around him says, rather confidentially as though what is coming out is of too profound import to be cheaply advertised,... "The strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone."

It is important that the moral of these 'beans' should not be misunderstood. In a letter to George Brandes, Ibsen clarified his position as follows: "I mean that minority which leads the van and pushes on to destinations which the majority has not yet reached. I mean: that man is right who has allied himself most intimately with the future." In another letter, also to Brandes, he gave the following justification for the failure of Dr. Stockmann: "the fighter in the intellectual vanguard can never sway a Majority with his opinions." Doubtless the realist is true in this as in his various other conclusions. It would of course be an unwarranted perversion of truth to maintain that Ibsen was an anarchist with an immeasurable hatred of all forms of government. He did realise that democracy and for that matter every other human institution had its own function to perform. But what he objected to in unambiguous language was the arrogation by these institutions of an infallibility for all their decisions against the individual and of an authority to coerce and crush those who dared to assert their own individual will. These institutions might hold sway over their component atoms (that is, the individuals) within certain specified and highly circumscribed limits. The words of Dr. Stockmann—"It is the majority of our community that denies

me freedom of speech and seeks to prevent my speaking the truth ''—are in fact the indirect expression, nevertheless the authentic statement, of Ibsen's own point of view. '*An Enemy of the People*' is in more respects than one a thrillingly insinuating thesis in Political Science: and perhaps as such Ibsen wrote it. It is by far the most unanswerable and pungent of artistic onslaughts on modern pseudo-commercial-political activities. After "*An Enemy of the People*" Henrik Ibsen turned and rightly to "fresh woods and pastures new," in the shoreless realms of drama.

(*To be continued.*)

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

THE FUTURE OF OUR FOREIGN EXCHANGE BANKS

A Central Bank of Issue and its Control over Exchange.

Now that the long-operating gold-exchange standard system has practically removed wide exchange fluctuations altogether, it remains to see how the same desirable feature can be obtained under the Central Bank management of a gold standard. The sole purpose of the gold standard is to achieve stability of foreign exchange. Free gold export shipments and due contraction of credit would restore the exchange rate back to its old moorings. Similarly free gold imports and a liberal credit-policy would raise the domestic price-level and check exports with the result that imports would increase and gold would flow back so that the unduly favourable balance of payments would tend to correct itself.[1] This is the conception of the automatic gold standard which however is not the standard that has been adopted of late by the important countries. The new gold standard does not solely aim at creating devices for stabilising exchanges alone but it seeks to stabilise the value of gold and thus prevent long-term upward or downward movements in the value of gold or price-levels. An effort is thus being made to attain general stability of the world price-level, over short- as well as long-term periods. It is not necessary to discuss the further aspects of the new gold standard which is now being uniformly accepted by almost all other countries.

[1] See Taussig, International Trade, Part 3 (1927). An adverse trade balance is set right by altered exchange rates and this would lead to the building up of a favourable trade balance. This corrective would be efficacious if economic conditions do not change, *viz.*, that the volume of domestic currency is not being inflated that budgets are being balanced, that speculation does not enter the exchange market, that invisible items do not alter the balance of payments and that no arbitrary restrictions are imposed on the movement of trade and of exchange rates.

It is apparent then that if the Reserve Bank were to be started in this country this control over the exchange value of the currency can be secured by its policy. With the disappearance of the Government as the " currency authority " or its dominance over the Central Bank which we have witnessed in the case of the Imperial Bank, the Central Bank has to maintain the exchange level. Operating the new gold standard whose important features would be the absence of a gold currency and international co-operation with the other new gold standard countries, the procedure of parting with actual gold or gold exchange can be resorted to as in the case of the Reichsbank of Germany. It might even adopt the obligation to sell gold or gold exchange only when the gold export point is reached as is the case now with the Nederlands Bank to those countries which would permit the free movements of gold. The administrative technique might be different but the principle is always to be the restoring of exchange conditions to stability. Its control over the price-level would be aiming at stability, internal as well as external, *i.e.*, " within as well as without " as Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, would put it.[2]

The main problem ahead is not the maintenance of the stable exchange alone, which can however be realised as a part of the Central Bank management of the new gold standard, but our attention should be rivetted on the immediate problem of financing foreign trade with domestic resources. Exports and imports have reached the pre-war level only in the year 1927-1928.[3] They are bound to expand in the near future. The financing of this huge foreign trade at home is essential. Another part of the duty would be the facilitating of the transfer of the net balance of payments to India proper.

[2] See the Evidence before the Hilton-Young Commission.

[3] See the Review of the Trade of India, 1927-28.

The Defects of the Present-day Foreign Exchange Banks.

The chief counts of indictment against the powerful foreign exchange banks as they exist now are that they compete with the Indian Joint-Stock Banks not only in the matter of securing deposits but in financing borrowers in the slack season, that they drain away resources from this country for services which can be performed equally efficiently by progressive domestic banks, that they promote trade in raw materials and the industrialisation of the country is no definite policy of their own, that they refuse to adapt themselves to the requirements of a great agricultural country like India where produce advances are more necessary and should be made freely, that they do not teach the principles of foreign investment banking, that they stoop to unfair tactics against budding rivals, that they are tending to amalgamate with the big London Joint-Stock Banks and future economic development might be served well or ill by these huge financial leviathans, that they do not give an adequate return for the " open-door policy " we maintain, that they form a compact homogeneous group and give no positive encouragement to the Indian Bank officers to rise to positions of responsibility, that they tend to drain away funds from up-country centres to the ports in the busy season thereby leading to better financial facilities to exporters rather than the cultivators and industrialists, that they have not set up economic standards of bank management and organisation before the Indian Joint-Stock Banks who are financing internal trade requirements and that they will not fit in in a nationally managed banking service which may be planned in the near future to develop our national resources and create productive industry. In short, they refuse to be instruments of national progress. In view of their past opposition to the Central Bank proposals, it is likely that, when the Central Bank would be started they would certainly refuse to co-operate with it.[4] Its resolute leadership might be opposed by

[4] See the Evidence of C. Nicoll before Hilton-Young Commission, 9N-14148, Vol. V.

these banks and Central Bank control might become a mere fantastic dream. Almost a deafening and tumultuous roar of criticism would be levelled against their uncharitable and uninspiring conduct before the Central Banking Committee. No one need be surprised at the particular animus that might be displayed by the critics but the ebullition of national feeling is such that many unjust accusations will be levelled and their little foibles would be magnified into serious mistakes.

The above formidable list of their shortcomings and defects does not mean that they are not of any use to this country. As models of sound finance the Indian banking institutions can of course learn something from them. The Indian depositors would also have to be grateful to them and every failure of an Indian Bank has indirectly added to their prestige and deposit-attracting capacity. Their skill, freedom from dishonest manipulation of bank funds for Director's pet schemes and the maintenance of liquidity of their resources are indeed objects which ought to be the subject of proper emulation on the part of the Indian Joint-Stock Banks. These have contributed much to raise the level of their steady profits which the Exchange Banks declare at present.

In view of the fact that the World Economic Conference[5] has passed resolutions to the effect that "no discriminatory legislation" against foreigners should be passed and in view of the powerful influence the exchange bankers wield in the London financial circles it would be impossible to enact any punitive or provocative taxation measures against them. Similar well-drafted laws which can be applied to our domestic banks can be imposed on them. A slight return for the trading privileges can be secured. The systematic training of Indian apprentices on the art of banking can be secured out of these refractory exchange banks. But if any further penal measures are to be thought of, such as increased taxation or the withdrawing of the right to attract deposits or the right to open branches in

[5] See the Report of the World Economic Conference, published by the League of Nations, Vol. II, p. 42.

the interior of the country they can easily evade them by registering themselves with Rupee capital as local banks. Such has been the case in Spain.[6] As the Indian field is wide enough to permit the successful working of a number of banking institutions they would not lose this opportunity to defeat the real intentions of any penal legislation that can be enacted. But as I have stated elsewhere if these local banks are forced to maintain an up-to-date register of shareholders[7] there would be no possibility to escape this legislation. For the purposes of this act it can be enacted that all banking companies whose shareholders' list has more than two-thirds of its members from outside the country should be considered as foreign banking companies.

Without a real change of heart it would be difficult to make them realise our requirements. Our appeal to them to act as indispensable adjuncts to a nation-wide banking system would be vain. The real remedy then is to proceed cautiously and though our policy should be based on the justifiable motive of destroying all vested interests, the retention of these banks as useful complements in our banking organisation is the only wise alternative that is left to us. In the beginning, we will have to supplement their services and it is only after a time that we can hope to counteract their influence. Our local exchange Banks must be helped by the Central Bank to realise this aspiration. As in Japan, we should retain them in the banking system as willing helpmates, useful brethren, and subsidiary instruments. They must become a cog in the banking wheel. Their present-day uncontrollable and unassimilable part in the banking system and their acting as the chief controllers of our economic progress must be remedied.

[6] See the Chairman's Speech, Westminster Bank's Annual Meeting, 1923; see Sykes, The Present Position of English Joint-Stock Banking, p. 28.

[7] The newly enacted Company Law of 1929 of the United Kingdom contains this provision. A penalty is also imposed if the index to the register of the shareholders is not kept up to date. See sections mentioned in Part IV of the New Companies Act of 1929.

The financing of our Foreign Trade with Domestic Resources.

It has already been pointed out how under certain circumstances the Imperial Bank's funds might be utilised by the Exchange banks to finance our export trade. The lack of co-ordination between internal and foreign trade financing breaks down under these circumstances. If the Central Bank or the Reserve Bank were to lend its exchange funds at low rates of interest after taking proper security from the domestic exchange banks the financing of foreign trade with home funds can be accomplished. Under certain circumstances such as abnormal exports these resources might be reduced or tightened. But a Syndicate of bankers can then be formed to ease the situation, if the Bank of England refuses to help the Central Bank by rediscounting its bill assets in London. A Syndicate of bankers specially formed for the purpose can be utilised in financing the export bills. It might so happen that the local exchange banks might become saddled with huge London credits arising out of the purchase of export bills, *i.e.*, too many London credits than are necessary might be created. The Central Bank can however purchase these exchange funds by issuing an equal amount of notes at home, if such an abnormally one-sided export trade were to lead to the piling up of exchange funds abroad. This is how general trade prosperity fluctuations can be financed by the help of the Central Bank's resources.

In the case of general trade adversity fluctuations when India has to pay the foreign countries the Central Bank can mobilise the foreign investments held by the Indian people. These can be sold abroad while it pays the Indian owners of the same in rupees. It can float temporary loans abroad to have exchange funds for the purpose of meeting drafts on the same at the gold export point from this country. The undue slump of the exchange can be rectified by this method if especially the price movement tends to be relatively stable or constant. There would be no very great alterations from the purchasing power

parity unless the exchange dealers lose all confidence in the early revival of trade. As these tend to watch the draining away of the exchange funds kept abroad by the Central Bank their gloom tends to increase. These speculative fluctuations might complicate the situation and retard the process of recovery, but their bias would soon become corrected if trade follows the normal course and gives rise to the net balance of payments as in normal years.

The seasonal exchange fluctuations due to seasonal variations confine themselves to the range of a few points. The Central Bank can easily continue the pegging of exchange between the specie points by selling gold or foreign exchange at the gold export point and check the rise in exchange above the gold import point by mobilising gold or gold exchange in its vaults and introducing notes against the same at the gold import point. Mere gold movements would correct the situation. The Ricardian theory of outflow and inflow of gold would preserve the exchange level intact within the gold specie points. A programme of comparative stabilisation of internal prices by the Central Bank would tend to stabilise exchanges at the same time and the dual objective of relatively stable prices and tolerably stable exchanges can be secured without any great friction either to business or banking under an intelligent control and management of the new gold standard.

All this presupposes the existence of the Indian Exchange Banks and a Central Bank willing to help them so as to finance India's foreign trade at home with domestic resources. Since the dismal experience of the Tata Industrial Bank it is becoming practically impossible to create strong Indian Joint Stock Banks for conducting foreign exchange business alone. Proposals have been made that an Indian Exchange Bank would have to be started or the present Imperial Bank can be converted into an Indian Foreign Exchange Bank. Considering the impossibility of raising large capital for banking business at least on this side of India, it would be far better to create an Indian Overseas Bank which would have a part of its capital raised out of the

subscriptions of the individual capitalists and the remainder contributed by the present Indian Joint Stock Banks. It would easily be possible to raise a large amount of capital according to this method for conducting exchange business at a remunerative scale. If the Indian exporters command better prices for their export bills at the hands of the Indian Overseas Bank the business of financing export trade would easily be attracted by it. The Indian Overseas Bank should maintain always in its initial stages rates about one or two points more favourable than those of the foreign exchange banks in this country. If the exporters secure greater resources by selling their export bills to the Indian Overseas Bank than it would be the case when they sell them to the foreign exchange banks they would flock to the standard of the new bank. If the Central Bank were to help it with funds for this purpose at a low rate of interest more export bills can be financed by the Indian Overseas Bank. More rupees should be granted by the Indian Overseas Bank when purchasing the export bills at differential rates. Of course, rate-cutting would ensue and for quite a long period the foreign exchange banks would prove to be effective competitors. Similar should be the treatment shown towards the importers. They should be securing greater return in foreign currency by flocking to the standard of the Indian Overseas Bank than when they resort to the foreign exchange bank. It is only by this way that we can hope to create an institution meant for conducting foreign exchange business with domestic resources. This is the only way of defeating the present monopolistic character of the foreign exchange banks over the exchange situation. This does not mean that the rupee-sterling exchange would not rule the day in the near future. All foreign exchange rates would be resting on the rupee-sterling rate for, as in the case of most other countries, we pay our indebtedness in London. We hold foreign balances in London and any exchange rate would be depending on the rate of exchange on London and adjusted by a current rate of other country—London Exchange.

Its Advantages.

It remains to point out the main advantages of financing our trade entirely with the help of our domestic resources. An unnecessary tribute is being paid to the London Bankers who accept our bills and discount them in the London Money Market. Payment in sterling would be avoided and exchange risks need not be thought of. Though the Gold Exchange standard gives some amount of protection against fluctuations the resulting inconvenience to the Indian exporters in receiving a sterling bill and selling them to Indian Exchange Banks to receive rupees for them can be avoided. The Indian Importer likewise suffers in having to pay a sterling bill drawn against him. Dealings in future can eliminate all exchange risks.

The privacy of a discount market and the keeping of trade information would be achieved under this system.[8] The newly arising national pride resents the financing of our trade solely by means of sterling bills.

Free opportunity for a safe and sound employment of short-term liquid resources would be found in the discount market. The unwholesome over-investment of funds by the present-day Indian Joint Stock Banks in gilt-edged securities can be checked. The immobilising of the bank funds arising out of excessive investment is a grave evil to the existing Indian Joint Stock Banks for it leads to an unwholesome concentration of funds in one direction which is bad finance. The discounting of internal and external bills drawn in the course of trading would diminish the opportunities in the above direction of over-investment in Government securities.

Nextly, the Central Reserve Bank would be powerless and ineffective to control credit if the discount market does not exist. Under the new banking conditions that would exist if a Central

[8] It is on this ground that the United States of America began to exchange the development of bank acceptances and finance its foreign trade with the help of its own resources.

Reserve Bank were to be created, this active participation of the Central Banker would have a beneficial influence on the market. To guide and control the other banks and to regulate interest rates and money conditions the Central Bank must have liquid resources to efficiently discharge its public trust of checking undue credit expansion and easing credit when it is unwisely restricted. The smooth and gradual control over the discount and the money market is possible only if the Central Bank can have these bills marshalled in a steady succession of maturities. As a recent writer says[9] bills discounted and bought in the open market offer an ideal current of maturities. Certificates of Government indebtedness are a poor second. Government bonds and treasury notes have no liquidity at all on the basis of early and successive maturities. Their value as instruments of credit control must depend entirely on their ready saleability, a quality which they fortunately have to a high degree. It might indeed be true that the Federal Reserve Banks conduct open market operations with the help of Government securities rather than banker's bills. As the open market operations are undoubtedly beneficial to a certain extent these would have to be pursued by any Central Bank and an organised money market would be essential for the success of its measures. It is admitted even by Mr. J. S. Lawrence that "these open market operations would be very helpful at the time of gold movements, quarter-day adjustments, the attraction and discouragement of international commercial financing and the removal of undesirable items from the bank balance sheets." The larger ideals of price control and business stabilisation may not be achieved by this "delicate touch" or lever of the Central Bank. Considering the manifold advantages that would arise by the creation of a discount market and the financing of our foreign trade with the help of domestic funds and realising that both Japan and America have organised similar attempts to remove their dependence on London, our

[9] J. S. Lawrence, "The Stabilisation of Prices," p. 254.

objective should be in this direction. It is indeed true that in both these cases the attempts are not very successful as yet. But they point out unmistakably which way the banking progress lies. A sustained endeavour has to be made by the Indian bankers in this direction. Nothing is so important in the whole field of banking reconstruction as this.

One fundamental feature of this banking reconstruction should aim at diverting the surplus home or domestic funds for the financing of foreign trade and *vice-versa, i.e.*, surplus foreign funds for financing home trade aud industries. The more extensive use of bank acceptances[10] and an adequate discount market would facilitate the financing of foreign trade. In financing imports rupee bills ought to be developed. Specialised discount houses ought to conduct this operation. It is foreign interest-bearing bills that predominate in the import trade. No foreign exchange bank furnishes us with a report on this situation and most of the bills are drawn in sterling and are kept till maturity in this country and are not rediscounted in this country.

Other Ancillary Measures.

Nextly, the initiation of a programme which involves thorough-going co-operation between the Central Bank of this country and the Bank of England would be essential. Otherwise the Anglo-Indian Exchange Banks will refuse to obey the penal rates of rediscounting imposed by the Central Bank and resort to the Bank of Enland or the London Money Market.

[10] Bill acceptance and discount market can hardly be created so long as business is run on old ways of cash credit; so long as no business organisations exist for gauging credit and the credit standing of the firms; so long as specialising acceptance houses are not in existence as in London; and so long as the Indian Joint Stock Banks are very conservative and refuse to educate people in the use of bills. These can be remedied only by more education for bankers and businessmen concerning the advantages and disadvantages of bills of exchange and carefully enacted regulations regarding the use of such instruments. The Central Bank itself should buy and sell such bills of exchange in the open market just to popularise these bills as short-term investments.

An independent monetary policy on the part of the Central Bank would never be effective if the powerful foreign exchange banks with their rich shareholders, intelligent direction and financial support from London wish to run counter to the course of action proposed by the Central Bank of Issue of this country.

Finally, the Central Bank of the country should be intelligent enough to understand the drift of monetary conditions in London. If high money rates were to prevail in London the use of the exchange funds on the call market would enable the Central Bank to secure greater return than before and consequently induce it to lower the Indian rates. The Indian Exchange Banks would do it, if the Central Bank does not pursue this method. Thus it has to co-operate with the London money market and the Bank of England. Their mutual policies should not normally create disturbing influences in the different centres. The question of securing adequate funds can be solved easily by allowing the Central Bank of this country to secure access to the London Money Market and rediscount its bills at the Bank of England. It would also facilitate the stabilising of the money market in this country and with lower rates prevailing in this country Indian funds can even be removed to London. That this can be accomplished in due course of time need not be [11] doubted.

Our Plan ahead.

Although the chief meritorious characteristic of present-day financing of foreign trade lies in our possessing specialising exchange banks which do not usually tie up their resources in long-term investments in industries or agriculture still the main improvement needed is the financing of foreign trade with domestic resources. It should be done by funds raised inside the country. The would-be Central Bank can accomplish much

11 This was the idea of the late Sir Edward Holden when he advocated a Central Bank for India. See his speech at the Annual General Meeting of the London City and Midland Bank, the 24th January, 1913.

in this direction. Besides securing exchange stability within the specie points its endeavour should be in the direction of helping the Indian Overseas Bank which would have to be created with the co-operative action on the part of the public and the present Indian Joint Stock Banks. Acting as the central co-ordinator of banking funds it can take up an active part in controlling credit not only by lowering or raising discount rates but by buying and selling exchange bills at the time the exchange rates deviate from the normal points. Financial co-operation between all these agencies would easily enable us to finance our foreign trade. The use of bank acceptances and the development of a discount market have already been pointed out as the other necessary measures to popularise the rupee bills and they can be drawn in our import trade. The use of bills in place of cash credits in the matter of financing the merchant's requirements ought to take place. Regular specialising discount houses would ease the situation greatly. They can buy bills at banks and act as intermediaries between exchange dealers and bankers and between merchants and bankers. If the Indian Joint Stock Banks give up other entanglements and specialise in foreign exchange business they can easily suceeed if they conduct sound exchange banking.

Conclusion.

A comparative price-steadying programme, a proper external borrowing policy on the part of the Government, individuals and *quasi*-public bodies, a carefully framed note-issuing privilege and the extension of loans by the Reserve Bank on commercial paper or bills or notes instead of Government bonds and shares thus restricting the scope for stock exchange speculation, are some of the most important measures which our Central Bank would have to bear in mind. These ancillary reforms are essential if the vital question of financing foreign trade with domestic funds can succeed. With the prosperity of her great

exporting industries such as cotton, jute, tea, hides and skins, increasing efficiency of labour, a mercantile marine of her own, which reduces the invisible payments under this heading and the prosperity of Indian people emigrating abroad which would tend to an increase of remittances into the country, the net balance of payments would always be in her favour and this fundamental factor would greatly facilitate the task which the Central Bank would have to take up in right earnest. Facilitating free gold movements in normal times and making provision for meeting extraordinary situations as slumps and general trade prosperity fluctuations, the exchange situation can always be controlled by the Central Bank. Under an enlightened and consciously controlled Central Bank, which carefully manages its foreign portfolio, the present-day Government arrangements for gold exchange funds would disappear. The successful management of the new gold standard by the Central Bank would tackle the situation and eliminate all exchange fluctuations which are very demoralising either to business or finance. The resumption of the new gold standard without exchange-pegging devices will limit the possibilities of exchange speculation at any time. Its liberal help to the Indian Overseas Bank or the Indian Exchange Banks alone can hope to do something in this direction of financing foreign trade with domestic funds. The present-day tendency of maintaining an *Imperium in imperio* would be checked and the Foreign Exchange Banks recognising the different or changed political situation might resort to the tactful method of offering a portion of their increased capital for subscription in this country so as to placate public opinion, but the stigma attached to the "foreign banks" would always remain and the local people would securely support and favour the local banks. Thus the attempt of the foreign exchange banks would become futile if an intelligent and persistent effort is made by the local banks to finance foreign trade. Entrenched strongly in the favour of the local people those local banks can with the minimum of legislative interference undermine the

position of the foreign and Anglo-Indian Exchange Banks. This is the only rational way of providing an effective solution for a potentially inconvenient banking monopoly. The formulation of such a well-conceived plan would be far more advisable than the enacting of futile and mischievous programmes to limit the services of the present-day foreign exchange banks of this country in the direction of financing our growing foreign trade. The cry that the present number of foreign exchange banks is already in excess of legitimate requirements will of course be raised but it ought not to be allowed to side-track our efforts in solving the main problem of this country. Political independence without financial independence is a misnomer and a will-o'-the-wisp. It is like grasping the shadow instead of the real substance.

(*Concluded.*)

B. RAMCHANDRA RAU

TRYST OF THE SUN AND THE MOON

The Moon stood waiting with a thin cloud-veil drawn about her; shyly and silently her head was drooping.

Her nerves tingled, her pulses vibrated with eager expectation, for her world-honoured Lord was to be there in a moment ...and how would she welcome him ?

The Sun drew nigh, but all his grandeur and pomp were not around him ; naively he came with arms outstreched, just mantled with love, crowned with love, a votary of love. He captured her delicate lily-hands.

Holding them to his forehead he whispered : "Sweet, little Maiden, why did you illude me ? Did you not know that my heart is aflame with love of you ?"

Gently, so tenderly he closed her quivering form so frail within his throbbing arms; he held her, O ! so delicately to his mighty heart that palpitated with burning emotion.

"Queen-Moon ! You are mine !" said he. She leaned on his shoulder.

"My Beloved" said the Sun, "ancient yet never unaging, you have always been mine. To seek you I have travelled for weary ages, from my far-away realm. You must never forsake me, never leave me more. And no one shall rob these world-embracing arms of their treasure of you !"

Her lips blossomed into a smile. Her eyes shone with joy.

She hid her face on his radiant breast; he kissed her ; they were united, merged into one.

No one has since set eyes on the shy Moon-bride.

What is seen is but the reflection of one.

AZIZ SADIQ

THE POET'S WORLD

We have met this evening to intrude upon the poet's world, and explore as much as we may of this mysterious zone. I shall not begin by wearying your patience with a description of this strange creature called the Poet, the Seer, or the Singer by different peoples. Nor will I ask you to leave firm ground and soar into the ether of vagueness, and (as our Scientist friends would fain say!), the void of illusion. Rather, I would beg of you to set your feet firm on firm ground, if only to be able to let the mind trace the flight of the eagle or the descent of the meteorite. Set your feet firm on firm ground, so that it might be easier to feel its cold, hard surface, if only to be able to enjoy by contrast the warm and genial environment of poetry. Above all, let the mind be unchained. Let it bring out its luminous lamp of truth, so that when my own tiny torch flickers and is extinguished, you may help me out of the mazes of the Poet's World!

If I were to ask you to close your eyes for a moment and imagine a poet, some would picture the bent figure of Dante sitting in the solitude of his exile, some would picture the patriarchal figure of Tagore walking among the shadows of cocoanut-palms, while others might see Firdausi admiring the glory of Persian art, or Shelley lost in rapture gazing at a nightingale. There would be in your mental picture a man with dreaming eyes, unpractical mien, and erotic look. Out of ten, every nine would immediately think of a 'visionary' when asked to picture a poet. It is justifiable too. A poet says,

> "We are the music-makers,
> And we are the dreamers of dreams,
> Wandering by lone sea-breakers,
> And sitting by desolate streams.

" World-losers and world-forsakers,
On whom the pale moon gleams ;
Yet we are the movers and shakers
Of the world for ever, it seems."

True, therefore, as it is that the poet is a dreamer, it is none the less true that he lives in this world, as we know it, this planet of ours which is said to revolve round the sun, and he moves and shakes this world for ever. Thus it becomes necessary first to consider how much of this world (the outer world, shall we say ?) becomes the poet's world, or influences and affects it.

In the outer world, the poet comes in contact with two elements : the element of man and the element of nature, distinct to a degree, and yet inter-related. The world of men, narrowed by walls of caste, sect and creed, with the colossus of convention bestriding the stream of reason, is one element. In it the thousand phantoms of social, religious and political prejudice haunt him always. While he sits under the shade of a banyan tree, piping some passionate song, men and women brush past with hurrying steps. Not one, perhaps, stops to listen ; or one out of a hundred pauses, only to smile with curls of contempt, and move on towards the more important business of life. Others come in all the pomp and vanity of power, ask him what benefit he earns by singing and go their way. Some more come with offerings for the temple of wealth, frown at such economic waste of a life and pass by. Who is not reminded of Tennyson's lines ?

" The traveller hears me now and then,
And sometimes harshly will he speak :
' This fellow would make weakness weak,
And melt the waxen hearts of men.'
* * *
A third is wroth : ' Is this an hour
For private sorrow's barren song,
When more and more the people throng
The chairs and thrones of civil power?

A time to sicken and to swoon,
When Science reaches forth her arms
To feel from world to world, and charms
Her secret from the latest moon? ' "

According to the rigour of criticism a man should not even grieve in this world of mortals ! And yet, undaunted, the poet fixes his gaze on the blue vault of heaven and continues his song, awaiting some Carlyle to acknowledge : " The meaning of song goes deep. Who is there that, in logical words, can express the effect, music has on us? A kind of inarticulate unfathomable speech, which leads us to the edge of the Infinite, and lets us for moments gaze into that ! But such tributes are few and far between. They are precious, because few. The poet can scarcely expect an unsympathetic world to be unselfish, or a self-centred world to show fellow-feeling. He knows he has little in common with men. He knows he ought to be prepared for adverse criticism—valid or invalid. He knows he will be misunderstood by the majority. He is aware of the fact that men will brand him as a mad man, and stigmatize his work as aimless. And yet he cannot help feeling another's woe more than his own. He is moved with a feeling akin to that which Francis Havergal expresses thus,

" That will I stand
Firm on the rock and strong in thee,
I may stretch out a loving hand
To wrestle with the troubled sea."

He feels the sting of man's despair and cheers,

" Be still, sad heart, and cease repining!
Behind the cloud is the sun still shining ;
Thy fate is the common fate of all,
Into each life some rain must fall,
Some days be dark and dreary."

He feels the heart of man's struggle, and inspires,

" Be not like the dumb driven cattle,
Be a hero in the strife! "

He feels the dejection of youth, and encourages,

" We have not wings, we cannot soar,
But we have feet to scale and climb,
By slow degrees, by more and more
The cloudy summits of our time! "

He feels the heaviness of heart and the sorrows of all men and pleads,

" Ye voices that arose
After the evenings close,
And whispered to my restless heart repose!
Go, breathe it in the ear
Of all who doubt and fear,
And say to them, 'Be of good cheer! ' "

It is because he feels his mission is to serve humanity, because he feels his invitation to the world as a singer demands his whole-hearted service, that the poet continues to dwell amidst aliens in the alien world of men. He gathers from it the mysterious organisms of experience; for, he knows ' to detatch the individual idea from its confinement of everyday facts and to give its soaring wings the freedom of the universal : this is the function of poetry.' In a letter of John Taylor, Keats expresses his first poetical axiom thus :

" I think poetry should surprise by a fine excess and not by singularity; it should strike the readers as a wording of his own highest thoughts and appears almost a remembrance." Hence he cannot forsake the world of humanity.

Yet often we hear a Shelley invite,

" Away, away from men and towns
To the wild woods and the downs,
To the silent wilderness
Where the heart need not repress
Its music, lest it should not find
An echo in another's mind."

There is something in Nature, and some hush of suspense,

some music of joy, some beauty of truth, something so solemn, so kindred, so sublime that it draws the poet.

" While the touch of Nature's art
Harmonizes heart to heart."

Away from ' the weariness, the fever and the fret ' of the world, ' where men sit and hear each other groan ' ; it reminds the poet that there is still the love-lyric of the nightingale, while ' haply the Queen Moon is on her throne,' and there is,

" White hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine ;
Fast fading violets covered up in leaves ;
And mid-May's eldest child,
The coming musk-rose, full of dewy wine,
The murmurous haunt of flies on summer eves."

All this has a magic touch for the lute-strings of the poet's imagination, and it produces the melody that vibrates in tune with the music of unity in the depths of his being, in tune with the music in the heart of the Infinite, when he can say in Kabir's words,

" The unstruck drum of Eternity sounds,
And oh ! I am full of joy ! "

It is an environment of beauty so charming and so ennobling that Indians, in particular, have always felt drawn towards the forest-hermitage. Kalidasa sang countless immortal lines in praise of it—eulogies that tempted kings to forsake kingly luxury and share the cup of exquisite peace in the company of Nature. There seems to be an affinity so subtle as to baffle all scrutiny between the poet and Nature. He feels he is in the presence of a kindred spirit and shouts forth in the words of Coleridge,

" Ye living flowers that skirt the eternal frost,
Ye wild goats sporting round the eagle's nest,
Ye eagles, playmates of the mountain storm,
Ye lightnings, the dread arrows of the clouds !

Ye signs and wonders of the element,
Utter forth God, and fill the hills with praise!"

Sa'di says, "He biddeth his chamberlain, the morning breeze, spread out the emerald carpet of the earth, and commandeth His nurses, the clouds, to foster in earth's cradle the tender herbage, and clothe the trees with a garment of green leaves; and at the approach of spring crowneth the young branches with a wreath of blossoms; and by His power the juice of the cane becometh exquisite honey, and the date-seed by His nurture a lofty tree." When Nature can bring such a message it is natural that the poet delights in solitude. It is not strange, then, that,

"The meanest floweret of the vale,
The simplest note that swells the gale,
The common sun, the air, the skies,
To him are opening paradise."

In this paradise of peace the poet forgets all his earthly care, gloom and sorrow. Even the night, often pictured as full of awe, seems created to lull the 'weary strife of frail humanity.' Shakespeare says,

"How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!
Here will we sit, and let the sounds of music
Creep in our ears: Soft stillness and the night
Become the touches of sweet harmony."

In the ecstasy and festival of Spring to see the bowers of Nature exuberant with flowers painted with a thousand hues; to see the rivers variegated with their meandering streams and sandy banks in the snow and frost of winter; or to hear the call of the heron and breathe in the perfume of earth and earth's flowers in the gloom and rain of autumn: it delights the heart of the poet,

"And the poet faithful and far-seeing
Sees, alike in stars and flowers, a part
Of the selfsame Universal Being
Which is throbbing in his brain and heart."

Not only is Nature a shelter for the refugee, a source of joy, and a realm of freedom, but the temple of the Eternal immanent in His Creation. Hence, when his follow-men fail to 'bring a heart that watches and receives,' the poet feels sad, and, in F. Tennyson's words, sings,

"If only once the Chariot of the Morn
Had scattered from its wheels the twilight dun,
But once the unimaginable Sun
Flashed god-like through perennial clouds forlorn,
And shown us Beauty for a moment born,
If only once blind eyes had seen the Spring
Waking amidst the triumphs of mid-noon,
But once had seen the lovely Summer boon
Pass by in state like a full-robed king,
The waters dance, the woodlands dance and sing.
If only once deaf ears had heard the joy
Of the wild birds, or morning breezes blowing,
Or silver fountains from their caverns flowing,
Or the deep-voiced rivers rolling by,
Then night eternal fallen from the sky:
Ah! sure the heart of man too strongly tried
By god-like presences so vast and fair,
Withering in dread, or sick in love's despair,
Had wept for ever, and to Heaven cried,
Or struck with lightnings of delight had died."

What a purifying element. If only those blinded with the dust of illusion, deafened with the din of commerce would come under this influence of Nature they would find redemption, says the poet.

But such feelings are aroused in the poet's heart only when it is perfectly in tune with the Infinite, or else a Byron vainly sighs—

"Oh! that the desert were my dwelling place,
With one fair Spirit for my minister,
That I might all forget the human race,
And, hating no one, love but only her!"

This idea of the binding and beautifying influence of love is seen in the Ramayana also. The love that existed between the hero and heroine, Rama and Sita, did not only bind them to each other but by uniting them to the universe of life beautified the whole environment. Hence it was, that when the heroine was carried away, the loss was felt so deeply, not by Rama alone, but by the forest itself. Shall we pardon Byron, then, for continuing,

"Ye elements!—in whose ennobling stir
I feel myself exalted—can ye not
Accord me such a being? Do I err
In deeming such inhabit many a spot?
Though to converse with them can rarely be our lot."

But even Byron grows sane,

"There is a pleasure in the pathless woods,
There is a rapture on the lonely shore,
There is society where none intrudes,
By the deep Sea, and music in its roar!
I love not Man the less, but Nature more,
From these our interviews, in which I steal
From all I may be, or have been before,
To mingle with the Universe and feel
What I can ne'er express, yet cannot all conceal."

For Byron it is a struggle to realize fully what this influence is and all it means to him. It is a struggle because he is too fond projecting his own mood on the face of Nature, and thus misses the true message. But it betrays that conflict in the poet's mind: which is he to love more, Man or Nature? Byron, with all his frailty, inclines towards Nature. While in Cowper we find the poet inclining towards man.

"O Solitude! Where are the charms
That sages have seen in thy face?
Better to dwell in the midst of alarms
Than reign in this horrible place."

It may seem a vicious circle, for, we have come back to the point whence Shelley had invited us to ' the wild woods and downs.' Cowper pants forth—

> " Society, friendship and love,
> Divinely bestowed upon man,
> O, had I the wings of dove,
> How soon would I taste you again! "

Shall we pass the verdict of inconsistency and sentence the poet to rigorous imprisonment into the prison-house of discipline? Banish him, if you will, ' to the seclusion of the forest shades, and the severe discipline of courting—of courting the fair blossom,' ' born to blush unseen, and waste its sweetness on the desert air,' of courting every stray cloud that skims the sky with grace too pleasing for words, of courting the skylark,

> " Teach me half the gladness
> That thy brain must know,
> Such harmonious madness
> From my lips would flow,
> The world would listen then, as I am listening now."

This inconsistency, if so it must be called, is not a fickle wavering from one to another, but a concentration on one at a time of the duality, a response to that appeal which is more intense at the moment, though, sometimes, it may be that the element of mortals and the element of Nature may combine in one appeal. In Letters from John Chinaman, speaking as a Chinaman endowed with poetic feeling, Dickenson says, " A rose in the moonlight garden, the shadows of trees on the turf, almond blossom, scent of pine, the wine-cup and the guitar; these and the pathos of life and death, the long embrace, the hand stretched out in vain, the moment that glides for ever away, with its freight of music and light, into the shadow and hush of the haunted past, all that we have, all that eludes us, a bird on the wing, a perfume escaped on the gale—to all these we are trained to respond, and the response is what we call

literature." Thus, even the Chinese feel, or think they feel, the magnetic attraction of the Beautiful in the outer world, and respond to it. This response of the spirit of man to the aesthetic urge in nature and the realm of feeling constitutes literature, according to John Chinaman : and he is not wrong. There is, as we have seen, some definite though invisible tie between the mind of a highly refined, cultured individual and the pulsing heart of Nature. Perhaps, this led Hazlitt to remark " Poetry is close imitation of Nature."

The poet, then, lives in the world, yet is not of the world ; as his element, where he feels most at home, is not this outer world but his inner world. The twain, however, are almost inseparable. Although the areas that supply raw material be situated thousands of miles away from the centres that produce finished articles, there is, all the same, a very intimate relation between the two. Similarly though the outer world which we have been traversing and in which the poet finds himself located, is far removed from the inner world which we shall consider, and in which the poet creates, there is all the same between the two a close relation too subtle for prose to describe. The poet beholds the glory of the earth, hears the strains of its endless music, breathes in the incense of its worship, tastes the bitter-sweet cup of its life, feels the joyous torture of its love and dances to the rhythm of its heart-beats. Tagore chants, " I have kissed this world with my eyes, and my limbs, I have wrapt it within my heart in numberless folds ; I have flooded its days and nights with thoughts till the world and my life have grown one,—and I love my life because I love the light of the sky so enwoven with me." Sensuously the poet is one with the world; yet spiritually he is apart. The poet's soul dwells not on this terrestrial globe but in some dim distant unknown.

Thus we pass from the world of sights and sounds to a world of deep silences and vast voids. But let us not suppose that this world, the inner world, is either a chaos, or a deserted

island. In the heart of the silence sounds the eternal Music, and in the centre of the void sits the eternal Beauty. Aptly does D. G. Rossetti sing,

> "Under the arch of Life, where love and death,
> Terror and mystery, guard her shrine, I saw
> Beauty enthroned; and though her gaze struck awe,
> I drew it in as simply as my breath."

The Beauty and the Music are undefinable, fluid shall we say like the air, everywhere to be felt, but nowhere to be located. George Russell, the Irish poet, commonly called A.E., says,

> "A shadowy tumult stirs the dusky air;
> Sparkle the delicate dews, the distant snows;
> The great deep thrills—for through it everywhere
> The breath of Beauty blows."

The 'Breath of Beauty' is a life-giving breath. This atmosphere, therefore, is charged like the ether, perhaps with creative energy. It is of the poet in this environment that Shelley sings,

> "He will watch from dawn to gloom
> The lake-reflected Sun illume
> The yellow bees in the ivy bloom,
> Nor heed nor see what things they be."

It is of the poet in this setting that Shakespeare says,

> "The poet's eye in a fine frenzy rolling,
> Doth glance from heav'n to earth from earth to heav'n;
> And as imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shape, and gives to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name."

We are now face to face with a world of subtle and mysterious organisms, the organisms of thought, and a dynamic energy, the energy of feeling. We are in the presence of a high-power Radio station, the poet's mind, which exchanges messages in a code language, unintelligible to us until we study this code of

imagination, with the intellectual, emotional, and spiritual centres, scattered throughout worlds visible and invisible. We are in the poet's world proper, his inner World, as we agreed to call it, where in Tagore's words, "The emotional idea, incarnated in rhythmic form, acquires the dynamic quality needed for those things which take part in the world's eternal pageantry." I would put before you the fact that the poet must have original ideas, lucid ideas pregnant with the pulsing life of emotion, without which they cannot take musical form. I would put before you the fact that however emotional a man may be without thoughts he cannot be a poet. There must be sense-impressions. These sense-impressions must awaken emotional ideas. These emotional ideas must cause sensory reaction. This reaction finds fitting expression in song. Milton says poetry is

> "Thoughts that voluntary move
> Harmonious numbers."

Ideas that are truly sublime are born in music. "It is only when the heart of the poet," Carlyle says, "is rapt in the true passion of melody and the very tones of him, according to Coleridge's remark, become musical by the greatness, depth, and music of his thoughts, that we can give him the right to rhyme and sing; that we call him a Poet, and listen to him as the heroic of speakers,—whose speech is song." To Carlyle it seemed absurd that a man should fit into metre ideas that were not naturally musical. But it is easier to detect discordant ideas than to discover faulty metre, because conceptions not truly great have a hollow ring, and no technical knowledge is needed to catch this hollow ring. The poet, then, must be a thinker. The German 'Vates,' applied to poets, means both 'singer' and 'prophet.' While the Greek word for poets means 'Seer.' If a poet is to be a singer of his visions and prophecies he must needs have ideas. In the mental part of this inner world thinking, seeing and singing go on

conjointly and simultaneously. Without this it would be impossible to satisfy Saint-Beuve's expectations. "A true classic," says he, "as I should like to hear it defined, is an author-poet who has enriched the human mind, and caused it to advance a step; who has discovered some new and not equivocal truth, or revealed some eternal passion in the human heart where all seemed known and discovered; who has expressed his thought, observation or inventions, in no matter what form, only provided it be broad and great, refined and sensible, sane and beautiful, in itself; who has spoken to all in his own peculiar style, new without neologism, new and old, easily contemporary with all time." Saint-Beuve's expectations are decidedly high. But he is not alone. Horace and La Bruyère have voiced similar expectations. The poet does satisfy them all, since, according to Bacon, poetry has something divine in it, because it raises the mind and hurries it into sublimity, by conforming the shows of things to the desire of the soul, instead of subjecting the soul to external things, as reason and history do, it follows, as a natural corollary that poetry must enrich literature and ennoble man.

The poet placidly says,

> "On a poet's lips I slept,
> Dreaming like a love-adept,
> In the sound his breathing kept;
> Nor seeks nor finds he mortal blisses,
> But feeds on the aërial kisses
> Of shapes that haunt thought's wildernesses."

We find that unlike the philosopher and the logician, the poet is not forlorn even in the wilderness of thought. The shapes that haunt the poet in this inner world are the images of his ideas, they are the shapes of Beauty, Goodness and Joy; and it is on their aerial kisses that he feeds. Beauty, which is not mere prettiness or a mocking fantasy, but the expression of the one Reality; goodness, that is not mere kindliness or

passive (vain) piety ; joy which is not mere pleasure or selfish happiness, but the sacrament of communion with Truth, these companion the poet in this inner world. Is it a wonder that he is a 'dreamer'? Holding converse with such enchanting shapes and forms must keep him abstracted, must keep him in a dreamland of his own. By far the greater portion of his inner world is a fairy-land. It is this 'fairy-land' that we have entered and a voice from the distance seems to say, "Put the shoes from off thy feet, for the ground whereon thou standest is holy!" Holy, indeed, to the poet is this Eden where but one Adam and one Eve exist, this place of pilgrimage whither pilgrim fancies repair, this his land of dreams. But what are his dreams?

A. E. tells us,

"When the breath of twilight blows to flame the misty skies,
And its vaprous sapphire, violet glow, and silver gleam,
With their magic flood me through the gateway of the eyes,
I am one with the twilight's dream."

He dreams of the twilight and everything that such gorgeous twilight suggests to him. The slavery of a nation teases another to imagine ideal Liberty, and Byron whispers,

"Eternal Spirit of the chainless mind!
Brightest in dungeons, Liberty! thou art,
For there thy habitation is the heart—
The heart which love of thee alone can bind ;
And when thy sons to fetters are consign'd—
To fetters, and the damp vault's dayless gloom,
Their country conquers with their martyrdom,
And Freedom's fame finds wings on every wind."

Or the misery of men makes the poet shed a tear which expands into a dream and Christina Rossetti says,

"Heaven over-arches earth and sea,
Earth-sadness and sea-bitterness.
Heaven over-arches you and me;

A little while and we shall be—
Please God—where there is no more sea
Nor barren wilderness."

Wordsworth finds shelter in Nature's dream,

"For oft when on my couch I lie
In vacant or in pensive mood,
They flash upon that inward eye,
Which is the bliss of Solitude;
And then my heart with pleasure fills;
And dances with the daffodils."

Tagore sings his dream of love:

"I dreamt that she sat by my head tenderly ruffling my hair with her fingers, playing the melody of her touch. I looked at her face and struggled with my tears, till the agony of unspoken words burst my sleep like a bubble.

I sat up and saw the glow of the milky way above my window, like a world of silence on fire, and I wondered if at this moment she had a dream that rhymed with mine?"

It is not only a vision of his beloved but of Eternal Love in the form of woman, the symbol of creative power. This idea of the particular leading to the universal is brought out admirably by Rossetti:

"When do I see thee most beloved one?
When in thy light the spirits of mine eyes
Before thy face, their altar, solemnize
The worship of that love through thee made unknown?"

Tagore's dream unfolded in his "Lover's Gift and Crossing." Dante had a dream, perhaps a day-dream: it became the "Divine Comedy." Homer's dream turned into the "Illiad." Valmiki's dream was translated into the "Ramayana." Tennyson dreamed a dream of grief: it found embodiment in the "In Memoriam."

"Poets," says Shelley, "are not only subject to these experiences as spirits of the most refined organization, but they

can colour, all they combine, with the evanescent hues of the ethereal world ; a word, a trait in the reproduction of a scene or a passion, will touch the enchanted chord, and re-animate in those who have ever experienced these emotions the sleeping, the cold, the buried past.'' The poets' dreams are not idle, purposeless things if they can 're-animate in those who have ever experienced such emotions the sleeping, the cold, the buried past.' The poet dies and is forgotten or remembered perhaps by a few. But his dreams abide. His dreams never die. Thus Francis Thompson sings :

"Love! love! your flower of withered dream
In leaved rhyme lies safe I deem
Sheltered and shut in a nook of rhyme
From the reaper man and his reaper time.
Love! I fall into the claws of time,
But lasts within a leaved rhyme
All that the world of me esteems—
My withered dreams, my withered dreams!"

Yet how shall we analyse these dreams? On what canvas are they painted, with what colours, from what model, to what purpose, and by whom? Is it the artist who sits in the studio of the poet's subliminal consciousness, is it the seer who watches from behind the pupil of the poet's eyes? Is the canvas the poet's imagination? Are the colours the deep dyes of emotions? Is the model taken from the round of daily life and experience? It may be. Who dare decide? One thing is true that it is in these dreams he finds the most abstruse abstractions take tangible form and elucidate their own mysteries. It is in these dreams that thoughts crowd to his mind, not disconnectedly, not in fragments, but blended together to form a readable picture. Analogies and similes suggest ideas. Ideas shape images. Both figures of speech and ideas have personal experience as the common source. In "Defence of Poetry" Shelley writes—

"What were virtue, love, patriotism, friendship—what were the scenery of this beautiful universe which we inhabit,

what were our aspirations beyond it, if poetry did not ascend to bring light and fire from those eternal regions where the owlwinged faculty of calculation can never reach?" He goes on to say,

"Poetry thus makes immortal all that is best and most beautiful in the world; it arrests the vanishing apparitions which haunt the inter-lunations of life, and veiling them in language or in form, sends them forth among mankind." Thus when the poet philosophizes he is not in a metaphysical, ethical, logical or psychological mood, but still essentially in an artistic frame of mind, and hence, clothes the skeleton of the abstract generalization with the flesh and blood of emotion, and, then, robes it in the graceful garments of poetic fancy. Never does he send the bare skeleton to horrify an already superstitious world (as philosophers do!) His aesthetic taste chooses the words. His culture influences his ideals. Behind the whole complex and strange phenomenon of the poet's creation the mighty force men call experience is ever at work. Take this force from him and you paralyse the poet. No wonder Goethe said, "My poems are my confessions." The poet is not an intellectual mechanism—thank heavens! there are many such in the world; illfitted, ill-worked, ill-kept, turning-out results shockingly illformed to say the least. The poet is a living sentient soul. His feelings are intense. His experiences are minutely recorded. His sentiments are lofty. His imagination is agile. He is sensitive. Would you call him a sentimentalist, with a smile of scorn? Nay, rather call him an idealist. Sentiments for him are ideals. These ideals must be sanctioned by his presiding deity—Beauty. He thinks in terms of beauty as the mathematician thinks in term of figures—poor ungainly figures. For the poet civility becomes beauty of behaviour; truth is beauty of ideal; love nothing but beauty of emotions; and joy the expression of beauty: while beauty is the artist's conception of the Divine Being. The poet is no sentimentalist, happiest like a Romeo when playing the troubadour at some

Juliet's window. For Francis Thompson the poet is "enchanted child born into a world unchild-like, spoiled darling of nature, playmate of her elemental daughters; 'pard-like spirit beautiful and swift' laired amidst the burning fastness of his own fervid mind; bold foot along the verges of precipitous dream, light leaper from crag to crag of inaccessible fancies; towering genius, whose soul rose like a ladder between heaven and earth with the angels of song ascending and descending it."

Will it seem contradictory if I say that this, "towering genius,' this 'spoiled darling of nature' is a very loyal subject of the sovereign, the universal Emperor, men call Love? Tennyson says, "love is and was my king and Lord."

Shelley says,

> "I loved, I love and when I love no more,
> Let joys and grief perish and leave despair
> To ring the knell of youth."

Thrilled with adoration for the Noble, the Beautiful, and the True he must lay the tribute of his admiration at the feet of that embodiment of the noble, the beautiful, and the true, which seems the highest; he must seek the influence of this embodiment. This embodiment is the touchstone for his ideals. To her, it is, he must bring his truest idealisms for the testing. It must be accepted that woman has been, down the ages, an inspiration to man, guiding his restless and rebellious energy into an immeasurable variety of creations in literature, art, and music, of inventions and discoveries in science, of expositions and interpretations in religion. Even an unpoetical sociologist like Benjamin Kidd admits so much. The point at issue is that when this fact is so true for average men, how much truer is it in the case of a man endowed by heaven with a sensitive and highly strung nature. The poet is ever on the endless quest for this Touchstone for his ideals, this Inspirer of all his creative work, willing to make an offering of a poet's devotion at that Altar Beautiful and he asks,

" I can give not what men call love,
But will thou accept not
The worship the heart lifts above
And the Heavens reject not,
The desire of the moth for the star,
Of the night for the morrow,
The devotion to something afar
From the sphere of our sorrow? "

These simple lines illustrate the delicacy of feeling and the sublimity of the poet's conception of Love. It is rarely understood. If those biographies that have come down to us be reliable, as there is every reason to believe they are, we cannot help feeling it strange that the poet's question should be so infrequently heard, and seldom answered. We know how Tulsidas was repaid for his devotion. We know how Byron was treated by his first love. We know, when other things were favourable, how time proved treacherous and Dante lost his Beatrice. But does this experience, unfortunate as it is, lead to despair? Christina Rossetti says,

" Somewhere or other there must surely be
The face not seen, the voice not heard,
The heart that not yet never yet—ah me!
Made answer to my word! "

Such brave optimism must be the sentiment of a heroic soul. Small wonder then, that Carlyle considered the poet the Heroic of Speakers. We hear W. B. Yeats say,

" When you are old and grey and full of sleep,
And nodding by the fire, take down this book,
And slowly read, and dream of the soft look
Your eyes had once, and of their shadows deep;
How many lover your moments of glad grace,
And loved your beauty with love false or true;
But one man loved the pilgrim soul in you,
And loved the sorrows of your changing face."

What pathos! What bitterness! and yet what love! Generosity,

constancy, sincerity, ardour offered for the joy of sacrifice. It is enough, indeed, for the poet to have loved ; that, in itself, raises his mind on the soaring wings of ecstasy. Even after the tragedy ' When all the wheels of being slow,'' in the darkest mood of dejection, he still murmurs in the words of Laurence Binyon,

" O world, be nobler for her sake:
If she but knew thee what thou art,
What wrongs are borne, what deeds are done
In thee, beneath thy daily sun,
Knowest thou not her tender heart
For pain and very shame would break?
O world, be nobler for her sake!"

This selflessness in the poet, which commands our respect and wins our admiration, is the natural result of his ample culture and of his exalted sentiments.

Thus it is, that the disappointment in one world becomes an impelling force towards another and a sublimer world: and with that innate confidence in Love which can say, 'trust Love even if it brings sorrow,' the poet still wanders on his restless, endless, pathless pilgrimage to the Land of Love. We had agreed that the poet is a living sentient soul. He proves his soul-life. He glimpses in his own human devotion something of the reality of Eternal Love, whose smile illumines the Universe, and whose pulsing heart strikes the music of the spheres. He finds solace. He tastes the cup of inspiration afresh. He bursts forth into rapturous song :

" Rock the swing of love to-day!
Pillow the body and soul between the arms of the Beloved,
In the ecstasy of love's joy:
Bring the tearful streams of the rainy clouds to your eyes,
And cover your heart with the shadow of darkness:
Bring your face nearer to his ear, and speak of the deepest
longings of your heart,"

Kabir says: "Listen, bring the Vision of the Beloved in your heart." What was perhaps, rejected if not held cheap, by some unfeeling human creatures is accepted and responded to by the Divine: and the Poet's panting devotion made a target for the ridicule by some, and a source of merriment by others, finds the everlasting Arms, and is glad.

This, then, is a very brief survey of the poet's Inner World, full of conflicting paradoxes and contradictory experiences. But the day soon comes when in the words of Traherne, a seventeenth century mystic poet of England, the poet says,

"News from a foreign country came
As if my treasure and my wealth lay there;
'Twas wont to call my soul into mine ear;
Which hither went to meet
The approaching sweet
And on the threshold stood
To entertain the unknown good.

.....

But little did the infant dream
That all the treasures of the world were by:
And that himself was so the cream
And crown of all which round about did lie.
Yet thus it was the Gem
The Diadem
The ring enclosing all
That stood upon this earthly ball,
The Heavenly eye,
Much wider than the sky,
Wherein they all included were,
The glorious Soul that was the king
Made to possess them, did appear
A small and little thing."

Thus all unawares the poet becomes a mystic, and poetry is kindled with the perplexing though sublime flame of mysticism. He has found his soul. This discovery is very real to him.

Let us turn our attention, now, to the real and unreal

according to the poet's estimate of things. In the balance of his judgment what is weighed and found real and what unreal? If a titter seems to go round that a ' dreamer ' must dwell in a land of dreams which are necessarily evanescent and hence unreal, it would be most surely plausible ; for, unreality is so real and reality so unreal, that the unreal, which in truth is reality, does find its way into the poet's consciousness. It is an encouraging feature too, that the world has not yet lost its soul to the extent that no readers of a poet are left. There are still those who would ask,

" Come read to me some poem,
Some simple and heartfelt lay,
That shall soothe this restless feeling
And banish the thoughts of day ! "

The poet could not ' banish the thoughts of day ' unless he could conjure up a vision of something more real than the fickle day, full of defeat and failure for some, and triumph and prosperity for others ; nor could he ' soothe this restless feeling ' unless he could leave thoughts of the 'peace that passeth all understanding.' Peace, therefore, is real and not strife ; life is real and not death. Not what is ugly but what is beautiful in thought, word, and deed, not hatred but love, not darkness but light are real. Are the ideals of honour, nobility, and truth unreal? Are the feelings of pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, doubt and fear unreal? Are the experiences of victory and defeat, kindness and cruelty, luxury and poverty unreal? If these ideals, feelings, and experiences are unreal, life and all that sustains it, all that surrounds it, all that allures it further on its rugged track, all, all are unreal. But we know that this is untrue. These ideals, feelings, and experiences are real, after a fashion. They are real in as much as they produce an effect which lasts in itself, or lives through a series of reactions, and throughout this process of action and reaction which after all is life itself, these ideals, these feelings, and these experiences exist.

But when these ideals, feelings, and experiences combine to produce a picture, a dream, a reverie, a vision, call it by what name you will, is this picture, or dream, or reverie, or vision unreal ? In the realm of Nature and man, in the sphere of art, music, or poetry, in the domain of science or philosophy, all manifestations of the one Reality, *all* ultimate truths are *real*. It is from the realm of Nature or man, from the sphere of art, music and poetry, from the domain of science or philosophy that the poet gets his materials. When the material is not unreal can the thing produced be unreal?—

> " From these create he can
> Forms more real than living man,
> Nurslings of immortality."

The poet's creations are real, then, and so are his dreams, for, his

> " Songs gushed from his heart
> As rains from the clouds of summer,
> Or tears from the eyelids start."

What can be more real than this? " If poetry is a dream," says Hazlitt, " the business of life is much the same. If it is fiction, made up of what we wish things to be, and fancy that they are, because we wish them so, there is no other nor better reality.....Plato banishes the poets from his Commonwealth, lest their descriptions of the natural man should spoil his mathematical man, who was to be without passions and affections, who was neither to laugh nor weep, to feel sorrow, nor anger, to be cast down nor elated by anything. This was a chimera, however, which never existed but in the brain of the inventor ; and Homer's poetical world has outlived Plato's philosophical Republic." With such eloquence Hazlitt argues the reality, nay, the immortality of the poet's creations. It cannot be said that it is a poet defending himself. Far from being a poet himself, Hazlitt was one of the severest critics of his time. When all this is granted it still

remains to see what those elements are that constitute this reality. It has been observed that the natural as well as the social environment of man supplies the poet with material. What is it that shapes these desultory fragments into a well-defined form of poetical art ? It is the poet's genius. It is the vitality of mind that can infuse the spark of life into words and make them burn, and into thoughts to make them glow; it is that power of emotion that can charge the thoughts and words with an energy able to keep coherent what otherwise would be in a state of chaos and confusion : this is the poet's genius. Thus it is possible for the keen critic to say, " Impassioned poetry is an emanation of the moral and intellectual part of our nature, as well as the sensitive—of the desire to know, the will to act, and the power to feel; and ought to appeal to these different parts of our constitution to be perfect." Nothing, none of the fine arts has such a range of influence, such a thrill of appeal, such a reality of power as poetry—poetry, be it understood, worth the name.

The impatient question is: then is there nothing unreal? There is a great deal that is unreal: there is a great deal of tinsel. There are, to begin with, songs that are unreal, mere jingles of meaningless words to hide a stolen idea! Words, as such, are unreal

> " For words like nature half reveal
> And half conceal the soul within."

But, whereas, Nature reveals the other half to him who ' watches and receives,' words illude. It is the Idea that is real. Whatever conceals the Eternal Idea is unreal. Whatever is transient by nature not by accident, whatever like a grand star mimicry of blazing fire-works comes to ashes and is not, is unreal. Those circumstances which have always conspired to keep man hedged in a narrow arena to cripple his aspirations, to stunt his activities, to imprison his hope, are unreal. Society,

with its painted masks of custom and convention, meant to hide the souls of the actors of the drama of civilized life; society with its heartless laws framed in some barbaric age when History was yet unborn, society that shuts the door of common hospitality and love in a most disconcertingly eccentric manner against some noble though unfortunate mortal, enthroning an undeserving creature who has inherited, only inherited, pure or noble blood, though never proved it ; society in so far as it falls short of its highest definition ' a joint family,' and dissipates its energy in a vain struggle with truth, in so far as it becomes inimical to progress, and in so far as it hinders the unfolding of every individual life to its fullest, society in so far as it is not true to the loftiest conceptions of life and conduct—is hopeless tinsel, unreal and delusive. Thus Tagore prays,

" Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high,
Where knowledge is free,
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by
narrow domestic walls,
Where words come out from the depth of truth,
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection,
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into
the dreary desert sand of dead habit,
Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever-widening
thought and action:
Into the heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake."

And the poet's country is the world : the whole wide world is for him one social unit.

Religion that pays court to hypocrisy and plays a double game, misleading one into error and getting another persecuted, is irreligious, and, as such unreal. Religion when it has lost its soul and remains a corpse with its ornaments of words, unable to inspire man with true motives, or guide him to an ethical consciousness, is dead and hence unreal. Of the followers of such a religion a poet says :—

" Therefore the names of Demon, Ghost and Heaven
Remain the records of their vain endeavour,

Frail spells,—whose uttered charm might not avail to sever
Doubt, chance and mutability."

A religion that cannot raise the faithful to a high standard of honest, liberal, and conscientious thinking, willing, and acting but terrifies them into subservience by superstitious incarnations or bewitches them with sensuous ceremonials, is a powerless religion, and in so far as it is feeble, it is unreal. A religion so blind-folded by bigotry or prejudice, that it claims the sole custody of truth and the entire possession of God, which will not pause to see its own deficiencies, or in a self-complacent mood denounces everything else as false, is blind, and being blind is not perfectly true. Thus of truth a poet says,

"Thy light alone,—like mist o'er mountain driven,
Or music like the light wind sent
Thro' strings of some still instrument,
Or moonlight on a midnight stream
Gives grace and truth to life's unquiet dream."

The poet believes that whatever hides the message of Beauty, Love and Truth from him is false. All immediate needs weighed against ultimate values are unreal, for they distract the mind from facts by allurements of fiction. He believes in ultimate good: evil, therefore, is unreal. The darkest cloud of unreality, however, cannot all conceal the rays of truth that peep out and form, as it were, a fringe, the silver lining of that cloud. This philosophy of ultimate values is a philosophy of the soul more than a speculation of the intellect. Pure logic has failed to glimpse the truth. It is intuition, the eye of the soul that has seen what reason has failed to understand; it is intuition, the ear of the soul that has heard what the intellect has failed to fathom. This, it is, that gives the poet an indomitable will and saves him from submission to the cruel forces of evil and error. With Browning the poet cries,

" Rejoice, we are allied
To that which doth provide
And not partake, effect and not receive!
A spark disturbs our clod
Nearer we hold of God
Who gives, than of his tribes that take, I must believe! "

It is a faith in the reality, in the reality of the individual Soul, in the reality of kinship between the two, and in the reality of the immense potentialities of the mind of man.

Without such implicit faith in the high destiny of man, and without such implicit trust in the reality the poet could not reconcile himself with his lot. Byron asks,

" Have I not—
Hear me, my mother Earth! behold it Heaven!
Have I not had to wrestle with my lot?
Have I not suffered things to be forgiven?
Have I not had my brain sear'd, my heart riven,
Hopes sapped, name blighted, Life's life died away? "

and Byron explains,

" And only not to desperation driven
Because not altogether of such clay
As rots into the souls of those whom I survey."

Suffer me to repeat that truth and error, good and evil, pleasure and pain are ever at conflict in the experience of rational beings. The poor die for want of means, the rich die for want of means to spend. The irony of fate mocks man. Everything material is as it ought not to be. The idealist expects justice to prevail. He finds wrongs unredressed grinding men to dust. He expects joy to be man's birthright. But the birthright has been exchanged for a mess of pottage. He expects to meet Generosity even on the street but finds the pickpocket sons of Greed busy at work everywhere. He expects the very air men breathe to be tinged with the fragrance of spontaneous kindliness and finds callousness stink in his nostrils. Thus comes

the clash. Thus comes the rude awakening to facts as they are on this globe. And the mind of the poet which 'floats and dances on the waves of life amidst the voices of wind and water,' soberly pauses to fathom the cause of such a state of affairs. The results of this inquiry are embodied in the master-pieces of dramatic art. The drama is the only vehicle for the poet to convey his interpretations of the paradoxes of life.

The pride of a Dushyanta that doomed to sorrow the faithful heart of Sakuntala; the goodness and gentleness of a Vasantsena assaulted by the cupidity of a barbarian; or the high and altruistic nobility of a Brutus failing miserably before the mean and selfish cunning of an Antony; the passionate jealousy of an Othello gaining mastery over his finer sentiments; the undeserved afflictions of a Lear that sent him mad; the tragedy of a conscientious Hamlet; or the restless search of a Faust after ideal happiness; the injustice that Sigismund must bear because he is destined to overthrow tyranny: these the poet fashions into dramas, breathing into them the fire of eternal passion, eternal pain. The tragic element clearly lies in the cause of the mischief. It is found in the *hamartia*, the error or frailty, in at least one of the characters of the play, some human deficiency which brings about its own punishment in the ruin of the man. "The purpose of tragedy," says Aristotle, "is the purifying through pity and fear of the emotions." The moral process, the *katharsis*, the corrections and refinement of the emotions, is the end sought by tragedy. Tragedy is realistic. The realism is meant to impress ideals. Let me quote Hazlitt's remarks on this topic. "One mode," says he, "in which the dramatic expression of passion excites our sympathy without raising our disgust is, that in proportion as it sharpens the edge of calamity and disappointment, it strengthens the desire for Good. It enhances our consciousness of the blessings, by making us sensible of the magnitude of the loss. The storm of passion lays bare and shews us the rich depths of the human soul: the whole of our existence, the sumtotal of our passions and pursuits, of that

which we desire and that which we dread, is brought before us by contrast; the action and reaction are equal, the keenness of immediate suffering only gives us a more intense aspiration after, and a more intense participation with, the antagonist world of good; makes us think deeper of the cup of human life; tugs at the heart-strings; loosens the pressure about them; and calls the springs of thought and feeling into play with tenfold force. "The poet does so because he has plumbed the secret and knows that life itself is such a tragedy meant by the Great Dramatist to serve a similar end. The poet imitates the Great Dramatist. This is why tragic poetry appeals more to the finer sense in man. Tragedy is more poetic. Comedy has the air of artificial pleasure, betrays a strained effort to round off the tale smoothly and hence appears untrue to life. Tragedy, far from making men cynical, draws out from the deep recesses of the human heart an echo to the poet's unwavering trust in an All-wise Providence.

This confidence in the ultimate good that buoys up the poet during moments of storm and stress, remains with him to the end. Even in melancholy poets like Byron and Masefield it is not altogether absent. We had agreed that the poet is a living sentient soul, and it is precisely because of this that he can pierce through the mists and vapours of our earthly damps, and keep his gaze fixed on the distant 'scene,' beyond the vale of years. Come what may come, in the midst of inexplicable tragedies, unintelligible riddles, the soul of the poet cries with resolute daring.

"I will deck thee with trophies, garlands of my defeat.

It was never in my power to escape unconquered.

I surely know my pride will go to the wall, my life will burst its bonds in exceeding pain, and my empty heart will sob out in music like a hollow reed: and the stone will melt in tears.

I surely know the hundred petals of a lotus will not remain closed for ever and the secret recess of its honey will be bared.

Reviews

Andhra University Series—No. 1. The Beginnings of Local Taxation in the Madras Presidency.—A study in Indian Financial Policy, 1863-71. By M. Venkatarangaiya, 1928.

This is an investigation carried on into the finances of the local Boards and Municipalities in the Madras Presidency from the original sources and the material collected during ten months' research work is placed before the reader in this volume. The materials refer to early history of local finance and the author frankly admits that it is mere "spade work" and suggests that a more detailed critical study of the Institutions of local government. should be made; for the wide training that is so essential to enable us to enjoy responsible governmeut. in the near future can only be gathered in this local administration field and any success or failure in this direction is absolutely dependent on the financial resources at the back of the local bodies.

Leaving aside the dim beginnings of local taxation in the days of John Company (1 to 7) the author rightly points out that a conscious beginning in the development of local finance can be noticed in the years 1863-1871. The ever-growing expenditure on the part of the Government of India forced it to devise measures to increase taxation but financial equilibrium could not be secured by additional taxation for reasons stated on p. 14. "Uncertain revenue, increasing expenditure, spendthrift provincial governments, and an over-centralised financial system made the financial position of the Government of India a ludicrous one. With the Scylla of lessened resources on one side and the Charybdis of clamouring Provincial Governments for increased grants on the other the Central government. had to pursue a cautious course and it hit upon the stratagem of "Local taxation" as a thing different from Imperial Taxation. Relief was obtained by throwing certain charges on the shoulders of the Provincial governments, which were hitherto met by it. Cesses for education and Road-making were developed. Municipalities had to bear the cost of urban police. As Imperial expenditure went on increasing more and more relief was obtained by delegating the charges to the Provincial Governments. and this financial process known by the hackneyed term of "Decentralisation" commenced in rightearnest from 1870. Reference is made to Mayo's scheme of 1870, as a further illustration of the principal tendency of securing relief to imperial finances by additional local taxation. In 1871 the Provincial

Government had to shift these charges in the urban areas to the Municipalities and local taxation became a settled process by 1871.

The two other factors responsible for the development of local taxation are next referred to. To remedy the defects of Imperial Taxation of those days which practically meant unequal taxation and to securegreater revenue local taxation was hit upon. It was also owing to the honest endeavour to secure real improvements in local areas and train people for self-government that measures of local taxation were devised during these days. Thus far the brochure deals with historical details of the subject-matter whose outlines have been given out by other writers already. The author's main work consists in setting the proper statistical details referring to the Madras Presidency in close juxtaposition with the bare outlines mentioned by the older writers. The critical part of the study commences on page 59 and covers roughly 50 pages.

The apparent conflict between the different motives that led to the development of local taxation is the subject-matter of pages 59 to 80. So long as the dominant motive was relief to Imperial Government finances the true principles that ought to guide the division of duties between the Central and the Local governments were not logically carried out. Charges that ought to have been borne by the Imperial Government were delegated to the local bodies to be defrayed out of their meagre resources. The use of local taxes for non-local purposes and the control of the Imperial Government over the local services created much discontent among the minds of the people. The endeavour to evade police charges by declaring even mere rural areas urban ones and the extension of the Municipalities Act to them is quoted as a specific instance of the evils arising out of the conflict of principles which led to the development of local taxation.

The use of local taxation for higher educational purposes and medical relief and the building of high roads meant for Imperial use was also another specific grievance in the early days of local finance. On account of this conflict local finance could never be developed on popular lines and the true scientific principles of sound local finance could hardly have been evolved in those days of experiment and trying to learn by the method of trial and error.

The next definite piece of criticism of the author is that no real self-government was after all existing in the local bodies of those days. The constitution of the municipal bodies is examined just to illustrate that responsible Government did not exist in the local areas. The predominance of the official and nominated non-official element in the Municipal bodies and even the fixing of their expenditure level by the Governor

(till 1871) and the late introduction of the election element (1878) in few of the Municipalities, even though the people knew how to work self-governing institutions on an elective basis, are given out by the author as practical proofs of the non-existence of real self-government in these early days. The hesitation with which the elements of real self-government were introduced even when full control over the rates lay in the hands of the Government forms one of the last points of criticism. The depriving of the villages of the last vestiges of self-government by the Village-Cess Act of 1864 by making village officials the servants of the Imperial Government was another proof of the absence of any real self-government in those times either in urban or rural areas. The only silver lining to the cloud was the levying of the education rate by representative local committees for running "rate schools" in the Godaveri District but as the option of continuing or giving up the rate was given to the people at the end of every five years the experiment proved a failure, for the rates were considered a burden and the schools were closed by the people.

The utility of the monograph would indeed have been heightened if attention had been drawn to the rapid changes that have taken place in the administration of the local governments. With the development of cities and rapidly congested areas, the development of motor transport altering the use made of the roads and the insufficient local resources an impasse in the present system of local Government is bound to arise. Having studied the original beginnings and the development of the local finances it would have been more interesting if the author ventured to suggest the proper course of action for the Government to adopt in altering the present inadequate system of local finance. The applicability or otherwise of Baldwin's scheme of " block grants" to local administrative units and the "derating scheme" would have been stimulating and without any suggestions for the immediate future any study of the past is bound to be boring when specially new facts of material importance are not discovered. How and in what way should the restrictive measure of control over the local government be exercised by the Provincial Governments ? Is it not wise to set up a tribunal to solve all questions of "surcharges" of improper expenditure as the Government auditor is bound to term them? Is it wise after all to supersede altogether elected local bodies and are there no other ways of coercing refractory local bodies ? What additional financial resources can be forthcoming to meet increasing expenditure that would be needed to undertake public utility services. How and in what way can the elected local bodies be made miniature Parliaments or a progressive system of Parliamentary Devolution be

established within this country ? Such and other important questions require immediate solution and we appeal to the best brains of our country to solve these living, immediate and vital issues instead of frittering away our energies in reading into the past.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Economics of Rural Bengal,—by K. B. Saha, M.A., Lecturer in Economics, Dacca University. With a foreword by Sir Jehangir Coyajee, Chuckervarty Chatterjee and Co., Ltd., Calcutta. 1930.

Mr. Saha succeeds in presenting a vivid picture of the conditions of rural life in Bengal and attention is drawn to some of the important economic problems which have to be solved in order to increase the economic progress of the rural masses.

A debt of gratitude is owing to Prof. Saha for having given us an exhaustive idea of some of the different land tenures of Bengal. The author frankly admits that " the land system in the province is not inconsistent with efficient cultivation." But he makes no efforts to discover the causes leading to the non-progressive nature of the agricultural industry of Bengal. Compulsory consolidation on the model of the 1928 Act of the Central Provinces is rightly recommended and the abolition of the transfer fee in the matter of the exchange of land is also a wise measure.

In dealing with the grave unemployment menace Prof. Saha is pretty nearly at his wit's ends. To cope with the present situation he would like " the Bengalee merchants to make a bold stand against the dangerous and steady invasion of the outsiders in the trade and commerce of the province," p. 291. It is a pity that the learned author suggests a very inadequate solution based on racial discrimination. Work is not limited and it is erroneous to consider that every job held by a foreigner is one less for the son of the soil. Work grows with population and unless the children of the soil learn to be more obedient, skilful and attached to their work they cannot hope to check competition on the part of middle-class men from other provinces.

Throughout the different chapters the arrangement is scholarly and much information is doled out in workman-like manner. His well-considered deductions arrived at in some of the chapters after a systematic inquiry add to our common knowledge.

As a helpful study of rural economic life of Bengal this book will be useful and entertaining. It does not try to exhaust all that might be

said on each and every topic but traces the different problems and examines them with the help of a critical analysis. He certainly points the way for closer study and more intelligent criticism by the future citizens of Bengal.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Elements of Economics, by S. B. Sengupta, Principal, Khalsa College, Lyallpur. Published by Ram Lal Suri, Lahore, Rs. 4.

Specially written to cover the syllabus of the Punjab University Intermediate Examination, the book imparts the elementary notions on the subject in a clear and concise manner. It does not however cover the entire field. Book VII which deals with the main physical features, which tend to mould the character of the people ought to have been arranged at the very outset. We recommend this book as a useful manual to the Indian beginners who wish to study economics for their Intermediate Examination.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Whither India ? By Dhirendranath Sen, M.A. Rupee One, pp. 62.

A short and stimulating monograph on some of the important constitutional aspects of the Nehru Report. Written from the extreme national standpoint, the author advocates discriminations against foreign exploiters, the granting of immediate responsible government and the abolition of bicameral legislature in his first chapter. Chapters two and three and four deal with the oft-repeated and much misunderstood expression "Dominion Status" and its inter-relations. Chapter 5 deals with the position of the Indian States. Chapter 6 discusses the fundamental rights which ought to form the basis of India's Swaraj Government. In the last chapter he advocates federation of the Canadian model where the Federal Government would be the residuary legatee of all the unmentioned powers. It would have been more edifying if the author had mentioned some convincing reasons why he disapproves so strongly Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Iyer's arguments for a unitary type of Central Government.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Memorandum on Production and Trade, published by the Information Section of the League of Nations. Geneva, 21st July, 1930.

This Memorandum contains the latest available data on the world economic situation. Very interesting lessons can be drawn from a careful interpretation of the world production index for foodstuffs and raw materials. The review of world industrial activity and recent changes in relative prices of raw materials and manufactured products would furnish useful data for intelligent action on the part of the different states bent on solving internal problems with reference to trade and commercial activity.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Memorandum on International Trade and Balance of Payments—1926 to 1928, Vol. I, Review of World Trade, published by the League of Nations, Information Section.

The increase in the quantum of trade which should not be mistaken for the level of prices during these years is first referred to. Nextly the share of the important countries is analysed. Thirdly the universality of the economic progress achieved is commented upon. Lastly attention is drawn to the relative and absolute increase of trade in manufactured articles arising out of rationalisation of industries in the old countries and the extended use of machinery in the new industries of other countries.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Principles and Methods, Financial Reconstruction Work, published by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, Geneva.

The League's financial reconstruction work in the case of nine countries is referred to in this brochure. A critical analysis of the principles involved in the matter of reconstruction is placed before the reader. The constitution of the three League organs, the Council, the Financial Committee and the Secretariat, which are concerned with the financial work is detailed in the first few pages. Secondly, the principles guiding the policy of reconstruction are elaborated in pages 17 to 36. Thirdly, the relationship arising out of this financial interference or execution of the scheme is referred to in pages 37 to 63.

This report finds its chief value in this: That it sets forth briefly and lucidly the scope and practical workings of the financial Secretariat, etc.,

of the League of Nations. It sets forth those details which will facilitate a better understanding of the adaptations of financial organisation and the technique worked out by the financial experts of the League of Nations. An accurate knowledge of these details will be of special value in this country as the commonly accepted benefits arising out of the efforts of the League of Nations have been so openly and frequently questioned.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Chaitanya to Vivekananda. G. A. Natesah & Co., Madras, Re. 1-8.

This is a popular history of religion in Bengal, or rather the religious men of Bengal, from the 16th to the 19th centuries—a period of 400 years, more or less. One wonders why the Brahmo Samaj men were left out ; evidently the author is of opinion that they do not deserve a mention. The account of Swami Vivekananda as given in the book confirms this idea ; but it is not fair to say that " the shining lights of Brahmoism had no spiritual experiences," for it is not true of stalwarts like Rammohan, Devendranath and Keshabchandra, whose figures loom large on the horizon of the times. Again, the inclusion of Sankar Dev of Assam may be justified only if the story of Jagannath Das of Orissa is similarly placed. If the learned author thinks that in these Bengali types is to be found (as no doubt it is) " a supreme and burning love for fellow-men," the feature is amply and admirably present also in the lives of the Brahmo leaders already mentioned.

It is to be regretted that the *dicta* of Mr. E. J. Thompson have been apparently accepted; for Mr. Thompson has amply demonstrated a constitutional incapacity to understand the language, or the spirit, of Bengali poetry. He has broken down totally even before Rabindranath; it can be hardly expected of him to do justice to Ramprasad. The lyrics of Rabindranath are easier of comprehension to the western mind than the *malsi* songs of Ramprasad and so Mr. Thompson's charge against " the fantastic imagery." Another statement in the book calls for notice. One cannot say that Ramprasad was born " long after the heyday of Shaktaism in Bengal." Shaktaism has ever found a congenial soil in the country. There is a glaring mistake in the name of the book written by Ramprasad and later by Bharatchandra; it is not *Vidya-Sundari* but *Vidya-Sundar*. Some confusion still exists in the transliteration of Eastern sounds, *e.g.*, in the names of *Ramprasad* and his father, *Ramarama*, and in *Shri* as well as *Shree*.

These are, however, minor imperfections; one cannot help being struck by the good features of the book. All the topics are admirably handled, but the chapter on Sankar Dev, which incidentally touches on Assam Vaishnavism and dwells on the important position of Namaghars, calls for more than a passing notice. The general reader will find the book both informative and soulful, and there can be no hesitation in saying that it forms a valuable addition to the publications of the already well-known and enterprising firm of Messrs. G. A. Natesan & Co. of Madras.

PRIYARANJAN SEN

Ourselves

Report of the Indian Board of the German Academy for the year 1929-30

I. *History of the Foundation.*

The initiative for starting an Indian Institute for furthering cultural relations and mutual understanding between Germany and India came from Dr. Taraknath Das. He tried in the years 1925 and 1926 to create among German teachers and politicians an interest in this plan and programme; his efforts did not at first succeed in eliciting much response. In 1927 Prof. Dr. Haushoper, Senator of the German Academy, took up the idea of Dr. Das and exerted himself, along with other members of the German Academy, in this matter: they all agreed about the foundation of an Indian Board, and thus the Indian Board of the German Academy came into being.

II. *Creation of Stipends.*

With the help of the German Academy and the German Academic Foreign Bureau, four stipends were at first created in the year 1929-30 for giving selected Indian students the opportunity of giving a finishing touch to their education abroad at the close of their studies at home. The stipends were advertised in the Indian newspapers and periodicals, as a result of which more than 120 students from 15 different Universities applied for these stipends which consisted in exemption from college fees and free board and residence. The following stipend-holders were selected :—

1. Dr. Girindranath Mukherjee (Medicine), formerly of the Calcutta University : Studying under the direction of Prof. Döderlin, Munich.

2. Dr. Kalipada Basu (Chemistry) of Dacca University: Studying under the direction of Prof. Wieland, Munich.

3. Mr. Trigunacharan Sen (Machine construction) of National College of Engineering, Calcutta: Studying under the guidance of Dr. Thoma at the Technical High School, Munich.

4. Dr. Batakrishna Ghosh (Philology) of Calcutta University: Studying under the direction of Profs. Oertel and Sommer, Munich.

As the stipend-holders proved themselves worthy of the stipends in every respect and as they intended to supplicate for the degree of Doctorate, the stipends were allowed to be continued for the year 1930-31, at reduced rates. This was only possible through the generosity of the Academic Foreign Bureau of Munich which placed six free-studentships at the disposal of the German Academy for the current year.

Through the efforts of the Indian Board of the German Academy and with the help of the Ministry of Education of Württemberg, three stipends were created for the Indian students in Württemberg, one for Medicine at the Tübingen University, one for machine-construction in Stuttgart and one for agriculture in Hohenheim. Dr. K. C. Chaudhury, M.B. (Calcutta University), who had already worked in Vienna, has already begun his studies in Tübingen in order to specialize in children's diseases. The other stipend-holders are expected to join very soon.

Special thanks are due to Minister Bauer and Consul Straus who took great trouble to create these stipends. Similar assistance has been rendered also by Professor Hauar, Professor Krauss, and Professors Haushoper, Sarkar and Dr. Nobel of Berlin.

With the help of Prof. Obst in Hanover four post-graduate stipends have been created in Hanover for the year 1930-31.

The Zeiss works in Jena have most generously created a stipend of the value of M 2400 for the year 1930-31. The man chosen is Mr. Majumdar of the Allahabad University. He has, probably, joined in the beginning of December.

Through the efforts of Prof. Holl of the Technical High School in Karlsruhe, the Education Ministry of Boden has succeeded in establishing 3 stipends at the Universities of Heidelberg and Freiberg, as well as at the Technical High School in Karlsruhe. For Karlsruhe the stipend for 1931 is reserved; it will soon be advertised.

III. *Professor Exchange.*

At the annual meeting of the Indian Board of the German Academy, which was held last November, it was resolved, on the motion of Prof. Haushoper, to take steps to invite Prof. Sarkar, of the University of Calcutta and the National College of Engineering and Technology, to Munich to deliver lectures on Indian economic conditions. Through the energetic efforts of Prof. Dorus of the Technical High School, as well as of the Ministry of Education of Bavaria and other places, Prof. Sarkar has obtained a lectureship for one year commencing from March 1930 for the purpose of delivering lectures at the Technical High School in Munich and other cities.

IV. *Training of Indian Students in Industries.*

Inquiries relating to the question whether Indian Technical students can work as apprentices in German industries are increasing every week. We have succeeded in admitting Mr. Dutta whose work has been satisfactory. Co-operation with the Industrial Union of Bavaria has been secured in order to ensure a continuous regular training, which, from the point of view of industries, is of great value. Great care has been exercised in the selection in order to prevent industrial espionage.

V. *Advice and Help to Indian Visitors.*

The visit of Indian guests last year set things astir. The well-known Indian physician, Dr. Ukil, delivered a lecture on "The immunity of Indians from Tuberculosis" to the medical

members of the Munich Academy. Dr. Rabindranath was received with great ceremony and his play "The Post Office" was staged in the students' hostel.

VI. *Work in India.*

(*a*) We are in co-operation with the most important culture-centres in India. We are in correspondence with several leading personalities in Indian Universities with a view to ensuring that the German language, history and literature are taught by experts. We have to report some success in this matter—at the Universities of Calcutta, Bombay, Benares and Allahabad German is already taught.

(*b*) We have succeeded in the establishment of some Indo-German societies in India. We hope to win the support of Indian scholars and Indian residents in Germany.

(*c*) We tried to invite German professors to deliver lectures as visitors in India or to visit India and also to create lecture-ships for them. The Indian Universities would surely welcome the idea of German professors occasionally delivering lectures. Thus, for example, the Indian Universities welcomed very much the visit of Prof. Sommerfeld of Munich and Prof. Glasenapp of Königsberg. Recently the Allahabad University has invited Dr. Alsdorf, Privatdozent at the Berlin University, to teach German and French; so also the University of Dacca has invited Dr. Fick of Frankfurt University to deliver lectures on Islamic culture-history.

(*d*) The friends of Indo-German cultural co-operation will be specially interested to learn that during the year 1932 Professor Jaygopal Banerjee, of the Calcutta University, will deliver lectures on Goethe on the occasion of the centenary of his death.

(*e*) An important Indian Journal (the "Calcutta Review") will publish a series of five big articles on German culture and industrial life which will be written in co-operation with the leading industrial and cultural organizations of

Germany. Later, these articles will be published in the form of a brochure and distributed to all important Indian institutes, societies and organizations.

VII. *Indian Press.*

Dr. Taraknath Das has written several articles on Indo-German cultural co-operation for the "Calcutta Review," "Modern Review" and "Liberty." Prof. Sarkar has also written similar articles in the Journals of the Bengal and Indian Chambers of Commerce. Circular letters have been sent to the Indian press and the Indian Board of German Academy acknowledges with thanks the willing co-operation of several Indian newspapers and periodicals. The article of Dr. Das on Indo-German cultural co-operation has been translated into German and published in the "Transactions of the German Academy."

VIII. *Reply to enquiries from India.*

In the year 1929-30, the Indian Board of the German Academy received about 500 enquiries from India which were all fully answered. The remarkable increase in the number of Indian students in Munich (at present there are 19 Indian students, as compared with 5 in 1928) is to be directly attributed to the work of the Indian Board.

This activity, that is to say, the will of the Indian Board, should not be confined to Munich; it is only through the co-operation of all the important centres in Germany that a lasting and effective connection between India and Germany can be established. The work must, if it is to be successful, be *entirely non-political*; the Indian Board declines to be mixed up with the present conflict between India and England, because it is as much anxious to establish cordial cultural relations with England as with India. It is, however, convinced that Germany has a good deal to contribute to the development of

India, and considering the great efforts of French, American, and recently, Italian circles in this direction, it must mobilise all its industrial and cultural resources in order to carry out its task of helping the cultural progress of mankind in the Far East.

Next year the work that has been begun will have to be extended. This requires a strange structure for the business side of its task. The Indian Board will therefore try to create a permanent Indian labour centre which is to be looked upon as a preliminary step in the establishment of an Indian Institute. It is necessary to establish an Indian library and furnish necessary materials for the proper handling of all inquiries and information. With comparatively modest means much can here be done. The Indian Board hopes that this fact would not be ignored by those who are interested in the case of Indo-German cultural relations.[1]

DR. FRANZ THINFELDA,
Hony. Secy., Die Deutsche Akademie,
München, Bavaria.

[1] The Editor acknowledges with thanks receipt of this valuable brief account from the Hony. Secy. of the German Academy of Munich (Bavaria) and the help rendered by Dr. S. K. Maitra, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Benares Hindu University.

* * *

PROF. W. BLASCHKE APPOINTED A READER OF OUR UNIVERSITY.

The Syndicate has recommended to the Senate Prof. W. Blaschke of the University of Hamburg to be appointed a Reader of this University to deliver a course of lectures on "The Origin and Development of Affine Geometry" on an honorarium of Rs. 2,000.

* * *

A New D.Sc.

Mr. Hrishikesh Sarkar has been admitted to the Degree of Doctor of Science, on the thesis "On Some Hydrodynamical Problems and Associated Legendre Functions and Spherical Harmonics."

* * *

A New Ph.D.

Mr. Kalikaranjan Kanungo has been admitted to the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy on the thesis :—

(1) Sher Shah.
(2) History of the Jats, Volume I.
(3) Dara Shukoh.

* * *

Debendranath-Hemlata Gold Medal for 1930.

Applications are hereby invited from candidates for competition for the Debendranath-Hemlata Gold Medal for the year 1930.

The competition for the medal is limited to M.A., M.Sc., Ph.D., D.Sc., M.D., D.L., M.E., M.O. and M.S. of not more than three years' standing, and the standard of physical fitness shall be determined by a health examination of the competitors by the Students' Welfare Department of the Calcutta University as also by application of such tests as may be decided upon by the Committee appointed for the purpose by the Syndicate.

Applications from the entrants for the competition must reach the office of the undersigned by the 15th February, 1931.

N. Sen,
Controller of Examinations.

Senate House.

* * *

The Nagarjuna Prize for 1929.

The Nagarjuna Prize for 1929 has been awarded to Mr. Satyaprasad Raychaudhury on his thesis "On Activated Charcoal."

* * *

Result of the First M.B. Examination, November, 1930.

The number of candidates registered for the examination was 75 of whom 37 passed, 36 failed, 1 was expelled and 1 was absent. Of the successful candidates none obtained Honours.

* * *

Result of the Third M.B. Examination, November, 1930.

The number of candidates registered for examination was 95 of whom 56 passed, 37 failed, none was expelled and 2 were absent. Of the successful candidates none obtained Honours.

* * *

Commissions in the Indian Army.

1. Information regarding the first appointment to commissions in the Indian Army of Indian cadets who have successfully completed a course at one of the cadet colleges in England is contained in the "Regulations respecting the admission of Indian and Anglo-Indian gentlemen to the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell."

2. Pamphlets containing the question paper and results of the examinations held in India for the admission of candidates to the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell,

can be obtained on payment, from the Manager, Government of India Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, or from any of the following book-sellers in India :—

Messrs. Thacker Spink and Company, Calcutta and Simla.
,, Thacker and Company, Limited, Bombay.
,, Higginbothams, Limited, Madras, and Bangalore.

The price of the pamphlet is about Rs. 3-8-0 per copy.

3. The pay and allowances of regimental officers of the Indian Army are detailed in Appendix B to Army Instruction (India) No. 1-S. of 1925, and rise from Rs. 480 *per mensem*, the present pay of a 2nd-Lieutenant. These rates are, however, liable to revision.

Officers on leave in India (other than "privilege leave" when full pay and allowances are drawn) receive rates of pay which approximate to $\frac{3}{4}$ths of the pay and allowances they draw while at duty.

NOTE.—The rates of pay and pension referred to in this and other paragraphs were fixed for British officers serving continuously in the Indian Army away from their own country, and are considerably higher than the rates drawn by officers of the British Service serving in the United Kingdom. They may be regarded as including, like the pay of other All-India Services, an "overseas" element. It is improbable that this element could continue, indefinitely, to be granted to Indian officers serving in their own land.

4. Promotion and appointments are regulated as follows :

(*i*) *General provisions governing promotion.*—The promotion of regimental officers, who are borne on the rolls of their unit, is contingent upon their passing the prescribed professional examinations. Before promotion to Captain and Major, a regimental officer must be reported on as showing promise of being fit to command a squadron in the case of cavalry, or a company in the case of infantry, and to be second-in-command respectively. Save in very exceptional circumstances, a Major will

not be promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel or Commandant unless medically fit for active service, and unless he has been passed fit by the "selection board" to command a battalion or regiment and has earned a satisfactory report at the Senior Officer's School.

(*ii*) *Service required for promotion.*—A time-scale of promotion is in force. Officers are eligible, if qualified and recommended, for promotion to the rank of—

Lieutenant—after 2¼ years' service.
Captain—after 9 years' service.
Major—after 18 years' service.
Lieutenant-Colonel—after 26 years' service.

Promotion above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel is made by selection only.

(*iii*) *Appointment of Adjutants.*—A King's Commissioned Officer of an Indian cavalry or infantry unit who has passed the language and retention examinations and qualified at a Small Arms School is eligible for the appointment of Adjutant, which carries additional pay [see Appendix B to Army Instruction (India) No. 1-S. of 1925] selection for these appointments is ordinarily made from officers who have approximately, six years' service. Appointments are tenable for 4 years but are vacated on promotion to permanent command of a squadron or company, or on taking up extra-regimental employment.

(*iv*) *Appointment of Quartermasters.*—King's Commissioned Officers of Indian cavalry and infantry units who have passed the language and retention examinations are eligible for the appointment of Quartermaster, the tenure of which is ordinarily four years. These appointments also carry additional pay [see Appendix B to Army Instruction (India) No. 1-S. of 1925].

(*v*) *Other appointments outside regimental units, which are open to King's Commissioned Officers of the Indian Army.*—Officers are eligible for appointment to departments under the Army Department of the Government of India (such as the

Cantonments Department, the Indian Army Ordnance Corps, the Indian Army Service Corps, the Military Farms Department, and the Remount Department). Also to the Military Advisory Staff of Indian State Forces, the Political Department, and the Survey of India, in accordance with the rules applicable to each.

5. The pensions of Indian Army officers are governed by the Pension Regulations for the Army in India. The rates are liable to revision.

The pension consists of :—

(*a*) A service element based on the officer's total qualifying service in the Army.

(*b*) A rank element for the Army rank in which the officer retires.

(*c*) An Indian element for service in the Indian Army.

Officers retiring below the rank of Major, *i.e.*, with less than 18 years' service are ineligible for pension.

6. Disability pensions are also admissible under certain circumstances to King's Commissioned Officers. The amount of these pensions varies according to length of service and to whether or not the disability was attributable to military service. (See paragraphs 32-41 of the Pension Regulations for the Army in India.)

7. Widows' and families' pensions and compassionate allowances varying in amount according to the officers' rank, are also admissible under certain circumstances. (See paragraphs 93-97 of the Pension Regulations for the Army in India and Articles 659 *et seq.* of the Royal Warrant for the Pay, Appointment, Promotion, and Non-Effective Pay of the Army, 1926.)

(The Regulations and Army Instruction quoted in this pamphlet can be obtained, on payment, from the Manager, Government of India Central Publication Branch, 3, Government Place, West, Calcutta.)

Report of the Students' Welfare Committee.[1]

For the year 1929.

Section I.

The findings of the Students' Welfare Committee have drawn the attention of the public to the physical impairment of the adolescent. No one who has studied these records during the last decade can fail to anticipate that there must be a resulting serious impairment of health at later stages of life. The findings of the Committee may be summarised by saying that medical examination shows that, out of every 10 students examined, only 3 are perfectly fit and healthy for their age; 6 are on a definitely infirm plane of health and strength either from some disability or some failure of development, and the remaining one is quite incapable of undergoing more than a very moderate degree of physical exertion and can almost be described as a physical wreck. If we ask what are the causes which make this large body of students unfit, the answer is brief; that over a third suffer from poor physique and mal-nutrition, and the other principal forms of defects are heart disease, defective vision, dental decay and pyorrhoea. I would draw the attention of the guardians and the public to this rather alarming record, which concerns not a selected group of students, but the general body of college students who represent the rising manhood of the country.

The Students' Welfare Scheme, as formed in 1920, had as its objective a comprehensive survey of all college students. Their findings have raised the whole question of treatment, medical and educational, in the clinics and in the colleges, and this in turn has given rise to questions of preventive methods

[1] Those who feel interested for the complete Report together with the Appendices may apply to the Secretary, Students' Welfare Committee, University of Calcutta.

of Hygiene and Physical Education. During the year the Senate appointed a special committee to consider the future policy and scheme of work of the Students' Welfare Committee, and at a joint meeting of the present Students' Welfare Committee and the one appointed by the Senate the following Scheme was recommended for adoption :—

"The Students' Welfare Committee began its work in 1920. During the last nine years its Medical Officers have examined about 15,000 College students,[1] and full details of the results obtained and conclusions arrived at, have been published in its successive Annual Reports.

The experience gained during the last few years reveals the necessity of changing the scope, method, and nature of the work assigned to the Committee.

Scope.—It has been felt that the health examination of students will be of far greater value if it is undertaken at the school stage. Though it is eminently desirable that this examination should be conducted on an extensive scale and remedial measures should be adopted where any defects are found, the University cannot be expected with its limited resources to take up the work in the near future. We consider, however, a beginning should be made in this direction, and recommend that the Students' Welfare Committee should arrange that the students of at least two High Schools should be examined each year in order to find out at what stage the various defects pointed out in the reports of the Committee begin to assert themselves.

Up to the present medical examinations conducted by the Students' Welfare Committee have been confined to students reading in Calcutta Colleges. It is highly desirable that this should be extended to students reading in Colleges outside Calcutta.

The examination may be undertaken directly by the Students' Welfare Committee, the inspection being conducted by its

[1] The number of students, examined up to 31st December, 1929, is 18,853.

doctors in batches in case of Colleges near Calcutta, or with the help of the local medical officers who are serving under Government or local bodies.

But we consider that the best plan is that the University should request each College to engage the services of a medical officer, one of his duties being to undertake such examination.

Method.—(1) Medical inspection whether in Calcutta or in the Mofussil should be restricted to First-year students.

(2) It should be made compulsory; for this purpose necessary changes may have to be made in the Regulations.

(3) It is desirable that it should be finished within the first six months of the opening of the session.

Health Examination Section.—The Secretary, in consultation with the Heads of the different Colleges, will draw up a scheme of work for the year.

The Heads of the Colleges will give necessary facilities to the Committee to conduct the examination, and will make such arrangements as will ensure a regular supply of students per hour per day.

The practice of issuing defect cards to students or their guardians will be continued as at present.

After the completion of the health examination in the College, the Secretary will, as soon as possible, prepare a report on the state of health of the students of the College, and will forward it, together with his recommendations and suggestions, to the Principal, the Medical Officer and the Physical Instructor of the College concerned, as also to the Director of Physical Instruction, Calcutta University, who will take such steps as he may deem necessary. The Secretary will also prepare an annual report dealing with the various activities of the Committee during the year.

After-care work.—The After-care Officer attached to the University shall continue to issue defect cards to students or their guardians as at present. He shall further visit every College at least once in a session after the examination, and

report to the Secretary the steps taken by the students or the authorities or the guardians to rectify the defects pointed out during the previous examinations. Lastly, the After-care Officer shall keep students suffering from serious defects or diseases, such as heart and respiratory diseases, under observation for at least 6 months, and report to the Secretary on their progress from time to time.

The Committee should try to facilitate the dental and optical treatment of students in co-operation with existing medical institutions and by such other means as may be in their power, and attempts should be made to get needy students properly treated.

Nature of work.—The Students' Welfare Committee should not confine its activities merely to the health examination of students and after-care work. In the Reports of 1927-28 the Committee pointed out that some of the causes of the deplorable state of health among the students are :—

(*a*) Negligence and ignorance of elementary laws of health;

(*b*) unbalanced diet ;

(*c*) want of systematic physical training.

It has also recommended that—

(1) Regular courses of lectures should be arranged for students of all Colleges ; leaflets explaining the laws of health should be circulated, and posters should be provided for Hostels and Messes ;

(2) there should be intensive propaganda on the necessity for changing the diet and advice upon its improvement;

(3) a comparative study should be made of different systems of physical training with a view to selecting the one most suitable for Bengali students;

(4) the University should erect a gymnasium near the College area and appoint a Director of Physical Education to hold classes,

A whole-time Director will have to be ultimately appointed, but an experiment may be made with a part-time man at the outset.

A scheme for the establishment and working of a gymnasium with a Director of Physical Education at the head is given below :—

Site.—The gymnasium is to be situated either within the University compound or somewhere very near the University. It is in contemplation to demolish the present press building and to make heavy structural alterations in the Darbhanga Buildings, as a result of which sufficient space may be available for the construction of a gymnasium opening out into the compound of the Asutosh Building. If, however, this space be not available for the purpose, a gymnasium may be erected on the rectangular portion of land on the east of Halliday Park with the permission of the Calcutta Corporation.

Membership.—Students of the Post-Graduate classes, the Law College and the Under-graduate classes maintained by the University, *i.e.*, students under the direct control of the University, as well as students of affiliated Colleges will have the right to be enrolled as members of the gymnasium. A certain proportion of the athletic fees realised from Post-Graduate students will be paid to the Gymnasium Fund.

Students of affiliated Colleges will be admitted to the membership of the gymnasium on payment of a small fee either by students or their Colleges, and on production of a certificate from the authorities of the institutions concerned, that it has not been found possible to make adequate arrangements for their physical training in their respective Colleges.

The provision of a Central Gymnasium should not be regarded as diminishing in any way the responsibility of Colleges for athletic arrangements.

Provided that there is accommodation, ex-students of the University may be admitted to the gymnasium on payment of a suitable fee.

Special arrangements will be made in the Gymnasium for the following two classes of members :—

(1) Students who may be found to be defective on medical examination, and who may be recommended to take a course of physical instruction as a remedial measure.

(2) Persons who may seek admission into the Gymnasium with a view to qualifying themselves for the post of a Physical Instructor in affiliated Colleges or recognised schools. It is understood Government propose to establish a Training Institute for this purpose. If that is realised, the University need not make itself responsible for giving training to Instructors.

Management.—Rules for the management of the Gymnasium will be prescribed by the Students' Welfare Committee.

The Executive head of the Gymnasium will be a Director of Physical Instruction, appointed by the Syndicate on a salary of not less than Rs. 500 per month. The person selected by the Syndicate for the post may, if necessary, be sent to Europe or America for a course of training at the expense of the University. There should be one or two Assistant Directors of Physical Instruction to assist the Director in the discharge of his duties.

The Director of Physical Instruction.—The Director of Physical Instruction will be an *ex-officio* member of the Students' Welfare Committee and of the proposed Calcutta University Athletic Club, which is being formed to organise Inter-collegiate sports and games in Calcutta. His task will be to organise a wide variety of forms of physical activity in order to attract all students, and to supervise such activities as far as practicable. He will inspect the arrangements made in educational institutions for imparting physical instruction, and submit reports thereon for consideration by the authorities of the Colleges and the University. These reports will be taken into special consideration at the time of recommending allotment of grants to private Colleges.

The Physical Director will be expected to organise a series of lectures on laws of health for the benefit of students and to carry on such propaganda regarding health matters in the lives of students as may be recommended by the Students' Welfare Committee.

The Director will personally conduct a class for training qualified graduates as instructors in institutions affiliated to or recognised by the University, if such a class is not established by Government.

Play-ground.—It is hoped that in the near future it will be possible with the help of the Chancellor to secure a play-ground for the exclusive use of the University. It may be noted that the Islamia College has been provided with a new sports field and is likely to give up the ground on the Maidan. The Syndicate should enquire of the authorities concerned and apply for this ground, if available. The Director will be in charge of the play-ground which will be placed at the disposal of the members of the gymnasium. It will also be used for Inter-collegiate and Inter-University athletic contests.

Sections of the Institute.—If it is found practicable to build a gymnasium within the University Compound, and if it is decided to utilise the funds of the Sir Asutosh Memorial for this purpose, the Sir Asutosh Memorial Institute may consist of the following sections :—

(1) A gymnasium in the University compound.

(2) A training class for Lathi, Sword, Jiu-jitsu, etc. Space—The Asutosh Building Compound—its roof.

(3) Games Section—A play-ground in the Maidan—Cricket, Hockey, Football, etc.

(4) Swimming—College Square Tank.

(5) Indian Games, Basket Ball, etc.—Halliday Park and a rectangular piece of land to its east.

If the principles underlying the scheme are adopted, details may be worked out and submitted to the authorities for

approval. Details of the actual cost incurred by the University on account of the work undertaken by the Students' Welfare Committee are given in Appendix G, and an estimate of cost of working the scheme contained in this report is set out in Appendix H.

It is hoped that it will be possible to obtain a grant for a considerable portion of the capital expenditure required in connection with this scheme out of the Sir Asutosh Memorial Fund."

During the year ending 31st December, 1929, the Medical Board attached to the Committee visited the following colleges :—

Hooghly College.
Narasingha Dutt College (Howrah).
Scottish Churches College (Calcutta).
Burdwan Raj College.
Vidyasagar College (Calcutta).
St. Paul's ,, ,,
Presidency ,, ,,
Ripon ,, ,,
Bangabasi ,, ,,

and examined roughly 2,000 students. This brings the total of students examined to 18,853. Along with the other activities of the University, the work of the Committee suffered considerably owing to the unrest prevailing among the student population, and the health examination of the students had to be suspended during the months of July and part of August.

The system of sending separate reports to individual colleges on the health examination of their students was continued. These contained lists of defective students with the defects and diseases stated against their names and roll numbers, and were sent to the colleges concerned within a short time after the health examination, together with the recommendations of the Department. 534 defect cards were issued from the office informing the students of the defects found, and

arrangements were made in 15 cases to supply spectacles at concession rates. The Sun Optical Co. kindly supplied during the year 6 pairs of glasses free of charge. A. C. Mitra, Esq., L.M.S., acted as After-care Officer, followed up the defects of students, saw their guardians and the heads of the institutions, and kept himself informed of the steps taken for treatment.

At the invitation of the Secretary, Calcutta Congress Exhibition, specially illustrative Charts and Posters were prepared and exhibited in the Public Health Section, and the After-care Officer was deputed to explain the significance of the charts and give necessary information. Subsequently the charts were also exhibited at various other public occasions, *e.g.*, the District Teachers' Conference, Burdwan, and the Health Association meetings held by the Calcutta Corporation.

During the year Mr. M. N. Banerji, M.Sc., B.L., was in charge of the office, and Mr. Haripada Maiti, M.A., acted as the Supervisor of the Rowing Club.

Section II.

Findings of Medical Inspection.

The proportion of students found to be suffering from definite defects varies little from year to year. The proportion found to need treatment and observation are as follows :—

Name of Disease.	Percentage.
Mal-nutrition	40%
Skin disease	25.5%
Enlarged Tonsils and Adenoids	18.5%
Heart disease	4.1%
Enlarged Spleen	2%
Enlarged Liver	1.1%
Dental defects—	
(*a*) Caries	8.2%
(*b*) Pyorrhoea	3.6%
Visual defects	32.9

A study of the above table will make clear the direction along which arrangements should be made to improve the health of the student community. The most common defect discovered at routine inspection is mal-nutrition. Defects of vision, the principal sense used in education, comes a close second accounting for about 33 per cent. of the students. Next come skin-diseases and diseases of the Nose and Throat (Enlarged Tonsils and Adenoids—18.5%) followed by Dental defects, Heart disease and enlarged Liver and Spleen. These constitute the principal "student" diseases.

Under the present arrangement all these are referred to private medical practitioners in attendance at the students' homes. But it seems to me that some of these can best be dealt with most expeditiously and satisfactorily at a central Clinic established by the University.

Such a clinic should be one of the most important units in the Students' Welfare Scheme. Its function would be advisory and executive: advisory in the sense of being a clearing house for referring cases to various agencies, *viz.*, Private practitioners, Hospitals, etc.; executive in the sense of providing treatment for minor conditions, which, if neglected, may lead to serious results, and for making arrangements for the correction of visual defects. The most successful method of dealing with visual defects would be for the medical staff attached to the department to work in co-operation with a specialist to whom cases presenting special difficulties could be referred.

The ultimate success of any scheme for the treatment of visual defects is dependent on (*i*) arrangement for the provision of spectacles and (*ii*) on an efficient system of following up. Arrangements should, if possible, be made with respectable firms to obtain glasses at contract price, and in necessitous cases, the cost should partly or wholly be remitted on the recommendation of the Principal after enquiry into the circumstances.

Effect of Environment on Physique.

In our last report we made a comparative study of the health of the students attending the Calcutta Colleges and Colleges near Calcutta and came to the conclusion that "the physical development of students within easy reach of Calcutta is of the same standard as that of the average Calcutta student." We also began a study on the effect of exercise on the general growth and health of College students. We have continued this study through the year and the results are shown in the following tables :

Table of Measurements of Physical Traits of Exercisers and Non-excrcisers.

Criterion.	Exercisers.	Non-Exercisers.
Height ...	165·7 cm.	166·5 cm.
Weight ...	52·4 kg.	51·7 kg.
Ponderal Index ...	2·26	2·24
Chest Expansion ...	5·08 cm.	4·96 cm.
Grip Right ...	40·5 kg.	39·43 kg.
Grip Left ...	37·1 kg.	35·9 kg.

Incidence of Disease in Regular Exercisers and the Non-exercisers.

Disease.	Exercisers.	Non-Exercisers.
Heart ...	2·6%	2·8%
Lungs ...	·5%	·6%
Bad throat ...	10·1%	13·3%
Digestive trcubles ...	27·6%	33·9%
Mal-nutrition ...	25·7%	34·5%

Analysing the table we find that the regular Exercisers show a definite superiority over the rest in all the items chosen as our criteria, and suffer less than the Non-exercisers.

Health according to Economic Status

This year we have made a special investigation of the influence of economic condition on the health and development of students. At the very outset one is confronted with the difficulty of determining the economic condition of the student's family. Occupation is usually taken as the criterion of the economic status of a family. But one is likely to be misled from this criterion alone if one does not definitely know the approximate income behind the occupation given. To guard against this source of error we made a comparison of two groups of students, the incomes of whose family are roughly known to us. In the absence of better descriptive terms these two groups have been named by us "the Well-conditioned group" and "the Ill-conditioned group" Under the former group the following occupations have been mostly represented :

(1) Attorneys,
(2) Barristers,
(3) Vakils,
(4) Merchants,
(5) Gazetted Government Officers,
(6) Zeminders,
(7) Medical Practitioners,

and in the second group are included professions like :

(1) Clerks,
(2) School Teachers,
(3) Naibs, etc.

The detailed tables of the two groups are shown in the Appendix E. Here we merely summarise the main differences between the two groups as regards health and development.

Development.

Criteria.	Well-conditioned Group.	Ill-conditioned Group.
Height ...	166.8 cm.	164.8 cm.
Weight ...	53.6 kg.	49.8 kg.
Ponderal Index ...	2.26	2.24
Chest Inspiration ...	84.3 cm.	83.4 cm.
Chest Expansion ...	5.70 cm.	5.80 cm.
Grip, Right ...	38.4 kg.	38 kg.
Grip, Left ...	35.5 kg.	35.1 kg.

Incidence of Defects and Diseases.

Criteria.	Well-conditioned.	Ill-conditioned.
Mal-nutrition ...	29%	35%
Obesity ...	10%	4%
Defective vision ...	39%	27%
Caries ...	9%	2%
Diseases of circulatory system ...	4%	5%
Bad throat ...	23%	13%

From the above summary of our results it is obvious that the students from the Well-conditioned families are better developed. The number of students suffering from mal-nutrition is also lower in them. But it is not to be supposed that all the advantages are necessarily on the side of the students from the better-conditioned families. They suffer more from defective vision, bad throat, caries and obesity.

Functional Test of the Heart.

One of the commonest questions asked by the student after the examination is—'Am I fit for active exercise?' To answer this question with any degree of confidence, a test for judging

the functional capacity of the *heart* had to be devised. Owing to the different grades of facilities available in the different Colleges a standardised test had to be devised. Of the different tests advocated for testing the functional capacity of the *heart*, the *staircase test* seemed to be the one likely to give the best results and the easiest to be adopted. The difficulty in the way of its adoption being the disturbance which would be caused to the general routine work of the College by students continually running up and down a flight of stairs. To meet this a modification of the test as usually applied had to be devised, and of the several alternatives suggested, the following was adopted :—

The student was asked to get up and down an ordinary office chair, a foot and a half in height, 20 times as quickly as possible, the maximum time allowed being one minute.

A medical officer was specially deputed to carry out this test which was applied to all students excepting those who in his opinion were not in a fit condition to stand the test. The following instructions for the application of the test were issued :—

"1. Examine the heart before exercise, note character of sound, rate, rhythm and murmurs, if any, determine if the student is capable of standing the exercise, in cases of badly damaged *heart* leave out the test.

2. Put the student through exercise.

3. Examine heart immediately after exercise and note rate, change in rhythm or character in sounds.

4. Ask the student to lie down and examine the heart after one minute, note the condition of the heart, and, if it has not returned to conditions as in item one, state the fact, and

5. Examine the student 3 minutes after exercise and note conditions."

Instructions issued tentatively to judge the effect of the exercise were as follows :—

A student is not fit for active exercise if (*i*) rate is increased

over 40 beats a minute after exercise; (*ii*) if rate does not return to the condition before exercise in a minute.

During the year under consideration about 1,200 students were put through this test. The number of students judged by the examiner to be unfit to undergo the test was two.

The results obtained are shown in the accompanying tables.

Table showing increase in the Rate of Heart-beat immediately after Exercise.

Rate of Increase.	No. of Students.
Less than 20 per minute	26
21-25	87
26-30	180
31-35	270
36-40	504
41-45	36
46-50	49
Above 50	62

Average—36.

The average increase will be found to be 36. In 88 p. c. of the students the increase in the rate did not exceed 40 per minute.

The largest group of 504 students showed an increase of 36-40 beats in a minute, while a very small group of 26 students showed an increase of less than 20 per minute. 147 students, *i.e.*, about 12 p. c. of the students examined showed an increase of over 40 beats a minute.

Table showing the State of Heart 1 minute after Exercise.

No. of Students.	Rate of Increase.	Percentage.
240	0	20%
120	2	10%
492	4	41%
116	6	9%
161	8	13%
85	Above 8	7%

Average—3·9, *i.e.*, 4.

From an inspection of the above table it will be seen that in only about 20 p. c. of the cases the heart returned to normal within a minute. In 612 students, *i.e.*, 51 p. c. of cases the rate returned to within 4 beats of the rate before exercise. In about 7 p. c. of the students the rate showed an increase of over 8 beats a minute after exercise. Most of the students therefore failed to satisfy the second condition formulated for judging the effect of the test, and the standard will have to be modified in the light of the above findings.

Age does not seem to have any marked effect on the applicability of the test; the average rate of increase immediately after exercise for ages between 15 and 22 is 36, and the difference in rate 1 minute after exercise in all the age groups is 4, as will be seen from the following table :—

Age.	No. of students.	Increase after exercise.	Difference in rate 1 minute after exercise.
15	32	36	4
16	182	36	5
17	272	35	4
18	274	36	4
19	212	36	4
20	133	35	4
21	58	36	3
22	30	36	4

In the following tables we have shown the results of the application of the test to students taking exercise regularly, and it will be seen that exercise does not affect the test in any way. The average in their case is the same as for the general group, namely, an average increase of 36 after exercise and a return to within 4 beats after a minute.

Exerciser's Heart-beat Rate immediately after Exercise.

No. of Students.	Rate of increase.
2	1-20
6	21-25
27	26-30
43	31-35
96	36 40
8	41-45
7	46-50
11	51 and above.
Total 200.	Average—36.

Exerciser's Heart-beat Rate 1 minute after Exercise.

No. of Students.	Rate of increase.
Nil	0
30	2
110	4
24	6
23	8
13	above 8
Total 200.	Average—4.

Conclusions.

In the light of the above findings we may conclude that (*i*) the modified test can be used in place of standard *staircase test.* (*ii*) A person is not fit for active exercise if the rate of heart beat is increased by over 40 beats a minute after the exercise advocated above, and (*iii*) if it does not return to within 4 beats of the state before exercise within a minute.

Section III.

Nutrition.

Nutrition is every thing during the developing period, but it must be remembered that nutrition is not an alternative term for food which is but one of the causes of mal-nutrition. Nutrition consists in the total well-being and right functioning of the whole body. Mal-nutrition is the opposite, and if the body be ill-nourished and below par, the mind and spirit of the student are by that much injured or impaired and its total capacity reduced.

We now come to the question of what constitutes a good standard of general nutrition and it is a question of great difficulty of determination. The medical examiners have to weigh facts they have collected at the medical examination, fix a standard in their own mind, and compare every case with it to settle in what class a particular student should be placed.

But as this standard is not fixed there is bound to be striking dissimilarity in the data from year to year according to the standard adopted by each individual examiner. The figures obtained by this method are as follows: —

Fatty	8.4%
Stout and Muscular	5.8%
Medium	63%
Thin	22%

We have this year tried to estimate whether a standard can be fixed or not, and have tested the values of the following formulæ in the estimation of *nutrition* :—

1. Ponderal Index. 2. Oppenheimer's Index.

Ponderal Index.

Ponderal Index is an index used in the estimation of nutrition and represents the percentage value of the cube root of *weight* in kilos and the *stature* in cm.

$$(\text{PI} = \frac{\sqrt[3]{\text{wt. in kilos}}}{\text{ht. in cm.}} \times 100)$$

In other words it gives the weight of a cm. of height in grammes. In calculating Ponderal Index we have used the Metric instead of the English system for reasons which are obvious. The calculation is undoubtedly complicated, but it gives a due adjustment for abnormal weights and varies but slightly round a fixed mean during the ages under consideration, *i. e.*, between the ages 17 and 21.

Factors affecting Ponderal Index.

The factors which may affect Ponderal Index are *Age, Race and Caste, Economic condition, Exercise and Diet.* In the following paragraphs I shall attempt to determine how much the above factors affect the Ponderal Index.

Age.

The averages of the different age groups as obtained by us from an analysis of 18,960 students are as follows :—

Age.	Ponderal Index.	Age.	Ponderal Index.
15 ...	2.19	20 ...	2.24
16 ...	2.21	21 ...	2.24
17 ...	2.21	22 ...	2.24
18 ...	2.22	23 ...	2.25
19 ...	2.22	24 ...	2.26

It will be seen from the above figures that from the 15th year the Ponderal Index increases and continues to rise into mature life. But the variations during the ages under our consideration fall within the epoch adopted for our classifications, and hence do not materially affect our conclusions.

Race and Caste.

Under this head we propose to study the variations of Ponderal Index as met in the various races. Most of the figures given have been taken or calculated from figures for height and weight given in Rudolf Martin's "Lehrbuch der Anthropologie," 1928. The figures are as follows :—

A. European Races.

	Ponderal Index
1. Norwegians	2.34
2. Polish Jews	2.36
3. Belgians	2.37
4. Germans	2.37
5. Dutch	2.37
6. English	2.38
7. Swiss	2.39
8. South Russian Jews	2.39

B. Asiatic Races.

1. Bengalee Mahomedan students	2.20	From our own data.
2. ,, Lower caste ,,	2.21	
3. ,, Vaidya ,, ...	2.22	
4. ,, Kayastha ,, ...	2.23	
5. ,, Brahmin ,, ...	2.23	
6. Mysore students ...	2.25	From figures supplied by the Mysore University.
7. Lower caste Hindus ...	2.25	

	Ponderal Index
8. Javanese	2.25
9. Higher caste Hindus ...	2.26
10. South Chinese	2.29
11. Melanesians	2.29
12. Annamese	2.33
13. Koreans	2.35
14. Japanese	2.37
15. North Chinese	2.38

C. Other Continents.

1 Bushmen	2.37
2. Maori	2.37
3. Red Indians	2.43

An analysis of the above figures will show that the Indians as a whole have a lower Ponderal Index than any of the races enumerated above. In this respect they are approached by the Javanese, Melanesians and South Chinese, and to some extent by the Annamese, *i.e.*, the inhabitants of South Asia seem to form a group by themselves independently of racial or ethnic factors. Therefore we are led to suppose that the Ponderal Index is independent of racial influence, and the differences which we notice are probably due to climatic conditions or to differences in diet. The South Asiatic races which we have grouped together are mainly rice-eaters, and it may well be, that the preponderance of rice in their diet may have some thing to do with the difference pointed above.

Economic Condition.

We have worked out in detail (see Appendix E) the differences in Physical standard among students from families of good economic condition, and indifferent economic condition. The Ponderal Index for the groups are respectively 2.26 for the well-conditioned students, and 2.24 for the indifferent-conditioned students. The above remarks are equally true for the groups of exercisers and non-exercisers, the figures for the

groups being—exercisers 2.26 and non-exercisers 2.24. Therefore it would appear that economic condition and exercise also affect Ponderal Index. The differences, though small, appear to be significant. Lastly, for want of proper materials, we have not been able this year to undertake the study of the effect of diet on Ponderal Index.

The figures for Ponderal Index, calculated from measurements of 18,690 students, are as follows :—

Frequency Distribution of Ponderal Index.

Epoch.	No.	Percentage.	Classification.
Below 2·0675	624	3·83	Greatly under-weight.
2·0675—2·1325	2111	11·29	Marked mal-nutrition.
2·1325—2·1975	4868	26·04	Mal-nutrition, including border-line cases.
2·1975—2·2625	5370	28·73	Average Nutrition.
2·2625—2·3275	2862	15·31	Fair Nutrition.
2.3275—2·3925	1480	7·91	Good Nutrition.
2·3925—2·4575	726	3·88	Stout.
Above 2·4575	649	3·46	Greatly over-weight.

The calculated average of the Ponderal Index is 2·23 with a standard deviation of ·098. The probable error is ·065 and we have adopted this as the epoch in our classification to enable us to roughly correlate the data obtained by physical inspection by the medical examiners, and the figures obtained by calculation. The results are shown side by side in the attached table :—

Classification by Inspection.	Percentages by Inspection.	Percentages by Ponderal Index.
Thin	22%	40.66%
Medium	63%	43.08%
Muscular	5.8%	7.91%
Stout	8.4%	7.3%

It will be seen that whereas the figures for groups 'Muscular' and 'Stout' agree closely in both cases, there is a considerable discrepancy in the figures for the two groups *Moderate* and *Thin*. This is due to the difficulty in drawing a distinct line of demarcation between the average and the poorly nutritioned students. A very large group of students, *i. e.*, 4,868 (26·04%) falls under the head 'Border-line cases' or cases which are below the average but not sufficiently ill-developed to be frank cases of mal-nutrition.

Oppenheimer's Index.

Another formula which has often been used in estimating functional inefficiency or nutritional disturbance is the Oppenheimer's formula, which makes the Index of nutrition equal to girth of arms divided by the chest girth. The Index should be equal to 30 at least if there is to be no mal-nutrition according to European standard. This figure, arrived at from examination of European students, is too high to be applicable to Indian students. We have analysed the figures for 200 college students between the age groups 17 and 20, and the frequencies are as follows :—

Frequency Distribution of Oppenheimer's Index.

Index.	No.	Percentage.
24	2	1
25	9	4.5
26	32	16
27	43	21.5
28	30	15
29	37	18.5
30	28	14
31	13	6.5
32	5	2.5
Above 32	1	.5

This gives as average 23.1 with a standard deviation of 1.732. If we adopt the European standard, only 23.5% of the students would satisfy the test. But if we adopt the average obtained by us, *i. e.*, 28, about 43% of the students would fail to satisfy this test. This approximates the figure of 40·66 per. cent. obtained from a consideration of the Ponderal Index. Therefore to judge the nutrition of Bengalee students, the figure obtained by us, *i. e.*, 28, should be adopted. It would appear that both the indices are equally reliable standards for the indication of mal-nutrition. They are fairly correlated to each other, the Index of correlation being ·5. But Oppenheimer's Index does not give us an idea of the different states of nutrition, which can be obtained by the use of the Ponderal Index, and therefore, where time and labour permit, it will be advisable to use Ponderal Index which has moreover the advantage of being a scientific index widely used by different workers in different countries. The difficulties in calculation can easily be overcome by the use of tables.

Conclusions.

From a consideration of the above we may conclude that :—

1. The Ponderal Index is the criterion of choice for judging mal-nutrition.

2. That about 40% of the college students suffer from mal-nutrition.

3. The Bengalee student is lighter, absolutely and proportionately than the Europeans; but approaches in character closely the south Asiatic peoples.

Section IV.

Physical Education.

Some progress has been made in introducing Physical training in our colleges. But I am afraid that some of the college authorities have not fully realised the importance of the subject,

and it is to be feared that physical training is not exercising its full influence for good in the lives of the young students.

The main requirements for the proper development of a system of Physical Education are :—

(*i*) A uniform and comprehensive system of physical training.

(*ii*) A sufficient number of fully trained teachers.

(*iii*) Allocation of sufficient time to physical training.

(*iv*) Improved facilities and equipments for games and play, both indoor and outdoor, and for formal gymnastics.

We mentioned in our last report that the University had appointed a committee to recommend a system of Physical training which might be adopted by the University. The expert Committee has submitted its report which will be found in Appendix F. To encourage the colleges to fit up suitable gymnasia and build play-grounds, the University has continued to give financial aid to colleges who have applied for the same. Further, a Committee appointed by the Senate to consider the future policy and scheme of work of the Students' Welfare Committee, has recommended (*a*) building of a central gymnasium, (*b*) the appointment of a whole-time Director of Physical Instruction with two assistants to organise physical training of college and University students.

Calcutta University Rowing Club.

The Students' Welfare Committee has been running the Calcutta University Rowing Club as a part of its activities for the last 11 years. Owing to development of its work in other directions, the Committee felt it advisable to recommend to the University to transfer the working of the club to a body in which colleges and the University may be properly represented. The University has accepted this recommendation.

During the year 1929 there were 9 Jolly boats, 2 Tub-fours and 2 Clinkers under the direct management of the Committee.

Three Jolly boats were placed at the disposal of private colleges. The number of members on the 31st December, 1929 was 40, and 3 boats went out daily on the average. Mr. Manojkumar Bose acted as the Assistant Supervisor during the year.

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GERMANY'S FOREIGN TRADE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO BRITISH INDIA.

In spite of the various present-day difficulties and hindrances in the field of Germany's foreign trade after the Great War mainly due to the Versailles Treaty, the German nation has succeeded by dint of almost superhuman efforts to win for itself a position in foreign trade which is not only equal to that of the pre-war days, but has even surpassed it in certain respects. On the one hand, this period of suffering and oppression called forth in the nation an iron will to fight the evil, and on the other, through good fortune all her resources and latent possibilities were happily combined to build up the new Germany's economic life and her oversea commerce. The result of these efforts will be best understood by a consideration of the development of Germany's foreign trade during the last few years; and we are giving here for that purpose figures for the years 1925-1929. The development of trade in purely commercial products, including

the remittances for reparation, was as follows during these years :—

	Import.		*Export.*	
1925	RM	12,362,055,000	RM	9,290,427,000
1926	RM	10,001,443,000	RM	10,414,459,000
1927	RM	14,228,061,000	RM	10,801,053,000
1928	RM	14,051,258,000	RM	12,029,589,000
1929	RM	13,436,002,000	RM	13,482,661,000

A short analysis of these figures will show that during the years 1925-1928 Germany's foreign trade was extremely passive and therefore the imported commodities could not be paid for by the proceeds of the export products. Now, as German capital investments in foreign countries and similar other enterprises, which, as in pre-war days, could have helped Germany to balance her passive foreign trade, were not in existence in sufficient quantities, this excess in import could be levelled only with the help of credit in foreign countries which German industry has received. Still, the rise of German export from 9·3 milliard Marks to 13·5 milliard Marks within the short period indicated above, remains a great achievement of German industry—an achievement which required the highest amount of foresight and capacity for organization in all the parties concerned. It is all the more remarkable because, as is well-known, tariff walls have been raised to prohibition heights in many countries of the world with the result that the market open to German export products was becoming narrower and narrower although their quantity was growing all the time. This position is quite preposterous for Germany in her present circumstances—perhaps even tragic —for ultimately Germany can pay the reparations only if her export trade gradually gains in volume, and yet it is being hindered and oppressed in every way by the high tariff wall and the administrative protectionism of the creditor nations !

As regards Germany's trade relations with British India we have to note, first of all, that they have been determined and influenced by various circumstances for a long time. Those relations were of course rudely disturbed by the dreadful World War; but soon after the conclusion of the war the normal conditions were restored to such an extent that now Germany's share in India's foreign trade has again reached its pre-war magnitudes. This fact is all the more encouraging to the German nation because the Germans have been allowed to travel in India and settle down there only since the year 1925. At present the magnitude of Germany's trade with India is equal to that of Japan and the United States of America, and these two countries have varyingly held the second position in the magnitude of trade with India, Great Britain having always possessed the largest share in it.

The course of Germany's trade relations with India during the years 1925-1929 may be followed from the following table in million Marks :—

	Import.	*Export.*
1925.	RM 640·4	RM 196
1926	437	244
1927	526	235
1928	708	223
1929	624	221

These figures give a clear idea of the great magnitude of trade between the two countries; and they also prove what may come as a surprise to many, *viz., what a profitable market Germany is for Indian products. According to these figures the value of German commodities imported into India is but one-third of that of India's export to Germany* !

This also shows that the possibilities of Germany's export trade with India have not yet been fully utilised. How far

the growing Indian boycott movement directed particularly against English products and also against all European cotton goods, has affected the trade relations between Germany and India remains still to be determined. But in view of the great importance of Germany as a profitable market for Indian products, it is to be hoped that the Indian buyers, in recognition of this fact, as well as of the universally admitted high quality of German goods, will remain true to their German purveyors; and rather than wind up their relations with German firms they will all the more cultivate them. Such a course will be not at all detrimental to their general tendency of the Indian people towards increasing industrialisation and self-production; rather the requirement of the Indian people will be increased in this way. Moreover, the difference between Germany and India in the conditions of production is still so great that even on the basis of a natural division of labour Germany may well be given more chance to push her products into India without thereby in any way jeopardising the real interests of India.

German import from British-India mainly consists of jute, cotton, cow-hides, earth-nuts, shellac, oil-cakes, cottonseed, powder, raw lead, cocoanuts, coffee, linseed, copper-ore, India-rubber, cocoanut-fibres, sacks, refuse of rice, rice-chaff, pepper, rape-seed, beet, copra and timber.

Iron-wares represent the chief item in Germany's export into India; then follow bars and plates of brass, silk, machines and machinery parts, iron pipes, aniline and other dyestuffs, woolens and similar other clothes, cotton goods, dress and toilette articles, lenses, paper, sugar, paper-paste, paste-board, slates, porcelain-wares, grease, beer, timber, potato-starch and potato-flour, chemical salts and acids, woven-goods, nets, laces and embroideries, glass hangings, imitation pearls, toys, electrical products and locomotives and wagons.

The above exposition will clearly show how perfectly the structure of German foreign trade—one of the most important factors in the economic life of Germany—answers to the demands

of the economic system of the world, divided now as it is into various different corporations on the principle of division of labour, and it will also be clear that Indo-German trade relations are based exactly on this principle. The truth of this principle is now being amply vindicated by the present crisis in the economic system of the world—a crisis, for which the buying power of most countries has been considerably reduced and which has completely changed the normal course of world-economy. This crisis, combined on the one hand with the heavy burden of reparations which Germany will never be able to bear for a long time, and on the other, with the present political situation in India, has thrown a veil of sorrow also on the economic relations of Germany with India. The German Government is doing everything to lead this world, threatened by the present economic crisis and full of conflicting political aspirations, towards that goal of peace and harmony which will be a blessing to all the nations on earth. But this brings along with it the necessary assumption that the responsible personages and Government circles in other countries too should rise to the situation and recognise that the modern nations of the world are so closely connected with one another through mutual economic interdependence that more than ever mutual sympathy and mutual aid is now absolutely necessary and that the present world crisis can be got over only when every nation on earth gets the right of political and economic self-determination.

HARTMANN.

MR. SINCLAIR LEWIS.

The 1930 Nobel Prize for literature has gone to an American writer, Mr. Sinclair Lewis, and this is the first time that such an award has been made to an American man of letters. Mr. Sinclair Lewis is interesting not merely as a novelist, but chiefly perhaps as a social critic. He is the product as well as the critic of the society which he has depicted. I call him the " product " of it, purposely, to mean that more than any of his contemporaries in the world of American literature, he has gone through it, and has willy-nilly been affected by it, so profoundly as to be able to reproduce faithfully American society, to point out its faults, and to illustrate the effect of this society on himself and his art. All of Mr. Lewis' novels—*Main Street, Babbitt, The Job, Our Mr. Wrenn, Martin Arrowsmith, Dodsworth, Elmer Gantry*—not only picture and satirize American life, but their main interest lies in the parallel they suggest with the author's own life, showing how the American environment has influenced his creative consciousness. Of this theme each one of his novels may be regarded as an illustration. In one word, his thesis is American vulgarity ; whether as Babbitt or Arrowsmith or Elmer Gantry, he is a personification of this vulgarity. Therefore, to describe *Martin Arrowsmith* only as an attack on the medical profession or *Main Street* only as a picture of ugliness, stupidity, standardization, automobilism, hustle, size, and efficiency, would be inadequate. The entire work of Mr. Lewis is an attack on the coarse Babbittry of the American nation. His fiction is the record of any seeker of truth—chemist, economist, historian, philosopher, theologian, and it does not differ essentially from the story of the artist, of whatever species. It is the story of the troubles and obstacles encountered by those Americans who, in Aristotle's terms, prefer the theoretic to the active life, or, in equivalent terms, the creative to the acquisitive, the artistic to the practical life.

Mr. Lewis' novels, therefore, deal, in my opinion, with the most important theme of all offered by American life, the conflict between two types of people—the type that cares only for getting on, for making good, and the type that wishes to pursue beauty and knowledge for their own sake, to investigate, and to enjoy. So far, the " practical " men have had things pretty much their own way in America, and the results they have achieved are recorded in *Main Street* and *Babbitt*. One familiar with Mr. Sinclair Lewis knows his society of Gopher Prairie and of Zenith—a society in which science, art, and religion are prostituted, in which poetry becomes heartening doggerel, orchestras are valued only as municipal advertisements—a society which stunts, thwarts, and starves those who do not conform to its recognised pattern. Of this society, then, Mr. Lewis makes his satiric fiction, and a national gallery of frauds and fakes, mountebanks and quacks, bosses and boosters. This fiction will certainly be valuable to the future historian of the United States for its close observation and faithful portraiture. Being a vertical rather than a horizontal view, it cuts across all strata of American life. As a spectacle, America of this age is quite unparalleled—the most potentially powerful and the richest nation in the world for the moment, and withal the Big Show, grotesque, noisy, vulgar, and incommensurable with any thing the world has seen for a long time. Ask Mr. Sinclair Lewis; he will tell you what it is—this fantastic extravagenza, and will do even more; he will explain his personal conflict with it, and all his futilities in consequence. That is his fiction. It gains enormously by its focus being centered not on the doctrinaires and exponents of social state in America, but on an antagonist, and to some extent, a victim of it. He is, therefore, the most successful critic of modern American society, because he is himself the best proof that his charges are just.

Mr. Gerald Gould observes that the two distinguishing features of modern American fiction are " the dissolution of matter " and " the dissoluteness of manner." In a certain

sense, this is true, because both assume the forms of experiments—attempts at adventure, raw and crude, but centainly sincere. As an American writer, Mr. Lewis exhibits these traits, perhaps not as glaringly as others, which suggest in him a certain poverty of invention and imagination which in turn may be traceable to Mr. Lewis' environment. He shows that the aesthetic and sensuous experience is not possible for an artist to have in America; so the only thing left for him to do is to repel it, to be on his guard against it. That is precisely why Mr. Lewis takes a defensive attitude towards his enviroment. An artist in a " practical " society, a society like that portrayed in *Main Street*, or *Elmer Gantry*, is almost certain to return scorn for scorn, ridicule for ridicule, unless he can let go and freely yield himself to it. This can be profusely illustrated from his writings. For example, there is that uncanny knack for observation of his which enables him to mimic exactly to the life ; this observation is as watchful as that of a wild animal on the look-out for its prey. There is also his keen eye for inconsistencies and weaknesses in his prey—how he pounces on them! Years of malicious scrutiny must have been spent by him to acquire this power. He writes as if always conscious of an hostile audience. Naturally, he has to make greater use of irony as a defensive weapon than any other modern writer. He takes needless pains to make it clear that he is more sophisticated than his characters, as if there was danger of our identifying him with them. The result is that nothing is more striking in his characters than their morbid self-consciousness. They do not dare to be natural; they are extremely self-analytical, insecure, and self-distrustful. They are constantly posing and pretending, even before lift-boys and porters. They have no inner standards of their own, because they are not integral personalities themselves. In fact, they have not developed any personality at all.

The art of Mr. Sinclair Lewis is defined by two mental attitudes—first, that he is sentimental and, secondly, he is a

philistine, and curiously enough, he is equally disdainful of both; that is to say, he has tried to escape from his environment and he has tried, with more success, to conform to it. The moment he has been severe with a member of Babbittry he at once turns to emphasise the virtues of the common people and the absurdities of the "high-brows." His sentimentalism is, however, simple and conventional. In *Arrowsmith*, he sympathises with Carol in her dislike of Gopher Prairie and in her longing for "a reed hut built on fantastic piles above the mud of a jungle river." He invents for Babbitt a dream of a fairy child playmate, "more romantic than scarlet Pagodas by a silver sea." To show the beauty that underlies humdrum life, he tries to prove in *Our Mr. Wrenn* that a clerk's life in a Harlem flat is more romantic than life in Venice, and in *The Job*, that a stenographer is more romantic than Clytemnestra. This sort of sentimentality is not an escape from reality, but the old-fashioned romance which consists in bringing out the essential quality of ordinary, common-place life. He points out the essential goodness of small towns and their inhabitants, and of boosters. He is "homey," chatty, and garrulous, and is strongly opposed to people whom he suspects of thinking that they are "superior." His whole tendency is to strengthen and entrench the folk of Main Street and Zenith in their self-complacency and sordidness. In short, he is a philistine. He does not, however, escape contamination; he speaks their language, and turns their type of wit and humour on themselves. All his satire is *tu quoque*. His style is founded on the uses of salesmanship, publicity and advertising. He avails himself of all the tricks of a racy newspaper reporter. His people do not speak; they "warble," "gurgle," or "carol"; they do not run; they "gallop"; their dancing is "the refined titillations of communal embracing."

The world of Mr. Sinclair Lewis' fiction is neither ordered nor haphazard; it is just a composite mess of physical facts and material wants, which has to be handled in the human

competition to satisfy its instincts and vanity—a sort of world-machine which functions impersonally, and the duty of man is to keep it oiled or get out of its way. Rawdon Crawley would have been shocked to find himself in such a world, but Becky Sharp would have triumphed in it and no questions asked. Mr. Lewis' Babbitt or Arrowsmith lives as little by the spirit and as much by the code as Kipling's gentlemen, but there is a difference in the code. Mr. Lewis' American Babbitt has no sense of superiority to be established in it and be satisfied with it. His world is not also a moral one; it does not even concern itself with sexual morality. A wife is a wife so long as she is a good wife, and no more. He knows only one moral law, which is an honest, determined self-assertion, succeed or fail. The pragmatism of Mr. Sinclair Lewis touches the lowest forms of expediency. But the European Babbitt is embedded in his past, and can never get away from it.

P. GUHA-THAKURTA.

HUMAN GEOGRAPHY OF THE GANGES PLAIN

I

Egypt has been called 'the gift of the Nile.' No area of the world, however, has been so completely moulded in its history, economic and social life by a river as the valley of the Ganges. The direction of this mighty river has governed the course of ancient migration, and conquest, as well as the modern distribution of population and prosperity. The whole of the Ganges valley may be pictured as a series of large belts of country laid out flat like a section of soil strata, exhibiting the upper and more fertile silt deposit towards the east. Almost everything enters the region at the north-west boundary and runs through it south-eastwards. Natural regions, rivers and the distribution of population follow the same pattern.

There are three reasons why the Ganges plain has been one of the earliest seats of civilization and to-day presents some of the world's highest records of aggregation which can be supported by agriculture. First, throughout the centuries the Ganges has not departed materially from its main channel and is thus strikingly different from the great rivers of China, whose wayward course has militated against a dense and permanent aggregation. Secondly, the Ganges has formed in the Himalayas, covered with perennial snow, an unfailing reservoir making it possible for nearly half the total cultivated area of the less dry portions of the valley to be irrigated by means of canals. Within less than 200 miles from the glacial ice-cave of its birth, known as the Gomukhi, the stream has been harnessed at Hardwar where almost the whole volume of waters has been diverted

towards the wheat, sugar and cotton fields of the upper Doab. Thirdly, the Ganges valley is not only one of the most fertile plains of the world but it is also within the influence of the south-west monsoon rains. Both the rich alluvium as well as abundant rain-fall in summer explain the phenomenal agricultural productivity, and high density. Moreover, wherever rain-fall is deficient or precarious the small depth of the water-table has led to an easy and cheap system of irrigation by means of percolation wells, millions of which are at work throughout the alluvial plain. Thus while the Upper Ganges and Central portions of the plain which suffer from deficiency or irregular distribution of the monsoons show us the world's most elaborate system of canal irrigation, the eastern portion of the valley exhibits the world's most marvellous system of alluvial well-irrigation.

Towards the delta the more certain and abundant rain-fall of the Bay current ensures agricultural prosperity and instead of canal and well-irrigation we have the natural system of flush irrigation. Here agriculture and population respond not merely to the sequence of floods of the Ganges called here the Padma, but also of those of two other mighty river systems, *viz.*, the Brahmaputrá and the Meghna which pour their mighty volumes of silt-bearing waters into confluence with the Ganges. The waters here widen out into endless vistas and the lands are in a process of perpetual building and unbuilding by a wide and interlaced network of canals and streams, while an endless procession of cocoanut-clad villages and itinerant hamlets containing a swarming population fringes the marshes or the river-banks which are higher than the surrounding country and are always accessible by water. Fishes are abundant here throughout the year and the paddy lands extend right up to the doors of the peasants' huts. Man here is essentially a child of the waters. His crops and farming practices are closely adjusted to the timely inundations of red water, and indeed if the rivers do not rise in flood, and submerge the country he will be a

fish out of water. He has discovered a variety of paddy which shoots higher and higher as the flood-water rises and submerges the entire landscape. When sand-banks are uncovered he sows seeds by supporting himself on a raft of bamboo or grows some quick-growing vegetables still maintaining his connection with the parent village by trips on boats and leaving the settlement as the wayward river drowns his fields and leaf-made huts. In the interior he ploughs his fields with buffaloes on standing water, reaps his harvest often in breast-deep water and goes for shopping along the innumerable creeks that intersect the country on earthen tubs or plantain rafts. His traffic and transport are determined by tides and winds, and he himself lives a more or less amphibious life. The villages here are huddled together on sites which have been artificially raised above flood-level or built upon mounds of earth, isolated islets amidst '*bils*' or marshes which are partially dry and covered with rice in the cold weather, but which during the rains form an almost unbroken fresh-water sea bordered by the river-banks rising only a few feet above the flooded country. These are thus very different from the hamlets of Western Bengal and Bihar scattered through the rice and jute fields or congregating along the banks of the rivers or in their neighbourhood where there are ridges of comparatively high land and of considerable extent. The contrast with the compact settlements of the Upper Ganges plain, situated in the midst of bare treeless plains, and packed with population that has lived for generations on the same congested site is even greater.[1] Not merely agricultural geography but race and history have also played a part in determining types of village settlement. Even in the same Province, we find the settlement of villages and distribution of fields differing according to agricultural tribes and castes. In the United Provinces, for instance, towards the west we have large

[1] See O'Malley, Census Report of Bengal, 1911.

and compact village sites and large holdings as contrasted with scattered homesteads and small holdings in the Sub-Himalayan East region. Not merely the contrasts of wheat and rice cultivation, but the differences of race, as for instance, between the Jats and the Gujars, on the one hand, and the Kurmis and the Bhars, on the other, have entered into the determination of the type of village settlement. It appears that the Thakurs, Brahmins, Kayasths, and other high castes seem to have a preference for living in contiguity throughout the Ganges Valley while the Dravidian communities the thorough-breds of the soil, whether the Kunbis, Kurmis or Muraos of the Upper Plain or the Bauris, Pods and Chandals of the delta would live in scattered clumps of houses on the brink of marshes or swamps, still fighting with the forests and the waters to which they are driven by excessive invasions of new settlers. The dwelling house also exhibits marked contrasts in different parts of the plain. In the delta, the huts are built on raised plinths and constructed of bamboo or reed framework heavily plastered with mud and thatched with straw, while these are enclosed by a wall of bamboos or areca-nuts or mandar trees serving as protection against inundation. In Western Bengal the thatch is thicker or sometimes the roof is made of tile or corrugated iron, and there are far greater use of wood and finer artistic decoration than in the delta on account of greater security against inundation. In the Upper Ganges plain, the houses are mud-walled huts plastered with straw and cowdung so as to impart solidity. The roofs are made of mud and are flat, having none of the curvature of the thatched huts of Bengal which is especially adapted for withstanding its heavy rainfall. The contrast between straw-thatched cottages and huts with walls and roofs made of mud has its roots in the difference between the luxuriant forest-growth of the of the rain-inundated delta and the dry steppe and prairie in the upper Ganges region, while the scattered hamlets of Bengal and the compact and congested rural settlements in the upper and middle plains mark the

difference between a relatively new and uninhabited landscape and the mature and ancient valley, thronged with population for centuries.

Beyond where the active delta building rivers meet the sea we have an intricate maze of sea-creeks, lagoons, islands and dense forests. Man here has to fight with fevers and brackish waters, with crocodiles and tigers ; he establishes his settlement along the banks of the smaller streams to escape from the danger of sudden inundation. At the commencement he lives on '*tongs*' or temporary sheds with thatch made of leaf, which are generally two-storied and built on platforms so that he may be safe from the attack of the tiger which growls beneath. The tide of reclamation usually follows the course of the creeks which open themselves into the large rivers, while the *khals* which communicate with them and which run far into the midst of the clearances are dammed to prevent the ingress of the salt water from the sea. A system of intermittent cultivation, aided by the hunter, the wood-cutter and, above all, the priest who presides over their safety, through his alleged supernatural influence over the beasts of the forest, is the general rule, and both the harrow and the plough are for the first few years inadmissible. But this is gradually replaced by a more intensive system of farming if fevers, *ñal* reeds and storm waves have not taxed too much the reclaimer's energy. For each hamlet that gradually emerges with its fields of waving paddy and its groves of plantains, bamboos and areca-nuts, we find ten other hamlets that have been swept away like the shifting *chars* of the rivers. Perhaps the same hamlet would be twice washed away and twice re-settled within the short period of two decades. Yet the river constructs as it destroys and it is just in the delta where its powers both for building or destroying are colossal, far outreaching man's feeble efforts to attach himself to the soil.

II

From its source to the delta, the great historic river in its onward march has exhibited interesting contrasts of social and economic types. On the mountains where the torrents can hardly be utilized for purposes of irrigation, we sometimes, find here and there in mountain fastnesses small and unstable hunting and forest tribes living on herbs, fruits and wild game. As the river comes down from the hills shepherds and flocks appear on the scene and thrive as pastures become abundant. Yet the community is still nomadic for when the winter snow covers up the entire vegetation there is wholesale migration from cold to warmer levels in search not merely of pasturage but also for some kind of intermittent cultivation. In the higher reaches of the river agriculture and pastoral life thus alternate in response to the cycle of the seasons and of vegetative growth. As we come further down the river at the junction of the valleys we have periodical fairs, markets or pilgrimages in which forest products or woollen goods are bought and sold and religious rites ceremonially observed. Further down the Ganges becomes a broad shining river flowing in easy channels through a flat landscape and on its banks stable village communities are found and at the confluences, or where the river is easily forded, big cities have grown. The upper portions of the valley are more mature than the lower. Here the soils being old naturally have to depend upon the artificial supply of manures to maintain their fertility as compared with the new alluvial soils towards the delta which are periodically replenished by silt deposits. Both the increase of the pressure of population as well as the necessity of irrigation have in the upper portions of the valley kept alive a crop of co-operative habits and practices in connection with agriculture. Given artificial manuring and irrigation the standard of farming is much higher and the cropping more variegated in the upper and middle portions of the plain than in the lower, while the social

cohesiveness also is much greater. Compact village communities with their strips of land scattered in different soil blocks of the village are to be found in the north-west than in the east, and in the gradual welding together of diverse tribes and stocks, function or the stage of economic development rather than race or culture serve as the basis of social gradation. Further, in the true and active delta where the reclamation of forests is comparatively recent we find not the autonomous type of village organization as in the north-west but the feudal system of land-holding, characterised by subdivision of superior proprietary rights in land, which has contributed not a little towards the lowering of the economic status of the peasantry. Like village tenures and rights in land and water, crops and density of population all vary in the different parts of the river system. Such variation is connected with the close adjustment to soil and water supply that the enormous multiplication of population has brought about. The Ganges valley is, indeed, divisible into several natural entities where agriculture responds like plant communities to such ecologic factors as rainfall or nature of the alluvium. No better instance of such adaptation can be adduced than the fact that there are altogether several thousand varieties of rice in the plain adjusted to conditions of soil, climate and the level of flood water. Many of these varieties show such striking adaptation, district by district, that interchanged one may not grow at all on the fields where another has thrived for centuries. Similarly the farming practices differ strikingly from region to region even with reference to the same crops. Along with differences in cropping, and agricultural practices we have associated differences of population growth.

In the different agricultural regions into which the Ganges plain divides itself water (precipitation, irrigation or flood) operates as the limiting agent in agriculture and the growth of human numbers. Land (old or new alluvium) through its effects on fertility and drainage governs the nature and rotation

of crops and the density and health of population. Not only climate, location and crops, but extra-terrestrial phenomena such as sun-spots and weather cycles have an intimate bearing upon the vicissitudes of man. Man and the wider environment evolve together through marked influences. Land, water, tree and man are by no means separate and independent factors for by reciprocal influence they form a natural equilibrium, parts of which can be understood only in terms of the other. Such an understanding of regional inter-relations is a decided advance in the study of social causation, while at the same time it will promote that alliance of man with the entire range of ecologic forces in which lies his real security and progress. How far does man, considered in his expression of population density, live harmoniously (symbiotically) with the ecologic forces of the region? How far has he multiplied in numbers beyond the resources of the region that he occupies thus setting narrowing limits for himself when nature is capricious? How far, again, his ignorance or reckless disregard of the proper balance and rhythm in nature brought about the poverty and ruin of future generations ? These questions in human ecology have an enormous practical importance for millions of people living in the steppe and prairie areas of the upper plain, in the malaria-stricken, deserted hamlets of the moribund delta or in the flood-swept settlements of the active delta of the Ganges. Famine and flood show equally well man's crime against Nature and Nature's stern rebuke. Where formerly were arid wastes man by his skilful engineering and patient effort introduced smiling fields. Where, again, there were bountiful orchards and fertile fields, man by his unskilful interference with the natural drainage brings about agricultural deterioration and epidemics of fevers. Everywhere man has thrived in numbers. The encroachment of the mountains by the tilled land spells ruthless destruction of the forest covering which has cumulative bad effects tending to decrease the humidity of air, the equality of temperature and the fertility of the region. As the mountain slopes are laid bare, the erosive forces

are further let loose which by destroying the soil cap on which forests flourished, makes forest growth impossible for some generations. The mountain torrents formerly harnessed for irrigation now become devastating floods while the accumulated stores of mineral salts in the mountain soil are let loose upon the plains below thus adding further to strips of barren waste. Man has also gone to the brink of swamps and reclaimed marshes for the plough. This coupled with the continuous exhaustion of subsoil water reservoirs by means of thousands of alluvial wells lower the water-level. As the water-level goes down pastures are depleted, and certain crops are no longer grown, while there is a great strain on bullock power especially in summer when fodder is scarce. As population and cultivation expand, both human and cattle population encroaches upon the junglebelt on the banks of the rivers. With the destruction of vegetation on the river bank, the forces of soil erosion under the heavy monsoon rainfall have free play, and we have an enormous loss of fertile soil that is carried into the rivers and extensive formation of desert-like and inhospitable ravines. In the lower reaches of the river, the increase of population leads to the construction of embankments, roads and railways which facilitate the silting up of river-beds and the change of water-course, leaving the legacy of decline of fertility, water-logging and fever. In the areas where the rivers still exercise their delta-building functions, making and unmaking the landscape, man builds his settlement on the banks of the mighty rivers but neglects to train the river and protect its banks. Thus the rivers go out of hand and ravage the country. Man in order to control Nature must to a large extent follow her, for Nature has her own wisdom. If he seriously disturbs the balance and rhythm in which Nature delights, vengeance often follows quickly and man has no escape. Co-operation in the conservation of the land, in the use of water, in forest management, in the training and management of rivers and, finally, in the reciprocal relations of the village and the

city ought to be the keynote of the future. Through the ages man has robbed the earth and committed crime against water, trees and animals, letting loose destructive forces which have impoverished and ultimately engulfed his civilisation even in most favoured regions. Man's future advance lies, indeed, in a bio-economic co-operation, based on the scientific comprehension of the complex Web of Life that comprises both the Living and the Non-living realms and this is deeper than and goes beyond co-operation merely within the human community.

RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE

PRAISE AND LOVE

If hunger I for praise of men,
  A sinner I 'gainst Love.
Is mine what calls forth praise in me
  Or gift from grace above?
Do I offend not 'gainst men's souls
  Deceiving all to take
As mine what is but left in trust
  By Love for lover's sake?
Am I not then a traitor black,
  A breaker vile of trust
O, how can I then hope for peace.
  By truth and Love accurst?
And pass 'mongst men this worthless fraud
  —Ah! woe to me and them!
I pray the evils hid in me
  On me may shameless sit!
To purify then by Love's grace,
  On them may lov'd ones spit!
O Love, thou art True magic spell,
  How Evil else with Good can dwell?
Transformed is Evil by thy grace,
With Goodness lies in close embrace.
Life's cares, O Love, thou kiss away
And let me live in peace alway!

MOHINIMOHAN CHATTERJI

AMARAVATI SCHOOL OF SCULPTURE

Buddhist Remains in Vengi

The recent sensational discoveries at Nāgārjunikoṇḍa and Gummadidurru, have focussed the attention of archaeologists to the existence of a flourishing centre of a school of art in southern Kalinga, with its centre at Amarāvatī. "The former are specially welcome additions to the extant monuments of early Buddhism," writes Sir John Marshall, "in that they belong to the Amarāvatī school of sculpture which, from an artistic point of view, is the most attractive of all the early Indian schools, but which has hitherto been represented almost exclusively by the well-known reliefs of Amarāvatī." [1]

This great school of sculpture flourished in Vengi, from the second century B.C. to the early third century A.D., chiefly during the ascendency of the Āndhras and partly under the Ikṣākus, who supplanted them. Thus the Amarāvatī school evidently covers the perplexing gap between early Indian art and the art of the Guptas. But apart from the intrinsic merit of the works and the important local bearing, the international significance of the school has been established, beyond doubt, by the indelible impress of Amarāvatī, not only in early Ceylonese art, but also in the recently discovered sculptures in Siam, Champa, Camboge and Indonesia.

The eastern Āndhras, who were a great sea-faring people, carried on regular trade along the entire coast of India and with Persia and Arabia on the one hand and Further India and Indonesia on the other. Hence the traces of foreign influence recognised in the works of art fashioned by their artists are

[1] Times of India, Illustrated Weekly for March, 1928.

easily explained.[1] The two different streams of foreign influences, *viz.*, the Hellenistic and the Śaka-Kuṣāṇa, which permeated the Amarāvatī school of sculpture, the former introduced by sea, and the latter penetrating overland from Mathurā, are significantly manifested in two very curious panels lately excavated at Nāgārjunikoṇḍa. "One represents a bearded warrior, apparently a Scythian, wearing a helmet, a long-sleeved tunic and trousers, and holding a spear.....The other figure is very classical in apperance. It shows a bearded male person nude down to the waist and holding a drinking horn (Greek rhyton) in his left hand." [2]

The remarkable remains excavated by Mr. Hamid Kuraishi in 1926-27, comprising three apsidal temples, two monasteries and three stūpas, in the valley of Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, on the banks of the Kistna river, in Guntur district of Madras Presidency, are claimed by Mr. Longhurst "to be the most important Buddhist site hitherto found in the South of India." Besides the splendid pieces of sculpture, the other remnants of great Archaeological interest, are the "ayaka" pillars, bearing Brāmhi inscriptions of the Ikṣāku princesses, which inform us among other things, that the Maḥāchetiya was founded by lady Chāntisiri. Another Upāsikā name Bodhisiri founded an apsidal temple near the Great Stūpa, dedicated to the fraternities of Ceylonese monks. "Another point of interest in the mention of Siripav (*v*) ta corresponding to Sanskrit Sriparvata. Now there is a tradition preserved in Tibet that Nāgārjuna spent the concluding part of his life in a monastery of that name in Southern India. If this convent is the same as 'the vihāra on the Siripavata to the east of Vijayapuri' of our inscription, it would follow that the association of the great divine of the

[1] The extent of foreign influence in the Amarāvatī reliefs has heen disucssed in my paper on "The Development of Buddhist Art in South India," Part II, in the Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta, September, 1927, pp. 498-501.

[2] Annual Bibliography of Indian Archaeology for the year, 1927, Kern Institute, Leyden, pp. 13-14, Pl. VI *a* and *b*.

Mahāyāna with the locality has been preserved upto the present day in the name Nāgārjunikoṇḍa." [1]

Another splendid array of basreliefs was also unearthed by the Archaeological Survey of India in 1927, decorating the base of a stūpa, 30ft. by 30ft. on the Ramreddipalli Hill at Gummadidurru in Kistna district. The remains also include two small stūpas, monastic buildings and other subsidiary buildings. "That the stūpa was in use for several centuries is shown by a collection of 127 clay seals inscribed with Buddhist creed, in Nāgari characters of the mediaeval period." An Āndhra scholar surmises that the Buddhist monuments and institutions of Vengi, were destroyed in the days of the revival of Bramhminical *advaitic* and *visista-dvaitic* cults during the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian era. [2]

The stylislic distinction between the marbles of Amarāvatī [3] and the recently discovered reliefs from Nāgārjunikoṇḍa and Gummadidurru, is not very great. "They looked very much, but not exactly like Amarāvatī reliefs," says Dr. Coomaraswamy. The "Māra-dharṣana" slab from Ramanagaram, now in Musee Guimet, Paris, [4] which was regarded by Rea "as having come from the Buddhist stūpa at Ghantasala," however may probably belong to Amarāvatī itself. The inference may

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[2] Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, Rajahmundry, Vol. III, Pts. 2, 3 and 4, p. 88.

From the mediaeval inscriptions of Ketaraja II, the Kota Chief of Amarāvatī, now in the temple of Amareśvara, we learn on the authority of Dr. Hultzsch "that though Keta II and his predecessors were worshippers of Amareśvara Svāmin, he granted three villages and two lamps to Buddha, and two further lamps were granted to Buddha by two inmates of his harem. This proves what is already suggested by the second verse of the inscription that at the time of Keta II the Buddhist religion continued to have votaries in the Telegu country and was tolerated and supported by the Hindu rulers of Amarāvatī.....In the present inscription the high chaitya of Lord Buddha is referred to and that is a clear proof that that Chaitya was still in existence and in good condition even as late as the 12th century A.D."—Epigraphica India, Vol. VI, p, 148 ff.

[3] For the treatment and technique of Amarāvatī reliefs see my article in the Indian Historical Quarterly, June,, 1927, pp, 264-272.

[4] Coomaraswamy—Buddhist Reliefs from Nagārjunikoṇḍa and Amarāvatī: Rupam, Nos. 38-39, April-July, 1929, Fig. 3.

be strengthened by a study of the form and treatment of the sitting figure on the left corner with similar figures at the ends of the Dharmachakra pillars, flanking the chaitya-slab from Amarāvatī. The figures of Nāgārjunikoṇḍa reliefs, are less connected with each other than the Amarāvatī examples.[1] The comparative lack of admirable sense of overlapping and the bewildering variety of movements, often lead to an impression of horizontal stiffness; which is further emphasised by the exaggerated attenuation of rickety limbs, reminiscent of the Jaggayyapeta formulá. The modelling, too, is more flat and precise, leading to a sharp contrast of lighted surface and dark background, of the positive and negative relations, strongly savouring of the peculiar Śaka-Kuṣāṇa convention. The influence of the Mathurā School, as embodied in the Yakṣī figures, is also apparently betrayed in the extremely flabby and heavy "sleeping women," in another relief, in the Musee Guimet, characterised by soft, round and sensitive modelling and elastic curves which make the physical beauty attractive in all its delicate sensuality, but without the slender and graceful elegance of Amarāvatī. At Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, again, the running figures of late Āndhra period, are substituted by frantic males, dancing in ecstatic frenzy, affording a fitting climax to the sense of rushing movement characteristic of the Amarāvatī representations. The feverish mannerism of the sharply outlined figures of the Gummadidurru slabs, composed of elongated, tapering and angular limbs, is full of that linear abstraction of Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, first noticed.

Influence of Amarāvatī Art.

We have already hinted at the active maritime habits of the ancient people of Kalinga, which spurred them often into risky adventures in distant lands across the seas and in quest of

[1] Eastern Art, January, 1929, Pl, XXIX, Fig. I.

commercial and colonial enterprise. They were the first to colonise the sea-board of Burma, which according to some, came to be known as Kalinga Ratta. "It is from this region" opines Krisnaswamy Iyengar, "that one set of colonists went over to Sumatra and Java, according to Javanese tradition. The region from which their traditional founder Aji Saka came in the 1st century A.D., seems indicated in the direction of Kalinga...the constant references to Kalinga and arrivals therefrom in the history of Ceylon seems to lend historical colour to this far off emigration to the eastern islands.[1] Vijayasimha, the conqueror of Ceylon, is said to have married a princess of Kalinga, the daughter of Simhabāhu. The intimate relations between Āndhradesa and the southern island, is further enshrined in the legend that the great teacher Buddhaghosa, who was originally a North Indian Brahmin, was converted into Buddhism while passing through the Āndhra country and thence he carried Buddhism to Ceylon.

It is well known, that, even now the Indian emigrants in Malay peninsula and the adjoining islands, are known there as klings—an evident corruption of the word Kalinga. If we remember these interesting facts, the indisputable evidence of the influence of Amarāvatī in the plastic arts of Ceylon, Siam, Champa, Camboge and Java, is easily accounted for. The magnificent Buddha statues, particularly of early Ceylonese art, are strongly reminiscent of the Amarāvatī prototypes, in plastic conception, treatment and form. While the beautiful bronze Buddha, recovered from Dong Dung in Champa, has strong affinities with the Kalinga examples. The recent striking discovery of a small image of Buddha, at Pong Tuk in Siam, has led M. Coedes to offer the following pregnant remarks in connection with the sculptures of Amarāvatī school. "They are important for the history of the Buddhist art not only in India itself, but also outside India. The delta of the Krisna river,

1 An. Bibl. of Ind. Archaeology, 1927, Pl. V

that is the region situated east of Amarāvatī and bordering the sea, was one of the starting points for the Indian colonists and adventures who sought their fortune in the east. And it is no wonder that the oldest images found in Ceylon,[2] in Champa (on the coast of Annam),[3] and in Netherlands Indies[4] shows the style of Amarāvatī."

"The fine statuette excavated in the banana plantation at Pong-Tuk" he goes on "presents all the principal characteristics of the Amarāvatī school; you will recognise at once the graceful arrangement of the monastic robe with its wave like folds—so different from the straight and transparent robes of the Gupta period, under which the busts and limbs of the Buddha appear like a nude object; you will also notice the peculiar shape of the face and its sharp, I might also say Greek nose."[5] That the peculiar dancing *apsarases* and the cylindrical head-dress with lateral projection of Amarāvatī, found their way into classic Khmer art, has been lately pointed out by Coomaraswamy.[6] These few instances suffice to show that the school of Amarāvatī in Southern India played the same leading rôle in supplying Ceylon, Indo-China and Indonesia with forms and formulas, what the rival northern school at Mathurā did with regard to Afghanisthan, Central Asia and China.

DEVAPRASAD GHOSH

2 Indian Arts and Letters, Second Issue for 1927: The Great Periods of Indian Art Illustrated (Grousset), Fig. 3.

3 Rao—The Ramareddipalli Buddhist Sculpture, Quart. Journ. of the Andhra Hist. Society, July, 1928, Pl. V.

1 Iyengar—Kalingadesa, Quart. Journ. of Andhra Hist. Society, July, 1927, p. 8.

2 Smith—History of Fine Arts in India and Ceylon, Figs. 178-80.

3 Bull. Comm. Arch. Indo-China, 1912, Pl. IX.

4 W. Cohn—Buddha in der Cunst des Ostens, p. 39.

5 Indian Arts and Letters, Vol. II. No. I, 1928, p. 14, Pl. VII.

6 Rupam, *ibid.*, p. 75.

THE FINANCIAL PROPOSALS IN THE SIMON REPORT

In the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, the subject of Finance received a very perfunctory treatment. In a volume of 282 pages, it was allotted 13 pages, not in a special chapter, but interspersed here and there. The Simon Report gives it the importance that it deserves. The Commission felt it necessary to secure the opinion of an economic and financial expert, *viz.*, Mr. (now Sir) Walter Layton, and in fact did little else than endorsing the latter's proposals. Mr. Layton shows an unusually brilliant grasp of the problems in Indian Finance. Let me say that at the very outset, because this article is going mainly to be a criticism of his views and proposals.

Mr. Layton starts very well by noting "three of the chief features of the financial situation in India, *viz.*, the mass of the people are extremely poor. She is incurring expenditure on the primary functions of Government, such as defence and the maintenance of law and order, as high in proportion to her wealth as Western nations. Her expenditure on social services such as education, health, sanitation, etc., on the other hand, is far behind Western standards, and indeed in many directions is almost non-existent."

There is one other 'chief feature,' *viz.*, that the expenditure on the superior administrative services in all departments is also on the Western standard as the recruitment for the same has been till recently almost exclusively from among the Westerners. Mr. Layton is, curiously enough, unaware of the fact that in specifying the three chief features he has constructed a syllogism wherein from the first two premises the conclusion in the third proposition naturally follows. In other words, it is because the people are extremely poor and the expenditure on

primary functions is high, that the same on social services is low or non-existent. Mr. Layton knows that " neither elected representatives nor the Government are willing to go very far in the matter " of increasing taxation. But he thinks that if increased taxation was earmarked for social services, it could be levied without becoming unbearable. He does not, however, stop to ask himself why, if that was so, Government in the six pre-Reform decades, when it had full powers of trusteeship, had been unable to follow that sage principle. So far as the people and their elected representatives are concerned, the question is not of what is to be done with additional money if raised by further taxation, but firstly as to whether additional taxation is necessary, whether the money that is raised by existing taxation is being properly expended, or a re-distribution of the same could make more available for the social services. Mr. Layton is aware of this, but he says, " It is outside the scope of my report to express an opinion upon either the efficiency and economy of the administration in India generally, or the large questions of policy involved in considering the scale of existing expenditure on defence or other purposes—though the analysis which follows may throw some light on the financial aspect of this latter problem." So this fundamental issues are outside the scope of Mr. Layton's inquiry. As regards the Simon Commission who may be expected to have considered those issues before endorsing Mr. Layton's proposals, they have nothing to say about the economy of administration in India, and as for the expenditure on defence they only look forward to "an equitable adjustment of the burden of finance " in the form of a non-votable contribution of an annual sum from Indian revenues.

Mr. Layton must be complemented for having ventured to go outside the scope of his enquiry to discuss the Indian expenditure on defence. He has no difficulty in showing that it is " not only high in itself and as compared with other countries, but it has also greatly increased as compared with the pre-war

situation." And the pre-war situation was such that Indian public men like the late Mr. Gokhale had for years been attacking our military expenditure as excessive and as a stumbling block in the way of greater expenditure on the social services. Mr. Layton says that though the rise of wholesome prices in India is only 41 per cent. (in 1928) above the level of 1913, the army expenditure is 66 per cent. above pre-war, and that at the pre-war rate it ought to be Rs. 44 crores instead of Rs. 55 crores. Since 1928 prices have fallen precipitately, the index number for June 1930 being 116. So the figure to-day would be not 44 but Rs. 36·3 crores. It is a bit surprising that Mr. Layton does not refer in this connection to the Report of the International Financial Conference of Brussels, 1920, wherein 20% of the national expenditure devoted to defence is stated to be something 'that the world cannot afford.' Thirty-nine countries of the world, including India, and representing 75% of the world's population participated in that conference and made unanimous recommendations. The Indian ratio, as Mr. Layton points out, is 62½ per cent. of the Central expenditure and 31½ per cent. even of the Central and Provincial expenditure taken together. According to the Brussels standard, an expenditure even of Rs. 35 crores on defence would be unjustifiable. Thus it is clear that there is room for retrenchment of at least Rs. 20 crores in our expenditure on defence.

Then there is the question of economy in administration consistent with efficiency. Merely recruiting Indians in place of non-Indians for the superior services will not lead to much economy. Provincialising all these services will only mean an alteration of the lebel if inside the Provincial cadre we create a class A and a class B and have separate recruitment and separate scales of pay for the two classes. We must be clear that in civil administration as in the army it is two distinct types of persons that we require to recruit, *viz.*, officers and men. If in the army we expect to get and do get our highest officers—from Lieutenant-Colonels to General Officers-Commanding from among young

men recruited as Second-Lieutenants, even so in civil administration we ought to be able to get our highest officers from among young University men recruited, say, as Mamlatdars (Tahsildars) or Subordinate Judges. With that kind of Provincialisation and Indianisation, there would open up a possibility, both of reduction of number of posts and of toning down the scales of pay, so as to reduce the present expen diture on superior services very appreciably, possibly by a good few crores in the whole of India. But neither Mr. Layton nor the Commission have seriously considered that line of retrenchment even if to show that not much would be achieved thereby. It is of course a question of policy, but it is idle to talk about finance without considering policy. Mr. Layton himself cannot get away from policy for he says that one of the two underlying assumptions in his report is "that it is both possible and desirable to improve the economic and social condition of Indian people by a substantial increase in expenditure on the nation-building services." His other assumption is that it is possible to raise additional revenues for this purpose. So without entering much into the propriety of present expenditure, he proceeds to consider how more money could be raised. He could, as a matter of fact, have made out a good case for the need of raising additional revenue, even after considering the possibilities of retrenchment, had he considered two items on the revenue side, *viz.*, liquor excise and salt.

Mr. Layton has calmly assumed that the revenue from liquor and salt would continue to come in as heretofore. Still more amazing it is to find the Commission dumb on the subjects. The latter-day movement against these two sources of revenue is merely a culminating point of the strong assertion of public opinion against them that has been made for three or four decades past. Any financial scheme that ignores public opinion in these two respects has small elements of stability in it. Mr. Layton, who estimates the need for more money for social services in the next ten years and the possibilities of additional

revenue by taxation during the period, ought not to have ignored the possible fall (may be, virtual extinction) in the revenue from liquor excise and salt, together amounting to more than Rs. 25 crores. He might, therefore, have said that the possible retrenchment in the military and administrative expenditure might largely be counterbalanced by the possible extinction of revenue from liquor excise and salt, and, therefore, additional taxation would have to be resorted to, if more money was to be found for the social services.

New Sources of Taxation.

Let us now consider Mr. Layton's proposals for additional taxation. As regards *Income-Tax*, his proposals for lowering the exemption limit for personal income-tax and also for steepening the progression of the rate are certainly to be welcomed and he deserves to be specially complimented for having made bold enough to advocate the abolition of the exemption of agricultural incomes. He would have liked to propose *death duties* but has been unable, it seems, to make up his mind. In view of the changes in the income-tax and the inclusion of agricultural incomes, it would probably be wise not to provoke further protests by proposing death duties just yet, but they would have to come in later.

As regards *tobacco*, Mr. Layton proposes an excise tax on cigarettes manufactured in India. That industry has as yet hardly got established in this country even with the help of heavy import duties. To imagine, as Mr. Layton does, that the industry will in ten years' time be so largely and so stoutly be planted in India as to be able to yield an excise revenue of Rs. 5 crores and yet stand the competition of foreign tobacco trusts seems to be the height of optimism. Those five crores had better be left out of consideration altogether, at least for the present. Let the industry grow and get firmly established in the face of foreign competition.

Exactly the same thing needs to be said about Mr. Layton's proposal of imposing an excise on *matches*. It is amazing that the rate he proposes is the same rate as the present import duty. He is not perturbed by the thought as to whether there would be any match-industry left alive to pay the excise at that rate. He calmly looks forward to collecting Rs. 3 crores out of it. Like the preceding Rs. 5 crores, these Rs. 3 crores too need not be seriously counted upon. Mr. Layton's mind seems to have pictured English factories, not Indian, before itself when it made these calculations.

Mr. Layton's proposal of a *terminal tax* may be welcome if it is restricted to imports and is also made a substitute for the municipal octroi wherever possible. It is meant to be a temporary tax, to be given up if and when road traffic in goods successfully competes with railway traffic. Mr. Layton counts upon getting at least Rs. 6 crores out of it, presumably in excess of the octrois for which it is to be substituted.

Mr. Layton's remarks on the *local cess on land* seem to be very casual. It is surprising that he should have failed to note that the Indian land revenue is itself a local rate in the English sense, being a particular fraction (anything from 20 to 50 per cent.) of the annual (or rental) value of agricultural land. The Indian local cess is a local rate on the top of a fairly heavy local rate, considering the smallness of the average agricultural holding in India. Had Mr. Layton compared the burden of land revenue in India with that of the land tax in European countries, he would have seen the picture in its proper proportions. The trouble with our land revenue policy has been that although land revenue has been collected on the principles of the English local rates, the money has never been expended on the English analogy, *viz.*, for purely local purposes. Unfortunately, very few even among Indian public men have grasped that aspect of the question. Most of the controversy on that thorny problem would probably die down if it was tackled on those lines. With the proposed taxation of agricultural incomes, the way has been

made clear to treat the present land revenue as if it was a local rate. But in saying this I have entered upon the next and the most important topic of the distribution of revenues.

The Distribution of Revenues.

On this the most vital part of the Indian financial problem, Mr. Layton's proposals are really disappointing. Little need be said about the Commission in this matter, because the Commissioners have done little independent thinking on the subject. The term, Financial Assessor, applied to Mr. Layton by the Commission, is in fact a misnomer. The Financial Assessor has really written the financial judgment which the Commissioners as judges have simply countersigned.

Mr. Layton should have started the consideration of this subject by enunciating the general theoretical principles which should govern the division of functions and resources between the Central and Provincial Governments and as between the latter and the Local Authorities. He should have drawn upon the practical application of those principles in the financial arrangements obtaining in Canada, Australia, the United States and Germany from which lessons for Indian federal finance could be suitably drawn, taking care to allow for abnormal factors like the excessive growth of national debts in some of those countries due to the late War, and the consequent need for the particular Central Governments to appropriate more of the national resources than they did before the War. The Taxation Enquiry Committee, to whose Report Mr. Layton refers now and then, had stated those principles, though it was unable to apply them to the Indian problem. There is really one principle, *viz.*, that the more direct a tax is, the more it should be spent in the locality where it is collected. As expounded by the Taxation Committee, the principles are :

(1) Indirect taxes, with the possible exception of stamp

duties, are commonly Federal. (Excise duties are almost invariably Federal.)

(2) Taxes on corporation profits are also commonly Federal.

(3) Personal income-tax is generally a State or Provincial source.

(4) Taxes on fixed property are seldom Federal and tend to pass increasingly from State or Provincial to Local Authorities.

Applied to India this would mean :

(1) Customs, excise (including liquor, opium, salt), corporation tax (present supertax on companies), railways, currency would be the chief Central sources of revenue;

(2) Personal income-tax, stamps, forests, irrigation would be the chief Provincial sources;

(3) Land Revenue would be the chief source of revenue for (Rural) Local Authorities.

It is the ultimate destination that is indicated above, whichever may be the suitable authority for collecting a particular tax.

In the earlier part of his Report, Mr. Layton himself says :—" The problem of financial relations between the central and provincial authorities in any country is ideally solved where the sources of revenue which, from the administrative point of view, fall naturally within the sphere of the Provincial Governments, harmonise so far as their yield and elasticity is (*sic*) concerned with the functions which are assigned to those Governments, while those which are naturally central sources accord with the functions of the Central Government.

" One of the chief difficulties of the Indian financial problem is that this harmony between the distribution of functions on the one hand and the allocation of sources of revenue to the Provinces and the Centre respectively, on the other, is lacking. Indeed, the contrary is the case, for whereas nearly all the functions which will require large expenditure in the future fall

within the Provincial sphere, the revenue assigned to them show a quite inadequate increase, while the Central Government, whose expenditure should be stationary or falling, has assigned to it the only revenues which in recent years have shown expansion."

This shows a brilliant grasp of the subject, but Mr. Layton seems to have forgotten what he thus wrote earlier, when towards the end of his report he comes to consider the distribution of revenues. Otherwise, how is it that out of the two elastic sources of revenue, *viz.*, customs and income-tax, he not only retains customs, but also the major portion of the income-tax, 14 crores out of 20, for the Central Government "whose expenditure should be stationary or falling?" If the incomes of persons domiciled within a province, from whichever source those incomes may arise—agricultural, industrial, commercial, professional, what not—are taxed entirely for the benefit of that Province, and the Central Government is permitted to retain only the tax on corporation profits (our present supertax on companies), would not the considerations of theory and the requirements of practice both be satisfied? It is surprising that Mr. Layton should have been unable to see this. Similarly should he have noticed that of the functions requiring large expenditure in future, *i.e.*, those on which expenditure "is far behind Western standards, and indeed in many directions is almost non-existing," the most expensive, *viz.*, primary education, sanitation, medical relief, etc., fall within the sphere of Rural Local Authorities, and hence these latter must have a respectable source of revenue. Mr. Layton has nothing to say about it beyond casually suggesting that the local cess may be increased. Is not the annual (rental) value of agricultural land the natural source of revenue for these bodies, as the annual value of house property is the natural source of revenue for municipalities? In other words, must not the whole of our present land revenue be allocated to the Rural Local Authorities? Does that not satisfy both the theoretical and practical requirements in that matter?

Mr. Layton, with his knowledge of English local finance, should have been the first to advocate this reform, particularly when the Taxation Committee's Report had virtually accepted the logic of this claim. In short, the harmony between functions and resources would in a large measure be achieved by allocating customs and corporation tax to the Centre, personal income tax (including tax on agricultural incomes) to the Provinces and land revenue to the (Rural) Local Authorities.

Excise of all kinds (including liquor, opium, salt) is but a counterpart of customs and must naturally go with it. That is theory. But practice also requires that to be done in India. One of the financial blunders of the Reforms of 1919 was the allocation of liquor excise to the Provinces. In province after province, particularly in Bombay and Madras, the Governments during the last ten years have found themselves entirely helpless to meet the emphatic demand of their Legislative Councils in favour of Prohibition. It was Mr. Layton's business, and most certainly that of the Commission, seriously to consider this problem, when the working of those Reforms was being examined and fresh proposals were to be made. The liquor problem, if it is to be tackled properly, must be tackled as an all-India problem, including the Indian States. The Central Government alone can initiate and enforce an all-India policy in this matter. The liquor excise revenue amounts roughly to Rs. 20 crores in the whole of British India. The Central Government alone can afford gradually to lose the whole of this revenue, if necessary, because its military expenditure is excessive by at least Rs. 20 crores, as I have shown earlier in this paper. Let the two policies of marching towards Prohibition and cutting down military expenditure progress side by side and the thing can be done without upsetting budgets, whatever period is fixed for reaching the goal. The Government of India will of course have to induce the Indian States,—and it knows very well how to do it—to be prepared to sacrifice liquor excise revenue, as some of them have already had to sacrifice opium revenue in the good

company of the Government of India, and to make up for the loss by taxing the personal incomes of their subjects, agricultural as well as others.

Mr. Layton, instead of proposing the transfer of liquor excise to the Central Government, as he ought to have done for the reasons stated above, actually advocates the entrusting of another mad dog to the Provincial care when he includes the proceeds of the salt duty in his Provincial Fund to be distributed among the Provinces on the "per capita" basis. Public opinion in the matter being what it is, the proceeds of the salt duty must be held in "suspense account" at least for some time. The proceeds may as a result of legislation vanish for aught we know or be very much reduced, the duty being lowered to a level where it is believed not to interfere with the maximum consumption of that necessity of life. The edifice of the Provincial Fund is not strengthened very much by making 6 crores out of its total of 14 crores arise from the salt duty. As a matter of fact, the other 8 crores—5 from cigarettes and 3 from matches appear to be very much more problematical as I have shown earlier. The valuable part of the Provincial Fund scheme is really the idea that far from levying contributions from the Provinces for expenditure which "should be stationary or falling," the Central Government, according to Mr. Layton, must now get used to the idea of contributing to the Provinces on a "per capita" basis to enable them to undertake expenditure on social services which, in spite of its care during all the five or six decades, "is far behind Western standards, and indeed in many directions is almost non-existent."

If the reallocation of resources which I have proposed above is made it means that the Central Government gets an additional Rs. 19·44 crores from excise, according to the figures adopted by Mr. Layton, and loses Rs. 9 crores of personal income-tax to the Provinces. Thus the Central Government has a surplus of over 10 crores, on the present basis of revenue and expenditure, and the Provinces will have an equal amount of deficit.

So there will have to be contributions from the Central to the Provincial Governments enabling each of the latter to start with a balanced budget and such contributions will have to continue till the Provincial deficits are made good by the application of part of the proceeds of the new taxes proposed by Mr. Layton, *viz.*, the taxation of agricultural incomes, lowering of the exemption limit, steepening of the rate of progression, and terminal tax.

The scheme that I have thus outlined gives a fairly clear-cut division of resources and achieves that harmony between functions and resources for the Central and Provincial Governments and also for the Rural Local Authorities—harmony which Mr. Layton approves but which his scheme hardly can be said to provide. Further, my scheme makes it possible to inaugurate new policies in consonance with public opinion, *e.g.*, reduction of military expenditure, adoption of the goal of Prohibition, abolition or reduction of salt tax, etc., which would be hardly practicable, in my opinion, under Mr. Layton's scheme blessed by the Simon Commission.

R. M. JOSHI

deliberate, or whether, as in other cases on record, spontaneous combustion took place in the magazine. From such a cause we lost several ships in the late War, though we suspected German agents.

Here then was a chance for a monumental piece of salvage. None but a rich community could have afforded the price which ran into six figures. It was believed that the work of raising the sunken battleship could be carried out for £60,000 ; in point of fact more than double that amount was expended in a single year. Twelve years had gone by since the "Maine" sank into the muddy bottom of the harbour. There seemed but one plan possible, it was to build a huge coffer-dam right round the spot where she rested.

This was a tremendous task, because the ship lay in nearly 40 feet of water or mud. It was necessary for the piles forming the framework of the coffer-dam, to be driven down very deeply, and yet still be long enough to be well above high-water mark.

The task set the salvors was so difficult that only upon a guaranteed payment for work done could anything be attempted. Thus, besides all those massive piles, a great number of cylinders were required to go round the circle. Some of the cylinders were 50 feet across, so their size may be judged. For a year the work went on, and then the huge pit was ready to be pumped out. It was a thrilling moment when the pumps began their steady plugging ; as they went on the water began to sink, very slowly it is true, but in time the masts of the lost battleship were seen, and as the water still flowed out of the coffer-dam the rest of that rusted hull appeared.

The force of the explosion had practically divided the huge ship; the front portion, in particular, was simply a mass of twisted steel. The after-portion was therefore patched to make it capable of floating, pumped out, and then the water was let into the coffer-dam again. The experts spent hours in examining the remnants of what had been one of the finest ships in the American Navy, but their task brought no real result ; the wreck

had been left too long. Indeed, it is doubtful, even had the salvage work been undertaken almost at once, whether the debatable point as to whether the explosion was external or internal could have been satisfactorily settled.

The wrecked after-portion was towed out to sea, and there sunk out of the way of navigation. So ended one of the most remarkable salvage feats upon record.

The British navy had two battleships losses in quick succession some years ago, both ships being of the same class. These were the "Howe" which went ashore off the coast of Spain, and the "Montagu" which met a similar fate off Lundy Island. In the case of the "Montagu" the salvage did not seem to offer very great difficulties; indeed, it was rather regarded as a chance for a little real practice for our naval salvage corps. But after spending £35,000 the Navy had, for once, to admit they had tackled something altogether beyond them. It is doubtful if it is worth spending five figures upon any naval unit which has gone ashore, or sunk in such a way that successful salvage is in doubt. Naval ships go out of date so rapidly. Very often five years sees a class completely obsolete, and the scrap value of a large battleship is very small indeed. For the "Montagu" the Admiralty received less than £5,000, but it was to be remembered that she lay some distance from a shipbreakers' yard, and that her hull would scarcely pay for fetching home; the engines and other machinery would prove the only really valuable salvage.

The "Britannia" was another battleship which went ashore in the war years. Here salvage was brought to a successful conclusion by the expedient of using concrete patches upon the inner and outer keels of the big ship. She got off under her own steam when lightened by the removal of her heavier fittings and her fuel. After thorough repair she was sent out to do her bit; a German torpedo put an end to her career not so long after her adventure off the Scottish coast.

The unexplained loss of the "Hampshire" startled all Britain probably more than any isolated incident of the war.

It was not so much for the loss of the vessel and her gallant fellows perhaps, as the way she went and the prominent personage who went with her.

More than anyone the nation looked to Lord Kitchener in those early days of the war: a great soldier and a born organiser; a man who had seen things through in various tight corners; a man whom we all counted upon in the first 20 months of the World War. It was decided that Kitchener should go on a military mission to Russia.

Although it might have been known to the Germans that Kitchener was to go to Russia, the details of the journey were altered time after time, and none knew for certain what route would be followed or what ship would be used. To reach Archangel it was desirable for Lord Kitchener to embark as far north as possible; for this reason the base of the Grand Fleet, Scapa Flow, was chosen.

Here "H. M. S." Hampshire was waiting. She was to go at full speed, escorted by destroyers, and then, after a hurried visit, occupying not more than a week in Russia, the little fleet was to dash back again.

As the train bearing Kitchener and his staff to Scotland neared the port of embarkation there were many signs that the voyage would be a rough one. Rain and wind made that June day anything but promising. After a crossing to Scapa in a destroyer, and a brief visit to Lord Jellicoe on the "Iron Duke," Kitchener embarked on the "Hampshire" and she at once set out. Lord Jellicoe had himself planned the course the cruiser was to take, arranging it so that, for as long as possible, the "Hampshire" should have the benefit of the sheltering isles which here fringe the coast.

The gallant little destroyers followed their larger sister out, but very soon found that, in the heavy seas running, they could not keep up with her. It was essential that the cruiser should be driven at full speed, therefore the destroyers were signalled to

return to Scapa Flow, leaving the "Hampshire" to proceed without escort.

All went well for a time; then a lonely look-out on the shore saw a cruiser stop, and after a few moments disappear completely—it was the "Hampshire." At first it was believed that she had been torpedoed, the Germans having learned of her errand, and of the presence aboard of Britain's greatest soldier. There were the usual cries of 'traitors in the ranks' and all that kind of thing. But no submarine could have fired a torpedo with any degree of accuracy, if at all, in those tremendous seas. What had happened was that the "Hampshire" had run full tilt upon a floating mine, and it was afterwards confirmed, from German source, that one of their submarines, equipped for mine-laying, had been up that very channel but a few hours previously.

It was a pure chance that the submarine laid her mines in those enclosed waters to such good effect. Given calmer weather the "Hampshire" would not have gone that way, so that there is no secret or mystery about the loss of the ship with so valuable a life.

In fifteen minutes after striking the mine the "Hampshire" had gone, and only twelve men came ashore from that gallant crew. She was about a mile and a half from the shore, but the huge seas overturned the boats which got away. The rafts did rather better and it was upon one of these that the only survivors came ashore. Upon another 43 poor fellows were found dead from cold on this summer night.

Lord Kitchener was reading in his cabin when the explosion occurred, which sent out all lights immediately. He came up on deck and waited calmly for the end; it was obvious to him that there was no hope of a boat living in that sea, nor did a raft seem to offer any better avenue of escape, therefore he remained on deck and sank with the ship.

Thousands believed for months afterwards that Kitchener was a prisoner in Germany, having been picked up by a German

submarine. Another tale was spread broadcast that the Government had deliberately planned this trip, and allowed the Germans to know of it in order to get rid of Kitchener.

Another theory was that a time fuse had been set in the "Hampshire" by German agents, but this too may be ruled out; it was a mine, set at random, that lost Britain her greatest soldier.

Mines were really responsible for many sinkings that were thought to have been due to the remarkable energy of the German U boat commanders. Of all weapons of war mines are the most sinister, and they served friend, foe, and neutral alike.

It was necessary to organise and send out quite a large fleet of mine-sweepers to deal with the mines strewn in many directions by the enemy.

The work of the mine-sweepers was done out of the limelight by men who were often volunteers; many of them belonged to the society of friends, whose tenets forbade them to take part in actual hostilities. Never could it be said of these men that they tried to shelter behind their conscience, for a more dangerous business than mine-sweeping could never be tackled. The vessels so employed had to face the double danger of mines and attack by German U boats, and the number of ships which failed to return was considerable.

Mines swept from one area one day were replaced when the sweepers went on to another, and too often they came back into the danger with no knowledge of the work accomplished behind their backs.

One of the Cunarders, the famous "Carmania" was equipped as an armed cruiser and sent out for patrol duties in American waters, where it was known that Germany had similar vessels employed upon commerce raiding. Very cleverly the German "Cap Trafalgar" was disguised as a Union-Castle liner; by this disguise she was able to select her victims, many a British ship having come within range of her guns under the impression that she was a member of that famous fleet. Then she met the

"Carmania" and promptly engaged her. Rarely were two ships so well matched in the whole course of the war; never was there a keener struggle than between these two liner cruisers. What advantage there was lay with the German boat, which was slightly faster than the "Carmania." The fight opened like a sea battle of the olden days, when one craft challenged another by a shot across the bows, usually sent purposely wide of its mark. If the challenged ship was in no fit condition to meet an opponent an opportunity was thus given to haul down its flag. So with the "Carmania"—she gave the "Cap Trafalgar" thatn invitation. But the German had no intention of hauling dow her flag; instead she replied with her starboard after-gun, and so commenced a duel which was almost certainly the finest isolated fight in the war. The "Carmania" opened at once with her port guns, and now the ships had drawn so close together that the "Cap Trafalgar" was able to rake the decks of her opponent with machine-gun fire. Very soon the captain of the "Carmania" realised that he was inferior in guns and speed, and he realised too that his safety depended solely on the manner in which his ship was handled. Now they were at it hammer and tongs, loading and firing as quickly as they could. By magnificent handling the "Carmania" drew away, and, in doing so, attracted the fire of the German to her upper works: these suffered very much, but far better these than a shell in her engine-room. There was no armour-plating on either ship to protect these vital portions. A fire was started by a German shell in a cabin well forward, and this led to the abandonment of the fore-bridge, the ship being conned from the lower steering position, situated in the aft portion of the ship.

So they went on—a fight to the death, in which both ships seemed to be suffering heavily. Several men were killed upon the "Carmania," and a great number injured; not such totals as were found later in the big fights, but sufficiently serious. Then the men on the "Carmania" gave a cheer; smoke was issuing from the fore-part of the "Cap Trafalgar," smoke

mixed with steam. The steam told of a burst pipe which might mean little or much. Better still the big German took on a decided list, and when a ship does that in a sea fight it is quite safe to say a shot has gone well home below the water line. The fire of the "Cap Trafalgar" began to slacken, her list became more pronounced, and now the ether was filled with urgent wireless calls for help. The fight lasted just 100 minutes; at the end of that time the gallant "Cap Trafalgar" heeled over and went down. Gallant she was indeed, and Captain Barr of the "Carmania" was expressing the opinion of many of his men when he said that the only German he would care to shake hands with was his opponent in command of the "Cap Trafalgar."

The commander of the "Carmania's" first thought was to stay to pick up the men from the sunken adversary, but a smudge of smoke appeared on the horizon. This smudge might, and probably did betoken a German cruiser hastening to the aid of her consort, and the Cunarder was in no condition to meet such a vessel. Therefore, she had to turn reluctantly away and steam towards a couple of British cruisers which were coming to her aid. Under their wings she was taken to port, and her worst damage made good.

When the end of the war allowed the "Carmania" to return to her liner duties, a graceful tribute was paid to her prowess. The Navy League presented a piece of plate to the gallant ship to carry for all time; this piece of plate had been carried in Nelson's cabin at the Battle of Trafalgar, and now it was to rest in the cabin of a ship which had proved herself a worthy successor of the old "Victory," beating a vessel which the men of the wooden battleship could scarcely have pictured. The "Carmania" received 79 shells, which holed her in 304 places.

It is good to know that she has been thoroughly overhauled and modernised, and now, with more than twenty years at sea, is still one of the favourite ships of the Cunard fleet. She set the fashion in the Cunard fleet for the big intermediate liner,

which, whilst not fast, is wonderfully steady and comfortable. She and her handsome sister, the "Caronia" go to and fro successfully across the wide Atlantic on various services, favourite vessels in every way.

It might be claimed that an accident altered entirely the design of the warship from the 'sixties' onwards. The French had already shown with their "La Gloire," and the British with the "Warrior," that the day of the wooden battleship was past. But it was left to an accidental happening in the American Civil War to prove that the entire design of the armoured ship would have to be altered. The first armoured vessels followed, in their main design, the old wooden walls in which Nelson had secured his victories. There was the same large amount of free-board, the same muzzle-loaders considerably greater in number than in power. An unpremeditated duel between two ships of entirely different design altered all that. The British and French ironclads were unproved; now came a couple which were to meet in deadly combat and prove that the earlier designed vessel of the two was rendered obsolete by the latter; that in effect, the "La Gloire" and the "Warrior," within a few years of their building, were entirely out of date.

A success of the Confederate States led to the abandonment of several wooden war vessels, which were first set on fire and then scuttled to prevent them being of use to the enemy. The Confederates determined to attempt the raising of one of the best of the abandoned ships. This was the frigate "Merrimac" of 3,500 tons and 40 guns. In this they were successful, but finding her greatly damaged by fire, they decided that the only thing to do with her was to cut her down to the water's edge and rebuild her as an armoured vessel. A rectangular casement was built upon her hull. This was constructed of exceptionally heavy timber, about 2 feet thick, and this was then covered with heavy plating, some of it being fashioned from railway lines torn up from the track. The casement was made to slope

inwards, at an angle of 35 degrees, and the armour-plating carried a couple of feet below the water line. It was an extremely crude floating fort, equipped with the poorest of engines. Five knots was the best it could accomplish, and the process of turning it completely round took something like half an hour! The re-constructed "Merrimac," which, by the way, was actually re-named "Virginia," a name never used by her historians, drew 22 feet of water mainly owing to her heavy plating. In all she carried ten cannons of which the pair of 7-inch rifled guns were the most powerful.

On the 9th of March, 1862, the "Merrimac" steamed out ready for action, and promptly engaged two federal ships, the frigate "Congress" of 50 guns, and the sloop "Cumberland" of 30 guns. The latter was rammed by the "Merrimac" very early in the action, though she remained afloat for some time and gave her assailant some heavy fire before sinking, with her pennant still flying from her topmast. Later in the afternoon, the "Congress," having done her best without appreciable result on the armour of the "Merrimac," was compelled to surrender. She had suffered greatly from the broadside of the floating fort. Other vessels of the Federal fleet, which had come to the aid of their heavily pressed consorts, had gone aground early in the action, and here, whilst safe from the fire of the "Merrimac," because of her great draught they were unable to aid their friends.

Meanwhile the Federals had not been idle in designing and constructing a vessel which they hoped would prove superior to anything the enemy then possessed. The very next day the "Monitor" arrived in Hampton Road, the scene of the action between the "Merrimac" and the Federal fleet. Arriving in the night, the "Monitor" anchored near the "Minnesota," a steam frigate which the commander of the "Merrimac" had determined to engage at the earliest possible moment.

The "Monitor" was designed by Captain John Ericsson, and was built at New York with great haste. Her designer

had borrowed the idea of a revolving turret from an earlier invention in which guns could be worked without being exposed. The vessel itself was given the lowest free-board possible. Indeed, except at the centre of the vessel, the waves broke right across the deck, the result being that the "Monitor" presented the smallest possible mark for an antagonist. The whole of the ship above water was very heavily armoured, whilst below it was carried for a sufficient depth to make her invulnerable to ordinary gun-fire.

On the morning of the 9th of March, 1862, the "Merrimac" steamed out to capture the "Minnesota," believing she would prove an easy prey after the experience of the previous day. As she moved slowly along, the "Monitor" slipped out to meet her, and a battle royal commenced as soon as both the queer craft were in range.

It has been stated very frequently that the victory in this sea duel went to the "Monitor," but it is more correct to claim the result as a draw, neither ship having her armour pierced, whilst the worst casualty certainly occurred on the "Monitor," where a shot from the "Merrimac" penetrated the pilot house and blinded the commander. Both vessels broke off the action; later the "Merrimac" was sunk to prevent her falling into the hands of the Federals. The "Monitor" foundered at sea within a few years of her launch.

G. G. JACKSON

THE AIRPLANE

What that disturbance in the trees
That refutes the music of the breeze,
And dominates the very air
Of earth's true symphony up there?

What causes all those thin shrill notes
Emerging from the bird's wee throat's?
May be they resent intrusion
On their little home's seclusion.

What that monster, might and loud
Soaring out of every cloud?
Who asks to share their home the sky?
They ask each other, and they sigh!

A giant of birds, yet not of them—
A wing'd animal,—can they but stem
Their numbers to resist the coming
Of that mighty engine humming?

They meet in every airy place
To chirp the fearfulness of the case.
They seem to say,—"It should not be
And mutely appeal to you and me."

CHERRY JALASS

HENRIK IBSEN

PART IV—MODERN DRAMA : SECOND PHASE.

The next four plays of Ibsen have certain distinctive marks which weld them together as a unique group. Social ideas and intricate problems of social relationship no more occupy the predominant position they maintained in the plays of the earlier phase. Occasionally they do shoot out revealing searchlights into the absurdities and obscurities of social compact; but that is all. Convinced more than ever that the final integrity of society is broadbased solely on the implications of human character as multifariously exemplified in the various individual souls, Ibsen, naturally enough, restricts the scope of his dramas to a discussion of the workings of the minds of certain individuals, almost detached from society, and to a frank exposure of the inevitable outcome of their selfish and impetuous actions. The ideas and ideals which rule society as such and contribute to the misery of its individual members were mercilessly pilloried in '*A Doll's House*' and '*Ghosts*' : they were caricatured in '*An Enemy of the People.*' Ibsen will deal with them no more : they have had enough of his pitiless handling. He now turns to the ideas and ideals which rule individuals, each one in a particular fashion, but which nevertheless cause fateful repercussions on the community as a whole. '*The Wild Duck*' written about 1884 marks the transition.

The centre of operations in '*The Wild Dnck*' is the intrinsically melancholy abode of Hialmar Ekdal, by profession a photographer. His father Old Ekdal had seen better days but is now a disgraced man. In conjunction with the rich manufacturer Werle he had violated the forest laws, even more indiscreetly than had his craftier accomplice. The law took its own magnificent course, clapped the less guilty in prison and acquitted the other. Ekdal when he came out of the cell was a broken

and a penniless man. Werle, much as he might have wished to help his unlucky partner, dared not do so lest his own complicity in the affair be made public. However he managed to employ Old Ekdal in copying work and paid him small sums just enough to serve him as pocket money. Werle had a remote idea of helping young Hialmar too to a career in life. Meanwhile another circumstance stared him in the face. During the last years of his wife's fatal illness Werle had contracted a liaison with his house-keeper, Gina, and having subsequently cast her off, his conscience was giving him no end of trouble. It became a positive necessity to still its insidious effervescence. However he made a quick job of it all by deftly contriving and effecting the marriage of Hialmar and Gina. He paid for Hialmar's necessary apprenticeship in photography, advanced some ready capital and satisfied himself that the couple had a quite decent start in life. Hedvig was shortly born and everything soon adjusted itself with supreme nicety.

When the play opens Hedvig is fourteen years old. Old Ekdal is a pathetic figure, only the chaff of his original solidity. His bear hunts have all been given up but he holds on with childish pertinacity to the essential spirit of adventure that had animated his early life. He has garret full of rabbits, pigeons and Christmas trees : Old Ekdal imagines this to be a forest and when he shoots down a rabbit with his pistol is elated as much with pride and self-esteem as in former days he might have felt on bringing down a ferocious bear. Anyhow his second childishness is in full swing.

Sordid and intensely prosaic as the Ekdal household inevitably is, it is illuminated by the illusions passionately nurtured by some of its members. Hialmar is a mediocre, weak in body as well as in mind, vacillating and vain. It is no more in his power than in his father's to restore the Honour of the family name by some bold stroke of intellectual activity. All the same Hialmar is touched to the quick by the poignant memory of the sight of his father " when he had put on the grey clothes

and was under lock and key" and his great mission in life, as he conceives it to be, is to perfect some fancied photographic invention and demand as his sole reward that his father may be allowed to wear the uniform of a lieutenant-colonel which rightly belonged to him. Hialmar has not the slightest aptitude for any kind of research and in fact this wild-goose-chase-idea did not originate in him. It was Dr. Relling, a lodger in Hialmar's abode, who had invented this pious illusion to mitigate the wretchedness and despair of his friend. In the same manner too he had made another friend of his, the Clergyman Molvik, who was inordinately addicted to drink and therefore despised himself with an anguished heart, that after all to Molvik drink was not injurious, that it was indeed just the thing to control his violently daemonic constitution. Hialmar and Molvik are now sustained in their daily battle with their respective infirmities only by the enervating influences of their 'life-illusions.' These are long cultivated lies no doubt: but these are precisely what make life worth living. On the strength of the illusion about the invention, the incomparable Hedvig builds dream castles about her future happiness. She has absolute and unshakable faith in the life mission of her father.

Then there is the wild duck. It was wounded by Werle and later given by his servant to Old Ekdal to be made the most important inmate of his garret. It thrives gloriously there and is earmarked as the special pet of Hedvig. She loves it very much, perhaps with a love second only to that which draws her to Hialmar. Old Ekdal may shoot any rabbits he likes but he should not touch the wild duck, Hedvig's wild duck. The picture of Hialmar's home life is complete.

Werle has a son up at the works who has a knack of being perpetually thirteenth at table. Gregers Werle's relations with his father have been far from cordial: after years and years of separation he comes to meet his father, having been sent for, and in honour of his home-coming Werle gives a

dinner party to his friends. At this stage the curtain rises. Gregers invites Hialmar, a chum of his school days, and from him learns of his marriage with Gina and of the pitiable existence of his father. Gregers happens to know a thing or two: he knows how great had been his own father's offence in the matter of the violation of forest laws and how he had emerged unscathed in the end: he knows too that Gina was the whilom mistress of his father. Hialmar has ever been in the dark on both these points. The tragedy now beings to work out its peculiar and grim fulfilment.

The character of Gregers as it issues from his actions has puzzled even the most characteristic of Ibsen's admirers. Gregers is another edition of Brand. The idealism of Brand, its sway over others, its inexorable finality and its pathetic reactions, were all portrayed by Ibsen in the earlier drama with a fascinating robustness in the soothing medium of poetry. This lightened its earthy repulsiveness to a minimum. But people admired it, and Ibsen very much doubted if they ever evaluated its maximum human significance. I do not mean to suggest that '*The Wild Duck*' is '*Brand*' minus the excellence of its poetry. What I do suggest is that occupying as it does a turning point in the chronology of his prose plays and representing a definite attitude of his mind, it is possible, even inevitable for the dramatist, to endeavour once more to point out the moral of the earlier play—the moral that had almost entirely been lost upon the public—along the recently perfected medium of the realistic prose play and concentrate it in a focus of burning and biting intensity. Gregers is a cruder Brand but a more plausible one. He is detestable because he is too true in an atmosphere of general falsity: he is unpleasant, cynical and sinister, because 'he thinks too much': he makes a mess of things where people are not of his way of thinking: and where one rare human being takes up his philosophy quite seriously and immediately acts up to it, he is the instrument of tragedy. It won't do simply to hold Gregers responsible for all the

ingredients of the final tragedy of the play. His character should be weighed with sympathy and discrimination, always reminding oneself of the fundamental kinship between him and Brand.

To return to the story. Once Gregers is in full knowledge of the facts he is convinced of one thing: that the life of Hialmar is based on a 'lie.' From this assumption he deduces that the Hialmar household is filled with 'marsh vapours' which could be permanently expelled only after reinstating the companionship of Gina and Hialmar on a foundation of truth and candour as opposed to the existing slippery and ruinous basis of falsehood and deception. Two things are significant about Gregers's viewpoint: firstly, he is hopelessly persuaded that the present bond that holds the couple together is unreal and therefore liable to give way at the slightest stress: secondly, far from desiring to effect any revolutionary change in the relationship between husband and wife he only wants them to understand each other, and then go on as before. He is for tolerance in its largest sense: he is for truth and humanity. It seems to him monstrous that in wedded life such putrid deceit could flourish. His ideal is far less stringent than Brand's 'Thy all or nothing.' "But the essential defect of Gregers's conduct consists in his having moved in the matter at all. He ought to have let things take their own course." Such at any rate in substance is the opinion of certain critics.

Gregers, desiring to put his idealistic plans into instant execution, takes Hialmar out for a walk and roundly tells him the truth about his marriage and the hidden motive behind Werle's generosity. Hialmar's high strung sensitiveness is thrown into violent convulsions. He goes home to "do" it with his wife: in other words to let her know that he knows the long guarded secret and then to found their relations on the more enduring base of understanding and harmony. This, anyhow, is what Gregers urges him to do.

Hialmar 'goes through' it in a halting and clumsy manner. His feeling is profound enough apparently but it is loose

sentimentalism and nothing else : he has not the toughness of character so necessary to battle sucessfully with the grim forces of reality. The one clear fact is that he passes through "the bitterest moments of my life." He detests and abhors everything that he ultimately owes to Werle, the "favour predecessor" —chairs, photographic equipment, above all 'the wild duck.' To Hedvig he says: "I should almost like to wring that cursed wild duck's neck.... I ought not to tolerate under my roof a creature that has been through those hands." But in consideration for Hedvig he would spare her dear wild duck.

Meanwhile Gregers, the incorrigible idealist, is expecting impossible things. To realise these he goes to Hialmar. Gina greets him with a sarcastic: "God forgive you, Mr. Werle." Gregers is pitifully disappointed in his expectations. It is inexplicable. He says: "After so great a crisis—a crisis that is to be the starting point of an entirely new life—of a communion founded on truth and free from all taint of deception..... I confidently expected, when I entered the room, to find the light of transfiguration shining upon me from both husband and wife. And now I see nothing but dullness, oppression, gloom....." Gregers Werle has indicted himself.

The worldly wise Relling joins the fray. He ridicules Gregers's mission in the Hialmar household,—"to lay the foundations of a true marriage." Between the idealist dreamer Gregers and the competent Dr. Relling, the wretched Hialmar contents himself with uttering platitudes and kicking his legs in pathetic anguish. Relling warns them all to deal cautiously with Hedvig whatever mess and muddle they may otherwise create for themselves: "Hedvig is at a critical stage ; she may be getting all sorts of mischief into her head."

At this juncture they get a sort of communication from Werle though it is primarily intended as a birth-day present to Hedvig. The sum and substance of it is this : Werle settles upon Old Ekdal a monthly pension of a hundred crowns ; this pension is to pass on to Hedvig after her grandfather's death.

Hialmar reads the deed of gift and turns pale. He puts two and two together. It is a fact his daughter is losing her eyesight, obviously on the operation of the inexorable law of heredity : Werle too, Hialmar has just learnt, is fast approaching the complete loss of sight. Werle has been Gina's paramour some fifteen years ago : just a few months before Hedvig was born. But all these rush past his mind in an instant. He cries half aloud, clenching his hands : "The eyes—and then that letter ! " Then later : "Oh what vistas—what perspectives open up before me ! It is Hedvig that he showers these benefactions upon. " The first flush of anger finds Hialmar tearing the deed across and saying : "Here is my answer. " The idealist Gregers is satisfied. Immediately Hialmar confronts his wife with a point-blank question : "Does Hedvig belong to me—or— ? " Gina looks at him 'with cold defiance' and answers : "I don't know. "

The last lingering cord is snapped. The edifice of the least semblance to home life breaks and crashes to the ground. "I have nothing more to do in this house, " says Hialmar simply. It is here that the constructive side of Gregers's idealism is brought to play. He perorates : "Surely nothing in the world can compare with the joy of forgiving one who has erred, and raising her up to one self in love... You three must remain together if you are to attain the true frame of mind for self-sacrifice and forgiveness. " But Hialmar is no more under Gregers's sway. He partly retorts : "I don't want to attain it... My home has fallen in ruins about me... Gregers, I have no child ! " Hedvig comes near him : Hialmar cannot bear to see her. He frees himself rudely from her embrace and leaves the room abruptly.

Even when matters have undergone such fateful twists, left to themselves, they would attain normality in due course. But Gregers wants to bring about a speedy reconciliation between father and daughter in a novel fashion. He injects her with his lofty notions about the unerring efficacy of

sacrifice: hers is a pliable mind most suited to receiving impressions. Moreover, being Werle's daughter, in fact, Gregers's sister, she is already harbouring such ideas, though in a latent form. What Gregers does is to generate this idealism in Hedvig just at this crisis in her relationship, or say, companionship with Hialmar. She realises that she has lost Hialmar's love. She is prepared to do anything to regain this love. Life would be impossible without it. She cannot envisage any mode of action that would give her back the pure gold of 'father's' love.

Gregers thinks that there is no question of Hialmar having ceased to love Hedvig anymore: such things don't happen with such suddeness. But Hialmar is afraid that Hedvig's love for him is a mere pretence, a calculated hypocrisy. All that is now wanted is some sign, tangible and definite, from Hedvig, which would send Hialmar's suspicions to the pit.

Hialmer hates the wild duck: Hedvig adores it. Could not Hedvig make a voluntary offering of her dearest treasure to prove her attachment to Hialmer? Hedvig might ask her grandfather to shoot the wild duck: the fact cannot fail to bring about amicable relations between the different members of the house. Hedvig tells Gregers that she would do it.

Hialmer keeps away from his wife throughout the night. Early next morning he returns with the ostensible intention of separating from his wife once and for all. But he is too weak to do anything: he whines and sneaks and sneezes: beyond that he could do nothing. The "mischief-maker" Gregers duly puts in his appearance: he is surprised to find that the wild duck has not been yet sacrificed. He plies the poor girl again with the philosophy of beautiful sacrifice. This time however she does not hesitate. She acts: but in a manner most unexpected and startling even to Gregers himself.

She silently removes the pistol from the shelf and hurries to the garret. Should she kill her 'wild duck' after all? And what stands she to gain! The doubtful contingency of

the reciprocation of 'father's' love. And for this she must deprive the innocent wild duck of its life. No, better die herself. She would sacrifice *herself* to prove her love. On the altar of her sacrifice might be built the structure of Hialmer's future domestic concord. Thus chalking out her misson, she presses the pistol right against her breast and shoots herself. Hialmar, too late, realises his irreparable loss. "She crept terrified into the garret and died for love of me:" He sobs. But his wife cuts him quick with the sensible and biting words: "We had no right to keep her, I suppose..... We must help each other to bear this loss. For now at least she belongs to both of us."

Even the consummation of the unrelieved tragedy leaves Gregers's idealisings untouched. We hear him saying to Dr. Relling: "Hedvig has not died in vain. Did you not see how sorrow set free what is noble in him (Hialmer) ?" But Relling brushes this explanation aside as sheer effrontery. His humanistic philosophy is expressed pithily in his reply to Gregers: "Life would be quite tolerable after all if we could be rid of the confounded duns that keep on pestering us, in our poverty, with the claim of the ideal." Apparently the two could never agree in this world. The one departs to fulfil his destiny of being ever thirteenth at table: the other is pitifully left alone, with a curse in his mouth. And you close the book, your emotions in great turmoil.

The next play of Ibsen's to be considered here, is '*Rosmersholm*' published exactly two years after '*The Wild Duck.*' In this play the idealist mischief-maker is a young woman of considerable bodily fascination and extraordinary intellectual vigour. Her ideal is to sway the multitudes by acquiring for herself the unassailable position of a Radical leader. This she hopes to effect by utilising some influential personage as her cat's paw. Rosmer is her prey. Descended from generations of Rosmers, Johannes Rosmer is every inch getleness itself: sometime priest of the local parish, he is full of episcopal

serenity and gloom. The family seat of Rosmersholm, for ages together, has been the citadel of propriety radiating its soothing influence all round. A mere suppliant at first, the idealist Rebecca takes deeper, ever firmer, root in Rosmersholm, till eventually the thought of her leaving it sounds preposterous to Mrs. Rosmer no less than to Johannes. This happens partly owing to the amiability of Mrs. Rosmer but largely a result of the unscrupulous manipulations and machinations of Rebecca herself. Rosmer, too, finds that an exchange of pulses is more easy of fulfilment with Rebecca than with the tender, but otherwise uninteresting Beata. The inevitable happens. But veils over veils of systematic hypocricy—or if, you will, persisting cowardice preventing them from facing facts—delude their minds and the situation grows from bad to worse. Rebecca of course goes on consolidating her position bit by bit. The more she discusses with Rosmer about the fallacies in the church and about the iniquities in the existing social system with all the warmth of her conviction and backed by the mass of arguments and data she had long ago made herself mistress of, the more is he vanquished by her bodily and intellectual appositeness, though, as yet, he would only acknowledge his subjugation on the latter score. He renounces the faith of his forefathers in conformity to the new opinions he has imbibed: but as this would shock his friends, particularly his wife, were this made public, the truth about his conversion is known only to Rebecca and himself. He subscribes too to all her radical views about the amelioration of the downtrodden and the imminent inaguration of the 'parliament of Man.' But the kernel of the matter is hopelessly in love with the woman Rebecca: but he would not admit this to himself.

On the other hand the vanquisher is vanquished as well. This strange woman, all will-power and iron, is slowly but surely drawn towards Rosmer and in the end, as hopelessly as the other, is thoroughly subdued and has no other thought except the consuming passion of love for the noble, inexpressibly

grand man, so long her willing prey. It is now a question of life and death with her: she must have Rosmer, all for herself. It is a mortal necessity therefore to have the gentle Beata removed. And Rebecca sets out to do this with callous and calculated villainy. The unsuspecting wife is first of all casually made to understand that Rosmer has broken with the faith he had held to all along. This is a staggering blow to Beata. Yet she holds her tongue, unwilling to wound the Rosmer she so profoundly loves. She longs passionately for a child by Rosmer: this would assure for her the impregnable position as mother in Rosmersholm. But years pass and she remains barren. By and by she understands how elated her husband feels in the company of Rebecca, poring over treatises, wrangling over social problems and fomulating conclusions with a majestic equanimity. Little by little she feels she is standing in the way of her husband's happiness. To clarify her thoughts and uncertain surmises the excellent Rebecca comes to her rescue. She tells Beata quite clearly, though not in so many words, that her husband's future happiness is irremediably thwarted by her existence. The relations between Rebecca and Rosmer, as it now subsists, could not go on for ever. Rebecca should soon leave Rosmersholm.

Gloomier and wretched grows Beata: the unhappy Rosmer entrenching himself behind his habitual non-interfering goodness draws the only conclusion possible, the conclusion suggested as most, obvious by the intelligent Rebecca,—that poor Beata is out of her mind! As for Beata, she loves her husband too dearly to bear tranquilly for any length of time the impossible, monstrous thought that she is obstructing the path of Rosmer to the goal of ultimate human redemption. Miserable, faithful, heroic, heroic almost to the point of divinity, she casts herself into the mill stream from the bridge: the ideal of her womanly devotion to her husband claims her at last, and whirled in an eddy, her sacrifice is over and done.

A year or so elapses after that tragedy. Rosmersholm is in mourning. Stray sensation mongers no doubt had whispered during the past few months that Beata was not really mad but Rosmer's thinking only had made it out to be so: that, further, she killed herself in distraction and despair because of the indifference of her husband towards her. However the traditional respectibility of the Rosmer's weathers the storm successfully enough. The tongue of scandal silences itself in the long run. Beata's brother, Kroll, the leader of the reactionary group in local politics, stands by his brother-in-law with courageous largeness of heart. The curtain rises.

Rector Kroll pays rather an unexpected visit to Rosmer. He comes with a mission. He is much disturbed by the rapid ascendency of the forces of disorder and revolution witnessed in recent months. The radical organ 'The Beacon' edited by the pest of the community, Peter Mortensgard, is subverting the minds of the ignorant school children. The Rector's own son is giddy with revolutionist maxims: and Mrs. Kroll, incredible as it may sound, actually sides with her son. This is Rector Kroll's tale of woe. Now he comes to the proposed remedies. A purely conservative newspaper is desideratum number one: that it should be edited by one whose personal honesty is above suspicion is desideratum number two. The first is achieved already, Kroll having just then effected the purchase of 'The Country News': but, as for the second, there is some difficulty in pitching upon a suitable person. Would Johannes Rosmer mind shouldering the responsibility of conducting the paper? Indeed could one better be found? The whole neighbourhood knows and esteems and reveres Rosmer's uprightness, humanity, his 'delicacy of mind,' 'his unimpeachable honour,' his severe honesty. In his conscience Rosmer owes it to himself, to the hoary traditions of his House and to the community to step courageously on the arena and save society from the impending storm. Rector Kroll has come to the end of his recital.

Rebecca's long awaited psychological moment has come. What use is it nourishing a hopeless love for Rosmer if a year after Beata's death her memory is so powerfully poignant in him that he cannot still dare to go over the bridge, the bridge from which Beata leapt into the mill stream? She cannot reckon upon winning Rosmer's love: he does not, can never, love her. Let her at least try if her original purpose can be carried out. She goes to Rosmer and urges him to 'declare' himself to Kroll. The ordeal must be gone through sooner or later: Why should Rosmer miss this chance? Rosmer, in broken accents, in pathetic trepidation of his heart, 'does' it. Kroll is thunderstruck. 'This was the unkindest cut of all!' In vain he exercises the conservative spirit of Rosmersholm; in vain with pedagogic repetition does he expatiate on the dangers strewed on the path of Liberalism; leaning on the hard and unbreakable rigidity of Rebecca, Rosmer stands firm. When Kroll abuses and threatens him, Rosmer quietly shows him the door. The rupture is complete.

Rosmer's faith in the importance of his mission and cocksureness of the pivotal part he is to play in the movement for the liberation of men from the mumbo-jumbo of tradition and convention, are shaken too. In the first place, Rosmer had only to 'declare' himself, when all the energy he had been deluded into believing himself to be in possession of, became as nothing. Rosmer is converted no doubt and the world knows that too: but he has not the zeal nor that implicit faith in his own capacity which alone could spur him on to activity and to the task of the reformation of the world. In the second place, Kroll in a subsequent interview, insinuates and makes Rosmer believe that the real cause of Beata's death is traceable to his own treatment of her. Not Kroll only but the whole body of conservative opinion in the neighbourhood accuses Rosmer of having been the indirect cause of his wife's death. Rosmer cannot understand all this. Could his once dear friends stoop so low as all that? Could they have the

heart to calumniate him in this hideous fashion merely because he thinks like them no longer? But, after all, what if Kroll had spoken the truth? Did Beata die in full possession of her faculties,—and just for the sake of smoothing up things for Rosmer—that he might conveniently marry Rebecca and with her pursue his crusade of world regeneration? Perhaps, perhaps, thinks Rosmer. Then, he is innocent no more of his wife's death? Alas, no. A severe gloom, an impenetrable melancholy, envelops the man. He is innocent no more! The spectre of the woman being swept into the mill stream—of Love rehabilitating itself by one great Sacrifice—of white horses heralding further disaster—of remorse, pity, despair—all in the person of the dead Beata, rise up in troubled disorder, and agitate his entire being. In a frenzy of despair he asks Rebecca if she could not unite herself with him. She shrieks, a spontaneous shriek of joy: but she knows that this joy is not to be,—ought not to be hers. The strange irony of her life is now approaching its quintessential crystallisation. She who in the full plentitude of her wonderful intellectual equipment shutting out conscience and consideration alike with a dictatorial snap has undergone in herself a wondrous transformation. Coming to vanquish Rosmer, she has at last been vanquished by him, rather, as she puts it, by the Rosmer view of life. No more for her the palm of leadership which grudgingly she would divide with Rosmer: no more for her also the connubial bliss offered now by Rosmer in his proposal for marriage: her indomitable spirit has been broken quite by her long association with Rosmer. Rosmer, amiable but grave, conscientious but not over-intelligent, who has never once laughed in his lifetime, always quiet, solemn, sedate, who rarely expresses an opinion and when he does so, does ever so mildly and unassumingly, such a man, impossible as it must seem to everybody and most of all to Rebecca, has with the art of alchemists—the philosopher's stone of his personal integrity—transmuted the base metal of her worldly ambition and passionate yearning, to the

noble gold of heroism, the courage to sacrifice herself if need be in order to save the man she loves still with a heavenly longing. No, she could not stand shoulder to shoulder with Rosmer in his endeavour to establish the Third Empire: she could not marry him. But she could do one thing incomparably superior to either: she could give him back his 'innocence.' This she forthwith does, directly and plainly, by confessing all, by taking away from him the last shred of doubt that in any way he had been guilty of Beata's death. She absolves him.

Rosmer is shattered also. He is depressed. He hurriedly goes to Kroll and others and makes it up with them. The rupture is to cease. He returns home. He finds Rebecca on the point of leaving Rosmersholm once and for all. He asks her why she confessed her all to him that day. She says it was because she loved him and because she wanted him to regain his faith in himself and thereby nerve himself to be in readiness to lead the world on to liberty and happiness. He refuses to believe this plausible and true explanation of her conduct. He asks her if she would be prepared "to go the way Beata went," to prove her love to Rosmer: then would he be sure of his mission and set about the due discharge of it. She eagerly jumps at the suggestion: yes, she would, that very night, to be sure. But immediately the broken, goodnatured Rosmer recognises the futility and inadequacy of such sacrifices. But there is no going back for her: "I am under the dominion of the Rosmersholm view of life—*now*. What I have sinned it is fit that I should expiate."—Rosmer understands. He takes the measure of Rebecca's sacrifice and resolves to sacrifice himself as well. He says: "Rebecca, now I lay my hand on your head—and I wed you as my true wife." They are one now in their determination: they understand each other perfectly. The wife goes with the husband and the husband with the wife. They go gladly braving the severest that lies before them. For the rest, the graphic description

of Madame Helseth, the servant of the Rosmers, is given here in full :

> " O. good God ! that white thing there..... !
> My soul ! They are both of them out on the bridge !
> God forgive the sinful creatures...aren't they
> Now in each other's arms? Yes. Oh.....down...
> Both of them, down ! Out into the mill race.
> .....The dead wife,—has taken them."

And that is the end.

The next play of Ibsen's '*The Lady from the Sea*,' stands somewhat apart from the rest of his plays. Not only is its conclusions 'happy' but even its treatment has certain peculiarities not met with in the other plays. But by far the greatest interest should centre round the theoretical aspect of the play. A study of the previous work of Ibsen had given rise in the minds of his readers to some vague misconceptions. Ibsen's view-point about Ideals had not been understood with the requisite clarity and therefore, in '*The Lady from the Sea*,' Ibsen goes into the root of the question. How do ideals originate in a particular individual? It is this question that is answered in the character sketch of Ellidda. Though the explanation, apparently, is intended only to make Ellidda comprehensible, it has a much vaster significance undoubtedly. Mrs. Alving, Gregers, Rebecca, Ellidda, all in passionate quest of the Ideal, have an undeniable common ground wherein their Ideals, differing considerably of course with their variant organisms, had fertilised and assumed full shape. Their common ground—in fact, the common ground of all Idealists— is the prevalence of an unalterable unhappiness. Unhappiness and wretchedness are not the exclusive heritage of the poor. In certain of their innumerable manifestations they afflict as well indeed, with severer malignity, the very rich and the very powerful. Luxury breeds boredom, which is only another word for misery,—a misery made more miserable by the fact, this misery is misinterpreted by many as heavenly bliss; power, too, generates in

thinking souls that lofty dissatisfaction with their own efforts,—their utter futility while yet in the seat of power,—and that naked pessimism that derives kings to the forests or to the beautiful heights of the mountains to be engulfed by an avalanche. Ibsen would in these plays seem to maintain what is after all commonly accepted that our Ideals are nurtured and worshipped more as an escape from the sordidness of the hourly urgency of the seething, miserable life around us, than on account of anything preternatural about themselves: however, there is this difference, that few could be found who would have the courage to admit the sinister truth to themselves. Mr. A. knows that the Ideals of all other men and women on earth are illusions, only *lies and superstitions*, meant to beguile the mind to seeming happiness and contentment. But what Mr. A does not know, or knowing will not admit to himself, is that he is himself one among the many, as eagerly clutching to his heart *his* Ideal and as sincerely ascribing to it divine omnipotence as *they* do with respect to *their* ideals. For once Mr. A takes this courageous step the dream castles of his fond imagination would vanish instantly to insubstantial nothingness. While in this sense Ibsen has propounded no new theory about Ideals, there is another aspect of his teaching which is indubitably his own. It is this: while the urgency and stress of life around may make you miserable, your Ideals, though they may produce an illusion, and a transitory and a temporary one at that, will not take you far, and sometimes, indeed more often than not, may positively lead you not merely to greater unhappiness. but it may even strand you in unutterable chaos. To demonstrate this thesis two things have to be proved: first, that blind allegiance to Ideals ultimately makes life even less worth living than it actually is, and second, that the only hope for idealists is, after having once made a terrible mess of things, to learn better, throw their precious Ideals overboard and return to normal, though almost always rather unsavoury life, like good and sensible folk. They could attain even this moderate happiness only

at the expense of the Ideals. In his earlier dramas Ibsen had followed the first mode of demonstration with such calculated insistence on the tragic outcome of Ideals, inordinately and unintelligently pursued, that he had literally turned some of his crises, that in '*Ghosts*' and 'Rosmersholm' especially, terrific, impossible, intolerable. In '*The Lady from the Sea*' he attempts and with striking success the second and in fact complementary mode of demonstration. It is a pity that this central point has been so scandalously missed by a whole host of eminent critics that one of them has had the effrontery to remark: "*Fruen fra Havet* (*The Lady from the Sea*) 1889, is the weakest of the author's works: not only does the author repeat himself, but the action is almost overcome by elements of symbolism and suggestion that are grafted upon it." It is certainly not his weakest play: none of Ibsen's plays is weak; they are either strong, stronger or strongest. '*The Lady from the Sea*' is one of his very strong plays. It is the very reverse of repetition, as has been explained above: as to its being submerged under symbolism and suggestion, it is true, though the effect of it is far from what the critic makes it out to be: symbolism and suggestion make it powerful on the one hand and highly poetic on the other. In its subject matter it is a necessary footnote, an indispensable gloss, to his earlier plays: in its style and technique it is admirable, poetic, fantastic, nevertheless with the ring of reality and plausibility ever ringing in one's ears from beginning to end.

The story is told in a few words. Ellidda and a seaman in a moment of innocent frolic throw their rings into the sea at the same time, this voluntary and almost silly act being in their eyes symbolic of nothing less than their marriage. But soon the seaman is obliged to fly away from her, being guilty of a crime. Ellidda after a short interregnum marries a well-to-do doctor whose daughter by his first wife does all the housekeeping leaving nothing for the new wife to interest herself with. Petted by her fond amiable husband and surrounded by all that

money can give her, she leads a life of high luxury. In a short time she is bored with her supposed sufficiency : her ennui drives her to sheer desperation. She has absolutely nothing to do in the house : her only daughter, who would have yet given her something to think of and work for, dies, leaving her literally forlorn. She thereupon resorts to the favourite occupation of all professional idlers—brooding. Ellidda broods, day in day out, from morn till night. Imperceptibly she becomes in course of time the slave of an idea : this strange idea dominates her : she thinks she has discovered at last the clue to the positive insufficiency, the glaring incompleteness in her life. This idea is that man having chosen rightly or wrongly to live on land has imprinted in his mind in greater or lesser measure a definite yearning for union with land's counterpart, the sea. This is an idea difficult to grasp. But on that score it should not be branded a mad idea. To Ibsen this idea had tangible meaning as it had to the seafaring people of Norway. In any case this is just one more among a host of ideals caricatured or exposed by Ibsen. Be that as it may, the lady from the sea, as Ellidda had better be called, broods on this, her enforced separation from the thing so near her heart, broods over her misfortune interminably, hoping, despairing, time and again grimly chuckling within herself. Her husband is a phantom to her now, a stranger : her place in her husband's home exists only in name, a mere figment of the doctor's imagination. Ellidda thinks of the sea, lives in thoughts directly concerned with it ; her other personality is totally submerged under the domination of this fantastic ideal.

At last an incredible thing happens, incredible to everybody except Ellidda. The *other* husband, whom she had long ago married by the simple act of simultaneously flinging their rings into the sea, bursts upon the scene and without much ceremony demands her as his own. To her this appears logical enough : this is exactly the preordained conclusion of all her brooding meditations. She tells her husband that her ideal

claims her and that she must leave him. The distracted doctor expostulates: he thinks her mad. She sticks to her purpose. The triangle spins for sometime in incredible extravagance. The seaman would take her only if she comes of her own accord: On the other hand whether she is locked up in the doctor's house or despatched with her lover, the fact remains, says Ellidda that the seaman alone has her soul: the doctor knows not what to do. After a good deal of aimless and irresponsible talk, the doctor cuts a long story short by saying that she may do what she likes either be mistress in the house of the man who so dearly loves her and will ever love her, or ruin her life irretrievably by throwing herself upon the fearful seaman. In a flash she takes stock of his situation. The spell of the ideal is broken as if by the wave of a magician's wand. She knows now that her place is only in the doctor's house. The seaman is sent away, consciousness dawns upon poor Ellidda's mind and she now knows the real clue to her past misery. She must work: that was what she had never done and what she must now do. As befits her position, she immediately takes upon herself the duties of keeping the doctor's household and applies herself from that moment to the proper, meticulous discharge of the same.

In his next play, '*Hedda Gabler*' Ibsen returned to his favourite theme. '*The Lady from the Sea*' an interlude though a brilliant one, had served its purpose. It had reminded men that ideals, if given up sufficiently early, do not lead to tragic denouements: it had done this effectively and finally. But the other mode of demonstration was capable of infinite differentiation in theme and treatment. '*Hedda Gabler*' is one of the most perfect of dramatic creation in all literature. The chief character in the play is a woman. She has affinities with Rebecca and also with Ellidda: but the resemblance in either case does not penetrate deep into the flesh. For the character of Hedda is an unique phenomenon. The only child of a defunct General, beautiful, spoiled, impulsive Hedda has

inherited from her father his dangerous soldierly qualities. She like Ellidda is ever consumed by ennui: her prescription for remedying this is not a wedding of the sea but incessant, exciting adventure, of some form or other. For one thing she dances as often as suitable partners are forthcoming. For the rest, as an outlet from her incomprehensible melancholy, she establishes a kind of companionship with one Lovborg, a rake and a genius in one, who lets her see only that part of himself which is disreputable, ugly nevertheless interesting and adventurous. She is fascinated by the recital which goes on from day to day: being too frivolous a being she cares nought for that side of Lovborg which has in it infinite potentialities for expanse of the right sort. They are both playing blind man's bluff with each other: she secretly yearns after similar experiences but her devotion to accepted canons of propriety puts down all such unworthy desires with an iron hand. On the other hand, Lovborg rightly enough interprets her absorption in his own adventures as partial acceptance of such behaviour. It is clear this kind of thing could not go on for ever and in fact it does before long come to a tragi-comic termination. In one of his chats she shows herself to be slightly more sympathetic than usually and this he takes as sufficient guarantee of her response and hence he ventures to make advances to her seriously and quite lovingly. For a second or two Hedda's mind wavers. Is it better to yield unmurmuringly to the fascinations and romance of this man and thereby follow the inward promptings of her virgin instinct or to take offence at his daring impudence in trying to lure her away from her chaste stand on virginity? Anyhow, the iron hand is for the last time commissioned to put down her natural promptings: and with mock, infuriated and scandalised pride she rushes towards him threatening to shoot him if he ventures to move one step further. Thus ends her first exciting experience.

Another period of unparalled boredom sets in. After a good deal of hesitation she chooses to marry a well-meaning

but otherwise not in any way distinguished research student, who has expectations of being appointed professor. George Tesmen and Lovborg had been competitors in their university days. While Lovborg went from bad to worse with all his brilliance, his mediocre friend, with his unflagging industry, had received plenty of academic honours, as usually happens. Lovborg, sometime after his affair with Hedda, takes charge of the education of the children of the Sherriff Elvstead. Here he comes in contact with Mrs. Elvstead with whom he immediately set up an intellectual comradeship. Thea is the counterpart of Hedda: between themselves they rock poor Lovborg to and fro, between the extreme of rapid intellectual ascendency and of pitiable infatuation leading to drink, debauchery and despair. Between themselves, too, they seal the fate of this remarkable man.

When the play opens this is how matters stand. After a long tour subsequent to their marriage, the Tesmens have just arrived at the house, which has been purchased specially to satisfy the uppish and refined Hedda. But this house does not interest her at all: the family nurse, Bertha, offends the aristocratic susceptibilities of the late General Gabler's daughter. To her cost, during the foreign tour, Hedda had been bored to death by her husband's mediocrity, his eternal talk about the domestic industries of Brabant during the middle ages, and his too unnatural obsequiousness towards her. Her husband's two aunts, the one dying and the other passionately affectionate, by their very cordiality and solicitude for the Tesmens' welfare exasperate the rebellious Hedda to a pitch of indignation only slightly lessened and alleviated by the fashionable and charming talk of Judge Brack, and of her former admirers, and one to whom her husband is now indebted in money matters. Pleased as she is with his delightful manners, she decides to keep him always at arm's length. All this happens within a few hours after Let, Tesmens' arrival in their newly acquired residence. While things are like this

here, in the Sherriff's house certain startling developments have taken place. Thea and Lovborg get on together for a time very well indeed. He actually publishes a book on the history of civilization which makes him famous and puts a good sum of money into his pockets. He has also, inspired and helped with a singleness of devotion by Thea, prepared another thesis 'dealing with the future,' which is written in Thea's own handwriting and which both are proud to call 'their child.' During these months Lovborg has become a very good boy in everything : not that he cares very much to be so but he has noticed how it pains the good Thea though she ever takes the greatest pains to hide her feelings. In this manner she reforms him by the very force and emphasis of her magnificent silence. As with his affair with the bewitching Hedda, whose memory, the glint of whose glance, during all these months at the Elvsteads he has been unable wholly to wipe out—those mischievous eyes and the little hand that pointed to his breast the pistol ever breaking in upon the Elysian equanimity of his life with Thea...this state of affairs is too beautiful, too evanescent to last for ever. In one pocket his manuscript and in the other the gold his latest book has brought him, Lovborg runs away from Thea to the rush and romance awaiting him in the city. Thea is perturbed : her dear lover has flown away and to Hell beset with temptations of every kind. She leaves her husband without a word and takes the road to where her lover is. She comes to the city also. It so happens she had once been a school mate of Hedda's : hearing of her arrival recently she hurries to her and requests the Tesmens to invite Lovborg to their house and thus keep him away from drink. Tesmen readily and his wife with dark sinister motives consent to the excellent proposal and the letter of invitation is speedily despatched.

From this point onwards Hedda controls more or less the movement of the play. Learning of the metamorphosis in Lovborg's career no less than in his character, achieved in the

main by the silent endeavours of Thea, Hedda's jealousy and rage know no bounds. It is the meaningless rage of those who can do nothing and whose only business is to stir up the kettle all day long, and whenever an opportunity presents itself, to clutch it with fiendish glee and work upon it with unscrupulous obstination. Hedda would do now two things: she would drive away her ennui by immediately subscribing to the creed of evildoing. She would turn Lovborg back into the path of vice and drink: she would with this self-same stroke of diplomacy demolish the things Thea has accomplished. Possesed with the demonic will of another Rebecca, she proceeds with her work of destruction with astute balance of mind. While dining with Lovborg and Thea, she quite casually insinuates that Thea is afraid that her lover Lovborg may take to drink: in other words, that Thea has not full faith in the permanence of Lovborg's transformed mode of life. This villainous insinuation and a taunting exhortation asking him to join a party at the Judge's, produce the necessary spark that is anon to reduce the whole edifice of Thea's work to ashes. Lovborg, smarting under Thea's ungenerous attitude towards him and unable to bear Hedda's taunts anymore, runs to the Judge's. Here he gets tipsy, as Thea had feared, and delivers an incoherant speech about many things, particularly emphasising the importance of his forthcoming book on 'Civilization in the Future' and ascribing almost the whole of its inspirational authorship to a lady whose and his own child the book in effect was. When the party breaks up Lovborg, still off his mind, wanders aimlessly in the streets and loses the manuscript. As luck would have it, this is picked up by Tesmen who takes it to his wife and leaves it in her keeping. In the meantime Lovborg has become sober, finds out his irrepairable loss, and comes to the Tesmens' and tells Hedda and Thea that he had torn up the manuscript to a thousand small bits and thrown them into the *fjord*. Thea shrieks: her child then has come to such a pitiable extinction! She has no more business there at

the Tesmens'. She leaves the room abruptly. After her departure, Lovborg tells Hedda the truth about the matter. But the woman does not return the manuscript. She offers him one of her father's pistols instead, advising him to " do it " beautifully, by which phraseology she means that he should shoot himself in such a manner that the bullet may enter his seat of intelligence,—his temple. The weapon had been aimed at him once : it would be only in the fitness of things that the work, by it begun, is completed. He promises and takes leave of her.

Immediately, in the consciousness that she has the ' child ' in her own power, she laughs a tigress's laugh and without an iota of remorse burns the entire book saying exultantly at intervals : " Now I am burning your child, Thea !—Your child and Lovborg's. I am burning—I am burning your child."

This part of her work satisfactorily accomplished she feels elated : after all even she has done something tangible, something to feel quite proud of.

So proud indeed she is, and so gay, that she is rather ruffled when she hears of the death of the elder of the aunts ; she has to be in mourning, willy-nilly. When Tesmen asks her about the manuscript she quickly acknowledges that she has burnt " every line of it "—because she was afraid that on the merits of this book alone Lovborg might wrest the professorship from Tesmen. She did it for love of her husband. Monstrous as her action appears to be in Tesmen's eyes, the magical word ' love ' throws dust into his eyes and his joy in having such a faithful wife actually sends him to the eleventh heaven of ineffable happiness. He desires to tell his aunt what a paragon of a woman had fallen to his lot, to be his lifelong partner. " That you love me so much, Hedda—aunt Julia must really share my joy in that !" The irony is terribly tragic.

Fresh thrills are in store for the exquisite thrills-huntress, Hedda Gabler. Judge Brack, the untiring lover, comes with a whole pack of information. He reports about the death of

Lovborg. Death, he has to call it, for none can say definitely whether it was murder or suicide. It had happened in Mademoiselle Diana's boudoir where he had gone to demand the delivery of his manuscript, thinking that it had been lost there the previous night. Either the pistol went off by itself or the dare-devil Diana should have taken his pistol, shot him and placed it back in his breast pocket. Hedda had been hoping against hope that Lovborg would indeed 'do it' beautifully, thus giving her the sense of freedom "to know that a deed of deliberate courage is still possible in the world." This ideal crashes into atoms when Brack docilely recounts the ugly and unpalatable details of Lovborg's death: how,—most ugly of all,—the bullet had entered his bowels. He makes her understand also that the pistol in Lovborg's possession at the time of his death had been abstracted by the police authorities and how they are investigating into the matter. Casually he confesses that he knows that the pistol was Hedda's but that he would certainly not say anything about it to the authorities and cause a scandal about her to rise. She knows that either she should ever be this unscrupulous creature's pliable victim or he would at any moment rake up a most detestable scandal. To add to her bitter chagrin her rival Thea is not cowed down at all: she is sitting with Tesmen, poring over the rough notes in her keeping out of which the final manuscript of Lovborg's had come into being, and discussing ways and means as to how the lost book could be best resuscitated. Tesmen is consumed by this one desire: he says with naive determination: "We must manage it. Arranging other people's papers is just the work for me." So then the child is to come again into the world: and Thea and Tesmen are to work together at it.

What is to become of Hedda then? Well, Judge Brack will be amenable enough to come to her every blessed evening and talk away the whole time. They could go on capitally together, they two! But not for the irrepressible Hedda such slavish existence: her fiery spirit could not envisage the bare

thought of the unending autocracy of Judge Brack's overmastering companionship. She has no place under the sun now: Judge Brack a present nuisance and potential danger, her only lover out of the world, her ideal shattered, her rival not a bit perturbed but getting on ' capitally ' with her own husband, with everything and everybody out of tune with her sentimental agitation, she feels that the only absolutely final thing she ought to do, is to utilise at least the second of General Gabler's pistols in the discharge of a glorious mission. In a word she herself " does it " beautifully: she shoots herself in the temple. She has had the courage to do that. She has had the courage to live up to her ideal, a shabby and dangerous ideal though it was. Brack is pathetically brought back to the world of reality. His slippery illusion of evening flirtations bids good bye to him: he cries in the anguish of disappointed hopes— " Good God—people don't do such things." Yes, people don't do such things: but neither are they all Hedda Gablers. But given a character of the type of Hedda's and assuming the persistent claim of ideals upon her, her final act is intrinsically and indisputably logical. Thus ends the mad career of one of the most tantalising creations of Ibsen, perhaps the most tantalising of them all.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

(To be continued.)

DEVELOPMENT OF JĀTAKA-VATTHU OR PROSE STORY

The term Jātaka in the sense of a new-born child applies very appropriately to such passages suiting Buddhism as were chosen by its earlier teachers from the floating literature in verse existing as Akkhānas or Akkhāyikā (Akkhānan ti Bhārata Rāmāyanādi—Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Digha-Nikāya). It will be further evident from the several ways in which Jātaka nomenclature was made from time to time and also from the fact that its number has varied with the facts of some overlapping those of others increasingly as time went on,[1] that a bigger Jātaka which itself was a selected piece was reducible to more than one pieces each of which would yet be a Jātaka and *vice versa*. Thus, the Jātaka piece known under the designation of Vitura Puṇakiya Jātaka in the Stupa of Bhārhut and agreeing with 'Vidhura Puṇṇa Jātaka' in the Milinda Paña ha was eventually divided into two Jātakas, *viz.*, 'Vidhura Paṇḍita Jātaka' in Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā and 'Puṇṇaka Jātaka' in Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Majjhima Nikāya (P.T.S., P. 42, Part II). Conversely, the combination of several Jātakas one of which is definitely the Yavamajhakiya Jātaka of Bhārhut Stupa,[2] is evident in the Mahāummagga Jātaka of Jātaka Aṭṭhkathā (F. VI. P. 365). Our definition of the term Jātaka is further corroborated by the fact, the full signification of which few seem to be cognizant of, that they are found arranged in Nipātas (collections) not according to the nature or size of the stories but according to the size (*i.e.*, number) of the verses each was composed of. It was the verse portion that was uppermost in the minds of old Pāli scholars when grouping them in the Jātaka

[1] C. F. Alaṃbhusā Jātaka (No. 523 F. V. P. 152) and Naḷini Jātaka (No. 526 F. V. P. 193).

[2] Also Pañcapaṇḍitajātaka of F. IV. No. 508, p. 473,

book in which they vary from a single verse up to several hundreds. Herein, indeed, is to be found the justification for the repetition of the same stories which having verses of different types are really different Jātakas and as such are not repetitions being the production of unskilful old fools in their attempt to provide examples for a large number of different existences of the Bodhisatta.[1]

Leaving sufficient room for amplification and interpolations the number of Jātakas each of which could merge into a bigger one or be subdivided into smaller ones, would not be fixed. A Jātaka being 'the chanted summing up of the story or of an episode in it' lost for the most part in oral tradition their collection in the Jātaka book has, as a matter of fact, in the process indicated above, gone on increasing from the earliest time onwards, for example, while it numbered 500 at the time of 'Culla Niddesa' in the second century B.C., at the time of Buddhaghosa in the fifth century A.D. it increased by 50 being 550 (*vide* Samantapāsādika—Introduction).

The Jātakas as a collection of selected verses go back to the very origins of the Sākya doctrine[2] and their antiquity will not preclude the possibility of a prose interpretation in the light of their progenitor following them from the very beginning. Though, there is ample evidence in support of the fact that ancient Indian literature was in verse, more so folk-lores called Akkhānas, the Buddha, who is said to have enjoined his disciples not to use them in practical life (Taṃ akkhānaṃ yasmin ṭhāne kathiyati tattha gantuṃ na vaṭṭati—Commentary on the Digha Nikāya) could not have entirely done away with their application and in the absence of developed Buddhist literature must have had recourse to such passages from these Akkhānas as seemed helpful to the propagation of his Doctrine of Ahiṁsā and Karma mixing them with his own interpretations for safeguarding against

1 "In this book we are given—crudely, childishly though it be—the life history of the individual man;" ... Mrs. Rhys Davids, Birth Story of the Buddha, p. 19.

2 'Manipulation and Antiquity of Jātakas,' C. R., July, 1930.

the influx of vulgar ideas and misconceptions. These interpretations augmented and modified by various other hands supplied the prose of the Jātakas from the time of their origin onwards.

The Jātakas from full stories which were already known, required little effort on the part of the Buddhist teachers to convey the moral lesson implied by them before their respective hearers, thus affording an explanation as to why these interpretations originally remained for the most part implicit rather than explicit. A little verbal explanation here and there was sufficient to guard against the approach of misconceived vulgarity.

After a close study of its history in different parts of the world it cannot be denied, that Buddhism which primarily grew up as a system of intellectual revolt against blind prejudice and conventionalism in all spheres of life social, political and religious, is a living organism which assimilating the most rational thoughts of every age and clime, has progressed onwards stoutly refusing to be stereotyped however much the orthodox school might preach to the contrary. The growth of a vast number of commentaries nay, commentaries of commentaries on canonical works is a sufficient testimony to this fact. (*Vide* Pāli literature in Burma—Mabel Bode.) With the passing of days these interpretations on Jātakas in the shape of stories underwent modification and had to be written down and definitely explained in the light of changing circumstances which to bring to a successful issue the attempt of scholars from time to time provided sufficient clue to the gradual development of the Jātaka-Vatthu or prose.

In discussing the function of Jātakas we have already observed in a previous article (Original Nature of Jātakas—C.R., January, 1930) that they were primarily meant to serve as moral lessons as viewed by the early Sākya teachers. The doctrine of rebirth in consequence of one's wilful actions found a very strong support from them and in this fertile Sakya mentality the seed of this doctrine found an exuberant growth with the result that to check the growing practice of taking life,

be it of an animal or of a human being [1] the antidote in the shape of the Doctrine of Karma coupled with that of Ahiṁsa was once more sought on the holy soil of India and preached by the Sakya teachers with a vigour the like of which she perhaps never witnessed before or after. In all walks of life—social, political and religious a new spirit was infused into the body-politic making every soul alive to its pulsation which vibrated in perfect harmony with the note that once rang through the religious sky of ancient India accepting the doctrine of God in everything and feeling oneness in all (**स तन्मयो हि अमृतः**, etc.).[2]

The menace of life-killing materialism was once more crushed with unceasing vehemence to make room for culture and progress centered in India's civilisation and national degeneration and death were averted in what is known as the renascence of religion that followed in the wake of Buddhism.

Man was made entirely responsible for his action. He was to enjoy or suffer according as he did good or bad deeds in this world. His past determining his present and his present shaping his future he went on aimlessly through an endless round of rebirths until again born as a man he attained 'Nirvana' by self-sacrifice and knowledge.

'Jātakas' drawn from popular 'Akkhānas' served for the most part as illustrations of this renewed phase of the Indian doctrine of rebirth. The Buddha better designated as Bhagavā Sākyamuni was merely the spokesman of the Jātaka characters who were not only examples of their past deeds but were also linked up with people of his time mostly among the disciples. Bhagavā also had his place in this system that assigned to him a degree of superiority never to be gained by an ordinary mortal. The 'Lakkhaṇa Suttanta' of the Digha Nikāya and the Jātaka stories in the Mahāvastu are apt illustrations of this fact.

1 'Mayham piyā puttā attābi piyo tumhe ca bhariyayo Saggañ ca patthayāno tenamahaṁ ghātayissāmi ti' (J. 542, VI, p. 151). Thus expresses a father king when about to sacrifice his son for his own attainment of heaven.

2 Swetasvatara Upanishad, VI. 17. 18.

Other Bhagavās had preceded him in earlier days and he also came and passed away like them quite unlike an ordinary individual having to undergo the training or mental progress under the law of Karma. In fact, he was kept far above Karma the application of which was not necessary so far as his person was concerned, for it was always devoted to the welfare of all beings. That which regulated his repeated births was his own will or 'abhinihāra.' Even long before his birth as Gotama he could say with authority :

> Aham jāgaratam sutto, aham suttesu jāgaro
> aham etam vijānāmi, aham patibhanāmi te
>
> —J. 404 III, p. 404.

"Where others are active I am inactive and am active where others do not act (lit. sleep). This do I know myself and shall speak to you in return." Bowing down unto his holy feet led to a state of happiness here and hereafter.

> श्रोयं परार्थ्यां विदधत् विधातृजित् तमो निरस्यन् अभिभूत भानुभृत्।
> नुदत् निदाघं जितचारु चन्द्रमा स वन्दतेऽर्हत् इह यस्य नोपमा॥
>
> —Asvaghosa.

Literature of every description was exploited to widen the field of Jātaka literature consisting of selections from different types of verses in agreeement with the standpoint of the Sākya doctrine.[1] But, though the Jātakas were selections it was not always possible to shape them in every respect conforming to the changed angle of vision taken up by Buddhism. Being mere cuttings they required on this very score an interpretation, as thought advisable by the Buddhist teachers, preserved for the most part by words of mouth and therefore, variable under

1 H. Oldenburg has used the Jātakas in support of his famous, though now no longer accepted "Akkhana-theory" (Journal of P. T. S. 1910-1912, pp. 19 ff) claiming them as proving the existence from Vedic period onwards of a type of narrative poetry, etc., etc.

—M. Winternitz, Indian Historical Quarterly, March, 1928.

varying circumstances. The importation of the Bodhisatta-Pāramitā theory into the Jātaka collection as a whole brought about a hopeless if not complete distortion of meaning of this verses though helping thereby the development of the prose in the 5th century A.D. in Ceylon.

To come to a concrete case, a comparison between the two versions of the same story based on a Jātaka as found in the Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā and Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā will fully illustrate our point in the development of Jātaka prose. The particular Jātaka is 'Kulāvaka Jātaka' so named after the first word of the verse which runs thus :

Kulāvakā Mātali Simbalismiṃ
isāmukhena parivajjayassu
Kāmaṃ cajāma asuresu pānam
ma-y-ime dijā vikulavā ahesun ti

Now, referring as the passage does to a characteristic of Indra, the king of gods, showing great consideration for the sanctity of animal life, a view also accepted in the literature of the pre-Buddhistic India, there can be little doubt as to its being culled out from floating folklore and adapted to illustrate the cult of Ahiṃsa in early Buddhism. A few cognate ideas about Indra from Purāṇas may be cited here. Indra is represented as creating trouble to stop Pṛthu from performing his celebrated horse and other animal sacrifices (Bhāgavat Purāṇa). The city of Indra is accessible only to those whose hearts are not tarnished by the thoughts of malice, hatred, lust, pride, etc. Even for his attitude of 'Ahiṃsa' copied so much by non-Brahmanical schools Indra could not escape the slur cast on him by Brahmanical writers who say that the various forms he assumed to create difficulties in the sacrifice of Pṛthu were subsequently adopted by Buddhists, Jains and Kapalic sects (Bhāgavat Parāṇa).

The verse in question is the chanted summing up of the story of Indra or rather of an episode in it which is in the background. The 'Vatthu' as it is called, though it is difficult to

divulge its earliest form, is almost the same in both the works Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā and Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā so far as the main outlines are concerned, with this difference that while in the latter the artistic side has been developed, in the former the descriptive or the practical side for impressing the average mind has been worked out nicely in conformity with the Bodhisatta ideal. Both are intent upon showing the past merit of Indra by dint of which he attained his position of eminence which according to Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā is the final culmination and in the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā is imperfect and defective.

Without much ado the Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā (Vol. I, P. II, pp. 265-280) takes us immediately to the field of action of Magha, then, the Indra to be, in the beginning of the Vatthu in the following words :

"Atīte Magadharaṭṭhe Macalagāme Magho nama mānavo gāmakammakaraṇaṭṭhānaṃ gantvā attano tiṭṭhanaṭṭhānaṃ pādena paṃsuṃ viyuhitvā ramanīyaṃ katvā aṭṭhāsi"

But, when according to the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā this young Brahman Magha was no other than the person of the Bodhisatta his early career was not to be touched upon so lightly and therefore in place of this short description it has the following :

" Atīte Magadharaṭṭhe Rājagahe eko Magadharājā rajjaṃ karesi. Tadā Bodhisatto yathā etarahi Sakko purime attabhāve Magadharaṭṭhe Macalagāmake mahākulassa putto hutva nibbatti nāmagahaṇa divase c' assa Maghakumāro tv' eva nāmaṃ akaṃsu. So vayappatto Maghamānavo ti paññāyittha' Atha assa mâtâpitaro samānajātiyaṃ kulato dārikam ānayiṃsu. So Puttadhitāhi vaḍḍamāno dānapati ahosi, pañcasilāni rakkhati. Tasmim ca gāme *tiṃsa* eva kulāni honti, te ca *tiṃsa* kulamanussā ekadivasaṃ gāmamajjhe ṭhatvā gāmakammaṃ karonti. Bodhisatto ṭhitaṭṭhāne pādehi paṃsuṃ viyuhitvā taṃ padesaṃ ramaniyaṃ katvā aṭṭhāsi..."

(Jātaka No. 31, F.I., p. 199.)

In the first place it pains one to find how heedlessly in the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā the idea of Bodhisatta has been thrust upon the previous existence of Sakka, the permanent (ajarāmara) ruler of gods who did exist in the time of Bhagavā himself and can by no stretch of imagination be identified with his Bodhisatta so wisely shunned in the more scholarly work Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā. In the Jātaka lines,

(1) "Assa Inda-samo rājā accantam ajarāmaro"
—J 433 F. III, p. 515.

(2) "Sahassanetto atulānubhāvo
na miyyati dhammavaro kadāci
—J. 417 III, p. 426.

the idea about a permanent Indra as the ruler of gods is clear and bold.

As to the next discrepancy, we find in the extract from Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā instead of thirty (tiṃsa) there were thirty-three (tettiṃsa akin to tāvatiṃsa) who grew to be his friends one after another when he was actually doing the deeds of piety :

"Tato paṭṭhāya deve janā ahesuṃ, te disvā tath'eva tath 'eva pucchitvā ca sutvā ca aparo ti tesaṃ sahāyo jāto' evam aparo aparo pi te sabbe pi tetiṃsa janājātā".

(Dh. Aṭṭhakathā, Vol. I, P. II, pp. 266-267).

Thirdly, the grandeur of the city of gods wherein delights Indra is described in detail in the Dh. Aṭṭhakathā which begins thus from "Devāsura saṃgāme pana asuresu parājitesu...to... evaṁ mahantaṃ yasaṃ anubhavanto Sakko devarājā vicarati"—(Dh. Aṭṭhakathā, V. I, P. II, pp. 272-274). This compares favourably with that given in the Bhāgavat Purāṇa (Book VIII, Chap. 15th) and bears positive proof of the fact that the idea of Sakka in Buddhism was derived from pre-Buddhistic times. But, as luxury was incompatible with the regulated life of the Bodhisatta this description of the city of Indra has been dismissed in the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā in only three or four words :

"(Bodhisatto) evaṃ pasaṃsiya bhāvaṃ āpajjitvā jivita-pariyosane Tāvatiṃsabhavane Sakko va devarājā hutvā nibbatti".

It is now clearly found that the omission or commission of facts pertaining to a Jātaka depended largely on how the authors viewed it from non-Bodhisatta or Bodhisata standpoint.

This is however the smallest part of the change in the character of Indra. A world of difference has been brought about in the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā by painting him as flying from Asuras after sustaining defeat in a battle against them,[1] when in his desire to save the lives of young 'garuḷas' threatened with death by his retreat, he utters the 'Jātaka' in question, *viz.*, "Kulāvakā Mātali, etc." But, the Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā puts it under very different circumstances. In it the occassion of the Jataka was when the king of gods was victoriously carrying off his bride, a daughter of the Asura chief, to heaven unaided by his gods and was pursued by demons in their rage to kill him. The verse is omitted from the story but it is found rendered in prose thus :

"Atha assa (Sakkassa) Simbalivanaṃ sampattakāle ratha-saddaṃ sutvā Sakko Mātalim pucchi 'ke ete viravanti' ti 'Garuḷā' devâ' ti 'kiṃkāranenâ ti 'Rathasaddaṃ sutvā maranabhayenâ'ti 'Maṃ nissaya ettako jano rathavegavicuṇṇito mā nassi nivāttehi rathan' ti' (Dh. Aṭṭha, Vol. I, P. II, p. 279).

Evidently, the Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā differs considerably from Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā in presenting the king of gods in a light quite in keeping with his dignity and character as recorded in earlier literature. Thus, it was the Bodhisatta ideal which was again responsible for this complete somersault of Indra's character in the latter work. This great change in outlook can only be accounted for by the fact, that while the author of Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā was intent on bringing to light the virtues of the Bodhisatta, that of Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā was busy

[1] Sakko, asurā kira uṭṭhitā ti sutvā samuddapiṭṭhe yeva abbhugantvā yujjhamâno tehi parājito diyaḍḍhayojanasatikena Vijayantarathena dakkhina samuddassa matthaka-matthakena palāyitum araddho—J.F., Vol. I, p. 202.

in pointing out the power and grandeur of the permanent king of gods raised to that eminence by merit alone. The former picture was yet to reach perfection while the latter was a stereotyped fulfilment of what had been accomplished in a past existence.

Now, this is only an instance in point to show how wildly speculation was rife as to the interpretations put on old Jātaka verses. Such instances might be multiplied by legion and need not be cited here.

The question which arises next is, how far these interpretations might be relied upon as belonging to the original Jātaka story. And for this we have certainly to go back to pre-Buddhistic conception of Indra and that preserved in the scattered Jātaka verses.

As early as the time of Rigveda, the Aryans of ancient India had conceived a picture of Indra which was indeed of a very lofty nature attributing to him even the power of the Almighty, though at times, it dwindled more towards his human than to his divine nature (Vedic India by Ragozin, pp. 199-200). He was the mightiest god whose adoration brought victory to warriors in battles and riches to commonfolk in life. But no attempt to paint his previous life preliminary to his rulership in heaven seems to have been made therein though in a particular hymn only a brief hint is given that he was an ordinary man doing good deeds on earth before he became Indra. The hymn is as follows: "Come O Indra, brother.....Here thy friends have lived from oldest time; look now on thy later friends the youngest.....For thou wast our fathers' friend of old and willingly didst grant them their wishes.....We call on thee who dost not make thy ear deaf to our voice but hearst from afar.....For thou, O gracious one, hast always been both father and mother to us.....the most fatherly of fathers."

A few quotations from Jātakas will also testify to the fact that reminiscence of the Vedic Indra was still retained to a great extent at the time of their composition from folk-lore

literature. The following are among the most notable points mentioned in Indra's character :—

(1) Indra is recognised as the mighty conqueror of the demon Vitra being the father of all victors and has his seat in the hall of 'Sudhammā' after winning the hands of the heavenly damsel Alaṃbhusā :

"Atha abravi brahā Indo Vatrabhu jayataṃ pitā
devakaññaṃ parābhetvā Sudhammāyaṃ Alaṃbhusaṃ "
—J. 523 V, p. 153.

(2) He is looked upon as Bhutādhipa (the lord of all beings) as known to Nārada :

"Tā (āsā, saddhā, sirī, hiri) Nāradena
paramappakopitā
udiritā vaṇṇamadena mattā
sakāse gantvāna Sahassa cakkhuno
pucchiṃsu bhutādhipaṃ
kā mu seyyasi ti"
—J. 535 V, pp. 411-12.

(3) Indra appears as the custodian of virtue (dhamma) :

"Sahassanetto atulānubhāvo.
Na miyyati dhammavaro kadāci
—J. 417 III, p. 426.

(4) Honour to samaṇas and brahmans, liberality, meekness, self-restraint and equality of treatment constituted Indra's doctrine which led to a state of happiness after death :

"Ye kec' ime maccharino kadariyā
paribhāsakā samaṇabrāhmaṇānam
idh' eva nikkhippa sariradehaṃ
kāyassa bhedā nirayaṃ vajanti
Ye kec' ime suggatim āsasāna
Dhamme ṭhitā samyaṃe samvibhāge
Idha nikkhippa sariradehaṃ
Kāyassa bhedā sugatiṃ vajanti ti "
—J. 535 V, p. 391.

From the above it will be evident that the picture represented in Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā is more akin to the traditional Indra than that represented in Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā though both have considerably deviated from the original.

With the rise of Buddhism assigning him a status no better than that of a virtuous devotee having the Buddha as his refuge, the high regard paid to Indra became considerably poorer as will be evident from the post-Jātaka Suttanta literature wherein he is depicted in the following manner :

However great or powerful he might be in the eyes of mortals of the earth, he was never tired of seeking for truth and religion which could give him the mental peace he required most and of meeting for that purpose various ' Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas ' living in forests (āraññakā pantasenāsanā) who to his disappointment, became, after a conversation with him, his disciples instead of teachers. Finally, in extreme veneration he approached the Master with caution (lest he be displeased) and saluting him with bended head asked him questions regarding ' Dhamma.' On hearing the Doctrine he became fearless and as a devout disciple taking refuge with the Master he expressed himself thus :

" Apariyositasaṃkappo vicikicchi kathaṃ kathi
Vicari dīghaṃ addhānaṁ anvesanto Tathāgataṃ
Yāsu maññāmi samaṇe pavivitta-vihārino
Sambuddho iti maññāno gacchāmi te upāsituṃ
Katham ārādhanā hoti kathaṃ hoti virādhanā
Iti puṭṭhā na sambhonti magge paṭipadāsu ca
Tyassu yadā maṃ jānanti Sakko devānam āgato
Tyassu maṃ eva pucchanti kiṃ katvā pāpuni idaṃ
Tesam yathā sutaṃ dhammaṃ desayāmi jane sutaṃ
Ten'ass' attamanā honti diṭṭho no Vāsavo ti ca
Yadā ca Buddhaṃ addakkhiṃ vicikicchā vitāraṇaṃ
So'mhi vitabhayo ajja Sambuddhaṃ payirupāsiyuṃ
Taṇhā sallassa hantāraṃ Buddham apaṭipuggalaṃ
Ahaṃ vande mahāviram vandām'ādicca bandhunam"

—Sakka-pañha Suttanta of Digha Nikāya.

It is however admitted in the extract above that though sceptical and inquisitive Indra did possess some doctrine which pleased 'Samaṇas' and 'Brāhmaṇas' before meeting Buddha notwithstanding the passage maintaining an air of Buddhistic arrogance that runs throughout its length. The prose portion of this Suttanta admittedly later than the verse, stresses moreover the fact that the arising of the Buddha in the world was responsible for increase in the number of gods in Indra's heaven as the disciples were mostly reborn therein after death. But it cannot be denied that although bringing in Indra to the field the author of the Suttanta literature was not actuated by a pious desire to laud him up in the same scale as ancient folk-lore and only used his name with a view to popularising the special aspects of the doctrine of the Master. Therefore, it would not be a matter for surprise if turning on to the Jātaka-Vatthu or prose of a still later time in both Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā and Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā, we find that the story of Indra is only a peg on which rests the moral of observing the five precepts which come so much in the fore-front that the main story fades into nothing. Thus, the original Jātaka-story of which the verse was the 'chanted summing up' illustrating Indra's greatness and regard for animal life dwindled in the fourth or fifth century A.D. into that of his humiliation while advocating the practice of what are technically known as 'Pañca Silas' in Buddhism.[1]

Almost every Jātaka story has suffered more or less by the introduction of the Bodhisatta into it. We shall cite one more example. In the Kāka Jātaka (J. 146, Vol. I, pp. 497-98) we are told that a certain female crow perished in the waves of a sea ; the male crows collected on the beach and out of revenge began to throw beak-fulls of sea-water on the land above in their effort to empty the sea of all water. But the water thus thrown out trickled down to the sea again. After a time, when their jaws began to ache they spoke the Jātaka :

[1] For the story please turn to pp. 198-208 in Fausböll's edition of Jātaka-Aṭṭhakathā, Vol. I, and in P.T.S. Dhammapada-Aṭṭhakathā, Vol. I, P. II, pp. 265-280.

Api nu hanukā santā, mukhan ca parisussati
Oramāma na pārema, purat' eva mahodadhî ti

Evidently they were about to retire at this stage when the Bodhisatta who was the sea-god at that time assumed a fearful form and dispersed them. Now, the part played by the Bodhisatta here is extremely ludicrous not to speak of his marring the simplicity and the effect of the whole story as it but for his intervention the poor sea would have been dried up by the mighty crows! In all deference to those who advocate Bodhisattaism in Jātakas may we ask: 'Did Bodhisatta in this existence perform a work of piety by saving the sea from the onslaught of crows?'

The intrinsic worth of many a Jātaka has been irretrievably lost in this way by the introduction of an unwanted Bodhisatta but for whom the main outlines of the 'Vatthu' would be original and trustworthy.

Generally speaking the growth of Jātaka prose, *i.e.*, the story proper depended largely on two main factors being (1) the nature or the type of the Jātaka itself and (2) its capacity for developing the Sākya religion in its diverse aspects. Hence Jātakas varied in size according as they bore on society, politics or religion. Topics referring to social matters or royal functions were generally cut short in as small compass as possible but those that seemed to help the establishment or propagation of the Doctrine either by way of criticism or support were unduly lengthened often to the point of exhaustion.

Examples of the first type are Jātakas like Gijjha Jātaka No. 164; Nakula Jātaka No. 165; Sakunagghi Jātaka No. 168 Rohini Jātaka No. 45, etc., which are contained in the greater part of the first, second and third volumes of Fausböll's edition while those of the second type being Jātakas like Citta-Sambhuta Jātaka No. 498, Sivi Jātaka No. 499, Campeyya Jātaka No. 506 Hatthipāla Jātaka No. 509, Sarabhaṅga Jātaka No. 522, etc., etc. comprise bulk of the fourth, fifth and sixth volumes.

The development of a Jātaka into a story replete with Paccuppannavatthu, Atitavatthu, Gāthā incorporating the Jātaka itself, Veyyākaraṇam and Samodhāna as a rule does not seem to have taken place even as late as the time of Buddhaghosa in the earlier part of the 5th century A.D. It appears from his commentary on the Majjhima Nikāya that the verse portion is reproduced when any reference is made to a Jātaka. The following are the examples :

(1) Titthiyānam pana Bāveru-jātake kākassa viya labhasakkāro parihāyittha. Yath' āha:

Adassanena morassa sikhino mañjubhānino
* * *
* * *
Atha labho ca sakkāro titthiyānaṃ ahāyathâ ti

(Majjhima N. Aṭṭhakathā, P.T.S., Part II, p. 3).

(2) Kin te vataṃ kiṃ pana brahmacariyaṃ
kissa sucinnassa ayaṃ vipāko
* * *
idañca nu dhira mahā vimānan ti
imasmiṃ hi Puṇṇaka Jātake dānaṃ brahmacariyan ti vuttaṃ

(3) Mayañ ca bhariyā nātikkamāma
amhe ca bhariyā nātikkamanti
aññatra tāhi brahmacariyaṃ carāma
tasmā ti amhaṃ daharā na miyare ti
Mahā-Dhammapāla Jātake sadārasantoso brahmacariyanti vutto

(M.N.A., Part II, pp. 42).

(4) Hinena brahmacariyena khattiye upapajjati
majjhimena ca devattam uttamena visujjhati ti
evaṃ Nimi Jātake attadamanavasena kato atthaṅgiko upasatho brahmacariyan ti vutto (Do. p. 42).

The portions from Jātakas thus quoted by Buddhaghosa not only testify to their forms being in verse but definitely prove that their avowed purpose was primarily the setting up of morals for

mankind. One noticeable feature in this connection is that whenever Buddhaghosa mentions any act of the Bodhisatta as narrated in a Jātaka story he does it by saying that such a thing happened in the time of the Bodhisatta born as so and so omitting the word Jātaka from his statement. Thus, referring to the story of 'Gandhāra Jātaka he says 'Tathāgatassa Bodhisatta kāle pi evam ahosi (M. N. A, Part II, pp. 382-84). Similarly with reference to the story of Sarabhaṅga Jātaka he observes 'Evaṃ Sarabhaṅgakale, etc.' There are also many other examples besides these two. Certainly, if the word 'Jātaka' had any significance of a birth story it would have been found attached to 'Bodhisatta' or his name instead of 'kāle.' That is, it would have been 'Bodhisatta Jātake' instead of 'Bodhisatta kāle.' Evidenty a wide distinction was maintained between the life story of the Bodhisatta and a 'Jātaka.'[1] Hence the study of how a 'Jātaka' came to be considered as a story of the Bodhisatta with the agglomeration of Paccuppanna Vatthu, Atīta Vatthu, Veyyākaraṇa and Samodhāna becomes all the more interesting.

It is natural that any aspect of the Doctrine contained either in gāthā or a Jātaka or a Udāna to have an importance of its own must have some context as regards its author, recipient and purpose. In fact, every Suttanta developed on these principles making the exposition of some cardinal point or points of the Doctrine as the basis. The author of the discourse no other than the Teacher himself makes clear some points of the Doctrine with an elaborate exposition in certain circumstances that culminate in the conversion of the recipient taking refuge with the Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha. The desire to preface a doctrine with a statement of circumstances leading to its pronouncement and for concluding it by recording the effort it produced on its hearers was predominant from the very beginning.

[1] This also agrees with our observation on the Jātakas of Milinda Pañha (Bhārhu-Jātakas in a new light.—C. R., August, 1929).

In literature the development of Jātakas into stories becomes evident for the first time in the especial Suttantas known as Mahā Apadāna, Mahā Govinda and Mahā Sudassana in the Digha Nikāya and Makhādeva in the Majjhima Nikāya. Though the real Jātaka and the story in each are greatly modified or lost they are clearly traceable all the same. The avowed object of these Suttantas is to belittle the previous existences of the Teacher however glorious they might have been in the past in order to show his final existence as Gotama Buddha the greatest of them all. This is not uncommon in India or be said to have been inspired by the Bodhisatta ideal in the least.

Ever since the beginning of her history India has particularly stuck to one common religious belief that in every age a teacher of religion is not only accepted by his disciples as God incarnate but as the greatest of all those who lived similar lives before him and the early Sākya disciples were in no respect much behindhand of this time-honoured custom. Believers in impersonal and omnipresent God explained it through the doctrine of incarnation but those who could offer nothing in common much less believe in such an idea had but one theory to advance their claim. This theory was that which later on developed as the 'Bodhisatta-Pāramitā-Cariya.' Deeply engulfed in the lofty personality and spiritual teachings of their master, the early Buddhists in the time of Suttantas while adhering to the belief that he was the best and the greatest of all previous manifestations had not as yet propounded the philosophy of his arising in the world or his disappearance.

The taking of infinite pains and sacrificing oneself for the good of all beings soon stood out to be the most prepondering ideal of Buddhism in which the hitherto cherished divine origin[1] of Sākyamuni was almost forgotten and there emerged

[1] Ten' ahu Porana :—
'Muhuttajāto va gavampati yathā
samehi pādehi phusi vasundharam
so vikkami satta padāni Gotamo

out of it the belief in the long long period of toilsome rebirths through which he had been making sacrifices in the cause of others and himself fit for attaining Supreme Wisdom.

"Kappe ca satasahasse caturo ca asaṅkheyye
ettha antare yaṃ caritaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ Bodhipācanaṃ"
—Cariyapiṭaka.

also

"Jātikoṭisahassehi pamānarahitaṃ hitaṃ
lokassa lokanāthena kataṃ yena mahesinā"
—Introduction to Jātakas.

Stories from Jātakas illustrating this part of his character were then selected and needless to say that the most enlightened ones were utilised for the purpose. They constituted the works known as the Cariya Piṭaka and Buddhavaṃsa and underwent during the process a thorough overhauling. In the next stage, the Jātakas of an extraordinary type were accepted as the 'cariya' stories of the Teacher without their undergoing any modification as will be evident from Dhammapala's commentary on the Cariya Piṭaka (Nidāna-Kathā).[1] Once admitted to the Jātakas, the Bodhisatta became the hero not only of selected stories but also under circumstances narrated in the introductory verses of the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā given below, came to be recognised in the years which followed soon after as the stereotyped hero of them all.

"Buddhavaṃsassa etassa icchantena ciraṭṭhitiṃ
yācito abhigantvāna therena Atthadassinā
Asaṃsaṭṭhavihārena sadā saddhivihārinā
tath' eva Buddhamittena santacittena viññunā

setan ca chattam anudhārayum maru
Gantāvana so satta padāni Gotamo
disvā vilokesi sama samantato
aṭṭhangupetam giram abbhudirayī
sibo yathā pabbatamuddhani ṭhito' ti
Evam tathā gato ti Tatthāgato"
(M. N. Atthakatha, P. T. S., pp. 47-49).

F. Vol. I, pp. 45, 46, 47.

Mahimsāsakavaṃsaṃhi sambhutena nayaññūnā
Buddhadevena ca tathā bhikkhunā suddhabuddhinā
Mahāpurisacariyānam ānubhāvam acintiyaṃ
tassa vijjotayantassa 'Jātakas' Atthavaṇṇanam
Mahāvihāravāsinaṃ vacanamagganissitaṃ
bhāsissam, bhāsato taṃ me sādhu gaṇhantu sādhavo"

The author who chooses to remain anonymous says "Desiring the permanancy of this history of Buddha's births I approached the 'thera' Atthadassi, also the calm and wise Buddhamitta leading a secluded life with pupils apart from the society of men; in like manner, the 'bhikkhu' Buddhadeva, clever in logic and experienced belonging to the Mahimsasaka school and being asked by them I am now going to write as directed by the residents of the Mahāvihāra, a commentary after meditating on the Jātakas in illustration of the 'cariyas' and the greatness of the Great Being. Let the virtuous accept my words in good faith." He also admits that Jātakas were already rehearsed and put into a collection before him by the 'Dhamma saṅgāhaka theras' in their desire to illustrate the 'cariyas' of the Great Sage.

'Jātakaṃ nāma saṅgitaṃ *dhammasamgāhakehi* yaṃ'
(Introductory verses.—Jātaka Aṭṭhakāthā).

Now as to the identity of these 'Dhammasaṅgāhakas' it may be almost definitely said that they did not belong to either of the first, second or third Councils which are invariably referred to by ancient Pāli scholars as 'paṭhama,' 'dutiya' and 'tatiya' saṁgiti respectively and their authors as 'Sangītikāra*k*as.[1]

'Sāsana Vaṁsa' informs us that in the reign of king Vaṭṭagāmini in the last century B. C. (Kern's Manual of Buddhism, p. 120) the whole of the 'Tripiṭaka' with 'aṭṭhakathās' was reduced to writing by the great *theras* numbering 500 in the

[1] Mahāvamsa—conclusion of Chapts. 3rd, 4th and 5th on pp. 20, 27· and 55 of Geiger's edition. Sāsanavamsa—Ed. by Mabel Bode, pp. 5, 6 and 10; also *cf.* 'Sangitikàrakà' on p. 345. F. Vol. I,

cave of Āloka at Malaya janapada[1] in Ceylon and that the council so formed was looked upon as the fourth council:

> "pañca-matta mahātherasatā Vaṭṭagāmanirājānaṃ nissāya Tambapaṇṇidipe padese Malaya janapade Ālokalene aṭṭhakathāya saha pitakattayam potthake āropesum. Tam ca yathā vutta-saṃgitiyo upanidhāya catuttha saṃgiti yeva nāma ti veditabbo"[2]
>
> (Sāsana Vaṁsa, P.T.S., p. 23).

Certainly it was this council that our anonymous author of the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā was referring to. We further learn from the post-script to the 'Chaddanta Jātaka' (No. 514 V, pp. 55-56) that the addition of 'Samodhāna' was made by the Dhamma Saṅgāyika *theras* in verse only thus bringing it into line with the Jātaka proper.

* * *

> " Ahaṃ vo tena kālena ahosiṃ ṭattha bhikkhavo
> nāgarājā tadāhosim evaṃ dhāretha jātakaṃ "

imā gāthā Dasabalassa guṇe vaṇṇentehi dhammasamgāyikattherehi ṭhapitā" (*cf.* Kurudhamma Jātaka, II, p. 381 and Mahāpaduma Jātaka No. 472, p. 169 IV).

It is beyond all pale of doubt that every Jātaka of the collection was not indiscriminately looked upon as a birth story of the Buddha[3] in this council following which and after consultation with some of the leading *theras* of his time our author sets himself to the task of preparing a commentary which at the very outset enunciates the principle that a Jataka is necessarily a birth story of the Bodhisatta. This then affords as the history of the agglomeration of Paccuppanna Vatthu, Atitavatthu, Veyyākaraṇa and Samodhāna with real Jātaka in the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā, edited by Fousböll in six volumes.

We have already commented on the gradual development of the Atīta Vatthu or the Jātaka story and will now make a few

[1] The central monntain region.

[2] C. F. Mahavamsa, Ch. 33, Gatha Nos. 100 and 101.

[3] This is proved by the evidence of Dham. Atthakathā.

observations regarding the importance and authenticity of the Paccuppana Vatthu, Samodhāna and Veyyākaraṇa.

It may be stated without fear of contradiction that in imitation of the Suttanta literature, Paccupanna Vatthu and Samodhāna were added to the Jātaka story not much later than when the Bodhisatta-Pāramita theory was read into the Jātakas themselves synchronising with Pali literature being first reduced to writing. That the 'Paccuppanna Vatthu' was not added earlier is evident from the very first Jātaka containing in its Paccuppanna Vatthu the following :

> "Atha Bhagavā māyā kho gahapati aparimitakālam dasa pāramiyo puretvā lokassa kaṁkhācchedanatthaṃ eva sabbaññutaññāṇam paṭividdhaṃ "

The date of its composition as indicated by the passage is certainly in the post-Pāramita period. It would therefore, be idle to expect in it that much love for old facts which it was our misfortune not to have come across in the Atīta-Vatthu itself. Moreover, on a comparison with that given in a different work the Paccuppanna Vatthu of Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā smacks of inconsistency and fiction. Take for example the 'Kulāvaka Jātaka' the story of which we have dealt with already. In the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā the occasion for its moralisation is said to have been caused by the act of a 'bhikkhu' compelled to drink water without using a strainer whereby destroying though against his will, insects living therein.[1] In the Dhamapada Aṭṭhakathā on the other hand, the story of the Jātaka was told by the Teacher at the desire of his disciple Mahāli enquiring as to whether the glorification of Indra in the Sākyapañha Suttanta was made by Bhagavā with full knowledge or not.[2] Whatever reliance may be placed on the latter, the former for taking very seriously what once constituted a minor offence[3] not quite applicable in

[1] Faus., Vol. I, p. 198.

[2] Dh. Atthapatha, Vol. I, P. II, pp. 263-65.

[3] Whatsoever monk uses water knowing that it contains living things in it, commits a sin which requires expiation—Rules on Pācittiya Dhamma.

this case, cannot but be looked upon as untrustworthy concoction. But, dwelling exclusively on the facts of the time of the Buddha derived for the most part from the Suttantas, the Paccuppanna Vatthu of Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā may be relied upon as noteworthy for general purposes, though it would be sheer unwisdom to stress the veracity of the relation in which it stands to the corresponding Jātaka story in the work.

The inconsistency of statements found in the Paccuppanna Vatthu and Samodhana deserves especial notice in this connection. Passages in the Paccuppanna Vatthu which introduces a Jātaka indicate its purpose to have been general moralisation in view of some past happening, while the Samodhāna belonging to it brings in, in a formal way, the Bodhisatta quite uncalled for, in the field as the master of the situation. For example in the same 'Kulāvaka Jātaka' the Teacher says in its Paccupanna Vatthu 'Bhikkhu pubbe paṇḍitā devanagare rajjam kārentā, etc., etc.' without referring to himself in the least, but, in the 'Samodhāna' he merges the Pandits of old in the person of the Bodhisatta :

"Tada Mātali samgāhako Ānando ahosi, Sakko pana aham evâ ti"—(J., 31, Vol. I, p. 206).

The number of such Jātakas containing inconsistencies in statements in the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā itself is quite large and would by no means come below 25 per cent. of the whole. Hence, apart from their proving that most of the Jātakas remained as moral stories even after the rehearsal of the 'Dhamma saṁgāyika' *theras* in the last century B. C. in Ceylon, they show how conventional the 'Samodhāna' in the sense of the identification of the hero with the Bodhisatta was with respect to a Jātaka in the 5th century A.D., when the 'Aṭṭhakathā' was compiled. But however unwise the addition of 'Samodhāna' to most of the Jātakas might have been, there can be no two opinions about the fact that in the beginning it was formulated to be added on to Jātakas of exceptional merit with a view to

inspiring adoration and love for the Teacher (Dasabalassa gune vaṇṇentehi) and was composed in verse by the Dhamma saṁgāyikas as already referred to.

Automatically after 'Samodhāna' Veyyākaraṇa came next, for the latter has been greatly influenced by the former. The Veyyākaraṇa being as it is, a literal explanation of the Jātaka Gāthās in bringing out the sense of the archaic words contained in them, is really an adjustment of their old meaning to the new one in consonance with the Bodhisatta ideal. And though there may be left in it much that is desirable, in our opinion, it seems to be one of the utmost importance inasmuch as but for it much of the meaning of Jātakas themselves would have been shrouded in mystery for ever. We will substantiate this view by citing a few cases below:

'*Potthakaṃ*' is used in a Jātaka (Vol. IV, p. 251) in the sense of 'ghāna sākaṭaṃ' whereas in ordinary prose the word signifies a book. The word '*Satthā*' is found in ordinary prose literature as always meaning the person of the Master but in Jātakas its application is met with frequently in the sense of an ordinary teacher who can show the way to heaven (Sagga maggasa desitattā Satthā—J. 537, Vol. V, p. 503). '*Thupa*' ordinarily denotes a burial mound or a tomb but in a Jātaka (No. 541, Vol. VI, p. 117) the word is used meaning a house with a dome (kuṭāgāra). The word 'Bhagavā' which in prose literature stands for the person of the Blessed One, in the Jātaka signifies any teacher worthy of respect and love (Ko nu te Bhagavā Satthā, kass' etaṃ vacanaṁ sucim, J. 539, Vol. VI, p. 60).[1] '*Paṭimokkha,*' a word seldom found in the prose literature, means that which is opposed to 'mokkha' or release (tam saṁgaraṃ paṭimokkhaṃ na muttaṃ, J 513, Vol. V, p. 25). Herein is to be found the derivation of the term Pātimokkha from Paṭimokkha meaning that (code) which is binding on every one concerned. *Bahutamajjā* is a word used in the sense of

[1] Also 'Bhagava bhumipālo' in the sense of a respectful or kind-hearted landlord. J. 537 V, p. 460.

'matakabhattam' (J. 417, III, p. 426) in a Jātaka but rare found in prose. The word *Dhamma* though used in the Jātak (No. 414, III, p. 404) in its general sense, is explained in tl Veyyākaraṇa as being equivalent to nine kinds of transcendent conditions 'navavidhalokuttara dhammam,' a technical term i Buddhist philosophy which developed long afterwards.

In fact, a vocabulary of these terms with original an especial meanings in Jātakas does by itself form the subject of separate thesis ; a few of them however will suffice to maintain i our case that 'Veyyākaraṇaṃ' was essential to the understan ing of the text.

Thus towards the end of the 5th century A.D. a Jātaka con prising only the verses of old fledged into a full story in combin tion with the Paccuppanna Vatthu, Atita Vatthu, Veyyākaraṇ and Samodhāna as its inseparable parts giving an account the author, the recipients and the avowed purpose, with a importance of its own ; in fact forming a miniature Suttant with this difference that while in the Suttanta the Jātaka for was quite lost or modified, in the new full-fledged story it wa retained intact.

We shall now briefly note in conclusion the employmer of Jātakas in ancient Indian sculpture. That Jātakas wer an essential feature of the life-history and doctrine of the Teache is clearly evident in the sculptures of Bhārhut and Sāñch Having at our disposal only fragmentary materials not exceedin two-fifths of the whole it is not possible to reconstruct tl complete story once revealed in the entire railing of the Stupa Bhārhut. But, an honest attempt in this direction with what left has every chance of arriving at what might be looked upon a satisfactory.[2] A close examination of the labels of the four quad rants as discovered and recorded in order by General Cunning ham in his monumental work, 'The Stupa of Bhārhut reveals one important fact that each quadrant consisting

[1] Our thanks go to Dr. B. M. Barua, D. Lit. (Lond.) and Dr. Stella Kramri accomplishing this task in a joint work entitled "Bharut Stone as a story-teller

twenty pillars including the coping and the return railing was really the exponent of an independent story having in the fore-front like the ' Paccuppanna Vatthu ' incidents from the life-history of the Master followed by the figure of a past Buddha and Jātaka scenes in the shape of the Atita Vatthu and terminating in representations of inhuman beings standing in reverential postures unmistakably bearing the stamp of the overpowering nature of the Master and his Jātaka doctrine as Samodhāna. Thus on the first and foremost pillar in the S. W. Quadrant we have on its three sides representations of 'Thupa pujā,' 'Kadariki (?) narā', ' Vijapi Vijadharo ; ' Sakamunino Bodho,' 'Sudhavāsa devatā.' 'turaṃ devānaṃ' also 'Dhama cakamo,' 'Pasenadi Vandate' and 'Bahu hathiko' all being scenes from the life-history of the Master and subsequent events ; on the sixth pillar 'Bhagavato Kassapassa Bodhi', on the twelfth 'Tikotika Cakama', on the seventeenth 'Yavamajhakiya Jātaka' and on the eighteenth being the last among those discovered 'Suciloma Yakkha' and 'Sirimādevatā' standing in an attitude of prayer.[1] These may be explained as representing the component parts of a Suttanta or more correctly a Sutta containing the exposition of some cardinal points in the Doctrine with an account of its author, recipients and the purpose involved therein. Thus the Jātaka forming an integral part of early Buddhism had some kind of Paccuppanna Vatthu, Atīta Vatthu and Samodhāna attached to it though not as component parts from the very beginning so vividly described in figures on the monuments of ancient India.

To sum up there were at least five stages in the development of the Jātaka Vatthu and they may be stated thus :

(1) Encased between the Paccuppanna Vatthu and the Samodhāna Jātakas represented the Doctrine as found in the Stupa of Bhārhut.

(2) Jātakas developing into Suttantas wherein the real

1 The sculpture of 'Latuva Jataka' is also found in a rail bar in this quadrant. *Vide* Cunningham's 'Stupa of Bharhut' pp. 134, 135, 136.; also p. 139. Plates : XIII, XIV, XV, XXII, XXIII, XXV, XXVII, XXX and LIV.

Jātaka form when applied to Buddha was lost or modified as will be evident from the Suttanta literature.

(3) Jātakas improved and represented as *cariya* stories and those of ghosts and angels in poetical forms found in the Cariya Piṭaka, Peta Vatthu and Vimāna Vatthu.

(4) Jātakas found as *cariya* stories contained in the Cariya Piṭaka of later writers. (*Vide* Nidāna-Kathā in Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā, Vol. I.)

(5) Jātakas in their final garb formed by the Paccupanna Vatthu, Atīta Vatthu, Gāthā, Veyyākarana and Samodhāna as in Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā of the 5th cenuury A.D.

Thus, as a record of the different stages of its progress to the student of Buddhism the value of the Jātaka prose in its final stage can hardly be overestimated while it is impossible to appraise too highly the importance of Jātakas themselves as a faithful document on ancient Indian history and culture so piously preserved in the lands of Buddhism.

GOKULDAS DE

MORN AND EVE

I

Morn.

My love's awake, she smiles on me.
A smile enchanting sweet
A smile that turns to rapture pure
In love to cool heart-heat.
Her coyness lost, love's art forgot,
Her smile's th' embrace of heart and heart
Her smiling eyes are rays of joy
That make all sweet and one
And make me feel the shining hope
Of duty's life begun.
Now blush of shame ov'r powers my bride,
Her face is hid in warm love-pride.
I know I'm hers and she is mine
In life and death, in gloom and shine.

II

Eve.

The fare-well smile of parting Sun,
The restful peace of duty done,
That smile for moment lives above,
Within it melts this life in love,
Ah! will it end, has it begun!
In gloom and gleam this life is spun
Now look! there's life, unstained by breath,
In love spun one with twin called death.
As one on Mother's lap they lie,
That Mother's lap they lie,
That Mother's love is earth and sky.

MOHINI MOHAN CHATTERJI

PROBLEMS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY

The problems which modern democracy has got to encounter and solve are, it will be admitted, many and varied, and there is, in almost every country which has tried and practised the democratic form of government, a cry that it has lost, its prestige and its vogue. It is interesting to note that this phenomenon of the diminished prestige of democratic government exsists side by side with the other phenomenon of a demand for an extended application of the democratic principle and for greater popular control of governmental institutions. But it is clear to any close observer of political tendencies and to any student of political institutions that neither of the phenomena noted above represents a correct understanding or a real appreciation of the present position facing democracy; for democracy, meaning thereby the " people " have nowhere yet come completely into their own and everywhere what is denoted by the people is the body of vocal or articulate individuals within a state, which is able to make its voice heard, its exsistence felt, and takes an interest in public and political affairs. It is not, however, the purpose of this article to discuss the meaning of abstract conceptions like the " people " and the " state " or the implications of the various forms of government and so on; but it is intended to take facts as they are, to adopt the generally accepted interpretation of the terminology of political science and to see how far and by what forces democracy is assailed and to suggest, at the same time, some means whereby it can be reinstated in its old pedestal of influence and prestige.

At the time such as the present when democracy is at the cross-roads, it is advantageous that such an examination of the tendencies affecting it is made in order better to guard ourselves against the pitfalls into which we may otherwise unwarily fall. There have been several definitions and interpretations of

democracy and what it implies; but it may safely be asserted that almost all of them are mere imperfect, improvised explanations of a phenomenon, which has not anywhere manifested itself in all its true bearings on account of the sheer impossibility of such a consummation. It is nowhere a government of the people by the people for the people but has everywhere meant only the government of the many by the few who have only indirectly held themselves responsible to the many, being chosen by the latter through the instrumentality of some form of an electoral machinery, so much so that for all practical purposes, it has come to resolve itself into a government by, at best, the ultimate consent of the governed. The position as stated thus is true of many countries claiming to be democratically governed and it remains only to understand how this consent is obtained.

What we now have in practice and what is now popularly known as democracy is in reality the government by representative institutions or representative democracy; but the term is a misnomer, firstly because though the legal power is vested in the community as a whole functioning through the representative institutions, the actual power may be exercised by a single man or more often by a dominant group of men and secondly because representative democracy, though convenient as a method of expressing the democratic ideal, really usurps and sometimes with very unwholesome consequences the powers and functions of the community, the ultimate repository of all such powers. Direct democracy or pure democracy, by which is meant that the whole people act as government is an impossible and impracticable ideal which had not been attained at any time in history, and which even the highly trained democracies of ancient Greece and of the present-day Switzerland cannot be considered to approach or to be capable of approaching. Apart altogether from the fact of the great difficulty inherent at arriving at a correct definition of the term "people," the people as a whole or even the adults and grown-ups in it cannot be thought to constitute the governing class anywhere; for the "people," whatever it may stand

for, is not capable of taking that sustained and careful interest in governmental matters to justify its being called the government by the people, which is what democracy is defined to be. Representative democratic government in practice is therefore only the government by the few or the few amongst the many; and democracy in the representative stage can only be called so in proportion to the ability and the readiness on the part of the representative institutions to devote attention to the securing of the good of as many amongst the people as is possible and not merely concern themselves with the good or the interests of a particular class or group of individuals.

So long as representative institutions keep in view the welfare and the advantage of a majority of the population within the state and so long as they succeed in inducing in the people the belief that they are actuated by altruistic motives, their success may be said to have been assured and their existence will be tolerated. But when they discontinue to inspire that confidence when they fail to perform their functions with the noble ideal before them of serving the whole nation instead of being the handmaids of particularistic groups striving for their own preponderance, then the rub comes; then will come out into bold relief the omnipotent character of the people, and they will be sought to be superseded sometimes mercilessly. A situation such as this has arisen in many European countries at present and let us analyse the causes for it.

As has already been observed, direct-democracy is an impossible ideal which cannot be achieved in the imperfect conditions existing in the world: but it is not, from that point of view safe or sound to assert that democracy is an undesirable form of government and that it should be scraped. It is no doubt true that the very professions and the experiences of the various people practising democracy through representative institutions prove beyond controversy how impossible it is to procure from the people at large an intelligent and understanding appreciation of their rights and responsibilities; and even England

and America, the two examples of countries working democratic systems of government for the longest period are coming to acknowledge the impracticability of sustaining the democratic character of their constitutions with electorates even as present constituted, while extensions of the franchise, though undertaken under pressure, as, for example, witness the giving of the vote to all adult women in England, only prove in an intensified manner the great difficulty in securing that impartial and sound judgment from the electorate on important and crucial public problems. But, notwithstanding all these discouraging cirumstances, the very fact that the people hitherto unenfranchised demand the franchise and exhibit a keen desire to secure it, ought to silence all those who consider that the people can be played with, can be duped into an understanding somnolence for all time with impunity. The people is a giant which has only to be roused into activity and life to make its existence felt; and though in all probability it may relapse into its wonted stupor after even a single effort, still the apprehension and the probability of its being awakened again to assert its supremacy will be sufficient correctives to and safeguards against either the excesses or the indolence and indifference of the few who actually are entrusted with the work of government.

That democracy is being put to a very hard inquisition now-a-days is a proposition which will receive general assent; but the statement should be made to apply only to the system of government connoted by it or rather to its administrative phase but not to the human agency in reference to which the system exists. Democracy in the latter sense of the term or the Demos, as it is called, is omnipotent and everlasting, something which is above and beyond the purview of fleeting political forms. Democratic government or government by the people as has already been observed, had largely been and is an unreal and unrealized ideal, in view of the tendency of democracy to resign actual governmental authority into the hands of an intellectual aristocracy or an official hierarchy; but, inspite of this, it must

be admitted that the source from which all governments draw their inspiration and strength is the demos itself. It is this recognition of the ultimate sovereignty of the people that lends sanctity and adds strength to the democratic forms of government and elevates them to a place that cannot be attained by any other form of government not based upon the consent of the people, however efficient or praiseworthy it may be, in itself, and it is this sanctity attaching to democratic government that has given rise to the saying that good government is no substitute for self-government and that enables one to repose faith in the prognostication and hope that democracy will assert itself in the end even though in the beginning it may allow itself to be eclipsed temporarily by hostile forces. The invocation that inevitably comes uppermost to the mind of anyone who has made a historical study of political development and of the principles of political organisation is ' Democracy is dead; long live Democracy ,' for, for one thing, though political organization changes its colour so that one form of government goes out of existence and yields place for another. Democracy will go on for ever; and for another though democratic systems of government go out of vogue at times, still they have got that potentiality in them of resurrecting again in fresher and more chastened forms after a time.

The most powerful factor that has emerged into view as a reaction against democracy in recent times is Autocracy, or in the terminology of political science in the post-war era, Dictatorship. Dictatorships have grown up in rapid succession during the last decade, and, though it is strange that the war which was fought ostensibly for the purpose of making the world safe, for democracy should give birth to such an obsolescent institution, still it cannot but be regarded as an essential sequel of war, the termination of which has brought in its train so many social, political, and economic problems of such great complexity that the young inexperienced democracies, especially of Europe, found themselves unequal to grapple with. For it is

in the new republics of Central and Eastern Europe that the principle of dictatorship has secured the deepest footing and is extending its vogue. The readjustment and reconstruction necessitated by the termination of the cataclysmic explosion of the great war required the undertaking of effective measures of political and economic amelioration, which democratic governments, with their inexperience on the one hand and with their traditional routine methods of carrying on business on the other, could not successfully accomplish. Moreover, the world as a whole is tending more and more to become an arena of economic conflicts throwing forward irresistible economic forces clamouring for satisfactory solution of their problems ; and when democratic institutions, constituted mainly for the purpose of reconciling political factors and embark upon political remedies only as the means of alleviating distresses in all spheres, are brought face to face with the challenging factors of an economic revolution, they have been found invariably wanting and incapable of accepting the challenge. There is however this extenuating circumstance in their favour and that is that they, being mostly institutions intended for a particular purpose, cannot be expected, in the very nature of things, to subserve other purposes as well, the result of all which is that representative democratic institutions organized for political purposes have had to own up their reverse when economic forces have assumed a dominant role. There has therefore, in many countries, been a reaction against democratic government, the intensity of the incidence of which, varying as it does with different countries, is simply a matter of degree and not of quality or kind. Economic ills, which are primarily what the war has brought into prominence, are not capable of being trifled with or put off indefinitely ; they call for immediate treatment and effective tackling; and while democratic institutions have been considering the methods of such treatment, the people who are affected by the evils most have taken the matter in hand and tried to solve them according to their

own lights, the result has been that a dominating personality who had the courage of his convictions and who could exploit the situation to his own advance gained the upperhand and succeeded in securing for himself a supreme position in the direction of affairs as Mussolini did in Italy. The meteoric rise of socialistic parties in several countries professing to practise the democratic form of government and their assumption of the reins of power at the present day is only a further indication of the urgent and imperious demands of economic forces for satisfactory solution of their problems. But socialism is only a moderate manifestation of the economic reaction and there are besides that the extreme forces of Fascism on the one side and Bolshevism on the other threatening to envelop the world in their folds, to perpetuate the phenomenon of dictatorship and lastly to remain as violent antagonists of the democratic forms of government.

The forces of Fascism and Bolshevism, the former with its doctrine of the dictatorship of the middle class and the latter with its slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat are penetrating their way into countries, which had hitherto been considered impenetrable and unsusceptible to such extreme forces, and bid fair to secure a firm lodgment in them. They have not confined themselves to the borders of the countries in which they first manifested themselves, as it was thought would be the case by many old-fashioned statesmen and political observers, but have easily crossed those bounds and tend to become international in the extent of their operations. The most optimistic country in Europe in this regard is England, the quiet, conservative country par excellence ; but even in England, it cannot now safely be assumed that there is not a considerable number of people who believe that a dictatorship is an indispensability or that communism is the only remedy for her industrial and economic ills, while, in every other country also still holding out to the democratic ideal, the danger of a fascist or a communistic revolution is any day considered imminent.

It may be that dictatorships are good in themselves and it may be that they contribute to the evolution of a new order of things which promise to be favourable to the economic prosperity of the people ; but the price which the latter have to pay for the luxury of dictatorship is indeed a very heavy one, too heavy perhaps for them to bear beyond a certain point. One natural and inevitable consequence of a dictatorship is the curtailment of the liberty of the individual to the very narrowest limits ; for in the nature of its existence it cannot but reduce every human being to a cast iron mould and capable of thinking only in terms of the particular methods and programme of the dictator and incapable of thinking out anything independently for himself. This sort of an artificial unanimity of opinion cannot be sustained for long without the strain proving too much for the natural instinct of man to a free existence and to throw off all restrictions to liberty of speech and action; and the time will inevitably arrive when the bonds binding the dictator and his supporters will snap and when the resulting reaction will sweep away the dictatorship and all that it stood for. It is this hope in the ultimate triumph of the ideal of human liberty embodied in democracy that ought to sustain all believers in the democratic ideal and to give them strength not only to guard themselves against the possibilities and the probabilities of incursion into popular liberties by dictatorship but to treat them as passing phases when once they come into being.

While, on the one hand, democracy is being threatened by forces of a highly inimical nature from outside, it is being gradually undermined, only in a lesser degree than those forces, from within by the canker of departmentalism and bureaucratic encroachment into democratic liberties. Owing to the immense accumulation of business in the hands of Legislative bodies of the representative variety and the heavy strain put upon them by the several matters that come up before them for discussion and disposal, much of the actual work of day-to-day administration

is being transferred from the control of the Legislature to the departmental heads and permanent civil servants, who are thus given a carte blanche to substitute departmental regulations for statutory prescriptions and carry on the Government of the country much according to their own lights. Parliament under the present system are reduced to the indispensable necessity of delegating their powers to departmental officials, while their political chiefs, the cabinet ministers being too much engaged in party manoeuvering and securing party advantages in Parliament to be able to devote sufficient attention to departmental details, are constrained to limit their supervision of their actions to the minimum, with the result that bureaucratic control over the lives and liberties of the subject is becoming more and more pronounced. This is a point which is receiving attention in more countries than one and is being vigorously protested against ; but a remedy for it is not easy to discover. The danger to-day is not that the state is keeping aloof but that it is encroaching more and more into the sphere of the individual's life and restricting his liberty at every turn. What we need most at present is therefore not more Government, of which we are already having too much, but less and less of it and the restoration of the individual to a place which ought really is his in the scheme of things, while, at the same time, there is need also for the restoration of the independence of Parliaments to their position of supreme legislative organs, the repositories of the people's powers and the representatives of the common will. For after everything has been said against representative institutions, we cannot but admit that some variety of representative institutions are an irremediable necessity for democracy to function at all.

But the curtailment of departmental initiative and the reinstating of Parliamentary bodies in their pedestal of pristine glory and things which are more easily said than done ; and it may be almost a matter of impossibility for the latter to regain anything like their former authority and prestige. The remedy for the situation is to be found only in the innovation of

establishing representative assemblies in several local centres in a country, all of which will possess law-making powers within their own sphere and exercise control over regional cabinets, subject however, to the general control and supervision of the Central legislative body. The growth of such regional institutions will secure for the people greater and more effective control over executive actions than can be the case if there is only national parliament, will circumscribe the operations of the party machine, will prevent the exploitation of popular support for party and sectional ends, and lastly will enable the people better to understand and easier to exercise their judgment in the various matters effecting their welfare and coming up before the national councils for discussion. There will further be longer opportunities for the introduction of the systems of the Referendum and the Initiative as methods of sounding popular opinions on important and crucial issues and for ensuring less departmentalism and greater scrutiny of official actions; and the wind can then be taken out of the sails of the complaints so persistently heard now-a-days that departmental rule is taking the place of parliamentary statutes and that the civil service is infringing parliamentary privileges.

Besides the dangers of delegated authority discussed above, there is another force which has grown in strength ever since representative institutions through which democratic functions have come into existence, which contributes to the throttling and stultification of democracy. The development of political parties is an advantageous factor from the point of view of the consideration that political parties are the only instruments that has so far been devised by the ingenuity of man to enable democracy to function successfully over an extensive area and to serve as a substitute for direct popular rule. There are obvious objections to the party system as an adequate instrument for securing the representation in political institutions of the various shades and phases of political opinion in the country, but that does not detract and has not detracted from their usefulness and value of

political parties to fulfil their highly beneficial office of bringing the majority opinion to bear upon the shaping of administrative policies, however imperfectly it may be. To say this, however, does not mean that this institution has everywhere and at all times functioned ideally and leave nothing to be desired; as a matter of fact, they have called forth into existence a number of forces which stand in its way of being the handmaid of democratic government and which contribute only in a very imperfect way to enable it to play that role. It has to be conceded that political parties, for the very success of their methods, have to resort to the device of manufacturing and sustaining an artificial public opinion in their own favour out of the inadequately appreciative understandings of the populace; and in this process, they have ruthlessly to stamp out in the individuals composing it that sense of independence and fearlessness both in forming opinions and in expressing them, so essential for the successful working of democracy. Political parties are, in short, the most potent enemies of the cultivation in the individual citizen of an independent outlook on political and public questions, in so far as they serve to compartment alike the ideas of the people, to circumscribe and narrow down their horizon of thought and to limit their vision to only an one-sided understanding of affairs. They, therefore, acting as they do through the party machinery, make democracy a damp quib, a lifeless system, incapable of asserting itself and log-rolled into a set of opinions, manufactured to the order of the party leaders and bosses, who run the whole show.

One problem on which most democracies founder and wreck themselves is their incapacity and sometimes even their disinclination to successfully manage their minority interests within the state. An unsatisfied or sulky minority is as great a danger to the safe existence of the democratic system as the emergence of a dictatorship; but majorities who leave by the sheer weight of their numbers and not on account of any

consideration secured predominant hold over legislative organs, very often refuse to see or acknowledge the necessity for reconciling minority opinion. This is another potent cause for the declining faith in democratic institutions in the minds of those who fail to get sufficient representation of their strength and their opinions in governmental organizations, and it is a factor which cannot be left out without being tackled if representative democracy is to be restored to anything like its former position. The attempt to suppress minorities and minority opinions will result in discontent being driven undergrounds and ultimately in armed revolutions, the chances of such catastrophic occurrances being proportionately heightened if the minorities so sought to be trampled down happen to be the more virile forces in a nation as opposed to the senile majorities. Minorities are bound to exist everywhere and there may be many varieties of minority opinion; but everything depends upon the majority to make them feel their position as safe and to rope them into an attitude of co-operation in maintaining the integrity of the nation as a whole. To the extent that the majority opinion succeeds in inducing in the minorities a feeling of security and sense of strength by the impartiality and altruism of its motives and actions to that extent will democracy attain a position of stability and permanence.

Democracy at the present day has got new problems to encounter and new phenomena to deal with; but it is set to assert though it may sound a trifle too optimistic, that soon after the transition stage is passed over and democracy attains itself to the new conditions that have grown up since the war, its depreciated vogue will re-establish itself. The centre of gravity in the world of the present age has shifted from the political to the economic sphere and an unconscionable burden is thrown upon representative democratic institutions which have got to shoulder them and carry through with them; and though in such countries as in England, where the people

have for long been brought up in the traditions of respect for law and dread for violent revolutions which may involve a complete breach of political continuity, the burden may not be too straining to their nerves to bring about a revolution ; other countries, which consist of more phlegmatic populations with less love for tradition, conventions and customs, will find it hard to bear and will surely become subject to violent convulsions, leading to general disorganizations of their political life, to the manifestation of undesirable exorescences like dictatorship and mob rule and to the supersession of democratic institutions and the subversion of democratic principles like individual liberty. In the latter category of countries, which have taken to the practice of representative government only as an experiment, democratic government cannot but prove a dismal failure, especially at a time like the present, when even in such countries as the United States, where the democratic experiment has been tried on the largest scale and under the most favourable conditions, it has been found to be woefully incapable of fulfilling all the hopes entertained about it. In all such countries, representative democratic government must be considered as a 'misfit,' and it is no wonder that it is being rejected everywhere in favour of " representative government " by which is meant the personal rule of a dictator, call him Emperor, President, Duce, or whatever one wills, directly responsible to the people. The conclusion is irresistible from this that in all those countries where democracy has been sought to be introduced in the face of conditions and circumstances unfavourable to the successful working of the system, it has met with but insignificant response, especially in view of the social and psychological conditions prevailing therein. Based as it is upon the doctrine of majority rule, democracy fails to notice the imperative necessity of reconciling the various minority interests, based though it is upon the principle of popular support, popular support is more often artificially manufactured than naturally secured by the spread of popular political education, and lastly based as it is

upon the doctrine of natural rights and of equality, it tends to perpetuate inequality through the emphasis laid upon class and religious distinctions of various denominations. The fact will not be sufficiently recognised by democracies that violent revolutions have always been the work of armed and organized minorities, for though they may be luked into satisfaction for a time through the operation of political compromises, they will very soon be able to see through the game and seek a remedy, which may, in its results, prove a complete sacrifice or even an overthrow of the democratic principle, which rests, as in the present circumstances upon majority rule. But majority rule, as every other doctrine on which democracy bases its claim to superiority, is a very unreal thing, a counsel of expediency, valid only in certain conditions and having no warrant either in nature or in history.

The future, therefore, of democracy is hanging in the balance, but it is pretty certain that in the long run it will come into its own, though in the short run there is room for grave doubt in the face of the various forces that confront it on all sides. Believers in the future of democracy base their faith on the fact that on the whole democracy is incorruptible and unassailable; that it is not a force which can be played with for a long tine and that it is sure to assert itself though it may be deceived or duped for a time by the machinations of artful politicians, unscrupulous demagogues and autocratic dictators. The forces that it has to contend against being mighty, it behoves democracies everywhere to be very vigilant and careful, to arm themselves against the encroachment of all or any of them, and to refuse to be influenced, or exploited or subverted. All democracies rest for strength upon public opinion, which, though intangible in its expression and imperceptible in the methods of its working, is yet a potent instrument for correcting and setting right any aberrations on the part of the agencies entrusted with the work of government in a democratically organized country. The non-existence of a sound public opinion and the absence of

favourable condition for its formation constitute the worst danger for democracy, as it gives the impetus for hostile forces to ingratiate themselves into the body politic and work for its overthrow.

In concluding this study of the problems of modern democracy, it is necessary to point out that the world is still in an experimenting stage so far as democratic government is concerned, though the spread of the democratic ideal immediately before, and more especially after the great war, had been most rapid, the stimulus to its growth being to a very large extent and in a very large number of cases, supplied by the fact that the war was fought professedly in the name of democracy. Not only is the whole of Europe now a field for experiments in popular government, but the influence of the ideal has spread into vast spaces of the world hitherto untouched by it and among people accustomed from immemorial times to other forms of rule. But by a strange irony and paradoxically enough, this broadcasting of democratic principles has taken place precisely at a time when among the European peoples themselves, democracy, in its representative form, has been rapidly falling into discredit. To say this is not merely to echo the croakings of hidebound conservatives intent upon decrying democracy and all that it stands for; the failure of popular government, in nearly every country it has been set up, is a fact so obvious that it must be admitted, as indeed it is admitted, even by those who are its ardent advocates. But the modernity of democracy, especially the special form of it known as representative democracy, is, from that very fact, still in is experimental stage, even in countries like England which is the nursing mother of constitutional liberty and where it had been longest established; and it is still too early to say what its ultimate outcome will be. Democracy, is, however, by itself a highly necessary and useful form of government; and it follows from this, that all who have the welfare of mankind at heart before they proclaim the democratic nostrum as a certain remedy for the political ills of any country, should first

understsand what is involved by it and then seek to introduce the conditions under which it can successfully be worked. The careful husbandman first tests his seed, and then scatters it in the ground prepared to receive it as otherwise he would reap a sorry harvest, and the same is true of the democratic experiment.

C. V. HANUMANTHA RAO.

BY SPANISH HEAD

What splendour waited for us on that walk!
'Twas lovely land—let other people talk
Of Wales, or Ireland, or of lands afar ;
Their boasted splendour does not even mar
This Manxland landscape clothed in sunny beams,
Oh, Beautiful!—a Fairyland of Dreams!
Nature with a fine and liberal hand
Passed by, and cast upon this happy land
A carpet made from sea-green grass, and gorse,
(The sweet gold-yellow kind, of course?)
And then she gently wove a purple sheen
Of deep luxuriant heather in between.
I see it now—my tender dreaming eyes
So gladly close to once more visualise
The rugged coast that bears undying fame—
The fame of beauty, and God's wondrous Name.

LELAND J. BERRY

DR. HALDANE ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

I

Dr. J. S. Haldane's Gifford Lectures of 1927 and 1928 on *The Sciences and Philosophy* are, like those of his departed brother, Viscount Haldane, on *The Pathway to Reality*, some of the best of the whole series. The Doctor has the advantage of being a scientist, an eminent physiologist, as well as a philosopher. This combination of qualities is very rare. Scientists as a rule are not only not philosophers, but are not even students of philosophy. This, more than anything else, is responsible for the supposed conflict of science and religion. Scientists, as men of reflection, cannot keep themselves confined to the conclusions arrived at in their respective sciences by strictly scientific methods, but must digress to matters beyond their sphere, either to other sciences or to matters religious or philosophical, and speculate on the way these matters are affected by the conclusions with which they are familiar. When this is done without any or only a poor knowledge of the methods and achievements of philosophy, the result cannot but be disastrous and irritating. Dr. Haldane complains now and again on the scientists', specially English scientists' ignorance of philosophy and its misleading effects on the mind of the unscientific and unphilosophical public. For instance, speaking of the relation of supernaturalism and materialism our author says: "The materialism with which orthodox theology is at present shot through and through is the whole source of the weakness of religious belief in presence of the sciences and of the alienation between religious belief and the sciences. It ought to be added, however, that men of science themselves are equally to blame in this respect. They have, on the whole, discarded philosophy

completely. It is probable, for instance, that hardly any scientific writers during the nineteenth century had a real appreciation of the work of Hume and Kant, and even now we find scientific writers taking an actual pride in their ignorance of philosophy. They are in a similar position to that of the schoolmen who despised experimental science." (Pp. 311, 312.) Again, in giving a retrospect or the whole discussion of his book in his concluding chapter he says: "Of all the very foolish ideas current at the present time done is, I think, more foolish than the idea that philosophy is useless and has made no progress since antiquity. I am bound, however, to admit that I have only as yet myself encountered this idea as originating south of the Tweed. Those who, in modern times, think that they can do without philosophy, and at the same time without religious belief, are invariably the victims of bad and obsolete philosophy; and unfortunately these victims have been very numerous in the ranks of men of science owing to their defective education in philosophy." (P. 339.)

In the first of the two courses of lectures comprised in the present volume Dr. Haldane narrates at some length the history of the different groups of the sciences,—the mathematical, the physico-chemical, the biological and the psychological,—and shows their mutual relations and also their defects. As all are based on conceptions more or less abstract, they cannot but be defective as systems of knowledge. "When we examine the body of knowledge presented to us by each science, we find that though it is logically consistent, it only corresponds partially or imperfectly with our actual experience. In other words, it does not represent actual reality, but only a subjective picture of reality···Thus science brings us to a point at which we require more than science." (P. 172.) This "more than science" is philosophy, which with its relation to theology and religion our author discusses in the second part of his book.

Nothing like a clear idea of the way in which Dr. Haldane shows the abstract nature of the special sciences and brings out

the concrete nature of the Supreme Reality which philosophy presents to us, can be given in a single newspaper article or even in a series of such articles. He shows that even the shadowy electrons and protons and their behaviour, to which modern scientists have reduced the fixed and solid 'bodies' of the Newtonian 'philosophy' and the 'forces' exerted by them, cannot be satisfactorily explained by present-day physics; that the so-called inorganic environment of organisms cannot be essentially different from the latter as they serve the purposes of life; that the attempted physico-chemical explanations of life entirely fail to account for the co-ordination of the different parts of organisms and specially their reproduction; that matter and life conceived as independent of mind are mere abstractions necessary for certain useful purposes, but not concrete realities; and that even persons conceived as mere individuals independent of one another and of a Supreme Person transcending the limits of time and space are not real objects of experience, as our author sums up the result of a long discussion: "A universe interpreted biologically is at any rate nearer to reality and less of an ideal abstraction than a universe interpreted physically; but a universe interpreted psychologically as a spiritual universe is still nearer to reality. We have seen moreover in the last lectures that a spiritual universe consisting of mere individual spiritual realities is not consistent with itself. The spiritual universe is one and leaves nothing outside. In other words, the only ultimate reality is, in the language of religion, God. This seems to me the result of analysis of what our Experience means, or what Nature means, if we prefer the word Nature to the word Experience." (P. 294.) Elsewhere the author has called his system "spiritual realism." He says: "It is thus what may be called spiritual realism that this course of lectures will represent." (P. 190). It might more fitly be called "spiritual mônism," so strikingly similar it is to the Unqualified Monism,—*Nirvisesha Ádvaitaváda*,—of this country, specially in its teachings on immortality. To our Monists the individual

self's distinction from the Universal is *máyika*, illusive, unreal. At death,—the death of both the gross and the subtle body, the latter passing through an indefinitely long series of incarnations before it is worn out,—the individual, with his illusory sense of distinction from the Universe, ceases to exist. Nothing real is lost thereby and so the wiseman does not fear death. He knows that in reality he is one with God, and as God is immortal, he, as in God, is immortal too. Dr. Haldane teaches the same doctrine,—leaving out only that of re-incarnation,—sometimes in different language, sometimes in language very similar to that of our Máyávádins. We shall make this clear by a few quotations from our author. He says: "Mere individual personality is unreal. It is only in so far as God is manifested in us that we partake of reality.....It is God manifested within us, and not the abstraction which we call our individual self, that is the Creator and Sustainer of time-relations themselves. From this standpoint the immortality of individual persons is only a meaningless conception." (P. 295.) Again: "For either philosophy or religion individual personalities are unreal, the only real personality being that of God." (P. 303.) Speaking of those who gladly give up their lives for the sake of their country in wars and such other occasions, our author says: "In losing their lives for the sake of others they show that individual life in itself is unreal." (Pp. 305, 306.) We may just ask parenthetically,—when those lives also for saving which the patriots lost theirs were "unreal," did not they commit a great mistake by sacrificing one unreality for a number of other unrealities? But our author is reminded and reminds us of the truth that "All that was real in those who have died is immortal and ever-present." (P. 307.) We shall however close with one more quotation: "Nothing else is real except God, and relations of time and space are only the order of his manifestation. Nature is just the manifestation of God, and evolution is no mere biological or physical phenomenon, but the order in time-relations of his manifestation." (P. 310).

There is much in Dr. Haldane's words with which we sympathise and which we can accept with the proper qualifications. But we miss these qualifications in the extracts we have made and in fact in his whole system. In emphasising unity and showing the abstractness of the individual apart from the Universal he commits the opposite mistake of not seeing, like our old Advaitavádins, that a bare Universal unrelated to individuals, a unity apart from differences, is as much an abstraction as those which he delights in exposing.

We shall try next to show this radical defect of his philosophy.

II

Dr. Haldane, as we have already seen, says: "It is only in so far as God is manifested in us that we partake of reality...It is God manifested within us, and not the abstraction which we call our individual self, that is the Creator and Sustainer of time-relations themselves." Again: "Nature is just the manifestation of God, and evolution is no mere biological or physical phenomenon, but the order in time-relations of his manifestation." We agree; but it seems to us that our author does not see the full significance of the term 'manifestation' used by him in the above quotations and elsewhere in his book. If he had seen it, he would not have spoken of the individual so disparagingly as he so often does. As the reader may remember from the quotations we made in the first part of our article, he speaks of individual personality as 'unreal' and of the immortality of individual persons as "a meaningless conception."

Let us see however what 'manifestation' means. It will be readily admitted that it is only through God's manifestation to us—'within us' is Dr. Haldane's own phrase,—that we know him, and as that manifestation is real, God must be as he is manifested to us. The importance of understanding the real significance of manifestation cannot therefore be exaggerated.

Hegel explains 'manifestation' as 'being for another' or 'being for an other'[1] and the correctness of this explanation is quite evident. The manifestation or revelation of God to or within us is just *our* knowledge *of God*. This implies a duality, a duality of subject and object, knower and known, each related to the other and thus constituting a unity-in-difference. Knowledge is impossible without both these moments,—unity and difference. The denial or disparagement of any one of them lands us in abstract thought, whatever form it may take,—Dualism, Monism or anything else. In God's manifestation to us therefore,—in every form of our knowledge of God,—he reveals himself as distinct from and yet one with us. In knowing him as infinite and perfect we necessarily know ourselves as finite and imperfect. In knowing him as "the Creator and Sustainer of time-relations" we know these relations to be real, or else their "Creator and Sustainer" would be, in Dr. Haldane's own phrase, "a meaningless conception." In knowing that God transcends the limitations of time and space, we know at the same time that we are under these limitations. 'Here' and 'there,' 'now' and 'then' are equally present to him, but not to us. To us only the 'here' and the 'now' are immediate, while the 'there' and the 'then' are mediate. The individual therefore is not to be disparaged, far less ignored or denied. The Universal and the Individual are necessarily and indissolubly related, and the one is as real as the other. If the individual is an abstraction apart from the Universal, the Universal apart from the individual is equally an abstraction. To teach therefore, as Dr. Haldane does, that the death of the individual does not matter, for "All that was real in those who have died is immortal and ever-present," is really indulging in abstractions. The individual, as a moment of concrete reality, *cannot die*. What is real in him, what makes him what he is, is his self-consciousness as a person distinct from and yet one with the Universal. He is either this or nothing at all.

[1] *The Philosophy of Religion*, Pt. III, pp. 2, 77, 98 &c.

The Universal himself, if he is a person, as Dr. Haldane teaches him to be everywhere in his book, must be ever-conscious of the individual as related to him,—as distinct from and yet one with him. Thus alone can he be truly self-conscious and a true person. This truth is liable to be overlooked and ignored owing to the apparent transiency of our existence as individuals. We seem to be born and to die, and even during our short lifetime our consciousness seems to be extremely intermittent,—alternating with more or less long durations of unconsciousness. Our knowledge of this intermittence and the constant reproduction of the contents of our consciousness which it implies indeed reveal to the deeply thoughtful our citizenship of an eternal kingdom. But this fact escapes the ordinary thinker and he does not see the individual's necessity as a moment of Reality. Nature seems to be a far more lasting manifestation of God—in fact a necessary manifestation,—to scientific theistic thought, and in its constant presence the death of the human individual does not seem to matter. This is evidently Dr. Haldane's attitude. To him, as we have already seen, "Nature is just the manifestation of God and evolution.....the order in time-relations of his manifestations." But the fact is that Nature being a manifestation of God, and manifestation meaning revelation *to another* it implies the same duality of subject and object as human life. To a spiritual philosophy like Dr. Haldane's the various stages of the evolutionary process, in fact all natural events, cannot be anything but presentations by an Eternal Spirit to a spirit or spirits subject to time-relations,—a person or persons to whom things appear and from whom they disappear. If nature is a unity,—a continuous process, which it undoubtedly is to scientific thought,—it necessarily implies a superhuman spirit,—indefinitely larger than man though not infinite in the truest sense,—to whom the whole panorama of creation is successively presented. Both Hindu and Christian philosophy postulate such a cosmic spirit, the former under the name of Brahma or Hiranyagarbha and the latter under that of the 'Word' 'the only begotten Son of

God.' If Dr. Haldane rejects this conception, as he seems to do by his silence about it, Nature to him ceases to be a manifestation of God, as his idea of it becomes as abstract as the 'realistic' idea of a material world. However, if Nature is, as it is to the true idealist, the son of God, what we have said about our deathlessness applies to him as fully as, if not more fully than, to us. A system of "spiritual realism," such as Dr. Haldane attempts to establish in his book, is a mere metaphysical chimera, with an Eternal Spirit that is timeless on the one hand and on the other an impersonal order of time-relations resulting in a countless series of rational beings engulfed in everlasting death. Its chimerical character will be more evident when we consider the world as a moral order with its various interests and values.

Dr. Haldane devotes a lecture to this important subject, but he fails to see that for a lonely Universal and Eternal, "above the vicissitudes of time."—with no other spirit to distinguish from him,—no interests or values either sensuous, intellectual, emotional or spiritual, either domestic, social, national or international, have any real meaning, all of them implying the existence of real and not merely apparent spiritual beings related to one another and progressive in their nature both as individuals and members of a brotherhood. The unreality of the individual taught by our author therefore makes all values unreal and only apparent. Personality, the real source of all values, is the most valuable of things. Its transiency, as taught by our author so far as man is concerned, makes all values transient. Dr. Haldane indeed speaks of God as a person and a loving person. But of what worth is a person without relation to other persons? And what can 'love' mean without real and permanent objects of love? All values depend on relation, and love is the highest of all relations. It may be said and this is implied in what Dr. Haldane teaches in his book, that values are conserved in the continuance of human society, the experience of individuals, whether they live or die, helping others in their progress. On this subject we content ourselves by repeating what we said on

another occasion :—"The moral good of the individual is indeed social ; it is constituted by his relation to society. But the moral progress of a society means nothing apart from the moral progress of individuals composing it. If the good man really dies, there is so far a cessation of moral progress even though his life may give rise to better persons in future. The demands of our moral nature are not met by the perpetuation and gradual progress of the race; they call for the immortality of both the race and the individual. It needs hardly to be added that those who have lost faith in personal immortality cannot keep up their faith even in the immortality of the race. The same laws that bring about in a few years the dissolution of the human organism will also bring about in a few millions of years the extinction of the earth as the habitat of the human race, and there will then remain no race to be benefited and enriched by the moral acquisitions of perishing individuals. The race and the individual are bound up with each other. They live or die together. If you lose faith in the one, you must lose faith in the other also. It is in vain to give up the one and stick to the other. 'The immortality of the race' is a straw which the man drowning in the sea of doubt catches at in his last despair."

PANDIT SITANATH TATTVABHUSHAN

Reviews

The Nyaya System of Indian Philosophy—"Akṣapâda Gotama."—By Pandit Narendrachandra Vedantatirtha, M.A., published by the author from Tirtha-niketan, 62/5A, Beadon Street, Calcutta, pp. 112+16. Price Re. 1.

The subject-matter of the work is very difficult, and we are glad to observe that Pandit Narenchandra Vedantathirtha, M.A., has solved in it a host of debatable questions which deal with the most difficult subject of the name, birth-place and the age of the author of Nyaya system of Indian Philosophy.

The questions raised by the author are—whether the name of the founder of the Indian Logical system is Gotama or Gautama; if he is known by the name of Gotama, then which of the Gotamas he may be identified with, and how his time may be fixed. The husband of Ahalya, a contemporary of Ramachandra, is also well-known as Gotama or Gautama. Is the husband of Ahalya then the founder of the Nyaya system or some one else before him?

The author of the Nyaya-sutra is well known in India as Akṣapâda also. What, then, is the import of this word—Akṣapâda? It is then necessary to solve whether the usual meaning of the word in ' having a pair of eyes on the feet' does fit in here. Of course, before the present author, some have devoted their time and labour, more or less, to fix the age and personality of the author of the Nyaya-sutra, but we are very sorry to say that we do not find anywhere else, such a critical and systematic treatment of the subject with so many fascinating arguments and thoughtful conclusions as may be seen in this work of the learned Pandit Narendrachandra. The author has concluded that Gotama, the author of the Nyaya system, may be identified with the renowned sage Dirghatamā of the Vedic period and as such he has advanced a series of arguments to that effect placing the Logician about 6000 B. C.

There is mention of the word "Akṣa", masculine, in the sense of 'blind from the very birth', to be had in the celebrated Lexicon Savda-ratnavali quoted in the Savda-Kalpadruma. The sage Dirghatamā, being blind from his very birth, there is no cause why he should not be named as '-Aksa". Then the significance of the word "Pâda" should be ascertained. The author says that the word "Pâda' indicates

honour and respect, as the words "Bhatta", "Acharyya", etc. Raghunāth Siromani was blind of one eye and so he is known as Kánabhatta; besides a father is generally said to be a "Tâtapâda" in Sanskrit out of regard for his person. The author of the Nyaya-sutra is also called Akṣapâda out of regard for his distinguishing merits. Our author has proved this point very creditably and established his novel and original theory on incontestable facts and figures. The name "Gotama" also points to the same fact. The word "tama" means "darkness", it may signify "ignorance" as well. 'Sightlessness' may be very well explained by the word "tama". It is said in the Puranas that Gotama was afterwards favoured by the divine cow Surabhi who dispelled his everlasting darkness by providing him with a pair of eyes and the word "Gotama", is no doubt, indicative of that fact.

In order to fix the chronology of the founder of the Nyaya system, the author has had to criticise the views of the Western Scholars like Prof. Maxmuller, Jacobi, Keith, and others. In those criticisms also we find sufficient proofs of the experience, scholarship and far-sightedness of the author. Finally, the author has discussed and shown that the Nyaya system of Philosophy was written and prevailing even before the birth of the "Buddha". That Pandit Narendrachandra is specially versed in history as well, can be thorougly seen from these discussions. We have, to say the least, gained much satisfaction to peruse this unique publication.

The book under notice has been printed and published as an Introduction to "Dārshanika-Tarkavidyā". It appears to us that the author has been writing or has already composed a bigger work on the Nyaya system of Gotama. We suppose that the principles embodied in the abstruse Nyaya system of Philosophy have therein received a due treatment; and if we are correct in our conjectures, we eagerly and earnestly long for the publication of that important work. It will not be out of place to say that there is hardly any book on Nyaya in Bengali to meet the demands of the learned public of Bengal; the one or two books already published, have not, at all, been able to clear away the logical abstrusity of the subject. It is next to impossible to present the difficult subject-matter and the subtle theories of Nyaya before Bengali readers in a very easy and intelligible way by one who is not well acquatined with the manner and method of discussion and the technicalities of Nyaya specially Navya-Naya, along with a strong hold on the Bengali language and literature at the same time. From the simplicity of expressions, dignity, liveliness and elegance of the style, forcibility and intelligibility of the arguments

in this introductory work, we may reasonably hope that Pandit Vedantatirtha's earnest attempts will be, no doubt, successful in the matter. Professor Radhakrishnan and Professor Dasgupta have attained name and fame by composing the 'History of Indian Philosophy', but it is much to be regretted that there is hardly any account of Navya-Nyaya even in their celebrated works. It may be that they have been dissuaded from similar attempts on account of the unpopularity of the subject. Pandit Dayálkrishna of Sylhet has written a Bengali book on translating some important portions of Gangesha's "Tattva-Chintamany", but has not, at all, been successful to render the subject-matter easier in any way. In his book also, attempts have been made to clear away the abstruse technicalities of Navya-Nyaya, but we are sorry to notice that the same difficulty of the time-honoured "Avachcheda", "Vyadhikaranadharmāvachchinna" and many other technical terms has still been in tact. Will not Pandit Vedantatirtha be able to fulfil our expectation and meet a long-felt demand of the educated public?

K. SASTRI

India and the Simon Report.—BY C. F. ANDREWS. GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd. 3*s* net.

The present condition of Indian administration is too well-known to bear repetition in this part of the country, but the book has been designed for a different purpose. It gives an account of the national upheaval which may be witnessed all over India and which received an impetus due to the Simon Report,—whence the name of the book. Mr. Andrews was the most suitable man to write it,—having had occasion to view men and things in India at close quarters and being closely associated with the movement which he seeks to describe and analyse. He has been prompted to take the pen, as he has been roused by the superiorly complex, by the new idea that bids fair to be popular in the West, *viz.*, the Indians are racially inferior to the British. What other way out for him but to show to the West, how India is certainly not inferior in point of civilization, how she can stand any fair and reasonable scrutiny.

The book is an attempt on behalf of a lover of both the countries, to reconcile them to friendly alliance, and to prevent bloodshed, for it is his fear, as it is that of many others, that "a guerilla warfare,"

with all the miseries of incessant shooting and bloodshed in every part of the country, may take the place of the present passive struggle.

But "Lord Birkenhead and the Simon Commission" were in limelight, and they pointed to the plague spot of India her political subjection. The trouble is deeper; and taking of other things Mr. Andrews goes on to tell us that the present architecture of the office buildings and the constitution of the Indian Christian Church both fail to satisfy the needs of the people. If the disease that the Indian body politic has been suffering from is to be diagnosed the shame of subjection must be realised as well as the national programme placed before the workers by Mahatma Gandhi requires to be understood.

Mr. Andrews finds no such bars to unification in India as frighten away many wise heads both in India and England. The Hindu-Mussalman problem simply does not exist before "the greatest levelling factor in modern India—nationalism," at least, that is the opinion of a worker like him who has been to the remote corners of the country and mingled freely with the masses that toil.

The appendices are a distinctly valuable contribution, specially the interview with Rabindranath published in the *Manchester Guardian* on May 17, 1930, in course of which he was reported to have said:

"The time will come when reparation will have to be made. Therefore, I trust and hope that the best minds of England will feel ashamed of every form of tyrannical action, just as we ourselves have been ashamed at the violence which has broken out on our side."

The two letters written by Mahatma Gandhi and incorporated in the appendices are worth perusal though they must be familiarly known to all lovers of India by now, and while recommending the book as a stimulating reading, we may be allowed to quote one pertinent passage, pertinent at this time of the day when politicians are busy in London divising safeguard:—

"This freedom must be entirely unfettered; for in that lies its moral value. The independence must be unconditioned; for here again to impose conditions would destory its moral content.....There can be no dallying in an intermediate stage where the great principles of freedom become confused and the swift currents of idealism run sluggish.....A protected India, with innumerable safeguards, can only develop weakness. But an India that launches out boldly into its own freedom under the inspiration of a moral genius like Mahatma Gandhi may fall back a hundred times, but in the long run it will stand upon its own feet with its manhood and its womanhood restored

to their full stature. No one but a prophet can bring to the heart of India in her present bondage the inward freedom which her soul so passionately desires." (Pp. 122-23.)

PRIYARANJAN SEN

Present-day Banking and Currency.—By B. Ramchandra Rau, M.A. Published by the Calcutta University.

It is admirable in its comprehensiveness. No topic on Indian Banking, present and past, has escaped the notice of the author. Every theme has been worked out in detail, all conclusions have been supported with up-to-date statistics and information, as well as quotations from and references to known authorities on the subject. At the same time the volume does not lack altogether in original contributions. The chapters on the indigenuous banker, the loan companies of Bengal and topics of the Hundi system, agriculturla credit and banking management particularly evince a painstaking spirit of research and original remarks. The author has boldly criticised and impartially pronounced judgments on many of the partisan-like conclusions which are so unfortunately prevalent in circle of the experts, real or so-called, in banking.

His views and suggestions may not be unquestionably accepted by all and his working of the details in some cases may seem a bit too much to many a real master of the subject and expert worker in the field, but to the students of the Indian banking system and to the curious general readers, the book will prove to be not only of immense interests but also serviceable for all information regarding the Indian banking system.

A. K. SARKAR,

Greetings to Young India.—By Benoykumar Sarkar. Published by M. N. RAYCHOWDHURY & Co., CALCUTTA Price Re. 1.

Prof. Benoykumar Sarkar has been long a toiler, earnest and unwearied, in the cause of Indian cultural nationalism, and his countrymen looked on with admiration while he was feeling the pulses of the world and studying men and things under other skies. When he returned to India after twelve continuous years of travel, he was received with gratitude for the service he had been rendering. On his

arrival he made some observations on different topics which are here published in book form and provide suitable reading for those who want to understand the present and see into the future. The 27 chapters embrace a long range of subjects—art, culture, commerce, politics, economics, education,—and whatever Prof. Sarkar has got to say invites attention. His suggestions are not commonplace but fresh, not vague but definite, proceeding from a mind not crude but well-informed. He is one of those rare critics who come out with a constitutive programme. But where are the men to work out his suggestions?

P. S.

A Refutation of the Versailles War Guilt Thesis.—By Dr. Alfred von Wegerer. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1930. Price $ 3·00.

Dr. Alfred von Wegerer has made a distinct contribution to the history of the World War. The author's fundamental thesis is that the Versailles verdict concerning Germany's sole responsibility for the war is false. This decision was arrived at because the commission which pronounced the verdict had to depend upon forged materials. He further holds that "a revision of this verdict is necessary in order to restore Germany's good name and to take the edge off the discordances between the nations which have arisen out of the false verdict on the outbreak of the World War.

Dr. Wegerer has devoted about eight years or more to study all the available materials on the causes of the World War and produced a work whose value will grow in importance. Every assertion made by the author in refutation of the charges about Germany's sole responsibility for the World War is backed by a document or an authoritative work.

Those who are interested in practical politics will find that this book will more and more be used by the German public as an effective weapon for the revision of the treaty of Versailles which in its Article 231 says:—"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the War imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

Germany's alleged responsibility for causing the World War makes her responsible for making up the financial damages caused by it.

There lies the basis of the so-called "Reparation" which Germany has been indirectly forced to accept.

Germany's future foreign policy will be to bring about such a condition in world politics that the Versailles Treaty, by which she has been robbed of her colonies and has been saddled with a vast Reparation, may be revised.

The value of Dr. Wegerer's book has been materially increased by an exceedingly able and interesting preface by Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes of Smiths College (U. S. A.). Prof. Barnes thinks that the allied powers, to enslave and rob the vanquished, cleverly laid down the false dictum of Germany's responsibility for the World War.

This book should be read by every student of World Politics. It is a valuable reference book for the students of history.

TARAKNATH DAS

Federal India.—By Col. K. N. Haksar, C.I.E. and K. M. Panikkar. London Martin Hopkinson, 1930. Price 10s. 6d.

When the Round Table Conference on India met in London, the whole world was astonished to learn that the Indian Princes had favoured the formation of a Federal India in which the Indian states will become component parts. They also advocated that a Federal India should enjoy equality of status with all other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. British statesmen were greatly surprised to learn this decision of the Princes, because the Simon Commission Report, the Government of India's Report and the Butler Commission's Report passed the judgment that there was not the remotest possibility of forming a Federated India in which the Indian Princes would be willing to participate.

The Princes of India have lately become much upset by the recent developments in India. The British Government in violation of the existing treaties have usurped some of the very fundamental rights of Indian Princes who are supposed to be its allies. By exercising the "doctrine of paramouncy" the Government of India has reduced the Indian Princes as mere vassals. On the other hand Indian nationaliats have begun to denounce them as "enemies and traitors to the cause of Indian freedom."

The Princes have very ably utilised the occassion of the Round Table Conference on India to establish that they are Indians first and are not

opposed to Indian aspirations; and at the same time they have demanded that their status—their treaty rights—should be judiciously determined and protected by the future constitution of a Federal India in which they will play an important part. For this, the able ministers of Indian Princes and their unquestioned patriotism and statesmanship should be recognised by all impartial students of the present-day India.

Let this be here asserted that if there was no boycott of the Simon Commission, and no Civil Disobedience movement under the leadership of the All India National Congress, then possibly there would not have been a Round Table Conference. Furthermore if the Princes of India, under the guidance of their able ministers, were not anxious to champion the cause of Federated India enjoying virtual dominion status, then the British statesmen would not have thought of adopting the course which might bring about a real United India including the Indian States.

The idea of a Federal India including the Indian States could not be easily brushed aside by British experts because, this idea has been very concretely and admirably presented before the world by a volume "A Federal India" by Col. K. N. Haksar, C.I.E., Political Member of the Gwalior Government and Mr. K. M. Panikkar, Secretary to the Princes Delegation to the Round Table Conference.

This book should be carefully studied by all who are interested in the future of India. To my judgment it is a distinct contribution to the valuable literature on comparative constitution and evolution of states. The authors have so ably and concisely presented various facts on constitutional history of various federal governments—the United States of America, the Swiss Confederation and the German Confederation and others—that it must excite admiration of impartial scholars. The book is a credit to Indian Scholarship in the field of Political Science.

The authors have not tried to work out a federation of Indian States and British India on an ideal basis. They have tried to draw an outline of a federation, which is within the sphere of practical politics. They think that at the present stage of political evolution of India, "a centralised unitary government for the whole of India is not yet an attainable ideal. And to have the Indian States as they are, that is as 'foreign' territories, would be to evade the crux of the problem" (p. 145). In this scheme the Indian States would enjoy internal autonomy, except in so far as it is modified by the constitution of the Federal State. "It may be that some states would have constitutional form of government, others a purely personal one. The difference of form need not stand in the way of a Federation. In Imperial Germany, the free cities like

Hamburg and Danzig, with their traditional Republican forms of Government, freely joined Prussia, Bavaria and other states which were monarchical" (p. 83). While advocating certain practices prevalent in Imperial Germany—such as Federal Council and special provisions for various states to participate in various committees, the authors rightly lay special stress in the need of the establishment of the Supreme Court, which will have the power to decide disputed questions on constitutional problems involving the states.

Space would not permit me to make a detailed examination of the suggestion made in this volume about the nature and function of the Federal Government in India. However it should be noted that the authors do not propose to erect "responsible government" for the whole of United India. They write:—"Responsible Government means the control of the executive by an elected legislature. If the Federal Executive is made responsible to a body elected by a *non-federal and unitary* basis, then the guarantees provided for the states will become illusory..... A parliamentary government for the whole of India is therefore not conceivable if the interests of the states are to be guaranteed and maintained. British has been promised responsible government. It has also been officially stated that the necessary implication of this promise is Dominion Status. Our proposal is perfectly consistent with the realisation of both these ideals. British India would enjoy responsible government for purposes of exclusive affairs, and for purposes of All-India affairs, by alliance with the states, a Dominion would come into being, the central authority of which would be created by agreement" (pp. 120-122).

In this connection the authors suggest that to guarantee all the Indian States a share in executive authority over the matters of common concern, there should be various standing committees of the Federal Council. "The standing Committees of the Council, in each of which adequate representation would be given to the princes, would be for—(1) Defence (2) Foreign Affairs and Political Relations (3) Trade and Commerce (4) Customs and Indirect Taxation (5) Transport, including Railways (6) Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones and (7) Currency, Exchange, Banking. In no case would the representation of the states be less than one-third; and on certain committees some states, which have special interests, would have to be given a permanent place—*e.g.*, Kashmir on the Committee on Defence, since that state borders on Russia, Chinese Turkestan, and on Tibet; Hydrabad on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, since the foreign relations of India would be mainly with Islamic countries (*Sic*).....It may, however, be mentioned that

the proposal to confer permanent seats on the Standing Committees is not a novel one. On the Council of the League of Nations the great powers have permanent seats allotted to them. Even in Republican Germany, Bavaria is accorded this privilege. Considering the great differences of area, population, and revenue among the Indian States, manifestly it would not be fair to treat them alike. Important states will not come into any scheme which does not secure to them an effective share in the exercise of the power they surrender " (pages 112-113).

The Nehru Report (published by the All India National Congress in 1928) presented the ideal of the Indian nationalists trying to work out a constitution for India with a Dominion Status, within the British Empire. This report made special mention of guaranteeing the Indian Princes, their rights in a federation. This report was denounced by some Indian Princes. Now in " A Federal India " by Col. Haksar and Mr. Panikkar we have the scheme of federation which will be acceptable to the Princes. Practical statesmen interested in the formation of a Federated India will be greatly benefited by the perusal of this book.

TARAKNATH DAS

England under Queen Anne (Blenheim).—By George Macaulay Trevelyan, O. M., Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, 8vo. pp. xii, 477. Price 21*s* net. Longmans, Green & Co.

In this admirable volume, we have the history of England under Queen Anne up to the great victory of Blenheim, a great event in the making of modern England. A country with five and a half million sturdy inhabitants had just solved its constitutional question, had sent its tyrannical king to exile and under a foreign king had come forward to make its importance felt by an attempt to check the aspiration of a king who almost succeeded in making himself the dictator of Europe. William III, the sworn enemy of Louis XIV, had devoted his life to the curbing of the pride of the Grand Monarch, but had not lived long to complete his great task. His mantle had not fallen on one equally energetic or capable. But the people of England had taken up the work he had begun. War with Louis was renewed though William was gone. Queen Anne, the last of the Stuarts, was on the throne. She lacked the abilities of her predecessor, but a new England had arisen, an England which produced eminent men of genius, capable

of promoting the national cause in all spheres of activity and thereby making their mother country move "forward in the path of destiny".

In his own admirable way, the author begins with a description of England of the time. He depicts English town-life and gives a decription of country gentlemen and their various types. He then passes on to the position of women and gives us a picture of female education as it was understood in those days and presents an account of the divergence of public opinion on the subject. There is also a fine picture of the marriage-market, and showing how 'in the upper and middle classes husbands were found for girls on the principle of ' frank barter.' Then follows an interesting account of contemporary social vices like gambling, drinking and dwelling. The condition of the parochial clergy, the position of the Catholics and the conflict of High and Low Church receive their proper attention from the author, and this is followed by a detailed account of the city of London, its growing commerce, its local institutions and its social and economic condition.

After a careful discussion of the above topics, the author devotes his attention to the position of parties in England and the prelude to the Spanish War of Succession. New light has been thrown on the nature and character of Queen Anne. In his brilliant analysis of temperament and her aims, we find in the Queen more of a desire to have her own rather than a meek submission to others. As the author shows, the Queen's friendship for Sarah Churchill was rooted in genuine human affection, but like the friendship of Hamlet and Horatio "it flourished on a contrast of temperaments." If Sarah looked primarily to her own self-interest, the Queen, too, had her own objections. Thus, instead of advancing the claims of Sarah's husband, the Queen entertained the ambition of putting her own stupid consort at the head of the allied armies. In the appointments to the church, the Queen always selected high churchmen, rather than the nominees of the Whigs, and Sarah's influence "went for nothing at all." In short, Anne had inherited all the Stuart instincts. At heart, she still believed in her 'right divine', but self interest had made her wiser than her father and if she recognised the checks imposed by Parliament on the royal power, she admitted it only as an accomplished fact, which it was too risky to nullify.

As in the case of the Queen, so in regard to Marlborough, the learned author attempts with justice to save England's great Generalissimo from the charges of perpetual perversity and habitual treachery, as we find in the writings of Macaulay and the Tory writers of the

period. Marlborough's true place was between Macaulay's 'villain of genius and the high-minded public devotion of Wellington.'

These fine character sketches are followed by an equally fine description of party strife in contemporary England. The author's illuminating style and lively description take us to the contemporary life. He describes the two rival parties, the electioneering methods and the great personalities of the Whig Junto like Wharton, Somers, Halifax and Oxford. He shows how Wharton was a man "without any principle in private, but an example of public loyalty in a slippery age, a monstrous compound of the very worst and the best."

The history of the great struggle is written in similar style. The army of Marlborough and the militia is described and we have accounts of the feuds at the Spanish Court. The notes, maps and the appendices add to the value of the work.

We offer our heartiest welcome to this fine work of an able writer, who is already too well-known. At the same time, we await the completion of the history of the reign of Queen Anne. The author adds to the laurels already won by him, and confers great benefits upon students and teachers alike. The printing and get-up are good as usual and the publishers are to be congratulated for all this.

N. C. BANERJEE

Lord Hastings and the Indian States.—By Dr. Mohan Singh Mehta, M.A., LLB., Ph.D. (Lond.) Bar-at-Law, with a foreword by Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer, K.C.S.I, C.I.E. Royal, 8 vo, pp. xv, and 275. Published by Messrs. D. B. Taraporewalah and Sons, Kitab Mahal, Hornby Road, Bombay.

At a time when the status and character of the Indian States under the paramountcy of the British Government are claiming public attention not only in India but in England, Dr. Mohan Singh Mehta has come forward with this volume on Lord Moira and his policy towards the Indian States. The value of the work has been enhanced by a brilliant foreword written by Sir P. Sivaswamy Aiyar, K.C.I.E., C.I.E.

The author who is an inhabitant of one of the most ancient Indian States, took up the suggestions of Dr. C. Delisle Burns of Glasgow and worked with a view to write a book on the Indian States 'from the impartial stand-point of an unofficial student', in order to state the relations existing between these Indian States and the paramount

power and to pave the way for the solution of the great question of their place in an All-India Confederation.

The first chapter of the volume gives us a picture of the political condition of India at the time of Lord Hastings' assumption of the Governor-Generalship of India. Next, he goes on to discuss the avowed policy of non-intervention once held by Lord Hastings and shows how he was compelled to change it. Several subsequent chapters describe the causes and circumstances leading to the Third Mahratta War and the suppression of the Pindaris, all ultimately establishing the ascendency of the British Company in India. The last two chapters discuss the sovereignty of the Indian States and give the author's own estimate of Hastings' work.

In writing out these chapters, the author has worked hard, having consulted almost all the English records, memoirs and historical works available. Had he but consulted some of the papers or records of the Indian States, the value of the work would have been further enhanced and this would have made his views more approaching the standard of impartiality which he claims. For although the imbecility and worthlessness of the Indian rulers were mainly responsible for their final downfall, the policy of the British Company and its officers deserves often the severest condemnation. Indian records if available would have done much to state the case of these princes who in their own way have a right to be heard.

It will be unpolitic in these days, when the Indian States are going to join the coming Federation of India, to raise the vexed question of past relation between the Company and the Indian princes. But no sincere and honest student of history will justify the treatment meted out to the Indian rulers. Incompetent and worthless most of them undoubtedly were and India suffered from a dearth of genius and a lack of personalities. The house of Taimur produced weaklings, the house of Sivaji produced profligate refugees in the harem and power passed to new lines of usurpers. After two or three generations of activity, these usurpers were themselves transformed into those imbecile beings, whom their forefathers had displaced.

Under these rulers, India enjoyed neither peace nor respite. War and aggression remained the guiding policy of all in position. The weakness of these rulers made them invoke the aid of foreign mercenaries and these raised themselves to position and power. Despicable men like Samru who in their own countries would have been readily hanged in

the midst of public applause became men of consequence and even rulers in India!

In the midst of all these, the British Company came forward to make a bid for political power. Success attended their intrigues and their military activity. After one or two defeats, Indian princes, fond of pleasure, handed over to the Company the task of protecting them and for this they surrendered valuable slices of their dominions. The contingents maintained at the cost of Indian princes served only to strengthen their new masters and they forged their own fetters. The alliance between the company and the princes, once on equal footing was, turned into a subsidiary one. The rulers of Indian States had to submit to everwaxing demands. The Residents became their liege-lords while in many cases, their own servants, with the connivance of the sovereign power became their masters. This was galling to many. Some princes like Sekandar Jah retired to the harem. Others like Baji Rao II, the evil genius of the Mahrattas, intrigued thought of resisting at last and thus ended their lives in agony and exile.

After Wellesley, came Lord Hastings, the next great founder of British power in India. He reduced the Maharattas to impotence and the Rajputs to perpetual dependence. At the same time he crushed the Pindaris. His public policy made him establish peace in Central India and he did it by absorbing the pre-eminent Maharatta State, reducing others like Holkar of Indore to vassalage and by rewarding the great services of Amir Khan and Gofur Khan with chief-ships at Tonk and Jaora. From the English point of view, he had done excellent service. He had followed the aggressive policy of Wellesley with vengeance and more than half completed his task. Two more successors like Ellenborough and Dalhousie were needed to enslave the Sikh state of the Punjab and the Amirs of Sind. As the result of Hastings' policy, the Indian states "ceased to be independent sovereign, bodies." "Theoretically speaking, they were internally sovereign, but even their functions of internal government were only discharged with the sufferance of the British Government."

The author's estimate of Hastings is good and his parallelism between Wellesley and Hastings very fine. He tries to be impartial and uses moderate language. A little bit of stronger language in condemning some of Hastings' policy—his extinction of the Peshwa's State, his rewards to Amir Khan and Gofur Khan and his support to Chandulal, would have added to the value of his criticism. Lastly, while we can safely accept his statement that 'Hastings' dealing with the states

constitute a prominent landmark in the course of Anglo-Indian annals' we entertain very grave doubts as to the truth of his statement that 'the problem of the Indian states ceased to be a military one.'

On the whole, the book is good and we recommend it to students and scholars.

N. C. BANERJEE.

The Splendour that was Ind—a Survey of Indian Culture and Civilization (from the earliest times to the death of Emperor Aurangzeb). By K.T. Shah, B.A., B.Sc. (Lond.), Bar.-at-Law, Professor of Economics, University of Bombay, xxxv+236, 8′×11″, published by Messrs. Taraporevala, Kitabmahal, Hornby Road, Bombay.

Messrs. Taraporevala are to be congratulated on having undertaken the publication of this fine volume by Prof. K. T. Shah, whose other works on Indian economics and finance have already given him an international reputation. The present volume shows that Prof. Shah is not a mere economist, but proves him to be one who can explore the very basis of Indian cultural and social life and give a lucid exposition of it. He tackles all sorts of intricate topics yet explains everything in his own way. He also evokes the interest of the reader in matters which too often appear hackneyed and common place.

The ambition of the author and its great magnitude has been very rightly emphasised by the Marquis of Zetland, known to Indians not only as a great English statesman, but as the able writer of the Heart of Aryavarta, in addition to his other works. Dr. Shah's 'canvas is vast, the span of time great and the material under view so varied!' yet he wields his brush carefully and presents things in their true perspective and colour. His first chapter gives a masterly presentation of the 'panoramic view' of India and in the next we have a fine description of the diverse races and peoples which make up the life of a living India. In succeeding chapters, the author describes the heroes and saints of the country, the makers of history and the builders of empire. He then passes on to poetry and drama, and then to religion and philosophy. Music and dancing as well as painting and sculpture, which unfolds the true psychology of a people next receive their proper attention. Lastly the author gives a fine exposition of Indian social life and analyses the caste system which too often calls for sneer and ridicule from European writers and their more fanatical disciples—modernised Indians.

In all these chapters, the author shows his originality of presentation and even in topics of dispute, his views are often sounder than many researchers. The different schools of architecture and painting receive the author's attention and we have illustrations of the best specimens of Indian temples, tombs and palaces.

To bring the present in harmony with the past and to mark the stages of Indian cultural development have been the main theme of the author and in this task he has succeeded eminently. Very few writers could have achieved this task better. Very few could have handled the exposition of the Indian social problem so ably. Dr. Shah is up-to-date in his way of thinking but is conscious of the existence of a real India, an India with a soul of her own, which western influences cannot easily destroy. The illustrations are fine and add to the value of the work, which ought to find its way to every library and to every scholar. Considering the numerous illustrations and the costly get up, the price is not high.

A History of India for High Schools—By E. Marsden, B.A., F.R.G.S., F.R.S.L., I.E.S. (Rtd.) and Sir Henry Sharp, M.A., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.E.S. (Retd.). Cr. 8 vo. pp. 284. Macmillan & Co.

This book written by two eminent authors is meant for High School students. The authors have done their work carefully and the book is sure to be useful to students. The language is easy and the student will surely form an idea as to the main events of Indian history. The addition of more details would have made the book better. The printing is good and the illustrations very fine.

N. C. BANERJEE

Ourselves

The Next Annual Convocation

The next Annual Convocation of the Senate will be held on the 28th February, 1931, at 3 P.M.

* * *

The Jubilee Research Prize in Science for 1930.

The Jubilee Research Prize in Science for the year 1930, has been awarded to Mr. Satyaprasad Raychaudhuri, M.Sc., on his thesis entitled "Soil Acidity and Base Exchange in Soil."

* * *

Result of the Supplementary Preliminary Examination in Law, November, 1930.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 919, of whom 408 passed, 211 failed, 1 was expelled, and 299 were absent. Of the successful candidates 42 were placed in Class I, and 366 placed in Class II. The percentage of pass was 65·9.

* * *

Result of the Supplementary Intermediate Examination in Law, November, 1930.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 567, of whom 305 passed, 92 failed, and 170 were absent. Of the successful candidates 32 were placed in Class I, and 273 placed in Class II. The percentage of pass was 76·83.

* * *

Result of the Final Examination in Law, November, 1930.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 679, of whom 228 passed, 120 failed, 330 were absent, and 1 was expelled. Of the successful candidates 20 were placed in Class I, and 208 placed in Class II. The percentage of pass was 65·5.

* * *

Result of the Preliminary Scietific M.B. Examination, November, 1930.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 56, of whom 39 passed, 17 failed, none was expelled, and none was absent.

* * *

Result of the Second M.B. Examination, November, 1930.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 103, of whom 73 passed, 30 failed, none was expelled and none was absent.

* * *

A New Ph.D.

Mr. Rasbehari Das has been admitted to the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy on his thesis on "The Self and the Ideal."

* * *

KRISHNAKUMARI GANESH PRASAD PRIZE AND MEDAL FOR RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS IN INDIA BEFORE 1600 A.D.

Dr. Ganesh Prasad, Hardinge Professor of Higher Mathematics in the Calcutta University and President of the Calcutta Mathematical Society, has handed over to the Society 3½% G. P. Notes of the face value of Rs. 1,400 for the creation of an endowment for the purpose of awarding a prize and a medal in memory of his daughter. The Calcutta Mathematical Society has laid down the following rules for the award of the medal and prize :—

(1) A research prize and a gold medal shall be instituted to be named Krishnakumari Ganesh Prasad Prize and Medal after the name of the donor's daughter.

(2) The prize and the medal shall be awarded every fifth year to the author of the best thesis embodying the result of original research or investigation in a topic connected with the history of Hindu Mathematics before 1600 A. D.

(3) The subject of the thesis shall be prescribed by the Council of the Calcutta Mathematical Society at least two years in advance.

(4) The last day of submitting the thesis for the award in a particular year shall be the 31st March of that year.

(5) The prize and the medal shall be open to competition to all nationals of the world without any distinction of race, caste or creed.

(6) A Board of Honorary Examiners consisting of (*i*) the President of the Society, (*ii*) an expert in the subject nominated by the donor, or after his death, such an expert nominated by donor's heirs, and (*iii-v*) three experts in the subject elected by the Council of the Society, shall be appointed as soon as possible after the last day of receiving the theses.

(7) The recommendation of the Board of Examiners shall be

placed before the next annual meeting of the Society and the decision of that meeting shall be final.

(8) Every candidate shall be required to submit three copies (type written) of his or her thesis.

(9) If in any year no theses is received or the theses submitted be pronounced by the Board of Examiners to be not of sufficient merit, a second prize or a prize in a second subject, or a prize of enhanced value, may be awarded in a subsequent year or years as the Council of the Calcutta Mathematical Society may determine.

(10) The thesis of the successful candidate shall be printed by the Society.

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INDIAN THEATRE IN MUNICH[1]

The Deutsche Akademie has the pleasure of announcing to the Indian public that the Indian Student's Club of Munich staged the famous drama *Chitra* of Rabindranath Tagore on the second December, 1930, in the Hall of the Studentenhaus, under the joint auspices of the Deutsche Akademie and the Deutsche Akademische Auslandstelle, for the benefit of poor German students. It was a spontaneous act on the part of the Indian students and at the same time a unique experiment, for this is the first time that an Indian drama was staged in Europe *in the original Indian text!* Still, strange as it may seem, the big Hall of the Studentenhaus was full ; and so great was the success of these amateur actors that they have been requested to repeat their performance on the eleventh December. Mr. T. Sen appeared in the very difficult rôle of *Chitra,* the heroine, and although nobody understood the meaning of the words which came with musical effect from his rich melodious voice, his acting

[1] The Editor is grateful to the authorities of the German Academy of Munich for this interesting and valuable communication.

was done with so much feeling and devotion that the main plot of the play was clear to everyone in the auditorium. Many Munich papers praised him specially for his wonderful acting. Dr. A. Mukherjee too was a success in every way in the rôle of *Arjuna*, and Dr. K. P. Basu produced a deep impression as *Madana*. A special feature of the evening was the real Indian music played on real Indian instruments for which the Munich public is thankful to Mr. N. Das.

The best society of Munich was gathered that evening in the Studentenhaus to watch the grand performance of the Indian students. Nobel-prize winners like Wieland, Willstätter, Sommerfeld and world famous Professors like Oertel, Fajans and Gerlach were present. Representatives of many Munich papers were also there on this evening and the press opinion was wholly favourable. The "Bayerische Staatszeitung" was enthusiastic over the beautiful figures of the Indian students in their classical costumes and their earnest devotion in the performance, and compared the piece with Goethe's Tasso. The "München Augsburger Abendzeitung," in a short but vivid review, would hardly admit that it was a performance by amateurs. The success of the evening was complete, but that is not all. It has a much deeper significance. It shows clearly that the Indian students in Germany have learnt to love Germany and their German fellow-students and that explains their loving sympathy for the German students in distress. This sentiment was fully expressed when Mr. Raju, President of the Indian Student's Club, Munich, in his opening speech, said: "This performance is the expression of our gratitude for all the sympathy and kindness we have received in the German Universities, from our German friends and in the German families." Truly it is the sign of a great cultural rapprochment now in progress between India and Germany and it is a pleasure to note what the "Welt an Sonntag" wrote on this performance: "Everyone who took part in the performance did his best to make its wholesome effect equally felt in both the Continents of Europe and Asia and to

connect this evening the two Continents by the bonds of friendship and specially the two countries of India and Germany."

* * *

Regulations made by the Secretary of State for India for admission to the Indian Civil Service Examination to be held in London in July and August, 1931.[1]

Home Department

Notification.

Examination for the Indian Civil Service.

1. A Candidate must be a male and either:—

(*a*) A British subject whose father (if alive) is a British subject or a subject of a State in India, or (if dead) was at the time of his death either a British subject or a subject of a State in India or a person in the permanent service of the Crown or a person who had retired from that service; or

(*b*) A ruler or a subject of a State in India in respect of whom the Governor-General in Council has made a declaration under Section 96A of the Government of India Act.

Provided that in the case of a male British subject the requirements of this rule may be waived by the Secretary of State in Council if he is satisfied that their observance would occasion exceptional hardship and the Candidate is so closely connected by ancestry or upbringing with His Majesty's dominions as to justify special treatment.

2. A Candidate must have attained the age of twenty-one, and must not have attained the age of twenty-four on the first day of August of the year in which the Examination is held.

3. A Candidate who is a Native of India must obtain a certificate of age and qualification under Regulations 2 and 3

[1] Liable to alteration from year to year.

issued under Notification of the Government of India, No. 1114, dated 12th September, 1918,[1] and signed, should he be a resident in British India, by the Secretary to Government of the Province, or the Commissioner of the Division within which his family resides, or, should he reside in a Native State by the highest Political Officer accredited to the State in which his family resides.

4. A Candidate must be free from disease, constitutional affection, or bodily infirmity, unfitting him, or likely to unfit him, for the Indian Civil Service.[2]

5. A Candidate shall satisfy the Civil Service Commissioners that his character is such as to qualify him for employment in the Indian Civil Service.

6. No person who, in a previous year, accepted the offer of a nomination as a Selected Candidate for the Indian Civil Service and subsequently resigned his position as a Selected Candidate, will be admitted to the Examination.

7. Should the evidence upon the above points be *prima facie* satisfactory to the Civil Service Commissioners, the Candidate, on payment of the prescribed fee, will be admitted to the Examination. The Commissioners may, however, in their discretion, at any time prior to the grant of the Certificate of Qualification, institute such further inquiries as they may deem necessary; and if the result of such inquiries in the case of any Candidate should be unsatisfactory to them in any of the above respects he will be ineligible for admission to the Indian Civil Service, and, if already selected, will be removed from the position of a Probationer.

8. The Examination will include the following subjects.[3] The numerical value is shown against each subject.

[1] This Notification is at present under revision in consequence of the recent amendment of Clause 2 of these regulations.

[2] The Civil Service Commissioners will regard no person as constitutionally fitted for appointment to the Indian Civil Service who has not been satisfactorily vaccinated within the last seven years.

[3] A Syllabus defining in general terms the character of the examination in the various subjects is sent herewith.

SECTION A.—Subject to the instructions at the head of Section B of this rule, Candidates are to take up all the subjects in this section.

		Marks.
1.	ESSAY	100
2.	ENGLISH	100
3.	PRESENT DAY	100
4.	EVERYDAY SCIENCE	100
5.	AUXILIARY LANGUAGE	100
6.	VIVA VOCE	300

SECTION B.—OPTIONAL SUBJECTS.—Candidates are allowed to take up subjects in this section up to a total of 1,000 marks, but Candidates taking one modern foreign language in Section B may take, in lieu of the auxiliary language in Section C, a further subject in Section B carrying 100 marks, and Candidates taking two or more modern languages in Section B may take, in lieu of both auxiliary languages (Sections A and C), a further subject or subjects in Section B to a total of 200 marks.

History.

		Marks.
7.	English History, Period 1	200
8.	English History, Period 2	200
9.	European History, *either* Period 1, *or* Period 2 ...	200
10.	European History, Period 3	200

Economics, Politics, Law and Philosophy.

		Marks.
11.	General Economics	200
12.	Economic History	100
13.	Public Economics	100
14.	Political Theory	100
15.	Political Organization	100
16.	Constitutional Law	100
17.	Private Law	200
18.	Roman Law	100
19.	International Law...	100
20.	Moral Philosophy, ...	100

		Marks.
21.	Metaphysics	100
22.	Logic	100
23.	Psychology	100
24.	Experimental Psychology	100

Mathematics and Science.

		Marks.
25.	Lower Pure Mathematics	200
26.	Higher Pure Mathematics	200
27.	Lower Applied Mathematics	200
28.	Higher Applied Mathematics	200
29.	Astronomy	200
30.	Statistics	100
31.	Lower Chemistry	200
32.	Higher Chemistry	200
33.	Lower Physics	200
34.	Higher Physics	200
35.	Lower Botany	200
36.	Higher Botany	200
37.	Lower Geology	200
38.	Higher Geology	200
39.	Lower Physiology	200
40.	Higher Physiology...	200
41.	Lower Zoology...	200
42.	Higher Zoology...	200
43.	Engineering	400
44.	Geography	400
45.	General Anthropology	100
46.	Special Anthropology, consisting of either Social Anthropology or Physical Anthropology ...	100
47.	Agriculture	200

English Literature, Languages and Civilizations.

		Marks.
48.	English literature, Period 1	200
49.	English literature, Period 2	200
50.	Latin Language	200
51.	Roman Civilization	200
52.	Greek Language	200
53.	Greek Civilization	200

		Marks.
54.	French Language	200
55.	French Civilization	200
56.	German Language...	200
57.	German Civilization	200
58.	Spanish or Italian Language	200
59.	Spanish or Italian Civilization	200
60.	Russian Language...	200
61.	Russian Civilization	200
62.	Arabic Language	200
63.	Arabic Civilization...	200
64.	Persian Language	200
65.	Persian Civilization	200
66.	Sanskrit Language	200
67.	Sanskrit Civilization	200

SECTION C.—Subject to the instructions at the head of Section B of this rule an Extra Numerum subject may be offered carrying 100 marks and chosen from the following:—

General Anthropology
Special Anthropology
An auxiliary language.

9. The auxiliary language in Section A or Section C will be tested by means of translation from the language. The following languages may be offered: French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Russian, Latin, Ancient Greek.

No candidate may offer any language or General Anthropology or Special Anthropology twice in the examination.

No candidate may offer in Sections A and C together two languages of the group Italian, Spanish, Portuguese or two of the group Norwegian, Swedish, Danish.

Only a Candidate who takes two modern languages in Section B may offer Latin or Ancient Greek as an auxiliary language.

Instead of an auxiliary language a Candidate whose mother

tongue is an Indian language may offer as Subject 5 either General Anthropology or Special Anthropology.

10. In subjects 50 to 67 the civilization subject associated with a language can only be taken by Candidates who offer the language itself for examination.[1]

11. A Candidate desiring to offer subject 24 or any of the subjects 31 to 43 must produce evidence satisfactory to the Commissioners of laboratory training in an institution of University rank. For Astronomy (29), Geography (44), the Physical Anthropology branch of Special Anthropology (46), and Agriculture (47), other equivalent training will be required. There will be no laboratory test as part of the examination.

12. From the marks assigned to Candidates in each subject such deduction will be made as the Civil Service Commissioners may deem necessary in order to secure that no credit be allowed for merely superficial knowledge.

13. Moreover, if a Candidate's handwriting is not easily legible a further deduction will, on that acccout, be made from the total marks otherwise accruing to him.[2]

14. A list of the competitors shall be made out in order of their proficiency as disclosed by the aggregate marks finally awarded to each competitor, and in that order so many competitors, up to the determined number of appointments, as are found by the Civil Service Commissioners to be qualified by examination, shall be designated to be Selected Candidates for the Indian Civil Service, provided that they appear to be duly qualified in other respects.

Should any Selected Candidate become disqualified, the Secretary of State for India will determine whether the vacancy thus created shall be filled or not. In the former case the

[1] *E.g.*, a Candidate desiring to offer subject No. 51 (Roman Civilization), must also offer subject No. 50 (Latin Language).

[2] It is notified for general information that the number of marks deducted for bad handwriting may be considerable.

Candidate next in order of merit, and in other respects duly qualified, shall be deemed to be a Selected Candidate.

15. Application for permission to attend an examination must be made in the handwriting of the Candidate, at such time and in such manner as may be fixed by the Civil Service Commissioners.

INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE

OPEN COMPETITION OF 1931

An Open Competitve Examination for admission to the Indian Civil Service will be held in London in 1931. The *viva voce* test will take place in July, the written examination in Section B subjects will begin on the 25th July, and that in Section A subjects on the 1s August.

The number of persons to be selected at this examination will be announced hereafter.

No person will be admitted to compete from whom the Secretary, Civil Service Commission, has not received, on or before the 8th May, 1931, an application on the prescribed form, a copy of which is sent herewith. No allegation that an Application Form or a letter respecting such Form has been lost or delayed in the post will be considered by the Commissioners unless the person making such allegation produces a Post Office Certificate of Posting. Candidates who delay their applications until the last days will do so at their own risk.

Acknowledgments of such Application Forms are sent, and any candidate who has filled up and returned the printed Application Form but has not received an acknowledgment of it within four complete days shoud at once write to the Secretary, Civil Service Commission, Burlington Gardens, London, W. 1. Failure to comply with this provision will deprive the Candidate of any claim to consideration.

The time Table of the written part of the examination will probably be posted towards the end of June to the address given on the Form of Application, and will contain instructions as to the time and place at which candidates are to attend. Candidates will be notified at the same time of the date and place fixed for their *viva voce* test and of the manner in which the fee (£8) is to be paid.

NOTE.

If Open Competitive Examinations for the following Services, *viz* :—

Eastern Cadetships in the Colonial Service,

Junior Grade of the Administrative Class in the Home Civil Service;

should be held in 1931 concurrently with the Open Competitive Examination for the Indian Civil Service, Candidates duly eligible in respect of age, etc., will be admitted to compete for any two or all three of these Services, subject to the following conditions,—

(1) Every successful candidate who may have been admitted to compete for either the Indian or the Colonial Service (or both), as well as for the Home Service, will be called upon to declare, immediately after the announcement of the result of the competitions, whether he prefers his name to remain on the list of Candidates for the Indian or Colonial Service or on the list of Candidates for the Home Service.

The name of any Candidate who fails to declare his choice when called upon to do so will be removed from the list of Candidates for the Home Service.

(2) Every successful Candidate who may have been admitted to compete for both the Indian and Colonial Services will be called upon to declare, immediately after the announcement of the result of the competitions, whether he prefers his name to remain on the list of Candidates for the Indian Service or on the list of Candidates for the Colonial Service.

The name of any Candidate who fails to declare his choice when called upon to do so will be removed from the list of Candidates for the Colonial Service.

(3) All declarations of choice are irrevocable.

(4) Candidates for all three or any two of the above-mentioned Services will be required to pay a consolidated fee of £8.

N.B.—For further particulars application should be made to the Secretary to the Public Service Commission, Simla, Delhi.—*Editor.*

Application Form

Application Form for the use of Candidates seeking admission to the concurrent open competitive examinations to be held in London in July andAugust, 1931, for appointment to services of the Administrative Group, namely :—

Home Civil Service : Administrative Class.
Indian Civil Service.
Colonial Service : Eastern Cadetships.

Note 1.—Male Candidates may include any or all of these three Services in their application (see paragraph 3 below); but it should be understood that the only competition yet announced as certain to be required in 1931 is that for the Indian Civil Service, the regulations for which are enclosed herewith.

An announcement as to whether competitions will be required in 1931 for the Home and Colonial Services will be made in due course.

Note 2.—This form is to be filled up and returned to the Secretary (C. Room 19), Civil Service Commission, 6, Burlington Gardens, London, W. 1, in time for delivery on or before *May 8th, 1931. No application Form received after that date will be accepted.*

A Candidate who fills up and returns this Application Form and does not receive an acknowledgment of it within four com-

plete days should inform the Secretary of the Civil Service Commission.

NOTE 3.—Candidates should, by consulting the regulations, make certain that they are eligible to compete for the services for which they make application, and that their selection of subjects conforms with the regulations. No scrutiny of the information which is given on this sheet is made by the Commissioners before the examination.

NOTE 4.—Should any of the particulars furnished by Candidates be found to be false within their knowledge they will, if appointed, be liable to be dismissed; and, if otherwise entitled to Superannuation Allowance they will forfeit all claim thereto. The wilful suppression of any material fact will be similarly penalised.

1.	WRITE NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS	(*a*) Surname ...
		(*b*) Christian name, or names (in full).
2. Postal Address (in full) ... ... (Any change of address should be at once communicated.)		
3. Place your initials against the Service or Services for which you desire to be considered (*see page 15*).		Home Civil Service : Administrative Class ... Indian Civil Service ... . Colonial Service : Eastern Cadetships .....
4 Date of birth (*see page 15*) ... Give place of birth, and state whether a natural born British subject.		Age last birthday .....
5. Father's Name ... ... ,, Address ... ... ,, Profession or Trade ... (If deceased, give the last address, profession, &c.) Give place of Father's birth and his nationality at birth Give place of Mother's birth and her nationality at birth		

Only for natives of India :— 6. State your community, religion, caste, sect, &c.	
Only for candidates for Eastern Cadetships :— 7. State whether you are of pure European descent, or of pure Ceylonese descent, or of mixed European and Ceylonese descent	
8. Name, in order, the Schools you have attended since the age of 12, giving addresses with dates of entering and leaving	
9. Have you been on any former occasion a candidate before the Civil Service Commissioners ? If so, state when, and for what appointment	
10. Age on finally quitting School ...	
11. Have you been a student at any University ? If so, name it, and give the dates of entering and leaving. State any degrees, honours or prizes you have obtained. Name your College	
12. Give the name of your Director of Studies or College Tutor, or of the Professor or other responsible person to whom reference can be made as being best acquainted with your conduct and the character of your work. You should give one name only, selecting the person to whom you think reference would be most useful. If you have been at more than one university, the referee should be chosen from your later university, unless you entered it at a later date than October, 1930	
13. Have you had any special teaching for examinations for these situations? If so, state where and by whom it was given, and the dates of beginning and ending. If it was part-time preparation state what fraction of your study time it occupied and whether by day or in the evening. Regular University courses are to be excluded	

14. State any University or College colours, and any position of responsibility or distinction in University or College societies that you hold or have held	
15. Give particulars showing dates, certificates obtained, and ranks of any service in :— Junior Division Officers Training Corps, Senior Division Officers Training Corps, Territorial Army, Territorial Cadets	
16. Have you served in the Naval, Military, or Air Forces? If so, state your rank (or rating) and official number, if any Your corps, regiment or other unit ... Dates of your service	
17. If your time since leaving School is not fully accounted for by replies given above, account for the reminder here, with dates If you have had employers, state their names and addresses in full	
18. Give the names, professions, and *present* addresses (in full) of two referees, who should be responsible persons (not relations), well acquainted with you in private life, and unconnected with your School or College	1 2
19. Are you free from pecuniary embarrassments? If you are under liability to repay money advanced by an institution or party for your education, state the particulars	
20. Signature and date	

ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP COMPETITION, 1931.

Selection of Subjects.

1. Do you select any of the subjects for which evidence of training is required? If so, pin the necessary vouchers to this form, stating here the subjects to which each voucher applies.

2. If you are taking the degree examination in Modern History or in Literæ Humaniores of Oxford University state which, and name your College. Endeavour will be made to avoid a clash of appointments.

3. Is your mother-tongue an Indian or a Ceylonese language? If so, name it.

4. Place a cross so, ×, on the dotted line opposite each of the subjects you take from the following list, show your auxiliary language and your extra numerum or their substitutes as well as your Section B subjects. Do not omit a subject because it is compulsory for the Service for which you are a candidate. If you are a candidate for more than one Service and you wish to offer different subjects for different Services, append a statement showing to which Service your selection applies, and the variations you desire for other Services. If your selection of subjects for any Service is not in accordance with the regulations, the Commissioners cannot undertake to avoid clashing among your subjects in the time-table.

Auxiliary French .....
Auxiliary German .....
Auxiliary Italian .....
Auxiliary Spanish .....
Auxiliary Portuguese .....
Auxiliary Dutch .....
Auxiliary Norwegian .....
Auxiliary Swedish .....
Auxiliary Danish .....
Auxiliary Russian .....
Auxiliary Latin .....
Auxiliary Ancient Greek .....
7. English History, Period 1 .....
8. English History, Period 2 .....
9. European History, Period 1 .....
European History, Period 2 .....
10. European History, Period 3 .....
11. General Economics .....
12. Economic History .....
13. Public Economics .....
14. Political Theory .....
15. Political Organisation .....
16. Constitutional Law .....
17. Private Law .....
18. Roman Law .....
19. International Law .....
20. Moral Philosophy .....
21. Metaphysics .....
22. Logic .....
23. Psychology .....
24. Experimental Psychology .....
25. Lower Pure Mathematics .....
26. Higher Pure Mathematics .....
27. Lower Applied Mathematics .....
28. Higher Applied Mathematics .....
29. Astronomy .....
30. Statistics .....
31. Lower Chemistry .....
32. Higher Chemistry .....
33. Lower Physics .....
34. Higher Physics .....
35. Lower Botany .....
36. Higher Botany .....
37. Lower Geology .....
38. Higher Geology .....
39. Lower Physiology .....
40. Higher Physiology .....
41. Lower Zoology .....
42. Higher Zoology .....
43. Engineering .....
44. Geography .....
45. General Anthropology .....
46. Special Anthropology { Social ..... / Physical .....
47. Agriculture .....
48. English Literature, Period 1 .....
49. English Literature, Period 2 .....
50. Latin Language .....
51. Roman Civilization .....
52. Greek Language .....
53. Greek Civilization .....
54. French Language .....
55. French Civilization .....
56. German Language .....
57. German Civilisation .....
58. Spanish Language .....
Italian Language .....
59. Spanish Civilization .....
Italian Civilisation .....
60. Russian Language .....
61. Russian Civilisation .....
62. Arabic Language .....
63. Arabic Civilization .....
64. Persian Language .....
65. Persian Civilization .....
66. Sanskrit Language .....
67. Sanskrit Civilization .....

Signature.....

Procedure.

Immediately the results of the examination are known, all successful Candidates will be summoned to attend at the Civil Service Commission to be medically examined and to state their choice among the Services open to them and among the various Departments, Provinces or Colonies. That statement of choice is irrevocable.

Evidence of Age.

A Candidate born in the United Kingdom must not send in a birth certificate with this form but must be prepared to produce it when required.

A European or Anglo-Indian who was born in India must be prepared to produce when required a certificate of baptism from the district in which he was baptized. If this does not also mention the date of birth it must be accompanied by a statutory declaration by one of the Candidate's parents, stating the date and place of birth.

An Indian born in India must send in with this form a certificate as required by Clause 4 of the Regulations for the Indian Civil Service. If the Candidate's family is resident in British India the Certificate must be signed by the Secretary to the Government of their Province or by the Commissioner of their Division. If they reside in an Indian State it must be signed by the highest political officer accredited to that State.

Fee.

Fees are *not* to be forwarded by Candidates. Instructions respecting the manner of payment of the fee prescribed (£8), and respecting the time and place of the examination, will be sent to Candidates before the examination.

H. W. EMERSON,
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

NOTICE TO SUBSCRIBERS (NON-MEMBERS)

The Commemoration Volume of the Calcutta Mathematical Society is out and is available from all book-sellers at Rs. 12½ in India and at £1 outside India. The volume contains 26 original research papers from eminent Mathematicians of America, Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Poland and Russia.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

MARCH, 1931

CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN GERMANY[1]

I

The extraordinary complexity of Germany's economic conditions renders it almost impossible to indicate within the limits of a short survey the various conditions which are exerting influence on the economic life of Germany. Any correct statement on the achievements and results in the field of German economic activities has moreover to take into consideration so many other facts of a quite different nature that it is hardly possible to compare it with a similar survey of the economic condition in any other country. The economic conditions of post-war Germany have undergone a radical change almost in every department in comparison with the pre-war state of things. The main cause of this radical change is perhaps the fact that the exchequer in its rôle of the Reich, country or the community, has now come into open conflict with private undertakings (building of lodging houses, banking, industry, agriculture, commerce), and that the State has exercised and is still exercising its influence in the widest possible sense in the control of prices (rent-control, cartels, regulation of working

[1] By Dr. Spitta.—Authorised Translation from the original German by Mr. Batakrishna Ghosh.

hours and the policy of taxation, wages and contracts). These measures taken by the State have led to the raising of the cost of production in private trade, and in combination with the progress of machine-power they have inaugurated an opposite movement which has resulted in the thorough economic and technical rationalisation of all business and commercial enterprises of Germany, so that the industrial organisations in Germany must be regarded as belonging to the most modern ones in the world from technical and organizational point of view. The rationalisation of German industry has, on the other hand, had far-reaching effect on the various means of trade and communication, such as the construction of harbours, railroads and ships, aeroplanes and locomotives, etc. A similar trend is perceptible in German building engineering, and even agriculture is undergoing a radical change inasmuch as former extensive agriculture is now gradually giving way to intensive farming and the standardisation of all agricultural products and the levelling of their quality has given the agriculturists an effective weapon to fight the present deplorable state of trade and industry.

On the other side, particularly in the face of the worldwide trade-depression, it was but unavoidable that with the rationalisation of the industrial organisations an increasing number of workers and employees would be thrown out of employment; and for the maintenance of these people it is again the industry which has to supply means. The situation has now become unusually acute, so that the question of lowering the standard of price and wages as well as a more flexible regulation of working hours, has become of primary importance for the future of German industry.

Although in the post-war period, in spite of everything, Germany has again gone up in many important branches of economic activities, we should never lose sight of the fact that strenuous efforts had to be made in order to achieve this end in a country placed as it is like Germany. Particular importance

attaches to the industrial development of Germany in this respect. Already before the war there was a large number of notable industrial concerns, above all the firm Friederich Krupp in Essen, the chief work of which during the war was to supply the needs of the army and the navy. Industrial concerns were drawn into this task in increasing numbers, so that at the end of the world war, which also meant the end of compulsory military service and a standing army only of 100,000, it was quite natural that a large number of people would be found unemployed. The restoration of the whole economic activity of Germany to the normal conditions of peace could be achieved only by slow degrees. With the help of the old trade relations, some of which were still remaining intact, new markets had to be found for German industrial products. But at first great difficulty was encountered in procuring raw materials, for with inflation much capital and property had dwindled down slowly but irresistibly. On the other hand, German agriculture too could not cope with the most important task which was entrusted to it—the sustenance of the people, for in the preceding years, manuring of the fields and foddering of stock animals had to be neglected for want of the necessary materials for manure and fodder. A further difficulty in the path of Germany's economic reconstruction lay in the fact that until the year 1925 Germany had not a free hand in shaping her own destiny in commercial policy and only from this year Germany was in a position to make commercial treaties as an independent party.

How since then German economic life has developed may be best understood by a foreigner from a consideration of the extent of Germany's foreign trade. Details on this point have already been published in another connection, particularly about the structure of Germany's foreign trade, which proves beyond all doubts the industrial efficiency of the German people. Let us here stop for a short time to consider the fact that in the year 1929 Germany was the third nation in the world in the volume of foreign trade, after the United States of America

and Great Britain. The figures (in RM mill.) for that year are as follows :—

	Import.	Export.
Germany	13,434,6	13,482,2
Great Britain	22,678,4	14,880,7
U. S. A.	18,191,4	21,661,1

Another significant fact in this connection is that in the increase in export in the year 1929 over that of the previous year Germany was the first country in the world. The increase in export in that year amounted to 1,206 Million Marks in Germany as against 580 Million Marks in U. S. A. and 125,5 Million Marks in Great Britain.

If now in spite of all these successes Germany has to experience an ever-worsening depression in her economic life, it is, apart from the gloomy world crisis which is darkening the prospect of all trade and industry, the unfortunate result of the Versailles treaty and particularly of the heavy burden of reparations, which are being extorted from her. For this reason formation of capital for the benefit of German trade and industry is almost out of the question. Moreover the normal course of economic life in the rest of the world too is being rudely disturbed. Only when this capital mistake is corrected it can be expected that Germany would resume her natural position in culture and civilisation benefiting her wealth of natural powers.

TOWARDS A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDĀNTA*

If philosophy is but life brought to the focus of self-consciousness, then, assuredly, the Vedānta, as Max Müller puts it, "is clearly the native philosophy of India."[1] Such a testimony, veridical as it is, is not to be accepted, however, without important reservations. His concluding reflection, "that, with the Hindus, the fundamental ideas of the Vedānta have pervaded the whole of their literature, have leavened the whole of their language, and form to the present day the common property of the people at large," may not unfairly be taken as an excursus on the initial statement. That Vedānta has, through the ages, gone on embodying the inmost stirrings of the soul of India is a pronouncement that bespeaks the depth of insight and imaginative sympathy which the Professor brings to the execution of his task—a task which, be it remembered, like the drawing of the bow of Ulysses by any lesser hand is attended with grave peril. It is to such a nature alone that is given the key to unlock the mysteries of the heart of India; for it is 'deep that calleth unto deep.' Truly, here as elsewhere, many are called but few are chosen and to him that is chosen is vouchsafed the bliss of realisation (*Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ*). And thus will burst upon us, with a flash of inner meaning, the full import of the much misunderstood saying—'to him that hath more shall be given!' It is idle to deny that many a sojourner in this realm, with all their ardour to make a pilgrimage into the heart of *Āryāvarta*, have stopped at the mere outposts, admiring, like Mammon, the 'trodden gold' more than the 'vision beatific.' Critics, again, there have been whose interest in the Vedānta

* The following article is the introductory chapter in the author's forthcoming work, *An Introduction to a Systematic Study of the Vedānta*, as being the Sree-Gopal Basumallik Lectures for 1929.

[1] *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 151.

extends so far as it serves as the target of the charges, improvised *ad hoc* to meet the exigencies of the situation,—the charges, namely, of nihilism, acosmism, illusionism, solipsism, or even pantheism. Verily, they have their rewards, all and sundry! But, "*de profundis*" is the unanimous verdict of all such critics, whatever they may otherwise choose to think about its merits as a philosophical system.

As already premised, Max Müller's statement is to be punctuated with forward reference to what it may, not improperly, imply. The phrase 'native philosophy' may, for aught we know, easily be paraphrased into the much too complacent assurance that we are all 'born Vedāntists.' If it means no more than that ideas of the Vedānta permeate and enliven the cultural atmosphere in a way in which those of other indigenous systems of thought do not, then the interpretation is clearly beyond challenge. Indeed, it is no senseless exaggeration to say that every Hindu is suckled at the breast of the Vedāntic *ethos*, but it is just possible to gloat upon a mere possibility with a placid pathetic contentment, and thus for ever remain a suckling in the realm of mature philosophic thinking. While it is true that of all persons it is the Hindu that has in him, *ceteris paribus*, the making of a true Vedāntist, it is none the less true that a mere potentiality is so often glorified into an actual possession, and thus rendered abortive. In the sphere of intellectual achievements—least of all, in that of philosophic pursuits—there is no established law of inheritance whereby one can claim to be a born legatee of a traditional faith; in fact, philosophic persuasion, like freedom, can never be made a gift of, it has always to be earned. It is on account of our sitting loose to this time-worn maxim—which, in its enunciation, approximates an empty platitude or truism and thus escapes notice—that we have come to discount an academic presentation, and bestow a philosophic consecration on stray musings and ramblings in Vedānta, bereft of a survival-value. The philosophic pilgrim's progress lies in cutting straight across this age-

long accumulation of weeds, and journeying with resolute steps to the promised land, undeterred by the *ignis fatuus* of dilettantism. It is not thereby suggested that the Vedānta is the close preserve only of academic philosophy-mongers, but what is definitely repudiated is the incidence of dilettantism and desultory reading with which the field is already overgrown. This is, to a certain extent, inevitable; for, in reliance on faulty logic, people so often ascribe the popularity enjoyed by the Vedānta to the absence of the steel frame of a philosophical system, and, proceeding on that assumption, read Vedānta as literature. Very few people possess an adequate idea of the initial strain on everyday experience, and sustained hard thinking that the Vedānta entails as a rule. Green's dictum " that we are Hegelian, so to speak, with only a fraction of our thought—on the Sundays of 'speculation,' not on the weekdays of 'ordinary thought' " applies *mutatis mutandis* to our *de jure* claim in relation to Vedānta. Nevertheless it is a striking fact that immersed, as we are, in the common-sense valuations of our work-a-day life, we can in a moment rise to the sublime heights of the Vedānta, and breathe no less freely in the rarefied atmosphere thereof than we do on the plains.

Closely akin to these instances of Vedānta simplified, is its representation as an art of life, or as a practical science,—a science, so to speak, of mysticism, or even of magic,—making out its sole concern to be a *meditatio mortis* culminating in the prescript of a happy euthanasia for its devotee. Nor is it unusual to come across the presentation of Vedānta as a *Lebensanschauung* or a 'synoptic' view of life based on the varieties of religious experience—of mystical intuitions and ecstatic revelations. This clearly entails a breach in our psychic continuum, and thus calls for a transvaluation of all values of life, that confessedly break down in the face of these abnormal experiences, the distinction of 'subnormal' and 'supernormal' being altogether pointless in a psychological reference. While it is not, indeed, denied that the Vedānta, of all indigenous systems

of thought, has evidently a close bearing upon practice, the claims of practice in this regard can easily be overrated, and the character of Vedānta philosophy, as a whole and in detail, entirely misrepresented. Such a one-sided emphasis upon practice (*kriyā*) may not indeed crystallize as a definite philosophic creed of pragmatism ; but, then, the whole of Vedānta philosophy is a sustained protest against the truth-claim of practical considerations, against practice itself laying claim to paramount authority or constitutive validity. In substantiating the point one need not invoke the shades of Śaṃkara who has placed on record his concluding reflection on the point. Says he, "barring knowledge not even the faintest odour of activity can fittingly make its way into the Vedānta " (*Jñānamekam muktvā kriyāyā gandhamātrasyapyanupraveśa iha nopapadyate*).[1] What explains the vehemence and rigour of the anti-pragmatic attitude in Śaṃkara is his strict fidelity to the spirit of Protestantism in the sphere of philosophic thinking to which he stood pledged. Indeed, his mission stood for a principle and this he carried out by setting his face resolutely against the pragmatic abuses and aberrations of the Mīmāṃsaka school—specifically, by the restoration of reason to its rightful rank in respect of a centrality of reference, and by the repatriation of the purely theoretical impulse from its subservience to practical considerations. What Śaṃkara achieved for the Vedānta—an emancipation from its age-long thraldom to mere practice or art—is symptomatic of the function of philosophy itself. But that does, in no way, entail a divorce of philosophy from life or practice. In fact, the best way to sum up the relation of the two would be, as in the present case, to define the Vedānta or *Uttaramīmāṃsā* as the philosophy or theory of practice itself. It is a truism that life or practice precedes reflection upon, or criticism of life (*vicāra, mīmāṃsā*); or, as one Danish thinker, *i.e.*, Kierkegaard, expressed it, with the force of an epigram : "We live forwards, but understand backwards."

[1] *Commentary on Vedānta Sūtras*, I, 1, iv.

It would be, however, an entire misreading of the situation to lay exclusive emphasis on this aspect of theory, and characterise Indian philosophy, least of all the Vedānta, as purely intellectual and not moral, as being a matter of outlook merely. Besides the long discredited compartmental view of the mind, which such a characterisation is clearly suggestive of, one wonders if such a charge, and that a serious one, can have any the least pretence to scholarship, or accuracy for the matter of that, in the face of fully accredited facts regarding Indian philosophy. But the very breadth of the indictment is its redeeming feature; and, so far at least as the Vedānta is concerned, it falls wide of the mark. It would have been nearer the mark to affirm what the indictment purports to deny, and, on that count, to frame the charge of loading the dice in favour of the moral or the practical. Complaints have often been made, and not without justice, that Indian philosophy, far from evincing a studied unconcern for the values of life, has given undue prominence to the non-logical or moral values as the shaping force and directive agency of the theoretical impulse, which alone, in the opinion of these critics, should have been the informing principle of a philosophical system. By so doing, Indian philosophy, it is contended, has so often betrayed the intellectual trust reposed in it, and made a premature compromise with the commonsense valuations of life, and thus ended by making a religion of philosophy. No less an authority than Deussen, for example, condemned, in no uncertain terms, the Sāṃkhya philosophy, for its having traced the philosophic ἐρος to practical or utilitarian considerations, and justified its *raison d'être* as a *remedium* merely of the three-fold misery of life (*duhkhatrayābhighātājjijñāsā tadapaghātakehetau*, as Īśvarakṛṣṇa authoritatively announces it in the very first *kārikā*)[1] Here, Deussen evidently overstates the point, and his avowed sympathy with the Vedāntic point of view may have been largely responsible for it. Doubtless it is true that problems of Indian philosophy have been considerably

[1] *Cf. The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 255.

influenced and shaped by practical considerations, that the roots of the philosophical impulse are discovered on closer inspection to be embedded deep down in the soil of life, but that fact does, in no way, justify an apotheosis of practice as the sole arbiter and determinant of philosophical truth. Life or practice may have, indeed, served as the basic foundation of all theory or speculation in India ; but the principle, on which the different systems of philosophy have proceeded, albeit unconsciously or instinctively, is that the foundation is not to be seen in the superstructure raised thereon. Metaphors apart, the conclusion is irresistible that pragmatism as a philosophical theory, with all its inherent ambiguities and eccentricities, has hardly found favour among the more notable or advanced sections of Indian thought. In a way, no doubt, the pragmatic method has been incorporated into all the recognised systems of Indian philosophy, the *Darśanas*, so far as an acknowledged harmony (*Saṃvāda*) between the cognitive and volitional aspcets of our experience is accepted as one of the tests, if not the sole test, of certitude (*prāmāṇya*). Indeed, the power of an element of cognition to prompt an activity, in accord therewith, (*avisaṃvādipravṛttijanakatvam*), is one of the undiscussed ultimate postulates of experience recognised in every system of Indian philosophy, worth the name. What affords a closer comparison is the principle of practical efficiency (*arthakriyākāritvam*), which is generally accepted as *one* of the factors of the existent (*sat*), though seldom as the sole factor thereof. The principle in operation answers exactly to what is now commonly acknowledged to be the only admissible thesis in the pragmatic contention—not the popular and misleading version of it that we have in the proposition 'what works is true,' but the more reasoned and acceptable formulation of it that we have in its obverse, namely, 'what *does not* work is not true.' This difference in formulation is not a matter of verbal quibbling merely, but argues a difference in principle as well—a point which hardly needs a fuller thrashing out in this context.

Accordingly, what the foregoing discussion brings into prominent relief is the utter inaptness of such epithets as 'intellectual' or 'moral' in their unqualified application to Indian philosophy. That is the standing vice of viewing Indian philosophy, as it were, *ab extra*. Roughly speaking, a man's philosophy is determined by his vital needs, both intellectual and moral. It is, to adapt a phrase of William James's in another reference, a 'total reaction' upon experience. In terms of scientific precision, they are but two complementary aspects of one completed circuit of consciousness. Even a tyro in psychology knows that the moral can hardly ever sit apart from the intellectual and *vice versa*, the relation between the two being one of perfect reciprocity. Thus, moral action has moral insight for its inevitable presupposition, while illuminative insight or theoretic vision is but incipient realisation of it in practice. In the hierarchy of spiritual values set up by the Vedānta, the intellectual and the moral, while enjoying perfect provincial autonomy,—a phrase more often sinned against than sinning—do yet retain their proper ranks as inseparable partners of a co-operative concern. Opinions may differ as to the position of the Vedānta regarding the status of intellectual values in the issue between intrinsic and instrumental values. But there is no gainsaying the point that the Vedānta has, all through, maintained a strict correlativity between the intellectual and the moral, between the theoretical and the practical, without the suggestion of a primacy or instrumentality on the part of either.

Such are the inevitable shortcomings of advance philosophic labellings with reference to the Vedānta. What these instructive errors and half-truths force into prominence is the need of a renewed effort in search after a *πού στῶ* of the Vedānta—a sticking-place to which once this effort is screwed up it shall no longer fail. Neglecting differences of expression, the one fundamental note that seldom fails to greet the ear of the inquisitive and the alert—rising far above the babel of scholastic confusion and divided counsels—is that of full-fledged *autonomy of the*

Spirit. This is the message that sits enthroned in its majestic simplicity at the heart of the Vedānta, and has at all times its ready appeal for those that have ears to hear. There is hardly any serious student of the Vedānta but has felt the direct impact and edifying influence of the well-known passage of focal importance, where the mighty seer of old, bathed in the full-orbed splendour of the life-giving message, exclaims with an invocation to the Sun, as the very symbol in the world without of that greatness and sublimity which is the soul's all own. The passage in question is couched in words that bear quotation here *in extenso*: "Oh, thou all-sustaining, solitary, all-controlling Sun, descended from the Lord of all creatures, do restrain and centralise all thy streaks of light that I may envisage thy blissful countenance,—forsooth, I am the very Being that abides in thee" (*Pūṣannekarṣe yama sūryya prājāpatya byūha raśmīn samūha tejo yatte rūpam kalyāṇatamaṃ tatte paśyāmi yo'sāvasau puruṣah so'hamasmi—Īśā* Upaniṣad, xvi). Assuredly, this is a pregnant utterance of unique historic importance, charged with epoch-making significance for the history of Vedāntic thought and culture. But clearly, more is meant here than meets the ear; and it was reserved for the illustrious *Ācāryya*, Śaṃkara, to rise equal to the height of this great argument, and to give the exact bearings of the historic pronouncement. Perfectly in keeping with the underlying spirit of the utterance, Śaṃkara has voiced in unmistakable accents what was left unvoiced, but none the less clearly suggested. Avoiding alike the aberrations on the one hand of devotionalism which imports a self-abasement up to the liminal intensity of a 'creature-consciousness' or a feeling of absolute dependence, and, on the other, of egoism which, by a misplaced emphasis, easily slips into that egotism, which is at the farthest remove from the attitude of worship, Śaṃkara brings to light the edifying implications of the cult of spiritual worship when he sums up his comments in the forceful words: "But, then, I do not beg of thee in the manner of a slave or a mendicant" (*kiṃca, aham na tu tvāṃ bhṛtyavadyāche*).

Cryptic and negative as it is in formulation, the statement is clearly symptomatic of a profound change in outlook—a change that may truly be said to serve as a landmark in the history of Vedic culture. Figuring as the dividing-line between the Ṛgvedic and the Upaniṣadic age, the change in question bespeaks a momentous influence in the religious history of mankind—a spiritual renaissance in ancient India that compares, not unfavourably, with the no less significant transition from the bondage of the Leviticus unto freedom of the Gospels. What is specially noteworthy in this spiritual awakening is that there is no more the paralysing spectacle of the human worshipper being awed into submission—no more of coaxing and cajoling, petitioning and propitiating beings that are alike credited with benevolent as well as malevolent impulses. In place of stupefying admiration that thrives by working upon the baser instincts,—fear of retribution and hope of reward,—one has here that elevating trust in the spiritual dignity of man which is the best ministration to religious worship. The cult of spiritual worship must necessarily be in a minor key where man shrinks into the comparatively insignificant position of a bare point on the circumference, bereft of the central importance he is by nature entitled to. On the contrary a cosmic expansion of the soul of the worshipper, an identification of it with the spirit behind this mighty frame of nature, is the surest way to kindle those higher emotions and aspirations that possess the specific flavour of worship. Such is, indeed, the meaning, plain and implied, of a 'free man's worship'—a phrase which, by a mere abuse of language, is made to typify, as in Russell, the uninspiring outlook of 'a weary but unyielding Atlas' with its faith pinned to the gospel of 'unyielding despair.'"[1] But, in point of fact, the gospel of unyielding despair,—if such there be one at all—should be more fittingly styled the gospel of the bond-slave rather than of the free man. It may have an 'austere beauty' to recommend itself; but its austerity turns

[1] *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays*, p. 57.

out, on closer inspection, to be a mere ' sham heroism ' and its beauty only a borrowed glory. Indeed, the gospel of ' unyielding despair ' is but a melancholy mimicry of what man has, during the ages past, understood by religious faith and worship. For, what is exactly missing her is that Promethean spark that can, by a miracle, as it were, transform the gospel of ' unyielding despair ' into an evangel of elevating hope—a hope that has potency enough to re-create itself out of its own wreck. The free man, according to Śaṃkara does not confess to an indigence of this kind. He does not appear as one, craving a kind condescension, but as one asserting his birth-right with a neophyte's fervour and vehemence. This is what invests his pronouncement with an authority and importance all its own. It is all the more important in view of the complete change of front it evinces in the history of Vedic thought and culture. " Śaṃkara presents us " as also observes Prof. Rādhākrishnan,[1] " the true ideal of philosophy, which is not, so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual freedom." It is however, a freedom that does not come within the range of the cheap criticism, namely, that it means nothing more than that there is freedom outside the prison-house—a gospel that ' comforts while it mocks ' those that lie imprisoned. It is, forsooth, a freedom that broods ' like the day, a master o'er a slave, A presence which is not to be put by'—a freedom that greets even those brows that languish behind the prison-bars, provided they would enter into a conscious participation in a birth-right that is eternally theirs. The orient light that once shone forth still shines undimmed with the passage of time that makes history. And the voice that once spoke, hushed as it is to eternal silence, still cries out from its own ashes : " Seek ye first this autonomy of the Spirit, and then all else shall be added unto you !"

With the Śaṃkarite exegesis on worship as the guide to conduct us through the ever-increasing volume of misstatements

[1] *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 447.

and half-truths, we are thus led to the vital spot where the heart of India beats. It is from such a vantage-ground that we are the better equipped for appraising the significance of the Vedānta system in its historic affiliations. Truly, then, we should be in a position to record the verdict that it is the focus at which is registered the repercussion of the divergent lines of Indian thought, and fully endorse the view of Vijñānabhikṣu, the Indian syncretist, that the Vedānta marks the third and the highest stadium in the evolution of Indian thought, the first two stadia being those of the Nyāya and Sāṃkhya respectively. According to this thinker, what is accomplished in the Nyāya stadium is the substantiation of the finite individual or *Jīva* as an entity distinct from the body, the senses, and the internal psychic apparatus, by way of a critique on naïve Naturalism that thoroughly demolishes the Chārvāka identification of the body with the soul. The Sāṃkhya stadium advances a step forward, and consolidates the critique of Experience in the form of *Viveka* or a discrimination between the principle of individuality or egoity on the one hand, and, on the other, the *Mahat* or the cosmic matter of experience and the primal source of all things, the *Prakṛti*. At the final and furthest reach of the same critique emerges the stadium of the Vedānta with its peculiar doctrine of *abheda* or non-difference between the self and the not-self, between the Sāṃkhya *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Thus, starting from a logical atomism or pluralistic realism and passing through the logic of exclusion, the high-water mark of philosophical thought is reached at last in the logic of Comprehension, which is the specific organ of the Spiritualistic Monism or Rationalistic Absolutism the Vedānta stands for.

It is customary for every writer of a treatise on Vedānta philosophy to dwell at length on the etymological as well as the conventional meaning of the term 'Vedānta.' While it is true that no departure need be made in the present case from what looks like an established tradition, it is instructive

to note that much ingenuity has been, and can be, displayed in this direction. There is hardly any room for ingenuity in the mechanical carrying out of the meaning that readily follows from the etymology of the term 'Vedānta' (= *Veda* + *anta*, a compound of the two component words yielding by euphonic combination the term 'Vedānta' and meaning literally 'the end of the Vedas'). The literal rendering of the term 'Vedānta' has thus an obvious reference to the body of doctrines set forth in the concluding sections of the Vedas, otherwise known as the *Upaniṣads*. This, its primary reference is staked, however, not merely upon the etymology of the word, upon the external fact of its position or grouping, but based on internal evidences of a growing maturescence, a continuous development of thought from the *Pūrva*-(earlier) to the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā*, the earlier and the final part of the Vedas. Having regard to these last considerations, one would be justified in claiming a wider latitude than what is strictly sanctioned by a literal interpretation of the phrase 'end of the Vedas.' It is but common knowledge that the engrossing concern of the Vedas is with ritualistic practices and sacrificial cults—of prayer and worship, of penance and propitiation. and the like performances of everyday life. With the gradual abandonment of the nomadic existence of our Vedic ancestors, and the steady evolution of a natural, a social and a cultural *milieu*, there was brought into active play the theoretical impulse which had been engulfed in the satisfaction of the brute necessities. It is only illustrative of a universally accredited fact of human history that life or practice always anticipates a criticism or theory thereof, and as a question of principle it has its justification *a priori*. What is meant, in brief, is that the chronological priority in question has a logical counterpart in reality, and is no mere freak of historical accidents. It is instructive to compare the parallel change of emphasis that came about, in due course, but for different reasons,—a change emphasis from the merely chronological and

etymological meaning of the Aristotelian *μετὰ τὰ φυσικα'* ("after the physics") to the logical and conventional sense invariably associated with the term 'metaphysics,' as understood at the present day. Accordingly, those who swear by the exclusively chronological aspect in the meaning of the term 'Vedānta' miss entirely the deeper, the more important, that is to say, the dynamic element in the fullness of its meaning. What lends countenance to the much-needed reorientation of the whole, and concentration on this aspect of the meaning, is the light that proceeds from the discovery of a radical affinity and perfect equivalence of meaning between the Sanskrit word *'anta'* and its English counterpart *'end'* (in the rendering of the term 'Vedānta' as the 'end of the Vedas'). Starting alike from the meaning of a 'last or extreme point' that readily follows from their common root, and following the dynamics of a meaning-particle through a variety of kindred and parallel meanings, the two converge towards what seems to be of central importance for both—namely the 'aim, purpose or essence,' as the moving spirit of the whole revealing itself by stages in a process, without surrendering its own integrity.

Indeed, the category of End, construed philosophically, means nothing but the insight that the end is not the final stage of a process that merely succeeds or supersedes its predecessors, but that it is the informing spirit of the whole, distilled, as it were, into its successive phases, all and sundry. It is by a figure of speech, therefore, that the 'End' or the moving spirit of the whole comes to signify the 'end' or limiting point ; for, it is only in the last term that is adequately revealed the nature of the principle which is operative throughout. In other words, the end is essentially a dynamic category ; accordingly, every phase in a process of growth or development is to be studied as much in the light of the whole process, as in that of its last term. Thus, the End, truly viewed, is a matter of what may be called progressive, and not merely catastrophic attainment—a matter of progressive realisation in the process as a whole and

not merely one of substantive existence descending as a *finale* on a sphere apparently complete by itself. Hence, the End in its interpretative function is as much operative at the very start or beginning as at the *de facto* end of anything. Verily, the first shall be the last and the last shall be the first! Thus alone is wisdom justified of all philosophical explanation, which in doing strict justice to the catagory of 'End' must necessarily look to the 'end' which serves in the double capacity of the 'last part' or term as well as the drive or *nisus* of the whole. This is precisely what the Aristotelian idea of τε'λος or End imports on a judicious rendering of it. Therefore, it is not merely by a rhetorical device but by close-knit arguments that is secured the larger and more important sense of 'end' in the phrase 'the end of the Vedas.' Such is unmistakably the drift of the statement that occurs in one of the comparatively obscure *Upaniṣads,* called the *Muktikopaniṣad,* where *Rāmachandra,* as the very embodiment of the Supreme Spirit is represented in the rôle of the redeemer, inculcating on his devoted attendant, the *Māruti,* the gospel of redemption in words to the following effect: "A great multitude of Vedas proceeded as so many exhalations from Me, the all-pervasive being ; verily like oil in the sesamum-seeds the Vedānta is securely lodged in the Veda." (*Niśvāsabhūtā me Viṣṇorvedā jātāḥ suvistarāḥ. Tileṣu tailavad vede vedāntāḥ supratiṣṭhitāḥ*—Verse IV.) The analogy that the statement in question draws upon, in this regard, is at once forceful and instructive ; it is clearly illustrative of the fuller meaning of the word "end" on which such vital issues are staked. Hence, it may be safely asserted that the Vedānta is the main objective and final aim, the cream and essence, the guiding spirit and shaping force, in a word, the *nisus formativus* of the Vedas.

That is one way of settling the connotation of the "Vedānta" so far as it is possible to do by way of a judicious concentration on the derivative meaning of the term "Vedānta." It may not have, confessedly, carried us very far, but it has most

certainly succeeded in the recovery of some stable ground or halting station for further advance in this direction—in the recovery, namely, of that dynamic sense of the term 'Vedānta' which was elicited in the course of our foregoing enquiry. The problem that now stares us in the face is that of a corresponding uncertainty in respect of what the Vedānta denotes or directly stands for. In view of the distracting varieties of commentaries —*Sūtras, Kārikās, Bhāṣyas, Anubhāṣyas, Vārttikas, Vṛttis, Tīkās, Sāras, Saṃgrahas* and the like, alike claiming to constitute the literature of the Vedānta, a solution of this problem is all the more imperative. Now, the Vedānta, as the age-long tradition would have it, refers primarily to the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahmasūtras* (otherwise known as the *Vedāntasūtras* or *Śārīrakasūtras*, from the fact of their dealing with the embodied self or spirit), constituting in point of their authoritativeness what may be called the 'canon' of the Vedānta. It is this accredited trio that has acquired the designation of 'the three institutes of the Vedānta' (*prasthānatrayam*)—the *Upaniṣads* marking the institute of revealed knowledge (*Śruti-prasthānam*), the *Bhagavadgītā*, that of traditional knowledge (*Smṛtiprasthānam*), and the *Brahmasūtras* that of philosophical knowledge (*Nyāyaprasthānam*). The relation that subsists between these three *prasthānas* is one of organic inter-dependence yielding a perfect concord or harmony among the constituents of the Vedānta. But a rift in the lute is inevitable, if we choose to stress one or the other of the two of these—the *Upaniṣads* or the *Brahmasūtras* in their competing for recognition as the Vedānta *par excellence*. Accordingly, in sponsoring the view that the *Vedāntasūtras* 'form the original authoritative work of the Vedānta,' one would be only introducing an unhappy breach into the *entente cordiale*, and abetting a domestic quarrel among the members of the otherwise happy family, and thus undermining the family solidarity. Nor is it a view that can stand a closer scrutiny. The sole *raison d'être* of the *Sūtras* in question consists, as Saṃkara clearly puts it, in

threading together the flower-like texts of the Vedānta (*Vedānta vākyakusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām*),[1] these being no other than the texts of the Upaniṣads (*Upaniṣadvākyas*). Developing the point of this analogy, one would be justified in contending that the *Sūtras*, taken by themselves, have as much reality or substantiality, as the rosary has apart from the beads, or varying the analogy a little, the *sūtras* by themselves would be more or less in the position of a soul without a body as its manifesting agency. Those who make an apotheosis of the *Sūtras* would be prepared even for that contingency, but surely such a problematic functioning of the disembodied soul is a thing on which the Psychical Research Society has yet to impress its seal of authority. Even at the most modest computation, the minimum requirement of the case would be a transmissive organ, such as the human brain. Accordingly, the view that the Vedānta philosophy is the philosophy of the *Brahmasūtras* as its only authoritative source-book appears to be an initial misdirection, making the designation in the end a misnomer merely. It has neither the sanction of sane criticism nor of authoritative tradition. On the contrary, the view sponsored by Ācāryya Sadānanda in his *Vedāntasāra* appears to be at once the most reasonable and authoritative pronouncement on this debatable issue. To quote his very words, "it is forsooth, the *Upaniṣad* that is the measure or authoritative source-book of the Vedānta, the *Śārīrakasūtras* standing in a complementary or instrumental relation thereto (*Vedānto namopaniṣatpramāṇam tadupakārīni śārīrakasūtrādīni ca*). Thus it may be safely concluded that the term 'Vedānta', in its primary or substantive sense, stands for the *Upaniṣads*, and, in its secondary or transitive application, for the *Śārīrakasūtras*.

Confessedly, it is not a conclusion universally accepted. Some are evidently in favour of giving an unlimited range to the term 'Vedānta' including within its scope every blessed

[1] Com. on V.S.I. 1. i.

commentary and annotation, manual or monograph on the main findings of the Vedānta. Some, again, *e.g.*, Brahmānanda Saraswatī, more moderate in their claims, pick and choose from among the vast literature on the subject, and canonize the following five as they appeared more or less in apostolic succession: "The *Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā* in its four divisions (by Bādarāyaṇa), commentary or *Bhāṣya* on it (by Śaṃkara), a gloss on it, again, (named *Bhāmatī*) by Vācaspatimiśra, a commentary (on *Bhāmatī*), again called *Kalpataru* (by *Amalānanda Yati*) and finally a commentary (on the last named) called *Kalpataru-parimala* by Apyayadīkṣita, as constituting in their *ensemble* the *Vedāntaśāstra*" (*Vedāntaśāstreti śārīrakamīmāmsā caturadhyāyītadbhāṣyatadīyatikāvācaspatyatadīyatīkā kalpatarutadīyatīkā parimalarūpagranthapañcaketyarthaḥ*). It is here that the need of the *sūtra* makes itself acutely felt, and its importance recognised. Like the proverbial Ariadne's thread, the *sūtras* of Indian thought provide a way of escape from the inevitable *impasse* to which one is driven in the bewildering mazes of commentaries and glossaries, *bhāṣyas* and *tīkās* and the like. As is well-known, the *sūtra* form, proceeding upon the maxim that 'brevity is the soul of wit,' has pursued, with relentless consistency, this ideal of abbreviation and exercised such a rigorous economy in its formulation as would come readily within the purview of the classic caricature of the grammarian 'as rejoicing in the economy of half a short vowel as much as he does on the birth of a son to him.' As a matter of fact, the *sūtra* has been defined as 'a short aphorism of minimum possible words, of unambiguous meaning, of the nature of epitome, possessing omniformity, unbroken continuity and flawlessness' (*Svalpākṣaramasaṃdigdham sāravad viśvatomukham Astobhamanavadyam ca sūtraṃ sūtravido viduḥ*). Although it is with a variant of the language employed here, that the commonly accepted definition of *sūtra* quoted by Vācaspati Miśra occurs in the *Bhāmatī*,[1] the construction that he puts upon the

[1] On Śaṃkara-bhāṣya, I, 1, i.

word is eminently suggestive and important. "The *sūtra* is so called" writes Vācaspati, "because of its multivocal character" (*sūtrañca bahvarthasūcanādbhavati*).

It is exactly here, again, that lie at once the strength and weakness of the *sūtra*. The extreme terseness of the *sūtras*, which spells their congenital weakness, has its own historic justification. In the absence of present-day printing facilities, the entire mnemonic (*i.e.*, the *sūtra*) literature that had to be improvised under the controlling lead of oral tradition, could not but invoke a rigidly compact form despite the risk of obscurity and ambiguity. The same enforced necessity of abbreviation, that engenders this anæmic, helpless state of the *sūtras*, invents a remedy in the prescript of periodical infusion of new blood from concrete flesh-and-blood existence of commentaries and scholia. Thus embodied and vitalized the *sūtras* prove to be a tower of strength, and fountain-head of inspiration for the commentaries with which they appear in constant conjunction—by providing a mariner's compass, as it were, to the individual commentators that might otherwise navigate in an unchartered sea without being ever brought to definite moorings. Hence, it is not merely from an historic necessity that the *sūtras* came into being, but the recognition of their need proceeds from a principle. They are mainly designed to arrest the rampant growth of unfettered free thinking (*niraṃkuśatarkaḥ*) that leads nowhere, and to stake out the limits beyond which such free thinking may not stray. That does not mean that the *sūtras* by themselves constitute the repository of all wisdom, dispensing with the necessity of individual commentaries. Adapting the words of an historian of European philosophy, one can observe that the *sūtras* 'do not think themselves, but are thought by living spirits, which are something other and better than mere thought-machines—by spirits who live these thoughts, who fill them with personal warmth and passionately defend them." In fact every articulate system of philosophic thought has a well-marked individuality, and it is the individuality of a thinker's 'vision,' *Weltanschauung*

or *darśanam*, meaning, among others, an intuition of the whole, that counts after all in a philosophical rendering of the world. There is, admittedly, in this recognition of the individuality of a philosophic thinker, the danger of the reign of a lawless individualism in the sphere of philosophic thinking. The remedy, however, lies not in obliterating or discounting altogether the individuality of the thinker or commentator, but in sublimating and maintaining it at a higher level. The way to achieve this lies in an advance through conquest of selfish prejudice or bias, if any, to that disinterested intellectual curiosity, which alone can appreciate or assimilate truth. That is why, among other pre-requisities, the renunciation of all self-centred interests or 'apathy towards enjoyment of the fruits of one's actions, whether here on earth or hereafter in the life to come' (*ihāmutraphalabhogavirāgaḥ*) is demanded of the student of the Vedānta. The change thus wrought in the soul of the philosophic inquirer bears testimony to 'the expulsive power of a higher affection.' In the absence of such higher affection or mastering enthusiasm for truth, there will spring up distracting varieties of polemics, leading men astray from the pursuit of truth. Such a mishap was foreshadowed by Śaṃkara, and the necessary safeguard provided for. "If men's inclinations," as he clearly laid down "were not regulated, establishment of truth would be impossible, on account of the endless diversity in their powers of apprehension" (*Kasyacit kvacittu pakṣapāte sati puruṣamativaiśyarupyeṇa tatvāvyavasthānaprasaṃgāt*).[1]

The strength or efficacy of the *sūtras* thus consists in its prescript of a chartered freedom, as against the possible abuse or license of free thinking. The *sūtra* form has the effect of pruning away the rapid accretion of rival commentaries and expositions, destitute of a survial-value. The temperamental bias of the Oriental mind against chronicling or conserving historical data and individual peculiarities or biographical details explains this natural predilection for the *sūtra* form. In a wider reference the same

[1] Com. on V. S. II, 1 i.

tendency expresses itself in the instinctive preference, not for personal, but corporate immortality. The *sūtras*, accordingly, are professedly conservative—illustrating in a limited manner what we understand by 'conservation of values.' But it is this very conservation that has ensured the historic continuity and perpetuity of the doctrines of a particular school in defiance of the spoil of ages. "For the Western philosopher" writes[1] Dr. Urquhart with the added authority of one representing Western philosophy, "it is true that our little systems have their day and cease to be" whereas "in the Vedānta, as well as in other Indian philosophies, we may notice a remarkable unity of development more closely knit than in Western philosophy." Indeed, the *élan vital* of Indian thought has, from time immemorial, carried forward the undying past into the living present which it interpenetrates, and, thus pressing on the frontiers of the unknown, created fresh channels for thought. Viewed thus, the *sūtra* form stands as the very symbol or formula of 'creative evolution.' That seems to be also the drift of Prof. Rādhākrishnan's suggestive phrase—"the constructive conservatism of Indian thought."

This innate conservatism of Indian thought,—which is symbolised by the *sūtra*—with its retrospective outlook towards antecedent conditions, does not, however, land us in sheer emptiness. The *sūtra* does not leave us, in the end, with a barren, abstract, colourless universal that rides roughshod over the particular. It is the universal in the particular and the particular as embosomed in the universal—or, to use the oft-repeated phrase 'the concrete universal'—that is not merely the 'secret' of Hegel, but the 'open conspiracy' of the Real. The white light, that is apparently colourless, reveals itself on spectral analysis to be a harmonious blend of variegated colours. So does the *sūtra* justify its essential character as *viśvatomukham* emulating, in capacity and function, a myriad-minded personality.

[1] *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 9.

That is why the towering figures in the arena of Indian philosophy announce themselves as the mere exegetes or commentators (*bhāṣyakāras*) on the original *sūtras* and redeem, with the strictest fidelity, their initial pledge at every stage of their career, without surrendering in the least their rights of private judgment (*vicāra* or *mīmāṃsā*) or fettering their decision in any way. In the words of a distinguished Vedāntic scholar "exegetical interpretation here inevitably shades off into philosophic construction, and this need not involve any intellectual dishonesty."[1] This is exactly the plea with which Śaṁkara enters upon his career. "For this reason" says he, "by way of enquiring into Brahman there is being undertaken an exegesis of the Vedānta texts, having for its materials arguments conformable thereto, and for its final end beatitude" (*tasmādbrahmajijñāsopanyāsamukhena vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā tadavirodhitatarkopakaraṇā nihśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate*).[2] If the vocation of the philosopher is to be, in the language of Plato, "a spectator of all time and all existence," he must have the eye to discern in time "the moving image of eternity." This clearly reveals an attempt to take time seriously, and it is with reference to the *sūtras* in their constant conjunction with *bhāṣyas* or commentaries, that the philosophers of the Vedānta school have achieved a much-needed solution of the standing conflict between the timeless or unhistorical and the temporal or historical character of truths. If truths 'wake to perish never,' neither antiquity nor modernity can either add to, or detract from the validity of these. Accordingly, the feverish passion for antiquity, matched by an equally frenzied zeal for a comparative recency, that is generally displayed by scholars, both in the East and in the West, with regard to the historic emergence of Indian philosophy, and of the Vedanta *sūtras* in particular, seems to be altogether uncalled for, and what is more to the point, unphilosophical. What the

[1] K. C. Bhattāchāryya, *Studies in Vedantism*, Introduction.

[2] Com. on Vedānta-Sūtras, I. 1 i.

sūtras seek to emphasize is just this interplay of timelessness as well as historicity of truths—this dance of eternity before the footlights of time—and the guarantee that all our finite strivings after truth survive in the *sūtra*, 'when eternity affirms the conception of an hour.' The mission of the *sūtras* is to authenticate the fact of the immemorial past interpenetrating, and energising the present, and thus to justify the double rôle in which truth appears—ever constant, ever new. The uniformity or identity in question is more akin to the self-identity of a 'continuant' than to the bare identity of a 'recurrent' character, to adopt the phraseology popularised by Mr. Johnson in his framing of the issue concerning universality. In point of fact, all historically conditioned systems of philosophy, Indian or European,—whether determined by the *sūtras* or otherwise—appear, to the discerning student, to be not so many thoughts, but rhythms in thinking. Nothing serves as a more apt illustration of the case than the analogy of the Indian *rāga* with its structural invariability as conjoined to an infinite variety in composition.

In an intelligent survey of Indian thought, specifically, of Vedānta philosophy, two extremes are to be avoided. In the first place, in a region where philosophic construction has invariably ushered itself into existence by way of exegesis or scholium, the selection of a faithful and reliable commentator is too apt to become a question of first-rate importance and initial settlement. But such selection inspite of allowances being made for temperamental bias, for personal equation and the like, should never be made to wear the appearance of individual choice or arbitrary preference. When, for example, a statement is made to the effect that 'the philosophy of Śaṁkara.....is the Vedānta *par excellence*,'[1] such advance labelling of the Vedānta comes perilously near the *ipse dixit* of a dogmatist or propagandist. Admittedly, there is some force in the contention that one is a

[1] P. N. Sen, *Philosophy of the Vedānta*, p. 6.

born Śaṃkarite or a born Rāmānujist, just as one is a born Platonist or a born Aristotelian. Nor need it be disputed altogether that a philosophic creed has, after all, its roots not so much in intellectual satisfaction as in the demands of the emotional and volitional sides of a man's nature. But, then, in a case like this no question of preferential treatment does or need arise. Commentators of the *Vedāntasūtras* there have been—and their number is a legion—such as Śrīkaṇṭha, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimvārka, Madhva, Vallabha, Baladeva among others who have, by adopting a policy of pick-and-choose, of stressing a point here and dropping a point there, of straining and twisting the resources of logic, sought to cater to demands that are extra-philosophical, and thus win the day. But the great never stoop to conquer. They develop their peculiar thesis with a vertical and unrelenting consistency, regardless of the consequences such a procedure might have on collateral issues. The authoritativeness of any of these commentaries on the *Vedāntasūtras* is not to be judged by the greatest common measure of agreement it affords among its rivals. The greatness of Śaṃkara, at least, does not lie there. He overrides others by the sheer force of his greatness—by the compelling greatness, in particular, of his logic of absolutism, or what is the same thing, his logic of comprehension. The whole host of other commentators exhibit in their interpretation what may be called thoughts of arrested development, and whether of the form of qualified monism (*viśiṣṭādvaita*) or of dualism (*dvaita*), they all point, by force of their unconscious logic, to *Advaita-Vedānta* of the Śaṃkarite type as their natural culmination. They are the people who make a premature compromise with findings that are not, in any sense, far-reaching or of foundational importance, and thus come under the category of those that have not felt the 'drive' or 'the arduousness of reality.' Indeed, there is nothing sacrosanct about any commentary, however august be the name associated with it as its author. Its claims to supremacy, if there be any, must be heard before the bar of individual reason; for, in the

republic of the Vedānta, we recognise no alien government except that of integral Experience as a self-legislative authority. From Authority to Freedom, from *Śruti* to *Anubhūti*, from Revelation to Experience in its integrity and back again—that is the systole and diastole of the life of the Vedānta. As it has been wisely observed,[1] the scriptural texts, such as those of the *Upaniṣads* are to be endlessly explained by the commentary of individual lives, and as placed in such a context, they acquire an individual meaning, awaiting, as it were, for their confirmation, the special testimony of each one of us. Thus is evidently secured that universality of appeal which the *Upaniṣads* can reasonably claim for themselves.

The other extreme to be avoided in a systematic rendering of the Vedānta, and of Indian thought in general, is that intemperate passion for historical scholarship which, instead of keeping within the legitimate bounds of Indology, has invaded the domain of Indian Philosophy. Some Histories of Indian Philosophy appear to have clearly succumbed to this temptation, and thus signally failed of their purpose, forfeiting eventually their title to this designation. In the matter of compiling a History of Philosophy, mere historical and even philological scholarship have undoubtedly their respective use. But they are made grotesque, if they are thrust into the forefront and made to do the duty of what a philosophic evaluation of thought-types primarily stands for. In a History of Philosophy it is not merely facts and events that we look for, but the underlying meaning and import of these, as they appear in their historic succession. The Baconian comparison of the respective functions of the 'ant' and the 'bee' has not, evidently, lost its force for us even to-day. Indeed, accumulation of facts is one thing, and illumination quite another; while many are the accumulators, only a few are torch-bearers. If, the proverbially good-souled ass, that was usually employed in the days of yore

[1] For example by Dr. Tagore in the Introduction to his '*Sādhanā*.'

to carry the fuel with which fire was lighted, were suddenly to take it into his head in a fit of contagious logic, that he was the author and source of all illumination, he would, inspite of his specious argument from agreement in presence and in absence, be held up to ridicule. Surely the benevolent ass—may his tribe increase!—has rendered himself indispensable to us; but he has to be reminded pretty often of his station in life and the duties incidental thereto. It is Hegel, the typical philosopher of the Restoration, who has laid down in the clearest possible manner what he conceives to be the main objective of a History of Philosophy in the 'Introduction' to his own 'History of Philosophy.' Philosophy, as it has been well said is largely a question of proportion; and it is re-assuring to note that Hegel, steeped as he was in the historical *Weltanschauung*, with its pronounced leanings towards a philosophico-historical necessity, saw things in their proper perspective when he observed that "in thought, and particularly in speculative thought comprehension means something quite different from understanding the grammatical sense of the words alone, and also from understanding them in the region of ordinary conception only."[1] 'The authors of such histories' as are lacking in this 'comprehension' or 'knowledge of the matter itself about which so much ado has been made' may, in Hegel's opinion, 'be compared to animals which have listened to all the tones in some music, but to whose senses the unison, the harmony of their tones, has not penetrated'.[2]

To the ends of a systematic study of the Vedānta, such as is ours, the need and importance of 'comprehension,' in its philosophic sense, cannot possibly be overrated. It is all the more imperative, in view of the fact that we have not, with rare exceptions, learnt the art of pressing historical scholarship into the service of a philosophical study. In fact, there

[1] *History of Philosophy* (trans. E. S. Haldane), Vol. I, p. xvi.
[2] *Ibid.*

Private :

LETTERS OF MISS FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE

III[1]

New Bengal Rent Act

10 South St.,
Park Lane
London W.
April 11/79.

Sir

I am truly thankful for your information that the Select Committee have not pledged themselves to any part of the Bill —that they are waiting to consider the criticism of mofussil officers—and that the Governmt will hardly attempt to hurry the Act thro' the Council.

I had previously made all the use I could of your very important information about the nature of the Bill itself: and had learnt that it was still under consideration here: or rather that it had not yet reached the stage of formal consideration: but that there still was ample time to secure for it full attention.

I do trust therefore that this Act will not pass without being modified to what it ought to be for affording full rights to the Ryot.

You will, I hope, kindly continue the valuable information which you have been so good as to give. And I shall hope to answer much more satisfactorily.

1 The Editor's thanks are due to Mr. Priyaranjan Sen, M.A. of the Post-Graduate English Department, Calcutta University, for these letters written to his father, the late Mr. Prasannakumar Sen, Vakil and Attorney of the Calcutta High Court.

Thanking you again and again for your Regulations, your Calcutta Gazette, your remarks upon the Bill in it of which I made the greatest use and for your letters : and may God speed the cause !

In haste,
and under stress of constant
overwork & illness,
pray believe me
ever the Ryot's faithful servt
FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE.

P. K. SEN, ESQ.

IV

Bengal Arrears of Rent Realization Bill

May 30/79
10, SOUTH STREET,
PARK LANE, W.
LONDON.

SIR

I am extremely indebted to you for sending me the petition, intended to be signed by the Ryots, against the provisions in Part 2 of the Bill under the head " Procedure for summary realizn of arrears of rent."

I rejoice very much that the Lt.-Governor, in accordance with the suggestion of the Select Committee, has postponed the further discussion of the Rent Bill till next session, —and has appointed a Commission for revising and amending the entire Rent Law.

How important this will be. May all good attend their labours !

I conclude that the gentlemen, whom you name as the members, are all good men for the purpose.

The petition dwells much upon the fact that, whereas the zamindar's rent is the same now as in 1793, the ryot's rent is from three to twenty-fold what it was in 1793 : [this is, I suppose, strictly correct?] and that, tho' the zemindar may have parted to middlemen with much of the difference between the rent paid by the ryot in 1793 & the much larger rent paid now, the fact that many are now fattenning on the ryot, whereas the Permanent Settlement destined one zemr (not to fatten but) to protect the Ryot, is no reason for collecting with extra severity these high rents.

In the long note, the petition shows that its observations (on the Regns. of 1799 and 1812) apply equally to provisions of Sections 3 & 4—

You concur in this?

Such observations as that any one, whether Zemr or Goma, who can assert falsely that a cultivator owes him rent, can sell off his property, etc : that the tenants can find no effectual security; and that petty officials can always be *bribed* to reject ' security ' : that the Zemindar should not be judge in his own case, subject to only ineffective " restrictions," that false witness can always be had for a few annas a piece :

This, I suppose, *was* too true,
& *is* still too true ?

The Table in the " Indian Tribune " (which you are so good as to enclose,) is very important : *viz.*, the Table showing that, out of 1915 cases in which defence was entered, it failed only in 478. And this in the 24-Pergunnahs !

Certainly, if any " restrictions " are to be placed, on any party in rent suits, it is on the landlord plaintiff & not on the tenant defendt.

After the statements about the fraudulent magnifying of rent-claims and supporting them by false witness & forgery,

the challenge, which you say has not yet been taken up, is very striking.

As also that Part II of the Bengal Rent Bill will become "an engine of oppression in the hands of the corrupt 'amla' of the absentee Zemr."

Alas! how does this evidence of corruption confirm the plan of putting natives—the thing we all so much desire—into Governmt situations and offices? That is what I think of continually. Can you devise the reform which will lessen this all but universal corruption? I ask it with the truest devotion to the cause.

Is it true that the Rent Leagues in Eastern Bengal have ceased to exist?

It is said that the prices of food are so very high now in Bengal as to make the necessaries of life even beyond the reach of thousands:

When you are kind enough to write again, please mention how this *is*.

I assure you that I have not been idle in pressing attention to the Rent Bill at *this* end:

From want of time and strength, I am obliged to put off some further questions with which I had to trouble you till next mail.

Pray, believe me,
with many thanks,
ever your faithful servt
FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE.

P. K. SEN, ESQ.

LONDON. *June 20/79.*

SIR,

I am extremely indebted to you for sending me the 'supplement' to the 'Calcutta Gazette' of April 23: It is exceedingly important document, as showing what is *acknowledged* by Government.

The Secretary to Government of Bengal says that the *Zemindars* declare the amended Bill to be of little use to them: & it is they who asked for the Commission.

At this end at the India Office it comes to this: that, as the Bill lately before the Council has been wholly dropped, and the whole question referred *de novo* to a fresh Commission, nothing can be done till they have reported.

The men selected to form the new Commission are far from hostile to the Ryot: and I earnestly hope they will examine Ryots and ascertain what their actual condition is.

Some means must be devised for dealing with this land question compared with which all others put together must sink into insignificance.

At the same time, is it not to be feared that, in any re-adjustment, the *men of money* who command the lawyers, and the newspapers, and the native members of Council, will certainly not lose, & may not improbably gain?

The thing would be: that there should be lawyers—noble native gentlemen,—who, despising worldly advantage, and gain, should be at the service of the Ryot, the weaker interest: that there should be newspapers, fearlessly but with the utmost attention to accuracy of facts, to advocate his cause. And we may hope that the day will come when the native members of Council will not be only in the interest of the Zemindar.

In European countries, such things have been known as young men patiently working their way up to riches or at least to honour and influence—not for their own sakes but for the

sake of their poorer fellows, of the people's cause: till at last they were elected to representative political life, to high official post, or even to the Cabinet.

Disinterested political, not party principle—oh what a great, what a divine quality that is!

One hears much in India—I do not say it is at all peculiar to India—of the corruption, the exacting of petty bribes, by the petty native officials, from the people, the wretched cultivators, who are in their power.

[There is, I believe we may say, less & less & almost nothing of this in England now, tho' there is very much in Russia.]

What a glorious career for a band of young native gentlemen in India, not only to be quite inaccessible to every kind of corruption themselves—[*that*, no doubt, they are already] but to set their faces like a rock systematically against every kind of corruption, however small—& probably it is the small & universal taking of bribes which is the worst mischief—in the *petty native* officials—to use every means in their power, not passively but actively, to establish a *public native opinion* against bribery—a manly horror of it—to raise the small official out of the habit of 'buttering his palms,' of taking 'douceurs' from the poor.

What a glorious object!

It is impossible for English officials in India,—incorruptible themselves,—to check or even to know the bribe-taking of the peons,—the small Public Works Irrigation overseers, etc. from the poor. Only the native gentlemen could speak & work against this.

And may God speed them!

2. I had hoped to have gone into this most important Gazette—important as showing what is acknowledged by Government—by this mail. But I find time and strength wanting.

But I assure you that there is at last, at last, so powerful an interest awakening in England for the affairs of India as I

never expected to live to see. The Houses of Parliament now discuss India as if it were a *home* question, a vital and mortal question, *as* it *is*. This new public opinion in England only requires educating.

It requires *facts*.

I was exceedingly glad to see that you were circulating questions requiring facts for answers among your mofussil friends, and that you were going to collect information yourself.

That is what is wanted.

3. To return to the Commission on the Bengal Rent Law: would you not be inclined to hope for the *crystallizations* resulting from time to term the Ryot's holdings into property as has been the case in most European countries and in our own country in the instance of the copyholders?

I should hope for legislation to give the Ryots relief against illegal exactions in excess of the rent established by law. For while the cases in which undisputed rents are withheld are few, those in which illegal cesses etc. are exacted are very many. It was a terrible thing that, while the Zemindars are supported in every tittle of their legal rights, when it was shown by a Commission of indisputable authority that illegal exactions are habitually made, all special interference was forbidden, & the Ryots were left to their legal remedy.

At present, I suppose, a suit for rent or a suit for over-rent or exaction can only be brought as a regular civil action: the same as if it were to try a question of title: & such actions only come on in their turn: it may be a very slow & long turn. Should there not be a separate file for such, and a cheap and summary mode of trial—a case being stated for regular trial when a real question of title crops up. The summary jurisdiction would in all cases be confined to enforcing the rent previously paid &.keeping down the levy by the Zemindar to that previous rent till it is legally enhanced. In Bengal and Behar no doubt the Zemindar's papers (in the absence of a public

accountant) have been, as you notice, thoroughly unreliable. But I have understood that the Road Cess returns have done much to obviate that difficulty. Is it not the case that the Ryots come trooping in, even in Mozufferpore, to obtain certified copies of the Zemindars' records of their own rents: & that they, the Ryots, will not then pay a rupee more than the amount? [I give them joy.] If the Zemindars fail to keep reliable accounts, so much the worse for them: they will lose the benefit of the summary jurisdiction.

I am obliged to leave off abruptly, I hope to write by next mail.

In the meantime, let me thank you for all your valuable information and trust that you will kindly send me more of what I expect to turn to good account, please God.

Pray believe me faithfully yours

FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE.

P. K. SEN, ESQ.

KALIṄGA NAGARA

In the Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Parts III and IV of 1929, Prof. B. C. Bhattacharya wrote an article with the title of "Kaliṅganagara and excavation at its present site." The author's aim in this article is to disprove the identification of the ancient Kaliṅganagara with modern Mukhaliṅgam in the district of Ganjam and assert that the modern Kaliṅgapatam had the glory of having been the chief seat of the Kaliṅga sovereigns.

He started with the assumption that the Kaliṅganagara of the Hathigumpha inscription was the same as the seat of government of the Gaṅga Kings of Kaliṅga. Perhaps it is the similarity in the name that made him think that it was so. If so, the Kaliṅganagara mentioned in the Ramayana (II. 71. 17) also must have been the same town. But Mr. Bhattacharya did not think of it. The Kaliṅganagara of Ramayana was to the north-west of Ayodhya, the capital of the North Kosala and therefore cannot be brought South and identified with the Kaliṅgapatam. Similarly Khāravēla's Kaliṅganagara also cannot be said to have been located at the mouth of the Vamsadhāra river.

The Kaliṅga edicts of Aśoka tell us that the kingdom of Kaliṅga did not extend southwards beyond Barua on the Ganjam coast. (*Vide* Samāpa or Aśokan Kaliṅga, I.A., April and May, 1923.) Khāravēla's kingdom also lay within the same limits. How can it be assumed that Kaliṅgapatam had been the seat of government of a kingdom the southern limit of which did not go south of a town which is about fifty miles north of the mouth of the Vamsadhāra? It is of political advantage to locate the central government of a country within its political boundaries.

McCrindle in his translation of Ptolemy's Ancient India said thus with regard to the identification of Tosali, the town

where Aśoka located the central government of his newly conquered province. Tosali, called a metropolis, has become of great importance, since recent archæological discoveries have led to the finding of the name in the Aśokan inscriptions on the Dāuli rock. Vestiges of a larger city have been discovered not far from the site of the monument, and there can be no doubt that the Tosali of the inscription was the capital in Aśoka's time of the province of Orissa and continued to be so till at least the time of Plolemy.

Mr. Jawaswal who made a special study of the Hathigumphá inscription says as follows regarding the identification of the capital of Khāravēla. "Several times the capital of Kaliṅga is mentioned in the inscription either as the *Kaliṅga capital* or as the *capital*; but nowhere its name is given. There are, however, indications that the capital must have been near the site of the inscription. One of the buildings which Khāravēla built was on the river *Prachi*. This is a small river near modern Bhuvanēsvara and not very far from Dhauli and Hathigumpha. Dhauli where the Tosali inscription of Aśoka is found is in the neighbourhood. Dhauli itself, as pointed out to me by Mr. Haraprasada Sastri, philologically stands for Tosali. Tosali was also the provincial capital under Aśoka. We would be justified in accepting that the capital of Khāravēla was Tosali in whose neighbourhood the Hathigumpha cave and the *Prachi* are to be found. From the inscription it is evident that Khāravēla continued the old capital of the Kaliṅga Kings and that he did not found a new one. He mentions the old buildings of the former kings." In a footnote the same scholar shows that the Kaliṅga in the later centuries was to the south of the Tel river and that, therefore, the capital of Khāravēla could not have been beyond the Tel. (J.B. & O.R.S., Dec., 1917, p. 440ff.)

In the same journal it is stated that the capital of the Aira rulers of Kaliṅga—Khāravēla was one of them—had been located near the Khaṇḍagiri is corroborated by an old MS. in old Oriya

characters which exists in the Indian Museum. The MS. says, "The Airas of Kosala removed their capital to the Khaṇḍagiri at Ekaprastāra." Then the author of that article says, "It is to be noticed that the capital of Kaliṅga before Aśoka and after the Nandas is called *Parthali* (by Megasthenes) which corresponds with the *Prasthara* of our MS. By its location in the Khaṇḍagiri, it seems to have been identical with Dhauli (Tosali).

All these evidences to identify the capital of Khāravēla with Tosali did not furnish Mr. Bhattacharya with so strong an argument as the destruction of buildings caused by a hurricane in the time of Khāravēla, and the discovery of large bricks and foundations of old buildings and of gold coins near Kaliṅgapatam. If these things alone unsupported by documentary evidence can furnish us with the clue for identification or location of the capital of Kaliṅga, then every place in the southern part of the Ganjam district can claim to be such.

The statement that Khāravēla repaired the buildings in his capital destroyed by a hurricane showed that that capital was located in a storm area; the havoc caused by the cyclone of 1924 in and around Kaliṅgapatam made Mr. Bhattacharya think that this Kaliṅgapatam, being also exposed to storms, was the Kaliṅganagara of Khāravēla. What a fragile support! Can one storm of a year assist us to confirm the identity? A reference to the Climatological Atlas of India by Eliot shows that, during the twenty-five years from 1877-1901, not less than 81 storms blew in Orissa and that, in the months of June, July, August and September of each year. Whereas, on the south Ganjam coast, during the same period of twenty-five years, only 8 storms occurred and that, only in the months of August and September. This does not give even one storm a year; while three storms a year on the average, blew in the area in which Khāravēla's capital was located. The valley of the Mahānadi is more exposed to storms and cyclones than the lower valley of the Vamsadhāra. Dhauli near which lie the remains of Tosali is

situated in the lower-valley of the Mahānadi. Consequently the storm referred to in the Hathigumpha cave inscriptions must have been one of those that frequently visit the Orissan coast.

With regard to the presence of the relics of ancient buildings, it has already been shown that near Dauli exist the vestiges of a large city. Large bricks and foundations of buildings are found in several places between Vizianagram in the south and Mahēndragiri in the north. Mukhaliṅgam which lies within this area possessses such relics, but only they have not yet been explored. This is one of the ancient places that had not yet been subjected to the inspection of an excavator; nor did any archæologist pay a visit to see what art has been hidden in that corner of the Ganjam District. The plan and structure of the temple, the torana gateways leading to the temple and the sculptures built into the walls, prove that the temple is as old as the Buddhist structures of Saranath, Amaravati or Baruhut. Each panel narrates an episode in the history of Kaliṅga or a moral story from the Saivate tradition. But these sculptures have not yet been studied by scholars of Archæology and stories depicted therein have been forgotten by the ordinary run of mankind who visit the place as religious devotees. The priests of the temple dupe these men who are already intoxicated with religious fervour, with stories which bear no relation to the actors shown in the sculpture. With unbiassed minds these sculptures have to be studied; it is only then that the episodes in the history of ancient Kaliṅga can be understood.

The small gold pieces said to have been found in Kaliṅgapatam are also found in and around Mukhaliṅgam, in Siripuram, a village about 4 miles to the north-west of Chicacole and in the open country now shown as the site of the fort of the demon Dantavakra. These coins are popularly known as the Nandichinnams (a *chinnam* is one thirtieth of a tola). In the Kshētramāhātmyam of Mukhaliṅgam, it is stated that when the king of Kaliṅga felt too poor to build the temple, the god appeared to

him in his dreams and told him that it would, on the next day, rain gold coins within a radius of ten miles.

सर्वेषामपि लिङ्गानां देवतायतनानि वै
भविष्यन्ति कथं स्वल्पं वित्तमात्मीयमक्षयम् ॥
इतिचिन्तापरीतस्य राज्ञः स्वप्ने महेश्वरः ।
एवं सत्कृपया देवः प्रसन्नः कथयिष्यति ॥
सर्वलिङ्गाच्चिते तस्मिन् पञ्चक्रोशे महीश्वरः ।
श्वः प्रभाते चतुर्गुञ्जप्रमाणैर्विन्दुभिर्वृता ॥
मत्प्रभावात्स्वर्णवृष्टिस्स्यात्सप्तघटिकावधिः ।
इत्युक्त्वान्तर्हिते देवे प्रबुद्धो धरणीपतिः ॥
तथैव तेन सर्वेण स्वर्णवृष्टिं प्रवर्षिताम् ॥

It is immaterial here to discuss whether the story of this gold rain is true or not. But it cannot be denied that this story must have been founded on the fact that these coins were picked up from the earth in and around the Kshētram. Even now it is popularly believed that these gold pieces are exposed to view after a heavy shower of rain. So this finding of these pieces of gold seems to have been known to the people from many centuries ago.

Thus Mukhaliṅgam possesses not only those features which the learned Professor has demanded for the identification of Kaliṅganagara, but also more. There is the documentary support to justify its claim. The Vizagapatam copper plate grant of Anantavarma Choda Gangadeva dated in Saka 1040, states that the capital of Kamarnava II was Nagara, where he built a temple to a liṅga called Madhukeśa. There is the Madhukeśvara temple and to the north of Mukhaliṅgam and joined to it is the village now known as Nagari-Katakam. This was the Kaliṅgā-nagara from the time of Kamarnava II. Can Prof. Bhattachari show any such evidence in favour of Kaliṅgā-patam?

Mr. Bhattachari thought the Nagara in Kaliṅganagara to be a proper noun and argued that the expressions like *Kaliṅgā vaninagara* do not mean Kaliṅgānagara. Such expressions as *Kaliṅgāvani Nagara, Kaliṅga-dēsa Nagara* and *Sakala Kaliṅgā-vani Nagara* which are found in the inscriptions existing in the temple of Mukhaliṅgam do not mean the Nagara in the country of Kaliṅgā as understood by the author. Let us study the inscriptions in which these expressions are found and what they signify.

Kaliṅgāvani Nagara is mentioned in inscription No. 1035 of Vol. IV of South Indian Inscriptions. The donor of the gift was an inhabitant of Bhendigrama and was the minister of Sri Vikrama Dhārunīpati. Is it not necessary for a foreigner and minister of the ruler of a different state to mention the locality of the capital of Kaliṅga?

No. 1036 is the record of a gift by an inhabitant of Vijaya-pura and second minister of Sri Vikrama Gaṅgēśvara. Therefore the locality in which god Madhukeśa was, is defined as the capital (nagara) of the country of Kaliṅga (Kaliṅga-deśa).

An inhabitant of Drākshārama records a gift (No. 1101) to Madhukeśa in the capital (nagara) of the Tri-Kaliṅgāvani. All these three are the records of persons from countries different from Kaliṅga. They have to state clearly the country or kingdom of which it is the capital.

There are instances in which the inhabitants of districts other than the one in which the capital was located, mentioned the district in which the place of Madhukeśa was situated, *e.g.*, No. 1046 states that the god Madhukeśa was in the district of the capital (Nagarāna Vīti). The records of those that lived in and around the capital simply mention that the god was present in the capital (Nagarāna). They did not think it necessary to define the position of that capital because it was their own native place. Similarly Hathigumpha cave inscription affords us with instances where *Nagara* is used by itself.

L.5.....Kadāpayati nagarim.

L.6.....Sata [m?] oghātilām Tanasuliya-vālā panādim Nagaram pavesayati.

The lord of the kingdom himself speaks and therefore he did not think it necessary to say 'the capital of the Kaliṅgā.' In the above extracts *Nagara* means Kaliṅgāvani-nagara or Kaliṅga-deśa-nagara.

In spite of these glaring examples the learned author pronounces that Nagara in the inscriptions of the Mukhaliṅgeśvara temple is a proper name and therefore cannot mean the capital. He also challenges Mr. B. V. Krishnarao, if he can show any instance where a proper name is so split. In the above extracts it has been shown that *nagara* is not used as a proper name. It is used as a common noun in all those records. In this sense, nagara is also used in the Ramayana :

Bālakānda, canto I. 3. ततः स्वलङ्कृतं राजा नगरं प्रविवेश ह ।

11. क्रियतां नगरं सर्वं क्षिप्रमेव स्वलङ्कृतम् ।

In the Pātāla-khanda of Padma Purāna (chapter 53) nagara is used in this sense :

सर्वान् वीरान्पथि स्थाप्य ययौ स्वनगरम्प्रति ।

Several instances from the epic and the Purānas can be quoted to prove that the word *nagara* signified only the residence of the king and it was used as a common noun. The Ramayana shows that it signified the pile of buildings in which the king, his family members and his personal servants lived. Compare the verse 3 above with the one which intimates the entry of Daśaratha and his followers after Sīta's marriage :

प्रविवेश गृहं राजा हिमवत्सदृशं पुनः ।

Here गृहं corresponds to नगरम् in verse 3 above. This is not the only instance ; many are the places in which either *nagara* or gṛha or pitṛ-gṛha is employed to denote the royal residential buildings of the Kosala kings. This is the real significance of the word *nagara*. Even in modern days, the word, in the Oriya

zamindari places, is used to denote the residential palace of the zamindar, who is considered by his people as their king.

This *nagara* has a significance different from that of *pura*. Sabdakalpadruma gives it thus: *Bahu-grāmīya-vyavahāra -sthānam puram, tatra pradhānabhūtaṃ nagaram.* From this it is clear that the abode of the lord of a group of villages is called a *nagara* while the metropolis of that group is known as *pura*. In the Ramayana such distinction is shown. Instances where *nagara* is used to denote the royal abode have already been shown. The significance of *pura* is brought out in canto 5 of Bālakāṇḍa. In canto 68 the following verses show that *pura* includes the royal dwellings as well as those of townsmen :

जनकेन समादिष्टा दूतास्ते क्लान्तवाहनाः ।
त्रिरात्रमुषिता मार्गे तेऽयोध्यां प्राविशन्पुरीम् ॥
राज्ञो भवनमासाद्य द्वारस्थानिदमब्रुवन् ।

The messengers having entered the pura of Ayodhya, approached the king's palace and spoke thus to the gate-keepers. Similarly, in canto 31 of Kishkindha Kaṇḍa :

16. तामपश्यद्बलाकीर्णां हरिराजमहापुरीम् ।
दुर्गमिक्ष्वाकुशार्दूलः किष्किन्धां गिरिसङ्कटे ॥
21. ततस्सुग्रीवभवनम्प्रविश्य हरिपुङ्गवाः ।
23. ततः सचिवसन्दिष्टा हरयोरोमहर्षणाः ।
गिरिकुञ्जरसंघाभा नगर्यान्निर्ययुस्तदा ॥

The word नगर्यात् in the last verse means the same thing as सुग्रीवभवन(त्) in verse 21. Thus that Nagara is a part of *pura* is clear. Nagara signifies only the royal palace while *pura* is the town in which the royal palaces are included.

With regard to *pattana*, I am not aware of its use anywhere in the Ramayana. The word seems to have come into use in times subsequent to those of Valmiki. I think it is a word having its origin in the Dravidian languages. So far as I know, there is not a place whose name ends with 'pattana.'

The only exception is Patna ; even that was originally called Pāṭali-putra. In Southern India many place names have endings in *pattana*. From the geographical position of those places, it can be observed that every one of them has the protection of the sea or a river. When Mr. B. V. Krishnarao had said that the seaport towns are generally called *pattanas*, the learned professor took objection and challenged if Mr. Krishnarao show how Srirangapatam, though unconnected with the sea is called so. Srirangapatam is protected on all sides by the river Cauvery and was, during the time of Haider and Tippu Sultan, used as a place of retreat for safety, when hard pressed by their enemies. It is a 'jala-durgam' as are all the seaport towns. Mr. Krishnarao by seaports, must have meant the *jala-durgams*. Since the origin of *pattana* is subsequent to that of *Nagara* or pura, it cannot be presumed that Kaliṅgāpattana has been in existence from historic times. Moreover I cannot see any reason why the *nagara* of Kaliṅga-nagara was changed to pattana, if Kaliṅga-nagara and Kaliṅga-pattana were one and the same. Can Mr. Bhattacharya show me another instance where *nagara* is replaced by *pattana*?

From the above discussion we learn that the Kaliṅga-nagara of Khāravēla was near Dhauli in Orissa. That was in the 2nd century before the birth of Christ. From the time of the Ganga king, Kāmārnava II the Kaliṅga-nagara was located in the site where Mukhaliṅgam and Nagarikatakam now stand. This Kāmārnava ascended the throne in *cir.* A. D. 761. Where was this Kaliṅganagara during the period between the 2nd century B. C. and the 8th century A. D.

No records have yet shed light on the history of Kaliṅga from the 2nd century B. C. till the conquest of it by Samudragupta. Leaving that period alone, we can, with the help of records and of literature locate the capital and see how it was changed from place to place from time to time. The Vizagapatam plates of Anantavarma Choda Gangadeva dated Saka 1040, tells us that Kāmārnava I had his seat at Jantāvura.

1.49.....tasya cha-āpahasita Surendrapuram Jantāvura 50-n-nāma nagari rājya-dhāny-āsīt. (I.A., May, 1889.)

The Ganjam plates of Prithivivarmadeva (Ep. Ind., Vol. IV, p. 198) spells the name as (read as Ja [no?] ra) जन्तौवुर (from the ink impressions supplied to me by the Superintendent, Madras Museum). It is spelt as Jayantyāpura in the Simhapura Copper plate grant of the Kadamba King Dharmkedi (Q. J. A. R. S., Vol. III, parts 2, 3 & 4, pp. 171 ff.).

It is this Jayantyāpura that has been wrongly identified, both by Mr. Krishnarao and his critic, with Mukhaliṅgam which is also called by the name of Jayanti, Jayanti-pura or Jayantinagara. The following extracts from the Kshetramāhātmya gives us the correct name :

तस्य क्षेत्रस्य माहात्म्यं जयन्त्याख्यस्य मे वद ।
जयन्तीक्षेत्रमाहात्म्यं क्षमः को वात्र वर्णितुम् ॥
तथा कलिङ्गदेशे तु जयन्तीनगरम्मने ।
यतः पश्यन्ति सर्वेशं जयन्तीनगरेश्वरम् ।
जयन्तीनगरस्थानात्तीर्थानि मुनिसत्तम ।
जयन्तीनामकं क्षेत्रमाजगाम यदृच्छया ।

These are taken from the chapter which closes with the colophon 'iti śri skāṇḍha-purāṇē uttara-khaṇḍē Jayantī Kshētramahātmyē chaturdho-adhyāyah.'' The difference between this name of Mukhaliṅgam and that of the metropolis of Kāmārnava I is so very marked in spelling that one cannot be mistaken for the other.

From a strategical point of view also, Jantāvura, the capital of Kāmārnava I cannot be located so far south as Mukhaliṅgam. If we study how Kāmārnava I came to possess the kingdom of Kaliṅga, we can understand where he could have had his capital. He first got up the Mahēndra hill, worshipped the God Gokarna there and then descending down into the plains, defeated Sabarāditya. The Mahēndra hill was as important to him as the plain country. He must care

to protect both. His seat of government must be in such a position as to command both the hill and the plain. He possessed the kingdom of Kaliṅga in *cir.* A.D. 700, a time when the whole country was undergoing disintegration consequent on the influx of the Huns and the dislocation of the hill-tribes such as the Savaras from their homes in the Vindhya mountains. These Savaras rushed into hills of Kaliṅga and even ventured into the plain country. It was therefore necessary for the sovereign of the country to guard the hills. The Mahēndra hill had been always considered as a stronger place of retreat and of defence than their residence in the plains. It was, therefore, necessary to have the capital of Kāmārnava I as close to this Mahēndra hill fort as possible.

This dual residence of the Kaliṅga Kings seems to have existed even in the time of Samudragupta. In the Allahabad pillar inscription, his conquest of Kaliṅga is mentioned in the expression *'Mahēndragiri-Kautturaka'* which means the country of which Mahēndragiri and Kottura were the capitals. This is an example of the very old custom of naming a kingdom by its capital. Both the Mahēndra and Kottura were the keys of the kingdom. Yet, the former appears to have been a more invulnerable place and therefore seems to have been the chief centre of attack of the hostile armies. King Raghu is said to have, as soon as he entered the kingdom of Kaliṅga, concentrated all his forces on the Mahēndra. (Raghuvaṃśa, Canto 4, 39.)

स प्रतापं महेन्द्रस्य मूर्ध्नि तीक्ष्णं न्यवेशयत्।
अङ्कुशं द्विरदस्येव यन्ता गम्भीरवेदिनः॥

The comparison between Mahēndra and the elephant that does not mind the pain caused by the deep thrust of the goad, shows how strong the fort had been; however forcible the seige might be, the enemy could effect nothing. The next verse tells us that the king of Kaliṅga, (hearing the seige) marched to its relief. So he must have been somewhere out

of his hill-residence. Naturally inference will be that he was in his metropolis in the plains, Kottura. Had it been Mukhaliṅgam, he could not have so readily marched to its relief. That this Kottura was in the vicinity of Mahēndra is certain and it has been identified with the modern village of Kottura near Barua, a port of importance even in the time of Ptolemy. (V. A. Smith, Early History of India, p. 284, Note 2—Kottur.) Kāmārnava I, who had first to secure the possession of the hill fortress and then obtain the whole country of Kaliṅga must have naturally had his metropolis in the vicinity of Kottura the capital of his predecessors, so that he might watch both the hills and the plain.

Statements from the copper plate grants of the Ganga kings of the middle ages conform to this evidence. It has been shown above that Jayantyā-pura is mentioned in the Simhapura copper plate grant of Dharmakhedi. This donor is said to have been the governor of the district called Pancha-pātra in the kingdom of Kaliṅga. This *Vishaya* is also mentioned in the Mandasa coppor plate grant of Anantavarmadeva (Madras Ep. Report, 1918, App. A. No. 12 and part II p. 139, para. 17) and it states that the Panchapātra Vishaya was a part of the Pancha Vishaya of which a Dharmakhēdi of the Kadamba family was the lord (mahāmandalesvara). It is also stated that the object of the grant was located in Mahēndrabhoga which must have certainly formed a part of the district under the control of the donor. This Mahēndrabhoga must be the country around the sacred hill of the Kaliṅga.

This Panchavishaya is again mentioned in the Parlakimidi copper plate grant of Vajrahastadeva. (Ep. Ind., Vol. III, pp. 220 ff.) Srimad Dāraparaja, the beloved son of Śri Chola-Kamādiraja, the lord of the district intimates the inhabitants of Laṅka-kona that the village of Hossaṇḍi was granted to one Kāmādi as a dowry. Consequently, this Laṅka-kona district was a part, like Mahēndrabhoga, of the Panchavishaya. In Juradah zamindari of the Ganjam district there is a village called Laṅka

(19° 4½ N. Lat. 84°47 E. Long., Indian Atlas sheet No. 108). The place-names mentioned in the grant are similar to the names of those found in this part of the district.

These two lead us to identify the Panchavishaya with the region of the Kaliṅga between 18°50′ and 19°50′ N. Lat. For this tract of land, the metropolis must be in a place which commands the whole region and especially the mountains, for it was from the west that the Kaliṅgas ever expected their enemies. Jantāvura must have occupied such a position.

Jallantra near Barua in the district of Ganjam was once the seat of a zamindari and it contains many ancient relics. (Sewell's Lists, Vol. I, p. 5.) The name of the town appears to be a modification of the old Jantāvura and it is near the Mahēndra hill. Though the Kaliṅga rulers prior to Kāmārnava II had their seat of government in the plain country, yet they seem to depend mostly on the strength and security of their hill fortress. The invulnarability of the fort has been adapted into a simile by Kalidasa.

In describing the King of Kaliṅga, Sunanda, the handmaid of Indumati, said that, in prowess he was as great as the moutain Mahēndra. Incidentally, she mentioned that Hemāngada was the lord of both the hills and the sea (meaning the coastal plain) (Ragh. canto 5, verse 54). This leads us to conclude that the Kaliṅga kings prior to *cir.* A.D. 800 had two seats of government—one on the sea-coast and one on the hills. In verse 56 of the canto 5 of Raghuvaṃśa, the poet emphasises the dual seat of the kings of Kaliṅga :

यमात्मनः सद्मनि सन्निकृष्टो मन्द्रध्वनि-त्याजित-यामतूर्यः ।
प्रासाद-वातायन-दृश्यवीचिः प्रबोधयत्यर्णव एव सुप्तम् ॥

The sea can be seen from the windows of the palace. Unless it had been on the beach itself, it is not possible to see the waves from the windows. The inmates of houses built on the beach need not go to the upper stories of their dwellings to see the rolling waves. Since it is said that the sea can be

looked at from the windows of the palace, it can be observed that the royal palace of Hemāngada was not on the beach. In any other place in the town, it is not possible to have a look at the sea, unless the palace is located on a high-land. This is a fact which must have been experienced by all who live in sea-port towns. Kalidasa himself says that Hemāṅgada was the lord of Mahēndra. It is but natural that the lord should reside within his dominion. The hill is so very high that the sea can be clearly seen from its top though the distance of it from the sea is 16 miles.

"The mountain is about 16 miles from the sea and lies exposed to the sea-breeze, the nearest port being Bāruva, which can be seen from the bangalow. (Ganjam Dist. Manual, p. 40.)

During the calm hours of the night the rolling of the billows is heard, deprived of the harshness which is experienced on the beach. It is this soft rolling sound that is described by the poet as the music that is played to intimate the morning hours.

Now it is clear that Hemāngada's palace was located on the summit of the Mahēndra hill. The copper plate grants describe the capital of the early Ganga kings to be 'Sarva-ṛtu-sukha-ramaṇīya.' This quality aptly suits to its position on the hill. Again Kalidasa comes to our succour to determine the climate on the hill. That the betel leaves and cocoanut palms grow abundantly on the Mahendra hill (*ibid*, verse 42) shows that the climate was salubrious in all seasons. Even in these days the climate is the same. It was once proposed to make a sanatorium of it by the Calcutta Government. Its height (4000 ft.), its vicinity to the sea and unhindered exposure to the sea-breezes are enough factors to keep its climate pleasant in all seasons.

That the kings of Kaliṅga had two seats is intimated both in the Raghuvaṁsam and the Daśakumāracharitam. When Kalidasa made Sunanda say,

अनेन सार्द्धं विहराम्बराग्रेस्तीरेषु तालीवनमर्मरेषु ।

he had at heart the custom of retiring into the forest to celebrate the vernal festival. It is also apparent that, in the time of Kalidasa there existed a big forest along the coast of Kaliṅga. King Raghu, after leaving the Mahēndra fort marched his armies through a forest of fruit bearing *pūgas* (*ibid*, 45).

Dandin, in his Daśakumāracharitam says that the king of Kaliṅga, with his harem and townsmen, had retired to the forest on the sea-side and that while he had been fully engrossed with the enjoyment of vernal pleasures, he was carried away by Jaya Sinha, the Andhra king, who had come there over the sea. In this we are informed of the custom that was prevelant in Kaliṅga that the whole town used to retire into the forest to celebrate the vernal festival. But the poet who took upon himself to depict the emotion of love did not care to say even a word of what the townsmen had been doing when their sovereign was slyly carried away by an enemy. Can we imagine that the Kaliṅga men remained imbecile, without striking even one blow to defend their king ? They must all have been engaged somewhere and watching that helpless condition of their king, the Andhara sovereign pounced on him and carried him away even before the men returned to the place. Where they had been and what they had been doing are not narrated by the poet and we have to supply that omission from other sources.

The custom of the observance of the vernal festival still in vogue in the Agency tracts of the Vizagapatam district gives us a full information regarding it. Under the name of 'chaitra parvam' the festival is religiously carried on in every village during the month of Chaitra, the first month of the Spring season. All able-bodied men of each village go for a hunt in the neighbouring forest and remain in it until they bag one or more animals. If they return home without killing any animal, the women in the village throw dung-water and dishonour them; the wives disregard their husbands. During the absence of the men in the forest, the women—both married and unmarried, maids and matrons—at home decorate their bodies with flowers

and dyes extracted from forest products and spend their time in frolic, song and dance. The song which is specially sung during this time is a duet between a man and a woman It is extempore and both man and woman express love in fine harmonious words full of poetry. To give a full idea of this song which, I hear, is heard in no other part of India, requires a separate paper.

When the women of the village are informed that their men have bagged some wild animals, all of them proceed to the precincts of the forest where the carcasses have been brought. They then form a procession ; the carcasses are borne on the shoulders of some men; the women sing and dance before the carcasses which are all decorated with garlands of flowers and bunches of leaves; while some men beat drums in front of the dancing women. Thus they bring the carcasses into the village and place them in front of the headman's house. The women then dance round the dead animals keeping time to the drum beaten by the men. After some time the animals are skinned and the flesh, if edible, is shared amongst all the villagers; if not, the skins and the skulls are preserved as trophies in the village.

This festival is found sculptured on the topmost *torana* slab of the entrance to the Asthana-maṇḍapa of the Mukhaliṅgēśvara temple. A bear, a sombar, and a deer are shown carried on men's shoulders ; in front of them are shown the drummers and the dancers ; this whole procession is shown to move towards the king who sits at the right hand end of the slab ; here he sits on his throne surrounded by his courtiers and amidst all his royal grandeur. We have already seen that the temple was built during the time of Kāmārnava II, *cir.* A.D. 830. The above described sculpture must have been formed to describe a custom then in vogue in Kaliṅga. This festival must have been in the country even some centuries before the temple was built. Dandin seems to have been aware of it ; Kalidasa knows it. This must have been in the country of Kaliṅga even before the time of Kalidasa.

When Dandin said that the Andhra king lay in ambush and carried away the Kaliṅga king, he had in his mind that all the men of Kaliṅga were absent in the forest on hunting expedition. This phase of the festival did not find place in his narrative because the central theme of it was love. The poet employed in his story such of the Kaliṅga customs as would help the main theme of his tale.

From the above discussion we learn that the custom of celebrating the vernal festival existed in ancient Kaliṅga and it is still found in the sub-stratum of society inhabiting the jungles and hills of the Jeypore zamindari of the Vizagapatam district.

Since the vernal festival was celebrated with so much zeal and fervour, the kings of Kaliṅga must have had a residence in the vicinity of the forest which in those days (*cir.* A.D. 400) existed on the coast. Thus the poets also indirectly intimate of the two residences of the Kaliṅga kings. The copper plate inscriptions of the early Ganga kings vouchsafe this statement. Of all the plates yet known there is only one (Chicacole grant of Indravarma dated 146th year. I.A. Vol. XII, p. 143) which is dated on the 15th day of Chaitra. The date being the middle day of the month, the vernal festival must have been in full swing. The king then resided in his coastal palace and that is the reason why the Kaliṅga nagara (the royal residence of Kaliṅga king) is described to have been embraced by the arms of the bellows of the sea (jaladhijala-taraṅga karapallavāliṅgita). The Atchutāpuram plates of Indravarma (Ep. Ind., Vol. III) were granted on the 30th day of Chaitra when festival must have been finished. The king, with all his retinue must have returned to his residence on the Mahēndra hill. So the document does not state that the Kaliṅganagara was on the sea coast. The other documents of Kaliṅga severeigns bear dates in the months other than Chaitra and therefore there was no need of the royalty to sojourn in their coastal home. These grants were all made when the kings lived in their residence on the hill. These grants show us another custom of the Kaliṅga

kings. Whenever the king, at the time of the grant, happen to be in a place other than the two 'nagaras' the place is simply mentioned by its name preceded by 'vijaya' *e.g.*, Vijaya-Dantapurat (Purli Plates, Ep. Ind., Vol. XIV, No. 27).

If the description of the Kaliṅganagara given in each of these copper plate grants is studied carefully, it is found that it is a true picture of the city as it existed at the time of the charter. For fear of occupying more space, I desist from quoting examples to justify the above statements. The readers and such of those that are interested in the ancient history of Kaliṅga may study those charters and verify the statement made above.

I may be allowed to conclude this paper with a summary of all the above discussion.

1. The capital city (Kaliṅga-nagara) of Khāravēla was Tosali near Dhauli.

2. From the time of Samudragupta till the time of Kāmārnava I (*cir.* A. D. 347 to *cir.* A.D. 700) the Kaliṅga sovereign maintained two royal residences, one on the hill of Mahēndra where their family god, Gokarna, was installed; and the other was Kottura on the sea side to which they resorted to celebrate the vernal festival.

3. Kāmārnava I also maintained these two, but he changed the coastal residence to Jayantyapura which in modern times has become Jallantra.

4. Kāmārnava II (*cir.* A. D. 880) changed his seat to Nagara (modern Nagarikaṭakam) and there he built the temple to Madhukeśa. From the time till the Ganga kings possessed Orissa, this Nagara remained to be the chief seat of their government.

5. Neither documents nor literature support the identification of Kaliṅgapatam with the Kaliṅganagara of any period. The arguments advanced by Mr. Bhattacharya are not strong enough to disprove the more authentic evidences in support of the identification of Kaliṅganagara which merely meant the royal residence of the Kaliṅga kings.

G. RAMADAS

JOHN GALSWORTHY

As a Dramatist.

As many as twenty-five years separate Galsworthy's earliest play, *The Silver Box,* in the first of his six volumes of published plays from the latest, *The Fugitive.* During this time momentous things had happened in the contemporary English theatre. On the heels of those very Victorian dramatists, Sir Arthur Pinero and Henry Arthur Jones, came a new batch of British dramatists headed by Bernard Shaw and Galsworthy, and in the rear Noel Coward and Frederick Lonsdale trailing on to the present day. John Galsworthy was practically an unknown author, when Harley Granville-Barker in collaboration with Mr. Vedrenne produced at the Court Theatre on the 25th September, 1906, *The Silver Box.* Unknown in this sense that Galsworthy had then published just two or three books over a pseudonym and brought out the first part of his *Forsyte Saga* and another volume called *The Island Pharisees,* the last two being the only books to which he had signed his name. It is common knowledge that the Granville-Barker-Vedrenne enterprise at the Court Theatre was the making of Bernard Shaw, and of this enterprise Galsworthy must think gratefully as also the beginnging of his own dramatic career. Galsworthy was then nearly forty. It is doubtful if he could have established his reputation if he had not surrendered himself to the efflorescence of the English repertory theatre movement of his time. He marched side by side with the young "dramatists of revolt,"—Granville-Barker, St. John Hankin, Elizabeth Barker, Stanley Houghton and Githa Sowerby.

Nearly thirty plays including six short one-actors in less than thirty years is certainly a substantial contribution from a writer, who is also the author of that vast prose-epic, *The Forsyte Saga,* with its sequels and sequences and over a dozen

other big novels. Some of the dramatists of revolt, such as St. John Hankin and Stanely Houghton are dead, but Shaw and Galsworthy are still alive and as very much alive as Noel Coward and Frederick Lonsdale. In certain quarters Galsworthy is often considered to be a bit old-fashioned, but he is by no means a back number. A new play or the revival of an old play of his would still be a big box-office attraction in England. The reason is simple. Galsworthy is quintessentially English. Moreover, his plays exhibit a set of most distinctive and individual characteristics, emanating from a consistent scheme of certain well-defined ideas. Galsworthy's range of interest spreads over a diversified area—modern social and economic life, touching family relationships as in *Joy* or *Family Man*; the causes and results of social degradation as in *Justice* or *Fugitive*; moral and legal injustice as in *Silver Box* or *Loyalties*; class or caste feeling as in *Strife*; and the tragedy of idealism and romanticism as in *The Mob* (most appropriately written on the eve of the world war). Even on a cursory view of these slices of Galsworthy's dramatic pictures one would be instantly struck by his qualities of complete detachment of outlook, analytical technique, humanitarian sympathy and judicious irony. In an article entitled *Some Platitudes Concerning Drama* (Fortnightly Review, December, 1909), Galsworthy attempted to set forth his own views on the drama and its future. He said that the drama of the future would flow down two distinctly different channels—one of naturalism, "faithful to the seething and multiple life around us, such as some are inclined to term photography," and the second, that of a kind of poetic drama, "incarnating through its phantasy and symbolism all the deepest aspirations, yearnings, doubts and mysterious strivings of the human spirit." He thinks that these two forms are inherent in the "awakened humanity in the conscience of our time," but "between these two forms," he warns us, "there must be no crude unions—they are too far apart." Galsworthy himself has written plays of the first kind almost to the entire

exclusion of the second. It would have been surprising if he had not. Being a follower of Ibsen, he could not but have been on the side of the naturalistic, realistic, and photographic drama of the modern age.

The question has often arisen, and not without justification, whether Galsworthy is better as a playwright than as a novelist. Miss Sheila Kaye-Smith is one of the few English critics who have rated him more highly as a dramatist, arguing that his characters, being types rather than individuals, add to the value of his plays on the stage. Galsworthy's pre-occupation with type-characters is, however, only limited to modern society, the emphasis being shifted from play to play, from the general to the particular, from the community to the family. *The Skin Game* contrasts a typical parvenu and a typical country gentleman; *A Family Man* glorifies the beauties of domestic life; *The Foundations* implies the contrast of the slum and the parlour and *The Forest* that of civilization and primitive life. In *Escape* and *The Fugitive* we come across his favourite type of conundrum, an escaped convict, a victim of social injustice. *Justice* is a protest against the denial of the privilege of divorce to the poor and against the severity of English prison administration. Undoubtedly, his sympathies are at bottom with the oppressed and the outcast, but in every play, as Mr. Ashley Dukes has said, Galsworthy is always anxious to show "with patent regularity that there are two sides to every question." This impartiality, rather a rare virtue in a writer, comes from Galsworthy's unerring sense of sincerity, absorbing his whole nature and dominating all his thoughts. Sometimes, Galsworthy stretches his dramatic impartiality so far as to approach almost a total impersonality of feeling. "Let me try to eliminate bias," he writes (*Another Sheaf*, page 12), "and see the whole thing as should an umpire... Let me have no temperament for the time being:.. Only from an impersonal point of view, if there be such a thing, am I going to get even approximately at the truth." This principle has made most of Galsworthy's plays

inconclusive. There is no clear solution, no finality. Although, at times, he has to deal with mutually opposed and violently conflicting types, he holds the balance absolutely even till the curtain falls. In this respect there is the greatest of differences between Shaw and Galsworthy. Shaw has absolutely no doubt in his mind as to the solution of the problem he is attacking and also as to its remedies. But Galsworthy only reveals a situation, diagnoses its troubles, and then leaves it at that, suggesting no remedy. This is also the reason of a generally pessimistic ending to most of his plays; and, as a matter of fact, not one of them is hopeful. In spite of the essential humanity of the situations and the questions with which he deals, and in spite of all his sympathy and impartiality, a certain element of abstractness enters into his dramatic work, which is seldom to be noticed in his fiction. There is no doubt that drama, being a more concentrated and plastic medium, gives him scope for the analysis of human types, but the present age is perhaps more interested in problems of the individual and of personality rather than abstractive types. Galsworthy's besetting weakness is a certain flatness in the personages of the drama, minor as well as major. They do not seem to grow within the action of the play. They remain practically the same in the end as they were in the beginning. So, with all his humanitarianism and judiciousness in his drama, he is unable to give his audience the impression of an ever-moving, growing, changing life. If Galsworthy were not highly skilled in the mechanics of play-making, Heaven knows what would have happened to most of his plays.

Galsworthy is a master craftsman, at least so far as character-construction goes. He beautifully balances his groups, each composed of various types, all combining in giving collective expression to the view-point of the group as a whole. Galsworthy says, "The dramatist's license, in fact, ends with his design. In conception alone he is free. He may take what character or group of characters he chooses, see them with what eye, knit

them into what idea, within the limits of his temperament; but once taken, seen and knitted, he is bound to treat them like a gentleman, with the tenderest consideration of their main springs. Take care of character; action and dialogue will take care of themselves." Obviously, formal symmetry of design is Galsworthy's favourite dramatic device. To him, again, the principal function of a play is moral and its aim is essentially expository. He says, "Drama must be shaped so as to have a spire of meaning. Every grouping of life and character has its inherent moral; and the business of the dramatist is so to pose the group as to bring that moral poignantly to the light of day." In this expository business generally three courses are open to a playwright: he may discuss popular or accepted views; he may elucidate his own views, "the more if they are the opposite of what the public wishes to have placed before it, presenting them so that the audience may swallow them like powder in a spoonful of jam;" or he may explain, "no cut-and-dried codes, but the phenomena of life and character, selected and combined, but not distorted by the dramatist's outlook, set down without fear, favour and prejudice, leaving the public to draw such poor moral as nature may afford." Apparently, the third course is the one Galsworthy has adopted. Because it combines happily with his temperament, detached and sympathetic, and his special prediliction for character-interpretation. In this respect he is very much like Bernard Shaw, but with a little difference, not so much of intention as of individual method. Shaw proclaims his gospels rather emphatically and aggressively, and spills them over his prefaces unabashedly and audaciously; but Galsworthy is a much quieter, softer, mellower apostle, who holds the moral of his play in solution, as it were, and takes good care that it does not get the better of his artistic sense. Galsworthy lacks the incomparable satirical gifts of Shaw, but his characters do not protest too much. They are not just ventriloquial reproductions of himself, as Shaw's. Further, Galsworthy does not always feel disposed to mock and

deride, like Shaw. He prefers to be disinterestedly aloof. By nature he is a shy man, and has refused to go out of his sphere at any time of his life. He is not a preacher. He is an artist, but most certainly having something worthwhile to say. And the moral that he tries to interpret is more or less an integral part of his entire dramatic frame-work; it doesn't proceed from any one part of it, nor is it conveyed by propagandist speeches of any one character. He says (*Another Sheaf*, page 88), "It is not the artist's business to preach. His business is to portray, but portray truly he cannot, if he is devoid of the insight which comes from instinctive sympathy.....an instinctive craving to identify himself with the experience of others." This principle is one to which Galsworthy has been more faithful than most writers, whose theories seldom show any relation to their own practice. Galsworthy is a sincere artist. This artistic sincerity alone, if not anything else, is bound to save much of his work from oblivion, even when some of his more loudly proclaiming competitors are forgotten.

Consequently, uninspiring though Galsworthy's plays are, they are, nevertheless, strong and vital, and absolutely free from dialectical fire-works on the one hand and taint of the theatre on the other. In them no situations are faked and no characters falsified. They are one and all photographic, to use his own phrase. As a result, his plays have a directness of appeal not to be found in the work of any other living dramatist in England. His style is straight-forward, economical, and clear-cut, without the crackling smartness of Bernard Shaw or paroxysmal cleverness of Noel Coward. It is neat and condensed, such as can only come from long self-discipline and apprenticeship. His style wins without arresting, and pursuades without ever having challenged. No doubt, his plays are apt to give an outside appearance of being too matter-of-fact, too unadorned ; but his characters are so sharply defined that in dialogue and action they live convincingly in the mind's eye of the audience. Galsworthy is quite typical of the modern age in the sense that his vision

is scientific. He is unwilling to draw a sentimental veil over whatever is ugly in present day social life. He sees men and women bound by class limitations, the poor by ignorance and want, the rich by prejudice and prudery, and he can suggest no remedy except more sympathy, more sweetness, more light. In his absolute freedom from aggressive self-assertion and over-statement, in his simplicity of technique and skilful economy of material, Galsworthy remains the most polished dramatic artist of the modern age.

P. GUHA-THAKURTA

THE FOOL MONARCH

A fattened ox, stroug in the loin
A government that bellows its power.
They moan
There is a fool in the tower.

Lamb-like the herd render
To the fates,
Who is mighty they surrender,
They know not what's written on the slates.

The caller and his trumpet
Echoes on the mount.
Hail the one to leade the stampede.
Onward, forward, we are on the hunt.

On the far horizon a shout
Hurray, Hurray!
We got them by the throat,
We are coming with our fray.

Who is there on that tour
Why the fool who made the stag.
Who moans but his own in the bower,
They waved a fool's rag.

E. PARKAR

WESTERN INFLUENCE IN ORIYA LITERATURE[1]

The contact of Orissa with the west is not of recent date; her geographical position made her coast a vantage-ground for trade-seeking invaders; we need not dwell on any ancient or mediaeval accounts of the contact between Orissa and the west but may point, in modern times, to the Portuguese who, coming up from Madras along the coast, founded an establishment at Pipli, which they utilised as a prosperous slave market, for residence, and also as a church (Our Lady of Rosary). The Portuguese had another settlement at Balasore where also they built a church. These settlements flourished in the middle of the 17th century and from that period up to the 19th century the political turmoils stirred the life of the times and that made it impossible for western culture to act upon the inhabitants of the province. These settlers had perhaps then very little culture to give, busy as they must have been in stabilising their own position and recruited as they were mainly from a class of people not conspicuous for intellectual culture. The result of these 150 years' stay and sway of the Portuguese is to be found, among other things, in the vocabulary of the Oriya language in which 34 words have been traced to a Portuguese origin by Mr. J. J. A. Campos in his account of the rise and decline of the Portuguese power in Bengal. It was only in the first years of the 19th century that the English came into power in Orissa and so they could not, until towards the end of the century when they were well-established, set in motion forces which turned the current of Orissan thought, and along with it Orissan literature, in a distinct channel, to indicate which is the aim of this paper.

[1] This paper was read at the Oriya Section of the 6th All-India Oriental Conference held at Patna, December, 1930.

It is interesting to observe that the British influence, once it had begun, was made to spread in a systematic way and with thoroughness. This is true of all India. A system of education by which the minds while in a plastic condition may feed on English literature, western philosophy, European history, and may receive practical lessons in democracy into giving up all notions of caste, at least for the period of training in schools and colleges; the printing press and the newspapers which have helped in linking the country, however slightly, both to its ancient traditions and its present environment and thus promoted a solidarity which has greatly contributed to the growth of nationality; movements, religious, social and political, which have passed over India causing numerous changes in the shades of thought and ways of living; an administration which levelled barriers through its courts of law and code of procedure, criminal and civil, uniform throughout the provinces; the mere fact that neighbouring provinces are affected by the influence;—all these served as channels opening up the new currents through the hills and dales of Orissa and bringing about changes in mentality which in turn would be, as they actually have been, reflected in the literature of the country.

What has been the result in literature? Let us detail some of the changes. First, in prose forms: for the consolidation of prose, grammars and dictionaries are necessary; and western attempts laid the foundation. The first grammar of the Oriya language[1] was written by Rev. A. Sutton and published in 1831. To the author of this pioneer attempt it came as a discovery that "the Oriya language was a distinct, and an original one." The printing press in Orissa had come into being along with the initiation of active propaganda by the Baptist Mission of England and Rev. Mr. Sutton was a member of the Mission. The difference between the traditional *kosa*, in which a string of synonyms was given as in the *Geetabhidhan* of Upendra Bhanja

[1] Rev. A. Sutton: An Introductory Grammar of the Oriya language, Calcutta, 1831.

authorship (which must be a doubtful matter), and between the new type which gives different uses of the same word, with illustrative references, as in Jagannath Rao's *Utkal Abhidhan*,[1] must be put down as due to English and Bengali models, which Mr. Rao acknowledges in the preface. It may be noted that Rev. Sutton had followed his Oriya Grammar with an Oriya Dictionary in 1841 and this book was published in three volumes in Cuttack. Mr. Sutton was aware of the importance of his own work and wrote : "A compiler of dictionaries is a kind of pioneer in literature." W. C. Lacy, Rev. W. Miller, and H. C. B. Hallam are other names worth recording by those who wish to trace western influence in Oriya, in the making of modern Oriya language and literature. Like many other Indian Vernaculars, more or less, modern Oriya prose has been largely due to western models and necessaries of life and civil administration, and the different prose forms—the novel, the essay, the newspaper, etc.—are directly or indirectly traceable to English influence. Such a work as *Bibāsinī* or *Māmu* was impossible in the past, before the days of British influence, not only with regard to the critical, satirical attitude towards life, but also in point of prose style. The whole world of prose—and it is not a small world either—is due directly or indirectly to similar works in English prose.

Let us now turn to verse forms. The major portion of Oriya verse is even to-day quite classical or traditional in diction and style, but while this is true of the poetry of Radhanath Ray, one of the three pioneers in modern Oriya literature, how much has been the influence of the west on him in the matter of literary forms and in a new literary sense which, passing out from him, forms a rich contribution to modern Oriya literature ! *Mahāyātrā*, incomplete in 9 cantos or *sargas*, is in blank verse, and though the preface written by a friend of the poet's asserts that

[1] Jagannath Rao : Utkal Abhidhan.

there is nothing strange in the medium but that the Sanskrit poetry has many models to show the way to blank verse, we must put that down to the bias of patriotism. The western influence in it has been acknowledged by Mr. Rao in that same preface. Again, the book is an epic, an epic fragment which, in tone and composition, is something new, not familiar to the language,—it is in perfect consonance with the influence of Milton and other westerners, filtrating through the writings of Michael Madhusudan Dutt, to whom Radhanath had served an apprenticeship in literature. The address of homage which begins the book, the patriotic motive, the romance of history,—all these new features are traceable to western influence. Again, the few fragments on the plan of The Birangana Kavya which are to be found in his writings, as *Yudhiṣṭhiraṃka prati Vyās* or *Satī prati satī-drohī patir ukti* are also new forms animated by a new spirit. The reader of Radhanath's writings cannot help noticing that he was widely read in Scott and Byron or their Bengali admirers who popularised their methods through Bengali literature. Madhusudan Rao, the literary comrade of Radhanath, in spite of his deep admiration for things of the land, had also been influenced by the west, *e.g.*, in his sonnets and elegies,—forms new to Oriya. It remained for succeeding writers to continue in their line and to adopt or acclimatise the new forms whose newness has now worn off with use.

Similarly with regard to drama: the old *yatras* which had charmed by the stories of Rama and Sita were no longer to please the changed spirit of the people. Both in subject and in technique there had been much of a change. The dramatists of the new age were busy satirising the follies of the times. Sj. Ramsankar Ray is a suitable example, being the leader of the new school. It is interesting to note the different attempts at finding suitable terms for the English expressions *scene* and *act*. Writers like Harihar Rath, Mrityunjay Rath and Ramsankar Ray sometimes use *Anka* and *Abhinay*, sometimes *Drishya* and

Anka, in order to convey the distinction, and the student is reminded of similar attempts in Bengali literature.

It is still an open question how far Oriya literature received western influence directly, and how far through the medium of Bengali. The close connection between the two countries, the establishment of one University for both, and many other ways of interaction make it probable that Oriya was influenced through Bengali. Even many of the words cited by Mr. Campos referred to above are common to Bengali and Oriya, and it would be an interesting problem for the philologist to answer—"Which of the two sets, Bengali and Oriya, first adopted these words from the Portuguese?" The comparative delay of the influence is explained by the medium of Bengali, which could not work and did not, till the seventies. There could not have been any talks of cultural interchange so long as the baneful results of the dire famine of 1867 raged through the province, when rice sold at 10 to 12 seers per rupee[1] and made 15,000 children helpless and destitute, in the city of Cuttack alone, and over which there had been a debate, deserving better publicity, in the House of Commons on August 2, 1867. The great pioneer of modern Oriya literature was Radhanath Ray, whose *Lekhavali* was written in Bengali and under the influence of Michael Madhusudan. The mere fact that Babu Bhudeb Mukhopadhyay, a mentor in matters literary and miscellaneous, took up the rôle of Mr. Drinkwater Bethune to the young poet and induced him to write in Oriya shows the part played by Bengali literature in the make-up of Radhanath. The Oriya poet himself complained that the literature of his country had been too much under the shadow of the Bengali literature, which was very much to be deplored. He complained that not to speak of the Bengali literature, but even the Hindi literature was marching ahead, while Oriya was in a static condition. Bengali had been a help in bringing within the

[1] Indian Mirror, July 15, 1867.

scope of the Oriya, a wealth of information, but at the sacrifice of his distinctiveness.

Not to speak of Bengali literature, even Hindi literature is developing so fast that it is no exaggeration to speak of Oriya literature in comparison as inert like a clod..... .. It is true that our knowledge has advanced through the cultivation of Bengali literature, but our originality has suffered a good deal.[1]

Speaking of modern times, it is a common experience to come across specimens of Oriya literature composed under the influence of Bengali, and thus exhibiting traces of western influence in form and temper.

It is, however, apparent that there has been less, far less, of western influence in Oriya than in Bengali. It has been neither so deep nor so extensive. And there are reasons for it. Among others it may be suggested that the centre of distribution of the influence has been Calcutta, the seat of the University, the seat of the Provincial Government and the centre of commerce. Cultural confusion has been nowhere so great as in Bengal, as may be seen on reference to the Census figures for 1921 : in Bengal 339 males per ten thousand (of age 5 and up) are literate in English, while the number of Bihar and Orissa is only 78. The force applied at the centre becomes attenuated a great deal as it passes on to the peri-pheri, and the physical inaccessibility of Orissa has also helped in preserving her literature, as it has her architecture, intact, her indigenous culture uncontaminated, and who knows if that is not one of the reasons why there is no artistic renaissance in Orissa as there is in Bengal?

PRIYARANJAN SEN

[1] Paper read at the 1st annual meeting of the *Utkal Sahitya Samaj*.

FINANCIAL PROPOSALS IN THE SIMON REPORT—AN ESTIMATE

The financial proposals embodied in the Simon Report, do not seem to have evoked the criticism, which the other proposals have. The Commissioners "accept and fully endorse the general principles of his scheme" and as such they are as much a part of the Simon Report, as the other proposals. When the Pre-Reforms financial system was abolished, and a clear cut separation of resources, was effected between the financial-resources of the Central and the Provincial Governments, it was expected that provincial autonomy would be made a reality. The old doctrine of separation of financial resources, has however passed away, as an article of faith since the War.

During the Post-Reforms period, it has become evident that provincial authority become a myth because of provincial financial stringency. Residuary provinces of taxation, being rested in the Central and not in the Provincial Governments, the provinces were not in a position to impose additional taxation. In fact, Land Revenue actually declined in certain provinces, mainly due to its inelasticity, through legislative impediments. Sir W. Layton rejects the scheme of federal subsidies for provincial services, such a scheme is at variance with the widely held view that the political evolution of India requires the development of as large a class of persons, engaged in public work and accustomed to public responsibilities. The actual set of recommendations, made in the Simon Report, may be classified, under the following headings :—

(1) That the provinces should be given $\frac{1}{2}$ of the collection of income tax on personal incomes, which will meet the claims of industrial provinces, like Bombay and Bengal.

(2) That the provinces should be empowered to levy additional taxes, like tax on agricultural incomes.

(3) Terminal taxes, levied at every railway station, at a low rate.

Nos. 1, 2, and 3, would not place enough Revenue at the disposal of the provinces. Layton also suggests the creation of a provincial fund, consisting of excises on cigarettes and matches and when the Central situation permits, the duty on salt. The provincial fund is trumpeted as a federal idea, providing for common rates of taxation, a common collecting agency, with the maximum of fiscal independence of the provinces. It is significant, that Layton's proposals are (1) totally silent on the question of popular control over the Indian financial system, and (2) they do not embody any suggestion for retrenchment, to be put into practice, immediately.

In order that both Central and Provincial Governments may realize greater revenue from Income tax, Layton recommends that the exempt minimum must be reduced from Rs. 2,000 to 1,000 and that steeper rates should be imposed on incomes between Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 10,000. This (taxation of agricultural incomes), would produce, according to him 5 crores for the provinces. As between taxes on agricultural incomes and Death duties Layton prefers the former, as being more feasible. The strong point of a terminal tax, is its productivity, and it is estimated by Layton that it would produce 8 crores of rupees. Perhaps the most noticeable feature of Layton's recommendations, is his insistence on distribution of resources in the provincial fund, on a *per capita* basis. This system of distribution of grants-in-aid is, according to him, the most equitable, as it would enable provinces, with inadequate financial resources, but with large expenditure to undertake various schemes of social reconstruction. We may note that the most welcome feature of the financial proposals in the Simon Report, is the abandonment of the old doctrine of clear-cut separation of financial resources, persistently emphasized, in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the Report of the Meston Committee. But it would be very difficult to subscribe to the actual set of recommendations made.

In the first place, the estimates of yield of Revenue, made in the Report, are unduly optimistic. It is very difficult to subscribe to the view, that Central finances would be stable, in the face of the boycott, depression in agricultural prices, and trade gloom in the country. The fact that the Government of India has even in October, 1930, begun borrowing in London, is significant: evidently the Finance Member dreads a deficit in the coming Budget.

The estimate of the yield from the main taxes, to be levied by Provinces, is too optimistic. In view of the present all-round depression, Agricultural Income taxes and Terminal taxes, may not prove to be as fertile as prophesised by Sir W. Layton. This apart, the suggestions of Sir W. Layton, in regard to Income-tax, if embodied in a statute, would unduly increase the burden on the middle class. Again his proposals would unduly increase the burden on land, which is sufficiently heavy at present. As a matter of fact, between Death duties and taxes on agricultural incomes, there are strong reasons, why the former should be preferred to the latter. For one thing, Death duties, being imposed, once in a way, are not likely to be so keenly felt, as the annually recurring taxation of agricultural incomes.

Again, in view of the varying conditions, in the Provinces, it is doubtful whether a uniform rate of Excise duty levied by the Central Government on cigarettes, matches and salt, would be equitable. As a matter of fact, one of the strong arguments for the existing system of Provincial Excise is that the rates can be adjusted to the needs of different provinces further, before we proceed to tax these poor mans' articles—cigarettes, matches, salt, other avenues of taxation ought to be explored. It is rather unfortunate that Sir W. Layton has not thought fit to suggest luxuries as fit objects of further taxation, if need be.

The Round Table Conference would have to think twice before it subscribes to the system of grants by the Central to Provincial Governments, on a *per capita* basis. Grants *per se* have no virtue; and if provincial autonomy is to be a success, an

adequate system of taxation for Provinces has to be devised. If this is found impossible, a more satisfactory system of grants would have to be introduced. It is significant that both in Canada and Australia, where conditions are more or less similar to our provinces, *per capita* grants have proved to be unworkable. Special grants have been given to certain provinces as well as a grant fixed per head of the population. The *per capita* system would mean ever-increasing payments to the state, whose population was growing fast, possibly because of the development of secondary industries, but the payment to other states, having great developmental problems to solve and vast territories to administer, would not increase to the same extent.

M. K. MUNUSWAMI

GOODNIGHT EDELE!

Dry those tears, Dear Love, and smile
Although we part now for a while,
It is 'goodnight' and not 'farewell'
At dawn we meet again, Edele!

This brief hour goes, Time bids us part
Once more lie closely on my heart,
On the hill, the clanging Convent bell
Calls thee home, Divine Edele!

I too am sad at leaving you
But I shall be here in the early dew
O! I love you more than lips might tell
And you are mine for aye Edele!

LELAND J. BERRY

THE CRISIS OF ISLAM [1]

Hardly any of the great religions penetrate as Islam does the whole life of its professors, individuals as well as communities, down to the smallest particular. As the Islamic church in the time of its founder and the first Caliphs bore the form of a state, (and this unity of church and state, in idea at least, persists up to the present time), the religion clothed its requirements in the garb of a law. The work of centuries developed this Islamic law into a powerful structure casuistically governing with the utmost exactness all spheres of human business and activities. This whole law, therefore, comes under the consecration of religion, since, in conception, state and church are one. There was perhaps a strength in this so long as the law was young, alive and meeting the requirements of the time. But yet it was so only in a restricted sense, for even during its development it was really never exclusive and unlimited in power ; it was not a creation of the state and its members, but a creation of the theologians. And finally when the conviction arose that the later centuries were subject to the first age of Islam,—that, in fact, the decisions laid down by the recognised fathers of the Golden Age were binding upon the Islamic community for all time, then that very religious consecration of the law which gathered the whole of life within its confines became a danger and threatened to put a stop to all progress.

People were unconscious of this danger, nor did it become acute so long as the Islamic world stood at the zenith of culture. This was essentially the case in the Middle Ages. Even the life of the Christian of the Middle Ages is similarly, if not so completely, under the dominion of the church from the cradle to the grave. There was a Western culture and civilisation which was Christian, just as there was an Islamic civilisation and

[1] Translated from the German of Dr. Richard Hartmann.

culture, and both, in spite of the contrast of creed, stood comparatively near each other as essentially connected, and built up on the basis of Hellenistic civilisation. While, then, in the West a restriction of the religious element to its narrower sphere and a secularisation of life were the results of the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times, and the Western Christian civilisation of the Middle Ages was replaced by a new civilisation based chiefly upon the national element, the world of Islam stood still in the tracks of its mediaeval Islamic civilisation which appeared to be fixed and ordained by the religion. This was why the gulf between East and West first became unbridgeable: Orient and Occident spoke two different tongues; and that state of things has persisted till the present day.

It has been shown by the course of history that the Islamic civilisation of the Middle Ages was not equal to that of the modern West,—and shown most drastically, in the realm of politics. We need not here describe the ever-increasing political retrogression of the Islamic world in most recent times. We all know how, last of the independent states in the world of Islam, only the sick man of the Bosporus was left, thanks to a few paltry loans to Western civilisation. At the end of the Great War even Turkey seemed to be completely marked off the list of independent states.

For a long time the world of Islam faced uncomprehendingly the slow decay which had attacked its power. Reverses, indeed, were opportunely regarded as timely punishments, all the more certain to be followed by a change of fortune. And when this change never came, then the misfortune which had overtaken the Islamic world was taken to be an omen of the approach of the end of the universe and awakened hopes of the coming of the Mahdi. But in the end the lessons of history were too eloquent and opened the eyes even of the Muslims to the inferiority of the Mediaeval Islamic civilisation to that of the modern West. But what is the result? The world of Islam to-day stands at a decisive turning-point: it is in the midst of a crisis. Has

Islam, which seems essentially bound up with that civilisation, played its part out? Is it doomed in the long run to go on pitifully pining away ? Or is Islam as a religion compatible with modern progress ? Is it separable from the civilisation of the Middle Ages to which we attach its name ? Is it capable of development ! Upon the answer to this question depends the permanency of Islam as a religion, and in a certain sense also the political and economic future of the Muslim nations.

Islam's incapability of a real reform, its inaccessibility to all progress, has been an almost unshakable dogma of Western thought. It may have been spread not merely in Christian Mission circles, which certainly often had but a very inadequate idea of Islam. Even a religious historian of the rank of E. Renan declared Islam as hostile to all science. In later times, too, a practical politician like Lord Cromer, with a knowledge of the Islamic world, was moved to express the severe judgment that a reformed Islam would be Islam no longer.

It certainly cannot be denied that there are serious grounds for the belief in the hostility of Islam to progress and its incompatibility with modern thought. However we are not concerned here with those general and therefore somewhat intangible impulses and moods of the Muslim masses which many observers in the East have claimed to establish,—such as the much-quoted fatalism, which, so far as it actually exists, has its roots perhaps more in the race and the climate than in the religion, or the wide-spread sense of superiority which is given to the Muslims by the consciousness of a revelation which builds upon Jewry and Christendom and supersedes them. Such qualities may certainly be a checking force, yet at most they are not characteristic traits of the religion, but results of it. Just as much would it miss the point of the question if we were here to speak of certain excrescences of national Islam which owe their existence to a compromise of the orthodox doctrine with deep-rooted animism and other primitive ideas. Every religious community, every evolutionary phase of a religious community

is to be judged primarily according to its recognised principles. In a special sense is this the case with a religion like Islam, in which these fundamental principles are elaborated with the utmost clearness and are even to-day regarded by the great and still solid majority as binding.

It hardly needs to be further insisted upon to-day that, in order to understand historial Islam, we must not hark back simply and directly to the founder of the religion so far as we historically know him. If we might do that, then matters would be comparatively simple. For there can be no doubt that the Muhammad of history who was not merely a prophet but also a statesman, was, after all, extremely wordly-wise, and suited himself to circumstances. The well-known answer which, according to tradition, he made to the question of a Bedouin,—"Shall I tie up my camel, or let her stray and trust to God?" "Tie her up and trust to God!" is, of course, not historical verbatim, but is not without inward truth, and this sound inheritance could not be quite lost even in the later development and establishment of Islam.

But historical Islam does not admit an arbitrary appeal to the prophet of history as valid without something more. The orthodox Sunnite Islam is the product of a long and changeful development. In the days of the prophet, Islam was a simple faith and a straightforward rule of life. It was only the speedy spread of Islam over regions more advanced in culture than was its birthplace that necessitated the establishment of a perfected system of dogma and ethics. This was effected by a clever adjustment with the mental equipment of the dwellers in the lands captured and taken over into Islam. The dogma, indeed, after severe and varying struggles, was finally reduced to a few doctrines in the meaning and interpretation of which, moreover, a pretty free scope was retained. But, as already stated, just because the Islamic church came at once into being as a state, the regulation of life, the ethics, or—more correctly let us say—the law, goes all the more into the smallest detail. The

structure of Islamic law, majestic in its way, and with a culture both religious and political, which from the very start lays claim to unchangeable validity, was finished with about the end of the 3rd (9th) century.

If, among the *Uṣūl al Fikh*, or Foundations of Law, not only the material sources of tradition, (*i.e.*, Koran and Sunna) and Judgment by Analogy, but also *Ijmā'* (*i.e.*, *consensus doctorum*, the agreement of all scholars of any age) be recognised as a just principle then a certain possibility of development seems guaranteed. In point of fact, in the end, through *Ijmā'* many a usage which seemed not at all compatible with Islam, or scarcely so, became subsequently legalised. But the action of the *Ijmā'* is always directed backwards, not forwards, it can bestow its recognition upon an accomplished fact, but it cannot be a pioneer of progress. Indeed on the other hand, this principle, by the rule that an *Ijmā'*, once made, is binding on posterity, has in practice an obstructive effect. If we also take into account that according to the authoritative view doctrine and law, from the moment of the stoppage of development, may no longer be drawn straight from the material sources; that the doorway of the *Ijtihād*, the free research in these sources, has ever since then been closed; that the method of valuation and interpretation of the original sources also,—including the differences between the four schools of law recognised as orthodox, the *Madhhabs*,—are fixed once for all by that *Ijmā'*, we see indeed that this system of law prepares the greatest difficulties for any further free development. The difficulty lies not so much in adjustment with freshly emerging problems of human life ; with these the well-versed jurist who knows how to use his instrument to suit his purposes—and the Muslim lawyer understands that quite as well as the Western one—always makes an amicable arrangement : the difficulty lies rather in the fact that a judgment which has once been made can never be revoked.

Moreover, as regards the phenomenon of the primacy of the religious element, characteristic not merely of Islam but especially of the Middle Ages ; in the subordination of all human relationships to the sphere of religion, as already indicated, the whole Eastern civilisation of the Middle Ages is now in a certain sense religiously consecrated and perpetuated by the astonishing extension of the Islamic law. Consequently the whole of the Islamic civilisation of the Middle Ages seems to have become taboo. In point of fact indeed the word Islam means for us not merely a religion in the strict sense, but this civilisation as well, and it is precisely this ambiguity of the word that is chiefly to blame for so many obscurities in the system of Islam which are everywhere met with. The very fact of the connection of religion and civilisation is the reason why the Islamic world for long opposed so absolutely the impetuous advance of Western civilisation. Certainly it was possible to take over a few European technicalities—which actually did take place in early times and more frequently later, but these elements could not be blended into a new unity with Oriental civilisation. They still remained foreign bodies adhering to the outside of the organism of Islamic civilisation.

Is, then, the question of the capability of the development of Islam in the direction of modern progress fully answered,—and that in the negative? It might appear so, nay, in strict consistency with the above-mentioned general orthodox doctrine it ought to be so. And yet it is not. Prominent Western scholars have already often asserted the possibility of the evolution of Islam, and to-day we are becoming able to say that the possibility which they asserted has begun to grow into a serious reality. If that takes place it is certainly not without a definite rupture with the fixed system with which we have hitherto been acquainted. But just at the very point where it does take place there is already a cleft at least slightly indicated.

Strange as it may sound, the road to Islamic Modernism was indicated and prepared by the most reactionary movement

of the whole of orthodox Islam. Even though the rigid system of the Uṣūl al-Fikh already described is undoubtedly the accepted orthodox one, there have always been single individuals who took the religion very seriously and who from this point of view were not willing to be deprived of the right of Ijtihād. The surrender of the Ijtihād to the Taklīd, the blind adherence to the old authorities and the rigid thraldom to one of the four Madhhabs or schools of law, seemed to them to be unworthy and unendurable. And in this claim, consciously or not, there was at the same time a limitation of the carrying out of the strict principle of the Ijmā', the *consensus doctorum*. Thus even a man of such outstanding importance and recognised by orthodoxy as the Imām al-Ghazāli, in the 11th century, claimed for himself the right of Ijtihād. And, to name but a few, later on not only the powerful Ḥanbalite, Ibn Taimiyya (14th century), but also the prolific writer Jalāll ud-Dīn as-Suyūṭī (15th century), who was Shāfi'ite, did the same. On the other hand, of the arguments which the modern Muslims bring forward against the general recognition of the principle of the Ijmā', there is at least so much to be conceded, that the exact definition of Ijmā', whether consensus of the Companions of the Prophet, or consensus of Medina, or precisely what, was long a matter of dispute until finally the broadest comprehension of the term prevailed. But above all the great theologians of the one of the four orthodox sects most faithful to the Sunna, that of the Ḥanbalites, fought hard for the Ijtihād against the Taklīd, in the interests of fidelity to the Sunna. Ibn Taimiyya, already mentioned (1263-1328) and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyya (1292-1356), in this same struggle, declared bitter warfare upon numerous Bid'a's—"innovations"—as well as reverence for holy things in any form. And from their way of thought there arose in the course of the 18th century in Arabia the Wahhābi Puritanism which at the beginning of the 19th century even took possession of the Holy Cities, banned all innovations,—including even the notable one of the use of tobacco and coffee,—and did not spare even the

worship of relics which flourished in the Holy Cities. The doctrines of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, the originator of this movement, may be said to be exactly identical with those of Ibn Taimiyya. He seeks to revive the Islam of Muḥammad and his Companions and does not understand people being unwilling to allow him direct and complete recourse to the Koran and the Sunna. And even when he safeguards himself from the reproach of not recognising the Ijmā', he in reality limits its power so strictly that properly speaking it is no longer compatible with the doctrine of the church. Even the most of the Bid'a's which he mercilessly opposed, and indeed flatly termed "unbeliefs" were actually admitted by the church through the Ijmā'. At the height of the disputes even men like Ibn Taimiyya and the Wahhābis also, when Muḥammad 'Alī of Egypt took up the fight against them, were accused of heresy by their adversaries. Strictly speaking, they actually did, according to the prevailing doctrine, tear to shreds the uniting bond of the Islamic community and placed themselves outside the church. On the other side, however, the Wahhābis only take their place on the extreme right wing of the Hanbalites, the harshest of the four recognised Madhhabs. And as in course of time Ibn Taimiyya was judged more leniently, many good Muslims, after the disappearance of the Wahhābi danger, did not draw the final conclusions concerning the Arab iconoclasts.

The effect of the Wahhābi movement was not at an end with the overthrow of its political power and the destruction of its capital Dar'iyya in Nejd in 1818. Its doctrine has been maintained in the interior of Arabia until the present day. In 1924 the Wahhābi kingdom again united within itself the greater part of the peninsula. Its great political leader, 'Abd al-Azīz ibn Sa'ūd, is to-day again recognised master of the Holy Cities. Even though the Wahhābi entry there was far from being so rude as it was 100 years before, and though they certainly do not take up an attitude of blind opposition to the technical progress of modern times, still they have not abandoned

their religious doctrines. There is no question now-a-days of a heresy charge by the church against Wahhābis. But there is another thing more important for us. Early in the 19th century the Wahhābi movement encroached upon other Islamic lands,—India chiefly, and Egypt also. But particularly its call for a return to the real original Islam and for a renouncement of the later innovations and the subtleties of the Fukahā has acted as an exhortation to join it, upon earnest Muslims far beyond the circle of its actual adherents,—men who would have nothing to do with the Wahhābis' enmity to progress. It is precisely because of this that Wahhābism has become of the greatest significance for the later reform movement, and hence must not be overlooked here, even though we may not be everywhere able to show the connecting lines with sufficient clearness.

At the head of nearly all the more recent reform movements there stands a personality which has certainly nothing to do with Wahhābism. This is the man whom Goldziher rightly terms "one of the most remarkable figures of Islam in the 19th century, Jemāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897). He was at once philosopher, author, orator and journalist, but more than anything else, a politician." So he is described by E. G. Browne in his monumental work "The Persian Revolution." Jemāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, whom an adventurous career brought from Afganistan through the whole of the Islamic world, to Europe, and possibly even America, is generally considered—and no doubt justly so—as the father of the Pan-Islamic idea, in which the idea is not to be regarded as equivalent to a direct transition into practical politics as 'Abd al-Ḥamīd II tried to make it. He was certainly in the first place the prophet of a political combination of the Muslims against Western Imperialism, but at the same time he was deeply imbued with the feeling of the need of a regeneration of the Islamic world by the introduction of less rigid regulations and by breaking with the prevailing traditionalism. As Jemāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī wrote comparatively little except journalistic productions with a pronounced political

tendency, which were certainly uncommonly effective for that sort of literature, it is difficult to be just to his personality and its influence upon the future,—an influence which can hardly be over-estimated. In spite of the stir which he excited even in the West, the process of his inward development is hardly quite clear and intelligible, and perhaps never will be. We neither know the sources of his great flow of positive suggestions, nor does his work result in a precise formula. His power in personally teaching and suggesting was greater than his power as an author. So we must judge him mainly by the fruits which he brought to maturity. And here it is indisputable that certain of his disciples who are among the greatest supporters and most influential representatives of Islamic Modernism acknowledge that they are indebted to him for their best work.

When Jemāl ad-Dīn came before the public, voices had already been raised here and there in British India advocating, though plainly apologetically, vigorous reforms within Islam. We do not exactly know how far Jemāl ad-Dīn is connected with the beginnings of the Indian movement at its rise or later. Both tendencies meet as they operate, and to-day, at any rate, Jemāl ad-Dīn stands as the great pioneer even for the young Indians. The ground was prepared in India at the beginning of the 19th century by certain national movements which were influenced more or less by the Arab Wahhābism, and in fact almost exactly coincided with it. But it is not these severely puritanical mass-movements which have given the lead to the Indian trend towards reform. Indian Modernism proceeds from a small highly-educated class, but the agreement of many of its demands with the views of the Wahhābis is perhaps to be explained by the coinciding impulse which radiated from the Arab centre. The current of Indian reform has grown to an intellectual force in earlier times through men like, for instance, Sayyid Aḥmed Khān, the founder of the High School of Aligarh (d. 1898), and more recently through men like Amīr 'Ali and S. Khudā Bukhsh. These Indians are deeply impressed

by the fact which is plainly showing itself, especially in their native country, that it is to their own serious detriment that the Muslims shut themselves off from western civilisation. Unlike Jemāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, they are, as a rule, not directly recruited from politicians. They really regard the overlordship of England in India as necessary and therefore at present desirable. Nor is it primarily religious aspects that have elicited their zeal. They have learned the value of western civilisation and are so deeply impressed by the backwardness of Muslim circles, that as good Muslims,—for so they consider themselves—they feel the urgent need to make it plain that genuine Islam is in no wise opposed to modern civilisation nay, that in reality it is the only religion really friendly to culture and progress. The *genuine* Islam,—there is the rub! For they cannot deny that the Islam hitherto prevalent hinders true progress in many ways. That is the result, they say, of the fact that independent research into the original sources of the religion—Ijtihād—was forbidden, and people have submitted in blind Taklid to the Ijmā' of a bygone stage of culture, by which measures necessitated by current events were given the value of perpetually valid laws, and the views of later generations were put on an equality with the revelation of the Prophet. Even the unquestioning acceptance of the contents of the Hadīth or tradition, so heterogenous and varying in value, is definitely refused. On the other hand, the sublimity of the Koran is given the greatest prominence. The Indian reformers thought—not always with historical accuracy—that they could appeal to the Mu'tazilites, who were of course represented as liberal thinkers, as the patterns and precursors of the new reformed Islam, and even for a time, with this notion, gave themselves the name of New Mu'tazilites. With great diligence and penetration they sought to prove by a sensible and practical interpretation of the Koran, and also, in so far as it coincided with their own ideas, by the use of the Hadīth, that the genuine Islam made an absolute demand for the cultivation of science

and could not clash with its results at all. The result, indeed, was the picture of an original Islam much idealised. The mode of interpretation is frequently a rationalism which to us to-day is somewhat unusually exacting, however possible it was in western theology 100 years before. If the methods which Islamic modernism made temporary use of—and in fact still frequently employs—may not always stand strict historical criticism, still it would have been a mistake to belittle the brave struggle of these men over problems which they have so much at heart. The essential thing is not the method but the aim. And clearly this is nothing else than the setting free of the religion of Islam from the fetters of the "Islamic" civilisation of the middle ages. What wonder is it that the first steps towards realising this astonishingly bold project, amounting in fact to a denial of the much-vaunted Islamic law, are not yet being made with the security which only long practice usually gives to the impartial critic, but here and there seem to be impeded by a quite comprehensible piety? But at the same time the ground for clearer historical understanding is already broken by the expression of the idea that regulations of the Prophet, made necessary by current events, could not possibly claim to be perpetually valid. Indeed, even these initial weaknesses are being at last overcome and the step "from rationalistic apologetics to a perception of the history of religion" is being accomplished at least gradually.

Arising from very different motives, Islamic Modernism in Egypt arrives at very similar results often by the same paths. In Egypt, which for centuries possessed, in the world-famous Azhar University, the most important centre of Islamic learning, though its system had long been obsolete and was ever growing more rigid, the reform movement is inseparably bound up with the name of Muḥammed ' Abduh, the most enthusiastic and outstanding personal disciple of Jemāl ad-Dīn Afghānī. Muḥammed 'Abduh, as student and young lecturer in Theology passed through long and severe spiritual crises before the striking

personality of Jemāl ad-Dīn, while the latter was staying in Egypt, showed him the path he was henceforth to tread. Later still, this path led him through many inward and outward struggles, and, indeed,—in connection with the 'Arābi movement—brought upon him a fairly long term of banishment from Egypt, until at last, as Rector of the Azhar University and as Mufti of Egypt, he gained the highest public recognition and the greatest influence, though he still was, even more than ever, an object of the bitterest hostility to the strictly orthodox circles. Even though, throughout his development, there is the suggestion of a distinct tinge of the Egyptian course of reform,—Muḥammed 'Abduh was a zealous champion against western influence, it is on the other hand best characterised by the name given to it by Goldziher,—a cultured Wahhābism. As a matter of fact, with the factors mentioned, sufficient hypotheses for Muḥammed 'Abduh's reformed theology are plain, and there is no need whatever to take for granted his dependence upon Indian Modernism for which we have no sure facts to go upon. The name "cultured Wahhābism," coined by Goldziher, does not imply that this movement came direct from Wahhābism, but only that, like the latter, in contra-distinction to the Indian culture movement, it is governed by a religious or theological motive, by the tendency to do away with abuses which corrupted the religion of Islam and rendered it obsolete. But there will hardly be any doubt that this movement is indirectly but essentially produced by the far-reaching stimulus given by Arab puritanism. It is that religious and theological motive which produces Muḥammed 'Abduh and his school, which has its scientific organ in the newspaper *al-Manār* run by the Syrian Shaikh Rashīd Ridā and whose aim is to combat the Madhhāb system founded upon the Ijmā' and the Taklīd, and to demand the freedom of Ijtihād based upon the Koran and the authentic Sunna. The deeply religious personality of Muḥammed 'Abduh, who had himself gone through the school of Sufism, postulates that the reformed Islam of Egyyt, as

opposed to that of the Indian Modernists, is remarkable for a decidedly more conservative spirit, and sounds a more passionate and pious note. But since belief in the sublimity of the revelation is coupled with the no less firm conviction that science and religion, properly understood, cannot come into conflict at all,—that they are sisters,—this spirit does not deter Muḥammed 'Abduh from accommodating himself, with the utmost freedom, to the requirements of scientific progress. Indeed, occasionally the blunt pronouncement is made that in a possible conflict between reason and tradition the former should be followed, or even that the requirements of the common good and the circumstances of the time are to be considered in preference to an explicit text. The subtleties of the *Fukahā* are rejected by Muḥammed 'Abduh and his school, and in place of the old faulty Ijmā', a new one arrived at by Ijtihād from the original sources, and meeting present-day conditions, is required. In this way, like the Wahhābis, by appeal to the great Ḥanbalite, Ibn Taimiyya, we come to the rejection of the worship of saints and all sorts of other superstitious abuses. But at the same time, and differing from the latter in following al-Ghazālī, we come to the attempt to make the religion of the law deeper and more ethical, and further, in the firm conviction of the unsurpassability of the true Islam untouched by the change of ages, terminating in the endeavour to make the religion suit every real advance of development.

(To be continued)

T. H. Weir

PLURALISTIC ATTACK ON THE CLASSIC CONCEPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Introduction

Society is dynamic, so too the scientific theories devised to explain social phenomena and relationships. We need not therefore be surprised to find that the classic theory of sovereignty of the state which has held the field for more than three centuries with slight modifications in form to suit the varying demands of different ages is being challenged by a new school of political thought, we mean, the Pluralists as they have come to be known. Unlike the anarchists or the Syndicalists the Pluralists do not challenge the state as such, but their attack is directed against the sovereignty or that attribute of the state which clothes it with legal omnicompetence, the authority to pervade every sphere of social life of man and to compel obedience to whatever it declares as " law " irrespective of contents. This, they say, is taking an exaggerated view of the importance of state and is hardly consistent with the developments in the complex political and economic relationships of the present-day world. The theory may have played its part in a state of society threatened with disruption and tired of anarchy and chaos resulting from a conflict of jurisdiction between competing authorities in the middle ages; but in the present day world with its crying economic and social problem demanding a decentralised and federal social structure to solve them satisfactorily such a theory is hopelessly out of place. Facts have already given the lie to the theory. Hence they say, a new theory of state and sovereignty is necessary to square with modern developments in social organisation. Their position in politics is analogous to that of Realists in literature. They want to bridge over the gulf between the metaphysical

abstraction of political theory and the realities of actual life in society and to present political theory in terms of social and political facts of the present day.

Historical Background

The classic theory—or let us say the monistic theory of sovereignty—dates back to the latter part of the sixteen century when it was expounded by the famous French publicist Bodin who defined the state as an association of families and their common possessions, governed by a supreme power and by reason and sovereignty as " Supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by laws." His theory may thus be described as " nothing but a demand for the unified organisation of authority within the community in order to provide the necessary basis for a system of legal order, the answer of an advancing civilisation to the unbearable legal confusion of the middle ages"—a confusion arising from the ceaseless conflict between the competing authorities, *viz.*, the emperor, the church, the monarch and the baron. It laid the foundation of the national state on the basis of a strong national monarchy. The theory was later developed by Hugo Grotius and Themas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, Rousseau in the eighteenth century and Austin in the nineteenth. By the time Rousseau handled the theory the national state became an accomplished fact under the influence of strong autocratic monarchs. So while keeping intact the nature of the state and contents of sovereignty he shifted its seat from the monarch to the people. Austin approached the problem of sovereignty from a new angle, that is, from the standpoint of a jurist and attempted a clarification of thought, by dispelling the mist of confused ideas that came to hang round the theory of sovereignty with the progress of democracy levened by the doctrine of Rousseau. Unlimited authority of sovereign power came to be questioned as being incompatible with the postulates of democracy. Austin

did a service to political thought by clearly distinguishing between the legal aspect of sovereignty from its political aspect and defined juristic sovereign as the ultimate human superior or a determinate human organ for drawing the line between what is law and what is not law without any reference to the political or factual considerations that influence the sovereign in such determination of legal norms. From the legal standpoint at least the state came to be the supreme organisation within the community, and an essential institution of society supplying in its capacity as an exclusive agency of law an indispensable means whereby men having common and competing interests can live together rationally.

Throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth some new tendencies in political thought combined to raise the pretensions of the state to portentious dimensions and tended to make it sit like an octopus on the life of individuals and associations. Pluralistic thought came by way of protest and reaction against this process of the exaltation of the state to giddy heights. Among these we may mention—the idealist school of German philosophy led by Kant, Hegel, Fichte and others and also the Oxford school in England headed by Green, Bradley and Bosanquet, the socialistic theory, and the optimistic theory of the Benthamites who pinned their faith in social reform through legislation. All these acted in the same direction, *viz.*, extending the horizon of the state and making it the pre-eminent organisation is society. But at the same time a new development in the economic sphere was coming to the fore in the wake of the Industrial revolution. Powerful economic groups came to be formed to protect the interests of the producers, the consumers as well as the capitalists. The state had to confront these powerful economic groups and the problem arose how to fit them into the social polity without impairing the pre-eminence of the state. The industrial revolution had also another very far-reaching consequence in opening up closer intercourse between nations by the development of international

commerce and facilities of inter-communication. This had the effect of widening the horizon of men's sympathies beyond the boundaries of the national state. Social grouping came to be based on interests rather than on territory. The labourers of England came to perceive greater community of interests with those of Russia or India rather than with the intellectual classes in their own country and their allegiance to the state came to compete with their allegiance to the Third International. Thus forces were at work in the new era ushered in by the Industrial Revolution which seemed to run counter to the sovereignty of the national state. On the other hand the theories noticed above had their repercussions in practical politics which precipitated the challenge that was imminent. Under the influence of these theories the state came to grow into a veritable Leviathan extending its long arms and bringing within its ambits every sphere of human life and activity till it threatened to crush the personality of citizens. This gave rise to a searching of hearts among sociologists and political philosophers.

Has the state any divine right to pre-eminence among all other social groups and is such pre-eminence in the best interest of society? Is there any such thing as the general will? Has not general will come, in fact, to be identical with the will of the powers that be? Is not passive submission to the laws of the state which are, in other words, the dispensation of a handful of men temporarily in authority—a surrender of human personality and as such detrimental to the true interests of society? Is the state competent to provide by its laws for the varied needs and the conflicting interests of the complex social organisation of to-day? These are the questions that agitated the mind of a certain section of political philosophers who set about reconstructing the theory of the nature of the state which they deemed, was called for by the new forces acting in the present day society. This school of political thinkers has come to be known as the Pluralists.

The Pluralistic Position.—The precursors of the pluralistic school are a group of writers who laid emphasis on the personality of the corporations within the state each of these being marked by a group consciousness among their members. The names of these writers deserving mention in these connection are Otto V. Gierke, F. W. Maitland, M. J. Paul Boncour, Emile Durkheim, Dr. J. N. Figgis. The central idea and the common feature in the discussions of all these writers who enlarge on the social value of the purposive associations is that in "present age the state is confronted not only by unassociated individuals but also by other associations evolving independently, fulfiling essential social ends, eliciting individual loyalties, better adapted than the state, through their special membership, their special forms of organisation and means of action for serving various social needs. Few, however, of these authors can be regarded as having clearly reached the pluralistic goal of non-sovereign state." This opened up a new vista of thought and furnished a convenient starting point for the pluralistic attacks on the classic theory of sovereignty and the reconstruction of a new theory of state more consonant with the complex structure of modern society. As Laski observes, " The state is only one of the associations to which the individual happens to belong, and you must give it exactly the pre-eminence and no more to which on the particular occasion of conflict its possibly superior moral claim will entitle it. In my view it does not attempt to take that pre-eminence by force, it wins it by consent." ("Studies in Problem of Sovereignty," p. 19.) They deny the abstract and metaphysical character imputed to the state by the classic school and view it from the standpoint of the pragmatist as simply one of the many organs of society with a distinct end in view, *viz.*, the co-ordination and harmonization of the other purposive groups, run by ordinary human beings with all the failings and frailties that flesh is heir to. As such, theoretically it is neither feasible nor desirable that it should control all interests of man and dominate every sphere of human life and

activity. As a matter of fact the state has failed miserably in the task of adjustment of the conflicting and varied interests in society with all its omnicompetence and absolutism. So they would rewrite the theory of sovereignty of the state specially in its relation to other social groups and to law, as also in its relation to other states from the standpoint of the pragmatist—so much as to its critical side. In its practical and constructive side it has borne fruit in the various proletarian movements for decentralisation of social control on a federal basis—either functional or territorial in character, *viz.*, syndicalism, guild, Socialism, Bolshevism, etc.

Let us now discuss the attitude of the pluralists to the relation of the state to law. All pluralists dispute the exclusive claim of the state or some sovereign organisation within the state to make laws binding on all individuals and associations within its jurisdiction. To put it in a nutshell—the will of the state, if only expressed through properly constituted channels cannot pass as law. It must face the competing wills of other social groups and in order to receive the compliance of individuals it must prove its superior moral value over the dicta of other rival organisations to which the individuals happen to belong. The validity of law is not dependent on its source as the monist holds but on the nature of its contents, or the end it serves, on its evaluation by the individual and his voluntary acceptance on the basis of evaluation of the rules issued by rival groups. The criterion employed in such evaluation is, of course, the end proposed to be promoted by such competing dicta. Law emerges, therefore, through the Darwinian process of the survival of the fittest, the judgment of the individual being the sole arbiter of fitness from the standpoint of social and moral values. and the state is only one of the competitors in the field Du Guit and Krabbe even go to suggest that the state far from being the author of, and as such, above laws, is itself bound by law. Law according to Du Guit means all rules of conduct binding on men living in society irrespective of their

political relations. The obligations involved in land do not arise from the fact that they are decreed by some organised authority but are imposed by the conditions of social life, by the fact that men must live in society and in order to survive must follow certain rules of conduct. This is called by Du Guit "social solidarity." Men must be guided in their behaviour by the ends of social solidarity and not by certain artificial rules created by a public authority.

The position of Krabbe is a little different from that of Du Guit. According to him also law is not purely subjective, its legal character depending on its source. Something else is necessary to give legal validity to certain rules of conducts. This something else is, in his view, "men's feeling or sense of right." But Krabbe is conscious that there is no universally accepted criterion of right or wrong, it is always relative. He is not disposed to leave it to each individual like Laski, for that would lead to disruption of society and anarchy. "The purpose of a community can be realised only if there is a single legal rule,"[1] he says. But how is this unity of legal rule to be secured? Here he seems almost to come back to the monistic position. In the absence of anything better he accepts the principle of majority as determining the rule of conduct to be accepted as law in community; only the legislative organ should be so organised as to reflect the sense of the right of the majority of the people both qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

He observes: "If the sense of right of the members of a community differs regarding the rules to be followed, those rules possess a higher value which are desired as rules of law by a majority of members (assuming a qualitative equality in the sense of right of the members) since there cannot be a single rule except by recognising the principle of the majority, the communal life which controls our consciousness and makes the sense

[1] John Dickson, "A working theory of Sovereignty," Pol. Science, Quarterly, Vol. XLII.

of right effective in us, carries with it the obligation to govern our conduct according to the rules approved by the majority." [2]

Laski's Position.—Laski's attitude on this point is more critical than constructive. He is more concerned with demonstrating the insufficiency of the juristic theory to meet real situations in modern society rather than giving some constructive suggestion as to the criterion of legal conduct in modern community as has been furnished by Du Guit or Krabbe. He challenges the pretensions of the state to passive obedience to its commands or laws on the part of the individual citizen on historical, rational and moral grounds and calls upon the individual to take an Athanasius attitude towards the laws of the state. Laws of the state as such have no superior claim to recognition except when they prove their worth to the individual by comparison with rules affecting the same interest prescribed by other associations to which he belongs. The individual is thus faced with rival sets of rules on every subject emanating from different organisations and is to make his choice among them in the light of his own knowledge and conscience. But what is to happen when the choice of one conflicts with that of others, or what criterion is to guide the individual in his choice? To these questions Laski gives us no satisfactory answer.

As he observes—

"The history of societies fatally contradicts the view that in a crisis only the state will have power of compulsion. What of certain miners in South Wales? What of certain unionists in Ulster? Of militant suffragists? Did not to them the wills of certain groups other than the state conflict with it and prove more intense in their demand? Such *marginal cases* will in all probability be rare but there is no sort of guarantee that they will not occur."

2. A History of Political Theories, recent times, p. 93. Merriam and Barnes.

"Then it will be protested if you justify resistance to the state. You deny that each state must possess a legally determinate superior whose will is certain of acceptance. But it is surely evident that no such instrument does exist. We have nowhere the assurance that any rule of conduct can be enforced. For that rule will depend for its validity upon the opinion of the members of the state and they may belong to other groups to which such rules may be obnoxious."[3]

In his "Grammar of Politics," he assails the classic theory of sovereignty in all its threefold aspect—as an incident in the process of historical evolution, as a theory of law "making of right merely the expression of a particular will without reference to what that will contains," and finally as a theory of political organisation insisting on the existing within every social order of "some single centre of ultimate reference, some power that is able to resolve disputes by saying a last word that will be obeyed."

Historically its bankruptcy has been proved, he holds, by the historical school led by Maine and others as it fails to square with facts in ancient communities and even in many oriental countries at the present day. Laski goes a step further and says that even in western civilisation it is useless if we are not disposed to ignore plain facts. It arose in response to the demand of a unified social order to supplant the chaos and anarchy of the mediaeval European society, but now it is a spent force with fresh economic and political developments. Sovereignty as conceived in the classic theory, nowhere exists at present as a political fact, nor is it any longer morally justifiable in the present state of human civilisation.

"From the political angle" he says "such a view as will be argued, is of dubious correctness in fact, and it is at least probable that it has dangerous moral consequences. It will be here argued that it would be of lasting benefit to political science if

[3] Krabbe, Modern Idea of State, p. 74.

the whole concept of sovereignty were surrendered. That, in fact, with which we are dealing is power; and what is important in the nature of power is the end it seeks to serve and the way in which it serves that end. These are both questions of evidence which are related to, but independent of, the rights that are born of legal structure. **** The problem before us has become, because of the unified interests of mankind, that of bending the modern state to the interests of humanity. The dogmas we use to that end are relatively of little import so long as we are assured that the end is truly served."[4]

As a theory of political organisation the theory of sovereignty, in his opinion, has also become hopelessly inadequate with the broadening of the horizon of human interests in every field of activity. National state organised on the basis of sovereignty no longer suffices to realise the highest ends of human existence. Society has become federal in character. It has activities of which the nature interests every member of the society ; it has activities also that are primarily specific in their incidence. General activities of the first kind belong to the state, though that does not imply an identical form of organisation. Activities of the second kind interest the state only in so far as their results bear upon the rest of the community.

Specific interests require specific organisations crossing the boundaries of the national state and ramifying through every part of the world with control of the state limited only to such part of their activities as has bearing on the general interests. The interests of the Welsh miners are more akin to those of India than to the interests of the English Railway-men and as such would be best promoted by a world federation of miners than by the British Parliament. But even in the sphere of the general interests of the community the state should no longer exercise exclusive jurisdiction in view of the closer bond of international co-operation and fellowship which is reflected in the

4. *Ibid.*

growth of a body of international regulations which are or must be effective in the international community as municipal law in the state, if civilisation is not doomed. It is no use brushing aside this cold fact to keep up the integrity of the theory of state sovereignty by saying that they are voluntary self-imposed limitations. There is already a tendency towards the growth of an international organisation which is to back up the system of international regulations with sanctions similar in character though not in form to those behind the municipal laws. Thus a new international order is looming on the horizon of world-politics in which the national state with unified legal control is fast becoming out of place. Pending the growth of a full-fledged international organisation of the type of Dante's universal Empire there would be intervening stages in which legal control is to be partitioned between the state and international organisation on the basis of the nature of the interests affected. In short, the pluralists stand for a theory of divided sovereignity and divided allegiance in the sphere of international relationships.

Thus Laski observes, " Internationally, it is not difficult to conceive the organisation of an allegiance which reaches beyond the limits of the the state.....When state sovereignity in international affairs was recognised, there was no authority existent to which that type of control might be entrusted. It is at least arguable now that an authority predominant over states may be conceived to which is entrusted the regulation of those affairs of more than national interest. That is clear in the case of War.....Wherever, in short, the interests of a unified and interdependent world seem to demand an international code of conduct, the corporate organisation of that standard and its corporate application, are at least conceivable. *It involves* at any rate *on the international side, the abolition of state sovereignty:* It sees the state simply as a unit in a society of states, the will of which would then be set by a process in which it would have no final say. It even implies, as the

acceptance of this doctrine grows, a duty on the part of the individual citizen of a recalcitrant state to look beyond the emotional penumbra of patriotism to the issue of conflict." He would thus reconstruct the theory of political obligation on a new basis, *viz.*, the fact of world interdependence and the recognition of society as "a complex of functions none of which is limited by the concept of final allegiance to a given state." "In a creative civilisation", he says, " what is important is not the historical accident of separate states but the fact of world-interdependence.....The real obligation of obedience is to the total interests of our fellowmen." [5] It is, he believes, in the acceptance of this new international order that the solution of the problem of world peace lies. Thus he observes, "Once we realise that the well-being of the world is, in all large issues, one and indivisible, the co-ordinate determination of them is the primary condition of social peace. * * Exclusive sovereignty of states in relation to other states is dangerous both morally and meterially. Common life of the great society must be regulated by an international fellowship—common and concerted decision of men." [6]

Critical Examination of the Pluralistic Position

So far we have surveyed the circumstances that led to the rise of the pluralistic school and also attempted to explain the pluralistic position in all its aspects. In doing so we have naturally laid special emphasis on the views of Prof. Laski as being the latest exponent of the theory and the most vigorous opponent of the monistic theory. Now we shall try to see how far there is real conflict between the points of view of these two rival schools of thought and what contribution this new school has made to recent political thought. We shall begin by examining their attitude towards the relation of state to law.

[5] Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, Laski, p. 12.

[6] Grammar of Politics, pp. 44-45.

The classic or jurisdic school believes in one and only one source of legal control within a community inhabiting a distinct geographical unit marked off from other such units. A rule of conduct cannot be accepted as a law within the community, however just or expedient or desirable it may be until and unless it is formally pronounced by the ultimate law-making organ within the community and when a rule is formally laid down by this authority there is only one attitude for the individual to take that of meek submission, willing if possible, under protest, if not. Disobedience to law may be perfectly moral but certainly not legal. It is a challenge to the existing social order—be it good, bad or indifferent—and must be punished if that order is to be maintained. What the law is and what the law should be,—they insist on keeping these questions quite distinct issues. They start with the hypothesis that a legal order is preferable to anarchy and as the only alternative to legal order is anarchy it is better to put up with even a tyrant than go back to a state of nature. After accepting one supreme law-making authority the next problem and perhaps the more important one is to see that it be so circumstanced as to ensure the making of good law only. This is essentially a problem of organisation. But before that it is necessary that there should be one and only one authority for distinguishing between what is and what is not law.

In opposition to this subjective conception of law the pluralists put forward an objective one. Law is not law simply because it emanates from one particular source rather than another but rather because it contributes to a social purpose. Its claim to obedience lies not in its form but in its object of view. Du Guit and Krabbe lay down their own standards—'social solidarity' and 'men's sense of right' respectively—by reference to which the legality of a rule of conduct is to be tested and even the state is not above these standards. But the question arises who is to be the judge as to whether a rule conforms to these standards. Krabbe being more practical

insists on the unity of legal rule and accepts the principle of decision by majority. But others seem to make the individuals and associations affected by the law the judge as to its validity and obedience conditional on this judgment in each particular case. The thing is, the Pluralists in their zeal for moral and ethical considerations which are by no means unimportant completely ignore the social and political implications of the attitude they advocate. Human nature being what it is, whatever the philosophical anarchists say to the contrary, there can be only two alternative conditions in society—a system of legal order or a régime of anarchy. Pluralists would be hardly favour the latter alternative, for unlike anarchists they are not for abolishing all social control but merely for changing its character. But if anarchy is to be averted we cannot do without sovereignty in the legal sense that is a single ultimate law declaring and law-enforcing agency. The pre-supposition of a system of legal order in the existence of a body of uniform and easily ascertainable general rules producing like decisions in like cases unless there is a single final source of law or say, an organ for ultimate reference in case of conflict between rival codes we cannot have that uniformity so essential to a condition of peace and harmony. This does not imply that there can be only one authority within the state to evolve rules of conduct for the whole community on all conceivable topics. On the other hand every particular social group has a distinct function or mission and is best competent to shape the rules to be followed by its members for the satisfactory performance of its function. These rules will form part of the code of civic conduct, although non-legal in their character but when these come into conflict with similar rules issued by some other association it is for the state to step in to adjust the differences and to strike a compromise consistent with the larger interests the community as a whole and at the same time satisfying the competitive demands of the associations as far as practicable. The rules that finally emerge in such a case are legal rules.

But legal rules ordinarily supplement the non-legal rules existing side by side and operating within limited areas of human interest; they supplant the latter only when the common welfare of the community demands it. It is for the sovereign to determine the occasion, scope and also the solution of such demand. As one writer has very ably pointed out, "Juristically it makes little difference what particular organisation is recognised as having ultimate law-making authority, so long *as one and only* one such organisation is recognised within the community in order that all the rules entitled to be called laws may form a harmonious and unified system.***The study of sources of other non-legal rules is an important part of politics but there is no reason to confuse it with the specific problem to which the term sovereignty is conveniently applied." [7]

Then it is not suggested by the political monist that law has no reference to any other consideration—social, political or ethical—than the will of the sovereign. The sovereign does not create laws *ex rihilo* but out of the materials already in the community—a complexus of opinions, prejudices, habits and customs and desires, etc. As a matter of fact a law cannot pass current as such in the community for a long time unless it be based on these materials either by becoming a dead letter or by provoking universal resistance. The point of the monist is that within a community there can be only one agency for creating uniform code of conduct out of these materials. "The legal sovereign is the ultimate source of law not in the sense of being an uncaused cause or an unmotivated author, but in the sense that only that which passes through it has the force of law and only after having passed through it received its stamp of validity. The important thing is that it is his act which entitles them to be called laws, which puts on them the stamp and genuine hallmark of law, although some men or many men have insisted all along that they should be law and have even called them law.

[7] Laksi, Grammar of Politics, p. 48.

The Sovereign is thus an organ of final choice." The question may be raised—what is the citizen to do if the sovereign systematically flouts popular opinions, desires and judgments and arbitrarily imposes its will ? Ordinarily the citizen's duty lies in bringing pressure to bear upon the sovereign to change such laws within the legal order, to effect a re-organisation of the sovereign organ in such a way as to make it responsive to popular demands but if reform is absolutely impossible with the maintenance of legal order a revolution with a consequent plunge into anarchy may be advocated in the last resort. But this is only a counsel of despair and should be adopted only when other peaceful and constitutional methods fail with a full consciousness of the consequences of a state of anarchy, and only with a view to establishing a better régime of law. A régime of law may not be without its blemishes but it is certainly more conducive to the promotion of the ends of human existence than a sustained state of anarchy. Hence although sovereignty is not taken as an inseparable incident of man's life in society—occasional breaks being quite possible and sometimes justifiable—yet it is a sort of working hypothesis in orderly life in society. Sovereignty in the legal sense and a condition of peace and harmony ordinarily go together, although not approximating to an ideal condition. As the writer quoted above puts it, " It (sovereignty) is simply a key-element in a pattern of possible organisation to which actual practice may or may not conform but which remains the only type or organisation capable of sustaining what we mean by a régime of law. It is true that even an organisation built on the lines of the pattern always function perfectly as it is supposed to do so." [8] In the complex social structure of the present day with interests of different individuals and groups so much interlocked if we do not accept a legal order with a single supreme law-making authority we offer people an inducement to take the law each in his own hand and throw

[8] *Ibid*, p. 66.

the door open to disorder and anarchy. The Pluralists like Laski by advocating the inculcation of an Athanaseus attitude on the part of the individual citizen are simply working up to that end. The analogy of natural selection in the physical world proves to be quite false when applied to social categories. There is no certainty that the rightful cause will in the long run prevail. The question of obedience to laws even when they do not square with one's personal predilections or sense of right or justice raises, therefore, a far more important issue than the question of agreement or disagreement in a particular case between the state's law and the dictates of conscience and reason, it involves the larger issue of the desirability of maintaining public authority and consequently civil society itself. There are certainly limitations and dangers of a system of positive law however perfectly the machinery of law-making may be fashioned but to abandon it because of these is to invite many such systems with all similar defects and absence of peace and order to boot. We cannot expect to have the cake of order without having to pay the price of obedience to some common authority and when we cannot in any case do without such control, one tyrant is preferable to many.

In the light of the discussion above it will appear that there is no real contradiction involved in the attitude of the pluralists and the classical school on the question of the relation of law to state. Each of them lays special emphasis on one aspect of law—the classical school on its formal and subjective aspect and the pluralistic school on its political and objective aspect. Even conceding all that the pluralist means by law we need not refute the truth of the classic theory. There is no objection to there being a multiplicity of sources of law provided that before they can be enforced they must receive the hall-mark of approval of the state. The political monist lays emphasis on the importance of keeping the idea of law distinct from other kinds of rules and imperatives which have influence on human conduct and relations but in doing so he does not necessarily rule them out.

What he insists upon is that they can assume a compulsive and universal character only from one ultimate authority in the community. It is by a combination of these theories that we attain to a true philosophy of law. Then alone we understand that law is not simply a formal command of a metaphysical abstraction called the legal sovereign but it is the expression of the ethos or the inner self of the community.

Let us now examine the pluralistic attitude to the question of the relation of state to other purposive groups—political, economic or religious. We begin with the propounders of the historical and legal theory of corporations like Otto V. Gierke and Maitland who believe in the real personality of such groups and thus serve as the precursors of the pluralistic theory of non-sovereign state. Although conceding autonomy to the various groups where their special interests are cencerned they would retain reserve powers in the state for effecting a co-ordination among the groups and deciding questions where common interests are concerned. But the point is who is to draw the line between special interests and common interests, who is to determine the scope of the powers of the various corporations and the state? If it be the state we come back to the monistic position, for the political monist does not want more than this that the state should determine the limit of its own competence and that of other groups and individuals. One might answer that the authority of settling jurisdiction between the state and other groups may be given to an impartial tribunal, but the question arises who is to appoint the judges and who is to lay down rules for the guidance of the judges in such cases. We come back again to some ultimate controlling authority that is, to a "legal sovereign." In a word, the whole position of these writers—that the evolution of self-conscious corporations with distinct social ends and serving specific social needs calls for a re-statement of the theory of state in its relation to such groups, that they are entitled to a status somewhat more exalted than that of isolated

individuals is untenable. We cannot give them such a special position without undermining the fabric of social order. All that can be done in recognition of their importance to society is to give them full internal autonomy, to provide them with every opportunity for self-expression so far as is compatible with similar opportunity for other groups and individuals, the state ordinarily remaining in the back-ground and interposing as an arbiter only when there is a clash of interests. In other words the state stands essentially in the same relationship with the individual and the group. The individual has also his sphere of autonomy, opportunity of self-expression granted by the state. If any difference in treatment is to be made between the individual and the group in view of their special importance in social economy it is only one of degree and not of kind.

Let us now consider the position of the more advanced Pluralists such as Du Guit, Krabbe, Laski and others. They do not believe in the much vaunted general will of state or its inherent divinity as postulated by the Hegelians. They approach the state from the realistic standpoint and take it as it is and as it acts through its governmental machinery in every day life. The will of the state is but the will of a small coterie of persons who happen for the time being to hold the reins of government. Hence it has no morally superior claim to the allegiance of individuals who are affiliated to a number of such associations. The state must win allegiance by consent and not by force. Every individual is subject to competing loyalties and the state cannot expect to absorb his whole loyalty. The duty of the individual where his loyalty to some association comes into conflict with his loyalty to the state is to take up an Athanasius attitude, "to undertake a ceaseless examination of its moral foundations" and to make his choice from moral and social consideration. In one word they deny the comprehensive and compulsive character of the state. If, for instance, the demand of state

run counter to the demand of, say, the church or the trade union or any other association, the individual need not blindly comply with the demands of state but should do so only if it appears to him that such compliance is socially beneficial and morally justifiable. It is, they hold, by releasing individuals and groups from the compulsive authority of state that they can be made to contribute most to social welfare which is the end of social organisation. Practically speaking it comes to this that they install sovereignty of the individual in the place of sovereignty of the state, for the final choice rests with the individuals. In doing so the pluralists inspite of their zeal for facing facts as they are, take a rather exaggerated view of the intellectual and moral capacities of the average citizen which is hardly warranted by actual experience. If such perfection as they obviously assume could be attributed to an average citizen then the *raison d'être* of the state as well as any form of social control would altogether vanish. This is exactly the position of the anarchists but the pluralists are not ready to go so far and accept the logical conclusion of their argument. They would retain the state for discharging a specific function—that of bringing about a social co-ordination although depriving it of the coercive authority necessary for satisfactorily performing the function. They would have the cake of social harmony without paying the price of organisation in the shape of authority.

It cannot, of course, be denied that man is a creature of competing loyalties and that associations are competing for enlisting the loyalties of individuals. It should at the same time be remembered that as the interest of all individuals and associations within the community do not always run parallel there is every likelihood of conflict and dead-lock. It would simply aggravate difficulties if in such crisis individuals are left to help themselves in the light of their reason and conscience. No two persons would possibly come to the same conclusion on the same question in the absence of any

uniform principle to guide them, with the result that there would be further strife and disorder. This clearly points to the need of an organisation for preventing such conflict as also adjusting them when they arise and if its decisions are at all to be effective in the present state of human civilization it must be given authority over all within the community. But to admit the indispensableness of such an organisation is not to ignore the usefulness of all other associations or to deny them free scope of self-expression within their proper sphere, not to declare the innate moral superiority and infallibility of the decisions of such an organisation, nor to deny the individual the moral right of questioning its decisions and even of disobeying it in an extreme case. The traditional theory of sovereignty of the state is not incompatible with any of these concessions. The thing is, we are here faced with two alternative methods of social organisation—one with a central organisation with co-ordinating authority among other groups and the custody of the common interests with organised coercion as one of its means of action, and the other with simply a number of functional or professional groups with voluntary membership, state being one of these with the functional of co-ordinating but lacking the coercive authority to enforce its decisions. Neither of these, of course, is, without its blemishes and can lay claim to perfection—no institution of human device ever can. So in making our choice between these we should be guided not so much by the feelings of each in particular cases as by their possibilities for good or evil of the community, in the aggregate. The question is not whether the command of the state is entitled to obedience even when it is, in some particular case, in clear conflict with all accepted standard of justice or social expediency. The fundamental question rather is—whether the organisation of society on the basis of one central organ with coercive authority to enforce its commands is *on the whole* more conducive to the ends of justice and social welfare than organisation on any other basis and if so, whether such an organisation

is possible where individuals and associations habitually claim the right to judge the validity of the decisions of that organ in the light of their own conception of what is right and proper. It is only under such an organisation that individuals and associations can hope to enjoy real freedom for self-expression or at least feel secure as to the degree of freedom they are entitled to, which it is the avowed purpose of the Pluralists to secure by releasing them from state control. The state may, of course, make errors and blunders or even perversely make unwarranted inroads on the proper spheres of associations and individuals but the attempt to devise safeguards or remedies against such evils will be easier and more likely to be successful under this system than in the other,—sources of danger being reduced to one only. It is not inconceivable so to organise the mechanism of state, within the frame-work of the traditional theory of sovereignty, as to make over the management of special interests to special groups through their expert knowledge, at the same time avoiding the conflicts resulting from uncontrolled authority of such groups. Thus the demands of the Pluralists may be satisfied within the frame-work of the traditional theory with organisation of the state on proper lines.

The Pluralist have however made valuable contributions to political thought in emphasizing the importance of social groups in the community, in drawing attention to the aspect of consent implied in the idea of sovereignty and the moral limitations on the exercise of sovereignty or in short in raising a timely protest against the rigid legalism of the Austinian theory. Pluralism has also served as a wholesome reaction against the idealisation and idolization of the state, against the dogma of the idealist-ethical school that the state is an end in itself having a code of morality of its own. But recognising all these valuable contributions of the Pluralists we need not repudiate the classical theory. As Gettel observes, "It is quite possible for the state to recognise moral obligations to limit the scope of its activities and to reorganize its internal organization along the lines of local

decentralization and representation of group interests without the loss of its ultimate legal sovereignty. In every independent society there must be a single organization of supreme legal control. Both a sound political theory and the actual facts of modern social life find this authority in the state. This does not mean that it need rest in a single or centralized organ nor in the particular form of governmental system that now exists."[9] Properly understood the traditional theory stands for unity amidst diversity and not for flat uniformity and it further states that real diversity is possible only on the basis of unity.

Conclusion

In conclusion it may be pointed out that some form of social control is indispensable for realising the highest ends of human civilisation for the highest development of personality of every individual. The controversy between the monist and the pluralists centres round the best method of organising social control for these purposes; the monists believe in centralisation while the pluralists in decentralisation. Both these points of view can be happily reconciled by giving due recognition to the federal character of society by a process of delegation of authority from certain convenient centres which are to be located within territorial units historically carved out by various social forces. Both history and reason bear testimony to the fact that order and harmony, so essential for progress are out of the question without a centre of authority within a community. Our present social organisation is based on the recognition of this fact which is embodied in the classical theory of sovereignty and we should not court a change in the present system unless we are perfectly convinced that it would be a change for the better so far as ends of human civilisation are concerned.

AKSHAYKUMAR GHOSHAL

[9] Gettel, History of Political Thought, p. 469.

RAINBOW OF LOVE

I.

Sigh of Love.

A song, all strange, descends on heart,
A grove, uncared and wild,
The song—the ray of earliest morn,
Of deepest dark the child.
In silence heart forgets herself,
The song's not sound but life.
The light of song makes all else dark
And sweetens bitterest stife.
The song makes all that's done undone
And all undone is done,
The seen unseen, the known unknown,
And death and life but one.
I swear I see the song is I,
Of will-formed Love, the joyous sigh.

II.

Pet of Love.

Ah! all I do, by thought is strung
In garland men call Time;
The garland ne'er begins nor ends
In discord nor in rhyme—
Of act and thought, Oh, make me free,
To live in love's eternity;
To live in love kills act and thought,
Though all be present all's forgot.

III.

Slave of Love.

I slave of self
For power and pelf.
My heart, plague-rotten,
Sweet love forgotten.
What hopest thou to gain?
Thy life is vain and vain.
Oh! slave of love thou be
And live in love, free, free.

IV.

Beauty in Love.

Can beauty be that I not love!
  Apart the twain ne'er be.
What magic makes love, beauty one
  For heart, not eye, to see!
O beauty thou art ne'er unloved
  Nor love unbeauty be.
Oh! beauty, love, the names but two—
  This is but Truth's master key
Beauty, Joy within, above,
  Call her beauty call her love.
Beauty, love must ever endure—
  Truth to mind, to life the cure.

V.

Life in Love.

The mother turns her angry face
Upon her wayward child.
His stream of tears in anguish'd cry
Sees her face sweet, mild.
O Love, thine angry face is turned
Upon the heart, hate-blind.
Repentant tears wash clean the heart
With joy of love to find,
O Love, thou ever mother be
To lull the heart to ecstacy.
Away from Thee may die all joy!
With heart turned Thee-ward, pain?—
sweet joy.

VI.

Death in Love.

Oh! let me never crave for life,
If life desires not me.
Oh! let me live uncounted years
To die in love heart free.
Love is not this life of breath
Love embraceth all in death.
Death in love? Its bare desire
Makes many one in cool love-fire.

VII.

Finale.

Oh! end this life, oh where art Thou?
Oh, Lord of love and life!
Oh kill me, kill me, in thyself
And end this life-love strife.

MOHINIMOHAN CHATTERJI

Reviews

The Industrial Efficiency of India—By Rajanikanta Das, M.Sc., Ph.D., published by P. S. King aud son, Ltd,, pp. 212, 1930.

It is often stated that "India is the eighth biggest industrial country in this world." There are others who persistently decry the old-fashioned and time-honoured methods of industrial organisation and equipment and opine that India's industrial efficiency is consequently very low. The information necessary for a comprehensive study of the industrial efficiency of the workers is arranged in this monograph. Though the different chapters are based on magazine contributions, the author has set forth the causes of our industrial inefficiency and suggests remedies for the same.

At the outset the author does not recognise that there is no distinct class of industrial labour as yet. Living on pure wages alone is a novelty except in big cities. Agriculturists and handicraftsmen abound in any number and many an employer finds it difficult to secure a *permanent and continuous* set of workers who settle down and break their connection with their ancestral land. No doubt, this has tended to remove the vital canker, *viz.*, industrial unemployment from our society. Industrial inefficiency is therefore the result of the peculiar system.

Lacking an efficient labour organisation no attention worth the name has been paid to the problem of securing efficiency on the part of the industrial workers. This stands in great contrast with the environmental conditions existing elsewhere and to institute a comparison under such conditions is totally odious. To say that India wastes two-third of her land, labour and capital resources and is only one-third efficient as other industrial countries has no definite and precise meaning. The institution of a Board of National Efficiency is the remedy suggested to conduct research experiments and bring about greater efficiency on the part of the different workers. The conservation of health, the development of physique, the rearing of A class people alone, real social regeneration tending to the uplift of individual character, business honesty, social equality, improvements in political organisation, the conducting of constructive research, the rationalising of the methods of industrial production including agriculture, the use of new technique of industrialisation in arts, crafts, and cottage industries, better organisation of capital

resources, and the development of enterprise on the part of the *entrepreneurs* would regenerate the industrial life of the country and the details of the Board of Efficiency are outlined in the final chapter.

With plentiful supply of raw materials and an immense potential internal market India is bound to forge ahead as a great industrial nation if the needed motive power and efficiency of her manual and intellectual workers are secured. Without first ensuring a permanent and trainable class of workers, the question of improving labour efficiency cannot be seriously thought of. In India there is "Labour, labour everywhere, nor any one to work." Educational improvements in home conditions, etc., of this trainable class would solve the problem. This is the crux of the problem. Without achieving this there is no meaning of improving the efficiency of the workers.

Even as regards the estimate of labourers' work (p. 50) we have seen estimates of Indian labourers' efficiency which compare very favourably with the Western workers in spite of all drawbacks and different methods of organisation. The following well-known statement gives a different view altogether: "The four looms and four weavers in Madras produce more per hour than the four looms and one woman weaver in Lancashire."

Another outrageous statement is the bland remark that "the revival of Khaddar might be said to be only a palliative measure for solving India's under-employment." He adds the significant remark that "patriotism based on uneconomic production cannot last long." The best solution for the country is to bring about a flourishing cotton mill industry and the charka production at the same time. Protection to khaddar can only be rendered in the shape of patriotism and in no other way. If that were to be done, it means success and the statement that "time devoted to the production of the khaddar might be utilised for the production of goods of much higher value" (p. 148) was perhaps written in a unguarded moment. The charka is meant for the rural folk and for the non-crop period of the year. There is no other secondary occupation, so cheap and economical as the khaddar industry. It is curious that he himself admits this on p. 193 of his book.

In spite of these apparent contradictions, the book is an eminently readable one and will be of more than ordinary value to all employers who can guide their activity on the lines chalked out by the author.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Bombay—To-day and To-morrow,—Edited by Clifford Maushardt and published by D. B. Taraporewala Sons & Co., Bombay.

The book contains a series of lectures delivered by eight eminent citizens of Bombay, each master in his own sphere of activity. The object in view is to bring into closer touch the different communities that live together in that big city, to show inter-relation of its various interests, to promote mutual understanding and to create an appreciation of the value of higher life and unity amongst its citizens.

Such a combination of masterly mind in a book form is undoubtedly a great achievement at a time when it is of supreme importance to create a better understanding amongst the heterogenous members of a big city.

The introduction from the supreme-head of the province, whose duty has been to study the activities of the city life in their various aspects, is in itself a great utility and novelty, specially so when it has come from the masterly pen of His Excellency Sir Frederick Sykes, well known for his great administrative qualifications.

The work on the whole is a very successful attempt to present to the Indian minds in general the utility of such a work. It will no doubt be appreciated if other cities, specially Calcutta, the great city of the British Empire, make an attempt on a similar line.

M. K. SHIRAZI

The Fight for Peace—By Devere Allen, Editor, The World Tomrrow (Published by The Macmillan Company, 1930).

This book is comprehensive, uncompromising and diversely useful as a literary contribution to the peace movement. The author draws heavily on other and earlier workers in the field, but he has brought tgether the materials of war and peace and of the persistent attacks upon the war system as has no other previous writer.

Mr. Allen finds a two-fold justification for his book: (1) the lack of any comprehensive guide for the pacifist efforts to reconstruct international relations; and (2) the urgency of discovering some way of blocking another world war which would destroy the race. The great majority of the historical literature from Herodotus to Shotwell has been devoted to wars and military activities. Pacifism has a long and honorable history which has gone all but unchronicled. Professor M. E. Curti was the first American historian to consider American pacifism a worthy subject for

serious historical research and his book on early American peace efforts is barely dry from the presses. Mr. Allen gives us the whole literature of the field canvassed, intelligently selected, well digested, and presented in a logical, convincing fashion.

This book by Devere Allen deserves to rank with the contributions of such writers as Henry George, the Webbs, Devine, Thomas Mott Osborne, Havelock Ellis and other leaders in the campaign for human progress and civic decency.

While the historical background of the problem of peace is amply set forth, it is introduced primarily to give perspective and clarity to the analysis of current issues. The author comes to grips at all points with the knotty problems that face the world in the year 1930.

One of the best chapters in the book is that in which the author puts the quietus on the perennial argument that it is hopeless to try to end war because man is by nature bellicose and that human nature will always defeat the pacifist.

Especially wholesome is the direct and implied rebuke to some of the more recent and flossy internationalists who contemptuously high-hat the traditional pacifism and place all their eggs in the single basket of legal rules and prohibitions. Yet Mr. Allen does not deny the necessity of new techniques in the pacifist campaign against war. So he discusses such new developments as the general strike against war, Gandhi's non-violent non-co-operation and the like.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

Canal Irrigation in the Punjab—By PaulW. Paustian, Colombia University Press, Now York, 1930, pp. 175, price 3Dollars.

Dr. Paustian has brought a vast amount of knowledge to bear upon this economic enquiry concerning the effects of canal irrigation on the people of the Punjab. Four years' stay in the province has enabled the author to make a first-hand study of the economic and social conditions of the people of the canal colonies of the province. Besides being a detailed historical survey of the canal irrigation policy from 1847 to 1927, the financial and economic implications of the policy are carefully considered. Part One, being purely a historical sketch (where undue prominence is attached to the British initiative) can be glossed over by the general reader. An area, of roughly 11,157,624 acres has been reclaimed from the desert as a result of the beneficient service of canal irrigation. How the early obstacles, such as salt silting, have been overcome by the Engineers are also referred to in this part.

It is part Two, consisting of VII chapters that concerns itself with the effects of irrigation on the density and distribution of population in the province. The main effect of the policy was to increase the area available for cultivation and as the corresponding growth of population was slower it led to the building up of the basis of economic prosperity of the canal colonies. He is careful enough to recognise that the pressure of the population on the soil will be felt in the near future. The real solution of the population problem would have to be reached some day or other and the irrigation policy can only be looked upon as a mere passing benefit and not a permanent remedy for the population problem. Due to the traditional methods employed the yield per acre is not so high as one would expect from an irrigated area. Lack of fertilisation of the fields by new manures the paucity of modern agricultural implements and the relatively small holdings are responsible for the low output. The last chapter speaks of the specific forms of revenue arising out of the irrigation policy and the profits arising out of the irrigation schemes.

While the capital cost of canal construction in the province amounted to Rs. 32,16,47,494 the return from the Irrigation Department yielded a net surplus over and above the operating and maintaining expenses of the canals (no less than Rs. 58,27,01,089) *i.e.*, Rs. 26,00,53,595 over and above capital costs, interest charges and operating expenses. It would have been more interesting if the author had discussed the necessity of a dual extension of railways and irrigation which would undoubtedly have heightened the gains to the population. The author frankly admits that the charges are indeed high when compared with the standard of living of the people but he attempts to find an apology, as it were, for this policy in mentioning the indirect benefits accruing to the people in the growth of cities and towns providing employment to the people and enlarging the sources of taxable income—a welcome benefit to the Government at the same time.

While the general interpretation of this important study is conceived and executed in a scientific manner still the oft-repeated attempts to justify the rule of the alien people smack more of a missionary zeal rather than that of the judgment of an impartial student of economics. The following apologetic statement would prove our remark. "It is thus probable that the cost of irrigation to the people of the Punjab is not unreasonably high if the very profitableness of the irrigation schemes will perpetuate the Pax Brittanica for the future." Throughout the object seems to be to preach to the people about the necessity of continuing to co-operate with the British in the economic development of our potential

resources. Every intelligent student of Indian economics realises the necessity to co-operate with Western Science, initiative, capital and engineering skill to increase the economic progress of the country.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

The Open Door and the Mandates System—By Benjamin Gerig, with a foreword by W. E. Rappard—Member of the Permanent Mandates Commission—published by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. pp. 236.

Colonialism and Preferential Tariff have been fruitful sources of war as the industrial nations tend to covet the self-same areas for the sake of raw materials. If all colonies, like the mandatory areas, are open to all nationalities and if exclusive ' spheres of influence " " financial protectorates " and " special interests " are cast aside, the way to lasting and permanent peace tends to become established. No nation must attempt to become economically self-sufficient for an attempt to do so leads to war and the cessation of commercial hostilities is essential for international peace. Recognising the whole world as one economic unit this economic interdependence has to be recognised. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the great thinker, truly asserts that " mankind is a great partnership and the aim of all nations should be to act fairly for the welfare of its neighbours."

A co-operative economic federation of free states and mankind is needed instead of the present aggressive nations and the intensely patriotic citizen who soon becomes lashed to fury or rage when he hears of an insult to his flag or his co-citizen. A carrying out of this policy means that Great Britain must give up Imperial Preference and throw open her colonies to the other nations. So also France and the other colony holding powers must follow suit. The inter-nationalising of territories, as was first attempted in China in 1900, under the world-famous doctrine known as the Hay doctrine has been rightly extended to the new mandatory areas by the League of Nations. Freedom, equality and equity in economic relations, rights and opportunities for all nations in the mandatory areas undoubtedly constitute the natural and necessary basis of international harmony, security and peace. This can be secured only out of moral education and a prompt realisation of the fact that " God and Nature have not given these countries to certain nations alone." They are entrusted to them for the common benefit of the whole mankind. The permanent Mandates Commission seeks indeed to achieve the impossible feat of one

nation imposing its own economic organisation, administrative policy and cultural outfit over another nation or people.

A lucid historical and descriptive statement of the early colonial history and the slow evolution of the doctrine of the open door otherwise known as economic equality in the matter of concessions, land tenures, mining rights, fiscal regime and customs regulations is given out in the first part of the book (pp. 1 to 106). The mandates system first originated by President Woodrow Wilson in the fifth of his famous fourteen points, assumed a legal shape under the authority of the League of Nations. Though much cannot be said of the success of this new device of solving a somewhat old economic problem, yet the machinery and procedure of the Permanent Mandates Commission are admirably conceived and being loyally executed. Mandatory administration, specially the development of the territorial settlements in the interest and benefits of the population concerned undoubtedly needs great improvement but precedents have already become so very many that an "international mandatory law is slowly evolving though it is in an incipient stage now. These undoubtedly tend to influence the administration of colonies by the Empire Countries and the "new trusteeship" idea which is being so enthusiastically taught by economists and being partially carried into effect by the Mandatory powers is bound to drive out the last vestiges of old imperialism.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Vedanta or The Science of Reality.—By K. A. Krishna Swami Aiyar, B.A., with a foreword by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan;—Published by Ganesh and Co., Madras. *Price Rs. 10 only.*

It is a work of great erudition and research. It is undoubtedly one of the most important works upon the subject which has yet been written in the English language. It reflects great credit on the industry and deep thought of the author. It is divided into 25 chapters of closely written matter and it is not possible in a short notice to give an adequate account. The most salient points are here noticed.

Waking, dream and sleep—these three states taken into consideration would enable us to obtain the true nature of Life. We should not, as we usually do, subordinate the states of dream and sleep to the waking states. People regard the world as something permanent extending to the past and future, and Life, as of a few years. But in Vedanta, the

world is connected with our waking; it is not independent of waking consciousness,—it comes and goes with our waking. We should not cut it off from our waking and not to be presented as *an entity by itself* for our contemplation. We perceive the world with our sense organ, but dream and sleep we cannot perceive—we know them by intuition immediately; they are subsequently thrown into the forms of our Intellect. These are three independent states distinct from one another—Pure consciousness is the *witness* of them all and their basis or substratum.

The pure consciousness retains its integrity yet manifests as Ego and Non-Ego. In the waking and dream states, it also retains its purity. Thus, no world can exist apart from Pure Consciousness and intellectual separation would make it unreal. The Ego and Non-Ego are correlatives in the two states, but dissolve in sleep into undifferentiated unity from which they originate ; and hence pure consciousness is all reality—सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म . The pure consciousness is not therefore static, for it means persistence unchanged in time, but pure consciousness is behind time. It creates forms without forfeiting any power, which is infinite. It freely creates and in associatian with Māyā (माया) it is clothed with attributes, *i.e.*, we do not know how it creates—how transcendental becomes empirical. Manifestation of world is preceded by metaphysical process beyond human understanding. The term *Māyā* signifies this.

That something persists unchanged in the midst of changing states involves the idea of time, hence as pure consciousness in sleep transcends time-series, it cannot be said either as changed or unchanged. Dream and waking both contain Ego and Non-ego—subject and object. It is a fact in Life that the supra-empirical entity—Pure consciousness—retains its integrity and yet seems as the basis of manifestation,—although to intellect the same thing cannot be conceived as possessed of two contradictory nature—changing and changeless.

The world perceived in waking is confined to that state and must not be severed from it. It should not be taken as existing independently from the perceiving mind. Does it persist when we sleep? Can we perceive it in any other state? Hence the world and waking state go together and come together. Did the world exist before living beings came into it—before any one perceiving it? Its reply is—it is due to *memory* which thinks the world as identical with the world of pre-sleep. But memory is unreliable. It is of past and we have dead representation only—not the world exactly faithful to the original.

We ought not to restrict ourselves to any of the three states, otherwise only a partial view of the reality would be obtained and not the

whole view, for which we are to view one state *in* the other states. When this is done, the reality which manifests itself without losing its integrity may be known which is a combination of subject and object; for the whole idea cannot be arrived at without combining subject and object.

In the view of one state only, the subject is the self and its object is the state and hence combination is not possible here. This is also the case when the object is regarded as independent existence from the perceiving subject which is unreal, for the world apart from the perceiving mind is unreal. Hence our view must be extended to the dream and sleep also and should not be restricted to the waking alone. This way we would obtain the view of the whole reality. When I say that I dreamt, I identify myself with dream-soul and appropriate all that I beheld in dream. But I am awake, I am altogether a different individual. Hence the point of indentity is a deeper element—the Brahma that underlies both. When I remember now a past dream that I had, the two I's are identified although they are altogether different. The point of identity is reached by laying aside all the differentia between the dreaming and the waking individuals, till only P. C. remained. Thus we would escape splitting up reality, and taking the world as real or unreal and each is therefore metaphysically equated to each. Each of these being self-contained expression of reality, we have the whole of reality before us. For, the world is as real as the mind as long as that state lasts. When the state disappears, the soul moves to the next state and finds a new world. Each of the waking and dreaming states being an aspect of reality, the reality is fully presented in each. In dream, we find a new body, new sense than those of waking state, and hence the self is independent of that body, etc. Reality ceases to be reality taken piece-meal.

Māyā presents to human mind reality broken up into subject and object. Māyā veils the Reality from us by presenting a world of plurality, but it has given us also a mind by culture of which we may transcend its limits. Causality is restricted to waking as a manifestation, in which we cannot overstep its limit which is a faculty of division, multiplicity. But there is intuition—which is another shape of reality. By this we realise the oneness of all existence, though intellect to which it is presented becomes subject to laws of causality. World is not independent of the reality and hence it is essentially *identical* with it. Reality has the power to assume a differentiated form of world without undergoing modification. This is *Māyā*. It presents to human mind Reality broken into subject and object and into plurality of world.

The empirical nature is adapted to the forms of our intellect—time, space, causality. They are meant for each other. The conclusion of the author is thus expressed: "The world of relations is real and objects within it react upon each other; but compared with the transcendental reality, which it essentially is, it is as if it were not. Progress is unendingly possible in the imperfect state which alone can admit of it, while from the higher point of view it is unmeaning."

More than 150 pages of the book is devoted to a criticism of points from Western Philosophy bearing on Vedanta. The criticism of Hegel is most effective, and the author passes in review almost all the Western philosophical systems and we recommend this portion of the work particularly to the attention of our students and teachers as well, and it will, we doubt not, repay a very careful study. Very few writers could, we think, have handled such problems with so much conspicuous ability. We offer our hearty welcome to this fine work and we only regret that we are handicapped for want of space from doing full justice to the subjects treated in the work with so much enthusiasm and such deep penetration. The Introduction appended to the book is a very pleasing reading and the observations embodied therein are thought-provoking.

K. SASTRI

Vedanta-Syamantaka of Radhadamodara—Edited with an introduction and notes by Prof. Umeshchandra Bhattacharyya, M.A., B.L., of the Dacca University. Published from the Punjab Sanskrit Book Depôt.

It is a well-known treatise belonging to the Bengal Vaishnava School of Vedanta. Visnu represents in the work Brahman of the Vedantists and it possesses, inseparable from it, its creative power looked upon as Vishnu's consort, from which this world has come out. The editor of the book has with great ability given us an idea of its philosophy—subdividing the topics into six chapters which successively deal with the *Pramanas* of which the author admits only three, including the rest of the Pramanas in one or other of those three enumerated and explained by him. The source of knowledge of the ultimate truth is the *Sruti*, as both the perception and inference are liable to error and uncertainty. But adhering to *Sruti* and admitting it to be the principal source of knowledge, the author of the *Syamantaka* quotes *Puranas* to establish the idea of the form of Visnu. The *Prameyas* are five and they are—Iswara, Jiva, Prakriti Kala and Karma. Iswara or Hari is the highest personal being possessing attributes—knowledge and bliss, Hari has got a form, but this

form is of the same essence as consciousness. His form or body is therefore not material. He has infinite number of attributes and cannot be qualified by these; He is thus an undifferentiated unity. The author holds like the Madhvites, the theory of *Visesha*. By means of this *Visesha*, the attributes of Vishnu are inseparable and yet are distinguishable in thought. His consort is His Power—distinguishable as ह्लादिनी and संवित् शक्ति—and yet not different from each other. They are the same and yet not the same. From this peculiar fact, the whole philosophical theory has taken the name of अचिन्त्य-भेदाभेद-वाद. The Highest Reality is looked upon as agent and enjoyer (कर्त्ता and भोक्ता). Purusha is therefere not, like the Sankhya idea, an inactive principle. The individual souls are regarded as अणु—atomic, yet they are indivisible consciousness which constitute their eternal attribute. They are the parts (अंश) of the Highest being. Even in Mukti, the distinction between the Jiva and Iswara will stand; they are similar in nature, not identical. Jiva, the author holds, is not different from Brahman. The non-difference cannot, he argues, be either different from. or identical with, Brahman. The world is real in the author's view. He refutes the Adhyasa-vada of the Adwaitins. The evolutes of Prakriti are not essentially different from the latter. The collection and the units constituting it are not fundamentally different. Thus none of the evolutes are realities other than their common matrix—Prakriti. Thus also, the effects are not different from their cause of which the former are mere states. But the Prakriti being one of the powers belonging to God, it differs in this respect from the Sankhya Prakriti which is an independent reality. Our Karma can be removed by knowledge; *bhakti*, in the view of the author, is a form of knowledge.

The book has been neatly got up with different readings noted at the foot of each page. The types used are distinct and clear. Evidently the editor has spared no pains to make the book a readable, handy, little volume, beautifully bound.

K. SASTRI

Ourselves

The Late Dr. M. N. Banerjee, C.I.E.

In the death, on the 15th of January, 1931, at the age of 75, of Dr. M. N. Banerjee, C.I.E., B.A., M.R.C.S. (London), Principal of Carmichael Medical College, Calcutta, (from 1916 to 1922), and for two decades President of its Managing Committee, and a Fellow of the Calcutta University, who also ably served its Syndicate, Bengal has lost an educationist of great eminence and the medical profession a leading physician of this city. The establishment of a non-official first-grade Medical College in Calcutta to the infinite benefit of Bengali students was largely due to the untiring efforts and sagacity of Dr. Banerjee whose services to the cause of suffering humanity were recognised by the Government and will be gratefully remembered by his countrymen. He did excellent work also as a member of the Calcutta Medical Club and the Indian Medical Association. We record our appreciation of his worth and deep sense of sorrow at his death.

* * *

Sir C. V. Raman.

In welcoming back in our midst our renowned colleague of the Science College, Calcutta University, after his return from his continental tour in connection with the award to him of the Nobel Prize, we sincerely offer the great Indian Scientist, Sir Chandrasekhar Venkata Raman, Kt., M.A., D.Sc., Ph.D., LL.D., F.R.S., N.L., our warmest congratulations and greetings. We are legitimately proud of his glorious achievements but more so of his intimate connection with the Post-Graduate Department of Science of the Calcutta University, of

which the prestige has been considerably raised by his wonderful researches in Physics. Sir C. V. Raman has in the course of his fairly extensive Western tour visited such important centres of learning as Stockholm, Copenhagen, Munich, Strausbourg, Paris, Glasgow, and became suitably honoured by the scientists of those places. His chief object was to make a special study in up-to-date laboratories and museums of highly organized scientific investigations and researches with a view to give Indian students of science the fullest opportunity of making the best use of their time and energy consecrated to the advancement of scientific knowledge. We wish him long life, perfect health, many more years of useful work in his own sphere of activity and an ever-increasing measure of success.

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Griffith Memorial Prize.

The Griffith Memorial Prize in Arts for 1929 has been awarded to the following four candidates :—

Mr. Sukumar Sen
,, Niharranjan Ray
,, Devaprasad Ghosh
,, Rakheshranjan Sarma.

* * *

Dates for the D. P. H. Examination.

The dates for the next D. P. H. Examination in Parts I and II have been fixed as follows :—

Part I...4th May, 1931.
Part II...18th May, 1931.

* * *

Honorary Degrees.

His Excellency the Chancellor confirms the recommendation made by the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate and supported by the Senate that Honorary Degrees be conferred upon the persons named below :—

Names	*Honorary Degrees*
Sir Rajendranath Mookerjee, K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., M.I.E.	Doctor of Science (Engineering).
Professor Herambachandra Maitra, M.A.	Doctor of Literature
Dr. Charles Albert Bentley, C.I.E., M.B., D.P.H., D.T.M. & H.	Doctor of Medicine

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B.Com. Examination.

Monday, the 11th May, 1931, has been fixed as the commencing date for the next B. Com. Examination.

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India Institute of Die Deutsche Akademie offers Twelve Stipends for Indian Students for the Academic Year of 1931-1932.

The India Institute of Die Deutsche Akademie herewith invites applications for the various stipends for Indian students at its disposal in the following German Universities for the academic year of 1931-1932 :

1. *Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen)* : One stipend in the Higher Technical School (Engineering College) of Aix-la-Chapelle in the shape of free tuition and free board.

2. *Hannover* : Two stipends in the Higher Technical School (Engineering College) of Hannover in the shape of free tuition for students of Engineering and one stipend of free tuition in the

Veterinary College of Hannover. All these Hannover[redacted] will further be supplemented by a small pocket allowanc[redacted]

3. *Hohenheim (near Stuttgart)* : One stipend at the Agricultural College of Hohenheim consisting of free tuition.

4. *Karlsruhe* : One stipend in the Higher Technical School (Engineering College), consisting of free tuition, free lodging and free board.

5. *Munich* : Three stipends in the University of Munich, in the shape of free tuition and free lodging, one for a student of Medicine, one for a student of Music or Art and one for a student of Physics. The candidate for the stipend for Music and Art has been already chosen. Two stipends in the Higher Technical School (Engineering College) of Munich in the shape of free tuition and free lodging, one for a student of Applied Chemistry and the other for a student of Engineering.

6. *Stuttgart* : One stipend in the Higher Technical School (Engineering College) for a student of Engineering, consisting of free tuition and free lodging.

These twelve stipends are tenable provisionally for one year only, covering the two academic semesters of the German Universities, the first of which will begin from the first week of October, 1931.

Only *graduates* of recognised Indian *Universities* are eligible to these stipends. Non-graduates will be given consideration, only if they have recognised literary or scientific achievements to their credit. Every application should be accompanied by *certificates of professors* under whose direction the applicant hitherto carried his studies. A working knowledge of German is very much wished for ; and other things being equal, the applicant with a working knowledge of German will be given preference.

No application will be given any consideration unless it is guaranteed by some eminent professor or an otherwise well

[redacted]rsonage that the applicant is really earnest about his [redacted]n and will actually come to Germany, *before the 1st [redacted]er, 1931*, if a stipend is offered to him.

All applications must reach the India Institute by the 1st of April, 1931. About the middle of April, 1931, a special committee of experts will choose the successful candidates who will be promptly informed of the decision.

All applications should be sent to the following address :

DR. FRANZ THIERFELDER,
Hon. Secretary,
India Institute of Die Deutsche Akademie,
Munich Residenz, Germany.

THE ROMANCE OF THE SEA

The Warship in Distress

Towards the close of the last century there was a good deal of friction between the United States and Spain.

It was alleged against the latter country that her administration of her few remaining colonies in the New World was as unsatisfactory as could well be; the colonists were in revolt, and they looked, not unnaturally, to the United States. Nor did they look in vain, though how far the U. S. A. would have intervened, but for the blowing up of the flag-ship "Maine," can only be conjectured. The "Maine" lay at anchor in Havana Harbour. It so happened that the revolt of the Spanish colonists was at its highest pitch in this island. On a February night, when all was dark, a tremendous explosion was heard in the town of Havana. Some said it was out at sea, others that one of the many earthquakes for which this part of the world is notorious had taken place. Actually the "Maine" had blown up and then sank, carrying with her some hundreds of American sailors.

How did that explosion come about? To the Americans there seemed but one answer. Though the Spanish indignantly denied it and do to this day—the Americans regarded the explosion as deliberately planned and carried out. War was declared, and, after a series of naval defeats, against a much superior enemy, the Spanish sued for peace.

The peace terms gave America virtual charge of the Philippines, Porto Rico and Cuba, though nominally the two latter islands are independent.

As years went by the "Maine" was found to be a menace in the harbour; in addition, there was a strong desire on the part of some of the citizens of the U. S. A. to discover, if possible, whether the blowing up of this fine battleship was